by Reese Erlich
The world changed in the 1990s. Under the guise of preparing for two states, Israel created militarized structures that functioned as border crossings between countries, except Israeli soldiers had total control of the border. Combined with the separation wall that cuts the West Bank off from Israel, Palestinians became trapped in an area designated by Israel, not the result of swapping land for peace. Israeli officials claimed these procedures protected the country from terrorism, but they served only to anger Palestinians and make reaching a peace agreement more difficult.
During a recent trip I drove on a modern four-lane highway from West Jerusalem, past Israeli housing in East Jerusalem, and then dropped off onto a side street that took me to the crossing point. It was traveling from the first to the third world. On the outskirts of the Kalandia checkpoint, dusty lots held a few cars, and there seemed to be no parking rules.
I didn't know where to cross, so I began walking toward some Israeli soldiers. One advanced menacingly toward me, motioning me away. I asked politely in English where I should enter. His mood suddenly brightened, and in excellent English, he pointed to a turnstile. As a foreigner I'm permitted to visit the West Bank. Israeli citizens are not allowed.
Once in the West Bank town of Kalandia, I was welcomed by a vibrant, third-world cacophony. Taxis gunned their engines and seemed to honk their horns in syncopation. The smell of hot olive oil and baking baklava filled the air. Pedestrians had no right of way in front of insistent drivers.
Taxi drivers quickly surrounded me, offering the best deal for the thirty-minute drive to Ramallah. At least, they assured me it was the best deal. I came to interview Hannan Ashrawi, a former spokesperson for the Palestinian peace negotiators, human-rights-group founder, and a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization executive committee.
I've interviewed Ashrawi numerous times because she's intelligent and capable of giving a straight answer in flawless English. She doesn't always give a straight answer, but at least I know it's not a communication problem. Ashrawi has aged, as have we all. She sat calmly behind her desk at the PLO headquarters and asked if the interview was for print or radio. For broadcast interviews, she would give short sound bites. For print, she would provide more elaboration. I was filing for both print and radio, I explained, causing momentary confusion. “Give me the long version,” I said.
Ashrawi acknowledged that the Syrian uprising remained a controversial question. In general, Palestinians sympathized with people overthrowing dictators, she said, in part because the United States and Israel have a long history of allying with such men. “The United States has been dealing with dictators for years,” she said. “Dealing with dictators is much easier. All you have to do is convince the big man, and generally, they are men.”33
Ashrawi said Palestinian leaders in the West Bank are neutral. “We have Palestinians in every neighboring country that are vulnerable. Any side you take, the Palestinians will pay the price. We are in principle on the side of the people…and of course on the side of human rights, democracy, and rule of law. All we know is that violence won't solve anything.”
Fatah is one of the two major parties in Palestine and the main force in the PLO. Fatah and the Palestinian movement had frequent conflicts with the Assads. In 1976, when Syria was backing the Christian right wing in Lebanon, Syrian troops helped lay siege to the Tel Al-Zaatar refugee camp, resulting in the death of an estimated three thousand Palestinians. Hafez al-Assad tried to take over the PLO and install his own man to replace Yasser Arafat in the 1980s (see chapter 4). “There's a long history of problems between Fatah and Assad,” Ashrawi told me. “I remember when Fatah fighters and revolutionaries were in Syrian jails. But you're not supposed to hold a grudge.”
Palestinians were extremely optimistic when the Arab Spring began, according to Ashrawi. “It was a transformational process. It was the will of the young, the reformers, the women, and civil society. We believed it was a defining moment in the history of the Arab world.”
