The data that’s most important to me is to watch the game. My best analytical tool is my eyes. I have the knowledge and experience that come from watching thousands of games, and any data I receive from my staff tends to complement that knowledge. That knowledge can also override the data. My job is to see all the data, sift through it and then decide which is relevant. I get my staff to watch the game and provide their own intuitive analysis. I ask them about the opposition, about their organization, recovery of the ball, speed of counter-attack, set plays – everything.
The importance of sifting this data, of not getting carried away with numbers just for the sake of numbers, cannot be overstated. At Chelsea an analyst came to me and said, ‘There are three players, Salomon Kalou, Joe Cole and Nicolas Anelka, and when they play together, they run more than one thousand metres without the ball in a sprint. There is a direct correlation with this and winning the game.’ ‘Great,’ I said, ‘and where do you suggest we put Drogba?’
The important data is that Ronaldo scores sixty goals in sixty games. This means that, on average, he scores one goal a game – which usually means that when Ronaldo plays you win. Even before the game starts, you’re already winning 1–0. The technical data we need to worry about is where these goals originate. If the opposition works this out then we have to react, but the great thing about Ronaldo is that, even if you know what is coming, it is difficult to stop. It’s the Lombardi rule. Legendary American football coach Vince Lombardi had fewer plays than other teams and he didn’t mind if the others knew what they were. His idea was simply to be as close to perfect as possible on the key plays so that whatever the opposition did, they could not stop them.
Mind Games
The psychological aspect is one of the least exploited in football. The media often like to talk about mind games and psychological ‘warfare’ that managers might use, to try to influence players and referees, but I am not interested. I am known for not participating in these kinds of tactics and I take pride in behaving respectfully with my players, the club and myself. It is not my style to defame opponents or referees in pursuit of a psychological gain. I fight with my team on the pitch, nowhere else.
I am, however, very interested in using psychology for the good of my players and the team. In my experience we have a lot of knowledge about the physical aspects, but not about the mind. I had a psychologist on the staff at both Chelsea and Milan, but not at Madrid. This aspect of the game is extremely interesting and useful, but one reason it is not widely practised is because the players are resistant. They think it’s too personal – too much like going to see a psychiatrist.
In one sense we have always worked on the psychology as much as the physical, just without the science. Every day as a manager you have something psychological to deal with. Keeping players happy, keeping them motivated – it’s all psychological. At Madrid I had Marcelo come to tell me that he wanted to play every game. If I did not make this happen then he would go to the president and ask to leave the club. I said, ‘Listen, now is not the moment because the market is closed, so you have to stay here until the end of the season.’ He was an experienced player – not old, but experienced – and he was frustrated because he hadn’t played in the previous game. Not because he was dropped, but just to rest him.
This is an example of how, when trying to keep your players motivated, you must communicate well with them. There was no reason for him to be alarmed, and with a lack of clear communication he could have thought that it was the club that was not happy with him. I told him, ‘When you don’t play it can be for two reasons. The first reason is because you played badly and the second reason to give to you a rest. For you, it is the second reason, because I don’t want to kill you. I want you to be fresh for the next match. You are too important to have you tired out in this match – so rest.’
Every day there are these psychological issues. They are small to me, but huge for the player. It is also important that my staff understand the issues and that we have the same type of communication with each individual. We must try to help that player understand because we can’t always change the situation – sometimes they are just playing badly.
If we look at the game itself, then we can see the importance of psychology. Taking a penalty when you are winning 5–0 with one minute left in the game is different from taking a penalty in the shootout of the final of the World Cup with 100,000 in the stadium and 2 billion watching on TV. At the 1994 World Cup, where I was working as assistant to Italy manager Arrigo Sacchi, we reached the final, against Brazil, which was settled with a penalty shootout. ‘Surely it’s impossible for Franco Baresi and Roberto Baggio to miss the goal?’ I thought. But not only did they miss the goal, we’re still looking for the ball that Baresi hit. It’s all in the mind.
During that tournament, Sacchi wanted technical data for the match for the first time. I had guys with computers sitting with me all the time, saying things like ‘this many passes for Baggio’ or ‘Demetrio Albertini’s movement without the ball is this’ – blah, blah, blah, all the time. We were a goal down and it was late in the game against Nigeria in the first knockout round when I had to put a stop to it and shouted, ‘Close the computers and concentrate on what’s going on in front of us! If we lose against Nigeria we will not be allowed home again – they will kill us.’ We scored a late goal and went on to win 2–1 in extra time. After the match Sacchi asked to see the statistics and I said, ‘Of course, but we don’t have the whole match – I was more worried about going home early than the statistics.’
He said to me, ‘No, no, no – I need ninety minutes, plus the extra time, of course.’ So I went upstairs with a video, made an analysis of the rest of the match and Sacchi was happy. But don’t tell me statistics won that match for us – the key to winning the game was casting aside the distractions and concentrating on the severity of the situation. It was the psychology, again.
