While it was designed to cover contingency plans for a war with Great Britain, War Plan Red contains very few references to that country. The only theatre of war mentioned in the plan was Canada, referred to as “Crimson.” There was also nothing defensive about the plan. The goal of the plan, its authors wrote, was, “ultimately to gain control of Crimson.”2 The earliest draft of the plan, approved by the U.S. cabinet in 1924, went further, suggesting that all territory gained during the operations (that is, all Canadian lands) would be held in perpetuity by the United States. The Government of Canada would be abolished. The capture of Canada was not expected to be easy on the Canadian population. The plan authors expected “consequent suffering to the population and widespread destruction and devastation”3 in Canada. The United States intended to start the war and even if Canada declared neutrality it was to be invaded and occupied.
The plan contained a detailed analysis of Canada’s geography, population, and, most importantly, the country’s military strength. It concluded with this stark statement: “Crimson (Canada) cannot successfully defend her territory against the United States (Blue).”4 In fact, espionage reports from the period on Canada’s defensive readiness were often as stinging as they were blunt. Canada acknowledged no known enemies, had failed to maintain a proper air force, and was, therefore, largely unprepared to defend itself.
Halifax was to be the first target. The capture of that port city would logically prevent the arrival of reinforcements from Great Britain and would leave the rest of Canada vulnerable. Several routes were considered, but in the end War Plan Red called for a seaborne surprise attack from Boston. The attack would have to take place even before war was declared, to maintain the element of surprise and ensure that the city would fall quickly. The next stage of the plan called for the immediate capture of power plants in the Niagara region. Once those were secure the U.S. Army would launch a three-pronged attack. They would take Montreal and Quebec via Vermont, seize the rail lines in Winnipeg from bases in North Dakota, and then swing up through Michigan and Sault Ste. Marie to take the valuable nickel mines in Sudbury.
In 1935 the plan was altered and the newer version called for an immediate and massive pre-emptive bombing of Vancouver, Quebec, and Montreal, in order to ensure a quick victory over those cities. The amendment further recommended the use of poison gas against Canadians prior to the actual invasion by U.S. troops. Interestingly — and in an echo of the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima — American authorities felt that the tactic was a humanitarian act, as it would end the war more quickly and save both American and Canadian lives in the end. The newer version of the plan also authorized the strategic bombing of the city of Halifax, Nova Scotia, in the event that U.S. troops were unable to defeat and occupy it. While the army invaded by land, the navy would seize control of the Great Lakes and establish blockades of both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
In February 1935, the U.S. Congress appropriated $57 million on behalf of the U.S. War Department. The money was to be used to build three air bases along the Canadian-U.S. border that could be used for pre-emptive air strikes on Canadian airfields. The bases were to be disguised as civilian airports and were supposedly a well-guarded secret. Then, in February 1935, Brigadier General F.M. Andrews, Chief of the General Headquarters force, and Brigadier General Charles E. Kilbourne, former of head of the Army War Plans Division, testified in a secret meeting of the Congress Military Committee. The testimony revealed the provision for “camouflaged” air bases on the Canadian border and suggested that the United States “must be prepared to seize nearby French and British Islands in an emergency.” The testimony provided by military experts to the committee was explosive and could even be considered slightly hysterical. There are, the experts testified,
[C]ountless operating bases within a radius of action of this country in the vast number of sheltered water areas that are available deep in Canada … from which pontoonequipped aircraft could operate at will … There is no necessity for starting with an observation in order to know what they are going to bomb. They know now what they are going to bomb. They know where every railroad crosses every river. They know where every refinery lies. They know where every power plant is located. They know all about our water supply systems. Their location is most difficult for us to learn, for our own air force to learn. We have to hunt them up. We have to find out where they are before we can attack them. 5
Interestingly, the U.S. military already knew an extraordinary amount about Canada and its resources. In 1919, they had gathered substantial information on Canada’s railroads and highways and a few years later the U.S. Army War College led a study of Canada’s airports, harbours, and radio stations. Shortly before Captain George gave his incendiary testimony, a secret mission in the Canadian wilderness had searched for the location of air bases and float planes.