Mustafa Barghouti agreed. He told me Palestinians enthusiastically supported the Arab Spring for the same reason Israeli leaders opposed it. Genuinely popular Arab governments would support the Palestinians and refuse to make backroom deals with Israel. “We thought these movements will improve the Palestinian situation because the public in general is very supportive. If the public has the right to direct the policy, then this will be a stronger solidarity with Palestine.”34
But Palestinians faced disappointments when the Arab Spring in Egypt and Libya turned to a frigid winter. Ashrawi said in some cases, the polarization between the old, corrupt regime and political Islam “led to the exclusion of the forces of reform and democratization that should have taken over. In other cases,” she said, referring to Egypt, “the people who did rebel and bring down the regime mobilized in cyberspace but couldn't organize on the ground to bring out the vote.”35
In the case of Syria, Palestinians thought Assad would be overthrown quickly, Ashrawi said. “People underestimated that the control of the Assad regime is powerful, not just the apparatus of government but also the private sector and others…. It's not just the Alawites.” Ashrawi remained optimistic about the possibility of progressive change in the Arab world. “By definition transitions are painful, unpredictable, quite often destabilizing. We are still in this period of transition. The cost is exorbitant in human lives particularly in Syria. It's still in a state of flux.”
Getting to Gaza wasn't easy. The Israelis strictly controlled their border, and for many years the Egyptian authorities made it impossible for journalists to enter from their side. That changed for a brief time in 2011. The people had overthrown the Mubarak regime and wanted greater support for the Palestinian cause. Border restrictions eased. That's when I entered Gaza.
I made arrangements through the Egyptian press office in Cairo. At that time no visa was required to enter Gaza. Anyone crazy enough to visit Gaza was apparently welcome. I hired a car and driver and we set out for the five-hour drive from Cairo to the Rafah border crossing. We jumped in the car, buckled our seatbelts, and couldn't leave the parking space for five minutes because the Cairo traffic was so thick.
We started late and got caught in Cairo's morning rush hour. Of course, it's always rush hour in Cairo. This was just worse. Once we got past the airport and onto a four-lane highway, the driver zoomed past cars at about eighty miles per hour. I liked the Cairo congestion better.
The Sinai is lots of desert—and flies. Moses and the Jews wandered here for forty years after outfoxing the pharaoh. I didn't fault them for getting lost. The Sinai stretches for arid miles, the sand only interrupted by an occasional lonely road.
An Egyptian press-office representative met me at the Rafah crossing point and escorted me through customs. I was pleased to have him there. The process of filling out forms and inspecting luggage was complicated, involving numerous lines. I would never have figured things out on my own. Finally, I paid a small fee and boarded a large bus. We drove about thirty yards to enter Gaza. There's no foot traffic or civilian cars, and certainly no commercial trucks. Requiring everyone to ride a bus gives authorities on both sides greater control.
The bus passengers included forty-nine Palestinians and me. When we arrived in Gaza, efficient guards with full beards took our passports: Let's see: Ahmad, Deeb, Shafi, Erlich—Erlich? The guard motioned me to wait at the side. Eventually a supervisor who spoke some English came to ask why I wanted to visit Gaza. I explained that I was a journalist, holding my hands in front of my head as if I was operating a movie camera. “CNN,” I said, using the internationally recognized term for crazy American journalist. I explained that I wasn't with CNN but was a journalist like those on CNN. He smiled, perhaps thinking he would see himself on satellite TV that night.
I gave him the mobile number of a friend who was picking me up. He phoned, we all met, and then I went through an informal entry process. The supervisor asked my friend for the names of his father and brothers
. Gaza had a population of about one million, so everyone knew everyone else, or at least someone in the family. My friend was warned that if I did something wrong, he would be held responsible. With that, we sped off as fast as the potholed roads would allow.
I interviewed a number of Hamas officials. They made clear that Hamas stood with the people of Syria against Assad. “We are with the people wherever they are fighting for their political and economic rights,” said Ziad El-Zaza, Gaza's former deputy prime minister. “The blood of Arab martyrs is on the heads of the government leaders in Syria.”36 That's a huge change for Hamas, which had been close allies of Syria. To understand why they split, let's look at some recent history.
Hamas had won the Palestinian parliamentary elections of 2006. International observers praised the elections as democratic.37 But the United States, Israel, and Fatah wouldn't accept defeat. The long-simmering differences between Hamas and Fatah boiled over and fighting broke out. By 2007 Hamas seized control of Gaza, and Fatah took the West Bank.