We need to work more on this and we need help from professionals. The players must understand that it is help, not criticism. For example, neuroscientists are looking at ways of improving the identification of talented individuals – that could be another way to help us. Any edge that we can gain is an edge that can keep us winning … and keep us in a job.
DATA: THE QUIET WAY
Don’t try to play ‘mind games’. Focus on what’s important: results.
Your most important analytical tools are your eyes and your brain. Draw on your experience and don’t get distracted.
Equally, don’t be afraid of data and analytics – embrace new developments and any edge they can give you.
Create a place at the table for analytics to thrive. Don’t treat the theme and person(s) as a ‘nice to have’ feature. Give it credibility but in return you need them to fully understand the sole reason they are there: to help us to win.
Embrace data but as a leader your role is to translate it into insight and then be the point person for delivering it to the talent. The leader has the ‘emotional credits’ with the talent to make the data insights fly on the battlefield.
Psychology is crucial. The mindset of your colleagues and teams will drive your success. Give people confidence to be themselves.
Clear communication is vital, especially to explain tough decisions.
In Their Own Words … The Opponents
Roberto Martínez on Carlo
Let me tell you a story about Carlo which shows the kind of guy he is. My wife drove down to Stamford Bridge one day to watch a game and she parked in the car park underneath the stadium. When she tried to start the car after the game, she had the oil warning light come up. As she opened the bonnet to check the oil, a guy came up to her and said, ‘Excuse me, have you got a problem?’ It was Carlo – I think he was chilling out a bit in the car park – and, in his full Chelsea suit, he rolled up his sleeves and refilled the oil for my wife. He didn’t know who she was – he would have done it for anybody. He did that straight after a game, just being himself, he
lping someone, and I think he manages that way. He tries to help people, to understand them, and he gets the best out of them in the dressing room. There’s no secret as to why he’s been so successful in high-pressure situations with the big expectations and the big players – it’s down to that.
I was managing Wigan when I came up against Carlo in the Premier League. Everybody was saying how much he had changed the Chelsea mentality and so, of course, I was very pleased that we managed to beat them 3–1 and give Carlo his first defeat in the Premier League. From my point of view, what I immediately thought of the man was, ‘Here is a real gentleman.’ He struck me as someone with incredible human values, and then you see that he manages that way as well. He puts players with big egos and big personalities into a system, which is the hardest thing to do, and manages to give it a bit of normality.
The other thing I noticed was that, as the game progressed and we scored more goals, he never lost the rag – never lost his composure. I remember that Ray Wilkins, his assistant, was telling him, ‘We need to throw John Terry into the box like an extra striker,’ and Ancelotti just said, ‘Whoa, whoa. We don’t do that. We need to be patient and play our way out of this.’ Whether he was correct or not wasn’t the point; he was under massive pressure but you could see that he was in control and he could make a decision.
Every time we played against him I always found real admiration for such a high-profile manager who was also an old-fashioned manager; he was managing big individuals, trying to understand both the player and the human being, trying to get the best out of them and get the quality in a group. After that first defeat there were little ups and downs and you could see that he always controlled the dynamics in the group, always understood the players and found the right solutions. That was him: never pretending to be someone else, always being himself.
Ancelotti is very clever tactically. In that first game we played, he had the Christmas tree formation, 4-3-2-1, from his time at Milan, and that was something we had to try to break down. I think we surprised Ancelotti in that game. However, in the last game of that season, we had already achieved survival in the Premier League and were playing for nothing – the players already had their suitcases packed in the dressing room. Obviously we were trying to win the game, but the Chelsea players had complete focus as they had to win to be crowned champions, and they did so convincingly.
When we played at Stamford Bridge in his second season, he showed the way that he thinks about the game. We were trying to take advantage of a specific player and he spotted this straight away. We were the better side in the first half, but he changed things, taking John Obi Mikel off and making things very difficult for us, and we ended up losing a tight match. That showed he could read the game well – his tactical disposition was very important.
One of the criticisms that he comes under – I know this happened in Madrid, but also to a certain extent at Paris Saint-Germain and even at Chelsea – is that because he has such a good relationship with the players it can get soft. One of the things he says himself is that he sometimes gets ‘lazy’, but what he means by this is that he can be too patient – you know, hang on, just that little bit longer. I know exactly that type of relationship. When you trust a player, you accept them making a mistake or their form dropping – you just want to create a bond where you’re going to get them back to their level.
But every manager has a different style. Ultimately, everyone is going to judge a manager on results. In football a dangerous kind of logic can creep in. What happens is that if you lose and you’re seen as soft, that’s pinpointed as the reason why you are losing. If you lose and you’re seen as a dictator, that’s the reason why you are losing. But if you win and you’re soft, that’s the reason you’re winning.