The supposedly secret testimony was mistakenly published with the rest of the committee’s proceedings in February 1935. In April 1935, a New York Times reporter stumbled on the revelations and revealed them. The article was reprinted in newspapers around the world, and outraged the citizens of numerous countries including Canada, Great Britain, and France. The administration of then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately attempted damage control and the president issued a stinging rebuke of the Military Committee, in which he wrote, “I call your special attention to the fact that this government not only accepts as an accomplished fact the permanent peace conditions cemented by many generations of friendship between the Canadian and American people but expects to live up to, not only the letter, but the spirit of our treaties relating to the permanent disarmament of our 3,000 miles of common boundary.”6
Despite Roosevelt’s assertions, in March 1935 General Douglas MacArthur suggested an additional amendment adding Vancouver to the list of priority targets. The latest amendment even included a list of the best possible roads for the invasion route. For Vancouver that was Route 99.
In August 1935 over 35,000 U.S. troops converged on the Canadian border just south of Ottawa for a series of war games. The scenario designed for these war games was a massive invasion of Canada. The war game plan called for the Canadian forces to repel the initial attacks. It then called for an additional 15,000 reinforcements to be brought from Pennsylvania, which was expected to outnumber and outgun the Canadian forces, who would eventually capitulate. The games were considered to be a resounding success by the U.S. military and were one of the largest peacetime manoeuvres in history.
Following the success of the war games, the U.S. military purchased additional lands around Fort Drum and greatly expanded the base. The expansion received a tremendous amount of attention and many Canadians along the border nervously eyed the buildup of troops and weapons to the south. If they had also learned of the existence of extensive plans for the invasion of Canada their reaction would have been much stronger — unless they had also learned that the Canadians had developed their own plan for invading the United States, nine years before War Plan Red was developed.
Defence Scheme No. 1 was the creation of Canada’s Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, James Sutherland “Buster” Brown. It was presented to Canadian military strategists in April 1921. Like War Plan Red, Defence Scheme No. 1 was a wellguarded secret. Te. Also like War Plan Red it was to be launched prior to any official declaration of war. However, Sutherland’s scheme was less strategic and based more on the twin premises of surprise and strength, a levee en masse as he termed it. “The first thing apparent then in the defence of Canada is that we lack depth,” wrote Brown. “Depth can only be gained by Offensive Action.”7
From bases along the border, thousands of Canadian troops would pour into Washington, Montana, Minnesota, New York, and Maine and overwhelm specific cities in those states. Brown did not expect that his plan would allow the Canadians to conquer America. Instead, his goal was to slow an American attack until Canada’s allies could arrive to help. Therefore, the plan also
included contingency plans for a retreat in which the Canadian Army would burn bridges and railways to hinder an American pursuit. Brown and several other military men even conducted reconnaissance to support their plan, travelling through a variety of U.S. states dressed in civilian clothing. Brown’s plan initially received a considerable amount of support from the Canadian military before being officially abandoned by Canadian authorities a few months before the United States began work on its own invasion plan
In 1939 War Plan Red also faded in importance as the world’s attention was captured by the image of the great German Army bearing down on Poland.
NOTES
Chapter One
1. L’abbé Ivanhoe Caron, ed., Journal de l’expédition de chevalier de Troyes (Quebec:
La Compagnie de L’Eclaireur, 1918).
2. D.W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland (Portugal Cove: Boulder Publications, 2002), 216.
3. Jean Baudoin, Journal du voyage que j’ay fait avec M. d’Iberville, Capitaine de Frigate de France en l’acadie en l’isle de terre-neuve, November 10, 1696.
4. John Clapp et al, in a petition sent to William III in 1697 begging for relief and for armed forces to defend the settlers of Newfoundland.