The two parties, at that time, also differed in their attitude toward Syria. Fatah had an antagonistic relationship with the Assads dating back decades. The Syrian government prohibited Fatah from organizing among Palestinian refugees living in Syria or Lebanon. Hamas, on the other hand, had allied with Syria. Hamas moved its headquarters to Damascus in 2001. But it was always a marriage of convenience. Syria was a secular state that repressed its own Islamic movements. Hamas was a conservative Sunni organization that opposed secularism. As Khaled Meshal, chair of Hamas's Political Bureau, told me in a Damascus interview, “We and Syria have the Israel issue in common. So we have good relations.”38
When the popular demonstrations began in Syria, however, Hamas criticized the Syrian regime's repression. When armed rebellion broke out, Hamas supported the rebels affiliated with Syria's Muslim Brotherhood. Meshal closed Hamas's Damascus office in January 2012 and moved to Doha, Qatar.
For a time, Hamas seemed to have come down on the right side of history. Conservative Islamists gained influence in Syria. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a close Hamas ally, won the parliamentary and presidential elections. The brotherhood expanded the Egyptian border crossings with Gaza, a policy begun under Mubarak. But Gaza residents still couldn't import goods on a commercial scale, so tunnel smuggling was allowed to increase.
The tide then turned against Hamas. When the Egyptian military overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government in June 2013, Hamas lost an important ally. The military closed the smuggling tunnels and restricted border crossings through Rafah.
Hamas had also allied with Iran. They agreed on opposition to Israel but had many disagreements on other issues. When Hamas broke with Assad, Iran cut financial aid to Gaza. Iran had reportedly been paying $20 million per month to help provide basic services for Palestinians. But that ended in 2013.39
Hamas officials wouldn't discuss specific figures, but Ghazi Hamad, deputy foreign minister, said, “For supporting the Syrian revolution, we lost very much.” He said military cooperation has stopped as well. Ahmed Yousef, an advisor to the Gaza prime minster, said “We never expected that a country like Iran, which talked about oppressed people and dictatorial regimes, would stand behind a dictator like Assad who is killing his own people.”40
Hamas even broke with its old ally Hezbollah. On June 17, 2013, Hamas called on Hezbollah to withdraw its troops from Syria and concentrate on the fight against Israel.41
Hamas turned for support to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. The emir of Qatar became the first head of state to visit Gaza and pledged $400 million in aid. Hamas's shift away from Syria and Iran could have long-term ramifications. Hamas leaders could remain independent, accepting money from diverse sources. Or their close reliance on money from US allies such as the gulf countries could open new possibilities for US and Israeli influence. If that seismic shift were to occur, at a minimum, Hamas would have to be included in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. That doesn't appear likely anytime soon.
Palestinian views on Syria are divided. In the beginning they welcomed an uprising that would replace Assad with a popular government more supportive of the Palestinian cause. As the civil war dragged on, however, they became concerned with external forces and extremist groups hijacking the uprising. Nevertheless, Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed Assad. A poll by the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research showed only 12.6 percent of Gaza and West Bank residents supported Assad's regime.42 A University of Haifa opinion poll among Israeli Arabs, also known as 1948 Palestinians, indicated that 72 percent supported or strongly supported the end of Assad's regime.43
To be sure, some Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza supported Assad. The Arab Socialist Baath Party in Palestine has held small rallies in the West Bank. Hamas prohibited pro-Assad demonstrations in Gaza, although some Assad supporters tried to organize rallies. A few prominent Palestinians supported the Syrian regime, most notably Bishop Atallah Hanna of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem.44
Political leader Barghouti, on the other hand, said the Arab Spring revolutions, including in Syria, would eventually triumph. “I believe this is just one stage, like has happened in many revolutions in the world. You have revolutions and counterrevolutions. People seek their way. I'm optimistic.”45
Palestinians overwhelmingly rejected foreign interference in Syria's war. Sixty-three percent opposed US and European arms going to the rebels, according to a 2013 Pew research poll.46
A similar percentage opposed US military intervention in Syria, a view that united Hamas and Fatah as well. Both argued that any US attack would serve to put pro-US forces in power, not help the Syrian people. “The Americans do not want good [for] the Syrian people,” said Hamas spokesman Salah Bardaweel. “The Americans only want to serve American and Israeli interests.”47 Fatah also strongly condemned US hypocrisy in criticizing Syria's use of chemical weapons. Fatah official Abbas Zaki said that the United States didn't act “when Israel used phosphorous weapons during its aggression against the Gaza Strip in 2008 and 2009.”48
Palestinians don't want foreign domination of Syria, but neither do they want dictatorship—secular or religious. Assad used support for Palestine as a justification for staying in power. But it turns out that he had little justification to claim their popular support.