You could say that Real Madrid in December 2014 under Ancelotti were at the best level a Madrid team has ever been; twenty-two wins in a row and then, suddenly, down – but only for a short time. They had another great run but it was too late; Barça had closed the gap and the damage was done.
They got too good and they didn’t know where to go next – you can see that the group is still suffering from that – and I don’t think that’s because of the manager; it’s because of the players. Sometimes you get to a point where you wonder, ‘How can I get them stimulated again?’ Sometimes it just doesn’t work out.
Obviously, when you make a decision it could be right or wrong. You cannot look back at the end of the season and say, ‘Oh, I should have done this, I should have done that,’ that’s very easy. He’s always been, or at least he gives me the impression that he’s always been, consistent and original with his decisions. When you look at his results over all the teams he’s managed across many countries, you have to say that the way he manages is the right way for him, because he has been so successful.
When I look at Carlo I see a real gentleman – he’s super-respectful and he doesn’t pretend to be someone that he’s not, which in the modern game is difficult. Add to that the fact that he clearly has a winning formula. Whatever he does, he gets teams working together, playing together and winning together. Trust me, Paris Saint-Germain is as difficult a first team as you’re going to get and he got them playing in a difficult 4-4-2 formation; he goes to Real Madrid, he gets them winning; he gets to Chelsea, they win the double. It’s very easy to say that he’s a bit soft or that his management style is wrong, but that’s not what the numbers say.
I think that Carlo found his spiritual home at Milan, and to a certain extent he is looking for a similar adventure. He wanted it to be in Paris, but that didn’t work out. I don’t think it’s going to be easy for managers in the future to have a long tenure, not least because they won’t be managers, they will be head coaches and they will be more easily removed. Being a head coach is very different from being a manager. As a manager you can plan the next five years, the next ten years – build the club, play young players – and you can get stimulation and enjoyment from seeing it develop. That’s a long-term ambition. It seems to me that Carlo could have stayed at any of his clubs for much longer and he would have had as much long-term success as he did at Milan.
Just as a player needs to find their highest level, so a manager needs to have constant stimulation. You wouldn’t last more than three years unless there was something else to achieve, and sometimes as a manager, if you haven’t got a link with a football club, it’s very difficult to build one. It’s very rare what Arsène Wenger has done at Arsenal. He’s constantly finding means of stimulation: building a new stadium, winning the Premier League, winning the FA Cup, getting into the Champions League, constantly creating his own challenges.
As a head coach you’re always only thirty minutes away from losing your job – there’s no more security. As a manager, however, you can have a five-year, a ten-year plan. When I was with Dave Whelan at Wigan, the last thing he would be worried about each weekend was the result, because he had a long-term philosophy. It’s the same with my chairman now at Everton, Bill Kenwright. We’re looking at Ross Barkley, John Stones, Brendan Galloway – players of nineteen, twenty, twenty-one years old – and we’re looking at them to hit full potential. It’s long term – that only happens with managers. You cannot do that sort of strategy with a head coach. When Carlo went to Madrid, he had to beat Barcelona or he had to win the Champions League – or even better, both. That’s a short-term strategy.
Carlo knew he was one goal away from the sack because if they don’t win the Champions League, he’s gone, in one season. Some managers lost their job after winning their domestic league – Fabio Capello, Vicente del Bosque. That’s how impossible longevity is in a job like that. That’s why Carlo’s relationships at Milan were so important. He was there as a player – he’s an icon there.
In fact, Carlo can look at any player and say, ‘Look, I used to do that ten times better than you,’ and there’s no way back for the player. People in England don’t remember what a great player he was. He was a cent
ral part of that glorious Milan team with the Dutch players, which was the best for three or four seasons.
In the top leagues in Europe, the only way of working for the long term is with a manager, and clubs like Chelsea don’t have that role; they’ve got a director of football and other people upstairs assembling the squad. I think you need to be in control of building the squad and working with finances and planning things and have some sort of vision and strategy in order to have a long-term future with a club. It’s chicken and egg. Carlo is one of the few to have had both a long-term job, at Milan, and the more modern two- to three-year tenures on his CV. He may well be unique.
Part Three
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LEARNING TO LEAD
Chris Brady
Leaders do not emerge fully formed from the womb with all the skills needed to take on the world. Every experience along the road to their eventual success, or failure, adds to the person the world sees when the mantle of leadership is assumed. Key learning experiences begin early, and for all of us these experiences are predominantly ‘informal’, in that they do not occur in a traditional educational setting. For someone immersed in the bubble of world football, it is especially relevant. Unlike in North America, where sporting development tends to take place in the universities, international football brings children into the bubble at a very early age and formal education is not the highest priority in the minds of the clubs. For them, it is about grooming a future asset.
Quiet Leadership: Winning Hearts, Minds and Matches Page 18