5. Baudoin, November 17, 1686.
6. Baudoin, November 30, 1686.
7. Baudoin, November 30, 1686.
8. Baudoin, November 30, 1686.
Chapter Two
1. Ben Franklin to his brother, John Franklin, Philadelphia, 1745.
2. Estimates vary. Some put the cost as high as $200 million dollars, others report that it cost barely half of the 30 million livre estimate. £30 million is, however, the most commonly quoted figure and can be found in such sources such as William Wood’s The Great Fortress (A Chronicle of Louisbourg 1720– 1760), and Robert Emmet Wall in the New England Chronicle. Interestingly, the reconstruction of barely one- fifth of the fortress, begun in the 1960s, cost over $25 million Canadian, and took 20 years to complete.
3. Quoted in William Wood, The Great Fortress (A Chronicle of Louisbourg 1720.–1760) (Toronto: The Hunter-Rose Company, 1920), 34.
4. Lettre d’un Habitant de Louisbourg, 36.
5. Wood, 30.
6. Lettre d’un Habitant de Louisbourg, 15.
7. Letter of Monsiery DuChambon to the Minister at Rochefort, September 2, 1745.
8. Louis Effingham DeForest, ed., Louisbourg Journals 1745 (New York: Heritage Books, 1998).
9. Lettre d’un Habitant de Louisbourg, 35.
10. An anonymous soldier in the Fourth Massachusetts Regiment quoted in Louis Effingham De Forest, ed., Louisbourg Journals 1745 (New York: Heritage Books, 1998), 27.
11. Quoted in Henry S. Burrage, Maine at Louisbourg (Augusta, ME, Burleigh &Flynt, 1910).
12. Burrage, 51.
13. Eric Krause, Carol Corbin, and William O’Shea, ed., Aspects of Louisbourg:Essays on the History of an Eighteenth Century French Community in North America (Sydney, NS: University College of Cape Breton Press, 1995), 128.
14. Wood, 76.
15. From a composite prepared from a number of primary sources in Robert Emmet Wall, Jr. “Louisbourg 1745,” New England Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1964, 66.
16. Quoted in John Stewart McLennan, Louisbourg from Its Foundation to Its Fall, 1713–1758 (Detroit: The University of Michigan, 1918), 237.
17. Quoted in Wood, 121.
18. In the 1960s the Canadian government launched a project to rebuild Louisbourg. Today the massive fort stands guard at the mouth of the St. Lawrence once more, but now it is manned by Parks Canada rather than the French Army.
Chapter Three
1. Wolfe in a letter to Amherst, August 8, 1758.
2. Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London: W. Heinemann, 1909), 417.
3. Wolfe in a letter to his mother, November 13, 1756.
4. Sir Arthur John Doughty, ed., The Journal of Captain John Knox, Volume 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 1968), 93.
5. Leicester Harmsworth, The Northcliffe Collection (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1926), 111.
6. Montcalm in a letter to Marshal de Belle Isle, Montreal, April 12, 1759.
7. This was the same Captain Cook who would later earn fame as an adventurer and explorer in the South Pacific.
8. William R. Nester, First Global War: Britain, France and the Fate of North America 1756–1775 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 132.
9. Estimates of Montcalm’s troop strength vary according to the source. Montcalm himself estimated that he had just over 13,000 but that number might not include some of the militia or thousands of Native troops who had allied themselves with the French.
10. Wolfe quoted in George M. Wrong, The Conquest of New France: A Chronicle of the Colonial Wars (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2003), 90.
11. Wolfe’s First Manifesto, Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London: W. Heinemann, 1909), 439.
12. Jean-Félix Richér, Journal du Sèige de Québec en 1759 (Quebec: Société de Historique de Québec), 59.
13. Marie de la Visitation, “Narrative of the Doings During the Seige of Quebec, and the Conquest of Canada,” Thomas Thorner, ed., A Few Acres of Snow:Documents in Pre-Confederation History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 99.
14. Ibid, 100.
15. Wolfe quoted in The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, 453.
16. Wolfe in a letter to his mother, Banks of the St. Lawrence, August 31, 1759.
17. Montcalm to Artillery Officer and Secretary Montbelliard.
Chapter Four
1. Paul David Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester: Soldier-Statesman of Early British Canada (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2000), 93.