Israelis and Palestinians can't help but see Syrian developments through their own lenses. For Israeli leaders, the civil war gave them temporary respite from a devilish leader but presented the possibility of ultra-right-wing Islamists gaining influence. They continue to fear democratic reforms in the Middle East. “We are a minority in the region,” explained history professor Zisser. “Minorities always prefer a strong authoritarian regime rather than a popular regime backed by an unreliable majority.”49
Palestinians said such a view dooms Israel to isolation and paranoia. “The Israelis are afraid of Arab democracy,” said political leader Barghouti. “Israel is shortsighted because democracy will come to the Arab world.”50
This argument reminded me a lot of the discussion I had with Rabbi Zeldin in 1967. Back then, Israel had to ally with dictators such as the Shah of Iran and leaders of apartheid South Africa because if the masses took over in those countries, they would oppose Israeli policies. Memo to Israeli leaders: maybe Israeli policy is the problem, not the people of the world.
I got lost on my way to the State Department. I showed up at the main headquarters, a massive, fortresslike building taking up several city blocks in downtown Washington, DC. But guards at the building had never heard of who I was supposed to meet. Turns out I was at the wrong place. My meeting was in an annex across the street and down the block.
A young woman employee in this section had been after me for months to talk with her colleagues about what was wrong with US policy in Syria. I was openly skeptical about any impact my definitely outside-the-box views might have. But she was very insistent. I finally agreed but only if I could also get a State D
epartment interview to use in my articles and in this book. We struck the deal. I put on my nicest sport coat and conservative tie, got on the metro, and headed to Foggy Bottom.
At the time of our interview, in April 2012, the State Department was officially supporting the nonviolent resistance in Syria led by the Syrian National Council (SNC). The State Department wanted the American people to believe that the SNC represented the major Syrian opposition groups. Its leader, Radwan Ziadeh, had lived in the United States, spoke fluent English, and promised democracy and pluralism for the new Syria.
I sat down with an official State Department spokesperson, who, under Washington rules, wouldn't allow his name to be used. When asked which group in the SNC actually provided a democratic alternative to Assad, he paused for a full fifteen seconds. “We continue to encourage and cajole them to lay out a vision. It's a work in progress.”1 So even after working with internal and external opposition groups for over a year, US plans weren't going so well.
Another State Department source, we'll call her “Kathy,” explained the US conundrum. She didn't want her name used, fearing retaliation for her critical views. She said the Obama administration had provided $100 million for salaries and equipment to the SNC as of April 2012. “But the SNC is faction-ridden,” she told me. We're trying to find a horse we can ride but we're not having much luck.”2
The official spokesperson admitted that Syria provided unique problems for the United States. Syria has a Sunni majority but also many minority groups. He insisted that the SNC was inclusive of all of these groups. He admitted, however, that they had little in common beyond favoring the downfall of Assad. “Once the common enemy is removed, that's when the divisions occur.” He added, “We do understand this is a long haul.”3 However, the Obama administration had no idea how long the “long haul” would be.
In practice, the SNC was never able to gather broad support within Syria. By October 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the SNC a failure. The United States finally acknowledged that the SNC didn't represent the struggle inside Syria and lacked participation by minority groups.4 In November, the SNC was replaced by a new coalition, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. That coalition also failed to develop significant support inside Syria, while conservative and ultraconservative Islamists continued to grow (see chapters 5–6).