2. Michael P. Gabriel, Major General Richard Montgomery: The Making of an American Hero (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002), 142.
3. Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Quebec, November 20, 1775.
4. Carleton quoted in Nelson, 72.
5. George Washington to the Continental Congress, from his camp at Cambridge, September 21, 1775.
6. Sir James Carmichael Smyth, Precis of the Wars in Canada (New York: C. Roworth, 1826), 79.
7. Arnold to George Washington, Chaudiere Pond, October 22, 1775.
8. George Morison’s journal, November 1775.
9. William Renwick Riddell, Benjamin Franklin’s Mission to Canada and the Causes of Its Failure (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1923), 130.
10. Ibid., 133.
11. Ibid., 133.
12. Ibid., 134.
13. Mark Zuehlke, Canadian Military Atlas (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, Ltd., 2001), 58.
Chapter Five
1. The Nootka are also known as the Mowachahts or Muchalaht First Nation.
They originated in the Friendly Cove area of Nootka Sound. In historical texts they are frequently referred to as the Nootka Natives.
2. Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, Scenes and Studies of Savage Life (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1868), 12.
3. Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543– 1819 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 58.
Chapter Six
1. Isaac Brock letter to Captain James Brock, Kingston, 1811.
2. Ferdinand Brock Tupper Esq., ed., The Life and Correspondence of Sir Isaac Brock, K.B. (London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1845), 172–73.
3. Isaac Brock letter to Captain James Brock, July 1812.
4. Walter Nursey, The Story of Isaac Brock: Hero, Defender and Saviour of Upper Canada, 1818 (Toronto: W. Briggs, 1909), 97.
5. Mary Beacock Fryer, Bold, Brave, and Born to Lead: Major General Isaac Brock and the Canadas (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2004), 72.
6. Nursey, 101.
7. John Boileau, Half-Hearted Enemies: Nova Scotia, New England and the War of 1812 (Toronto: Formac Publishing Company, Ltd., 2007).
Chapter S
even
1. Louis Joseph Papineau in a speech to the Six Counties, Saint-Charles, October 31, 1837.
2. Dr. Wolfred Nelson in a speech on October 23, 1837.
3. George Nelson’s Journal, Nelson Family Papers, Toronto Public Library.
4. George Bell, Rough Notes of an Old Soldier (London: Day and Son, Ltd., 1867), 51.
5. Amédée Papineau, Journal d’un Fils de la Liberté Réfugié aux États-Unis par suite de L’insurrection Canadienne, en 1837, Vol. II (Montreal: Éditions L’Étincelle, 1978), 46–47.
6. Bell, 55.
7. Jean-Joseph Girouard to M. Morin, April 28, 1838, quoted in John Hare, ed., Les Patriotes, 1830–1838 (Montreal: Libération, 1971), 144.
8. The Seventh Report from the Select Committee of the House of Assembly of Upper Canada on grievances, 6.
9. Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton on the Case of the Caroline, Department of State, June 27, 1842. This has become an internationally accepted precedent and was used most recently by the United States to justify its invasion of Iraq.
10. Lord Durham’s Report, 1839, 51.
Chapter Eight
1.The New Yorker, Saturday March 23, 1839, 12.
2. From an account told by Eleazer Packard to the Whig and Courier, Bangor, Maine, reported in the Daily Courier, Hartford, Connecticut, February 20, 1839.
Chapter Nine
1. Thomas Newbiggen, “Fenian Raids: Invasions of British-Ruled Canada,”
Historynet, 3–8 of printed materials; www.historynet.com/fenian-raids-invasions-of-british-ruled-canada.htm.
2. Ibid., 3.
3. John O’Neill, Official Report of General John O’Neill, President of the Fenian Brotherhood, on the Attempt to Invade Canada (New York: John F. Foster, 1870).
4. Estimates vary widely depending upon the source.
Chapter Ten
1. Henry Landau, The Enemy Within: The Inside Story of German Sabotage in America (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1937), 19.
Canada Under Attack Page 17