His death was at once irony and paradigm. Hans Hube had conducted an epic, indeed heroic operation—but in the wrong direction. First Panzer Army brought out its tanks and its wounded at a cost of 6,000 dead and missing. Its anabasis bought time, but to what purpose? “For slow exhaustion and grim retreat/For a wasted hope and a sure defeat.” The words of an American captured on Bataan in 1942 might well serve as an epigram—or an epitaph—for the saga of Army Group South in the endgame months of the Russo-German War.
III
ALBERT SPEER’S APPOINTMENT as Minister of Armaments in February 1942 brought no immediate, revolutionary change to Germany’s war industry. But Speer had Hitler’s confidence, as much as anyone could ever possess it. He was an optimist at a time when that was a declining quality at high Reich levels. He concentrated on short-term fixes: rationalizing administration, improving use of material, addressing immediate crises. And he faced a major one in tank production.
In September 1942 Hitler called for the manufacture of 800 tanks, 600 assault guns, and 600 self-propelled guns a month by the spring of 1944. In April 1944 the army’s panzer divisions had fewer than 1,700 of their total authorized strength of 4,600 main battle tanks: Panthers and Panzer IVs. That gap could not be bridged by admonitions to take better care of equipment and report losses more accurately. The long obsolete Panzer II was upgraded into a state-of-the-art tracked reconnaissance vehicle. But a glamorous renaming as Luchs, or Lynx, could not camouflage an operational value so limited that production was canceled after the first hundred. Other resources were also diverted to the development of a family of tracked and half-tracked logistics vehicles and increased numbers of armored recovery vehicles, both in their own ways necessary under Russian conditions. The growing effectiveness of the Soviet air force led to the conversion or rebuilding of an increasing number of chassis into antiaircraft tanks with small- caliber armaments. The continued manufacture of early designs—again necessary to maintain even limited frontline strength—further impeded production. Between May and December 1942, tank production actually declined despite constant encouragement and repeated threats from the Reich’s highest quarters.
One positive result of the slowdown was the ability to address the Panther’s shortcomings. The original Model D received improved track and wheel systems. Das Reich received a battalion of them in August, 23rd Panzer Division in October, and 16th Panzer in December. All played crucial roles in Army Group South’s fight for survival. The D’s successor, the Model A, had a new turret with quicker rotation time and a commander’s cupola. Both were important in the target-rich but high-risk environment of the Eastern Front. Engine reliability remained a problem, in part because of quality control difficulties in the homeland, and in part defined by the tank’s low power-to-weight ratio. Improvements to the transmission and gear systems nevertheless reduced the number of engine breakdowns. Modifications to the cooling system cut back on the number of engine fires.
Soft ground, deep mud, and heavy snow continued to put a premium on driving skill. One Panther battalion reported having to blow up 28 tanks it was unable to evacuate. Fifty-six more were in various stages of repair. Eleven remained operational. But during the same period Leibstandarte’s Panther battalion reported only seven combat losses—all from hits to the sides and rear. Of the 54 mechanical breakdowns, almost half could be ready within a week. On the whole the improved Panther was regarded as excellent: consistently able to hit, survive hits, and bring its crews back.
Toward the end of 1943 the High Command began rotating battalions officially equipped with Panzer IIIs—the old workhorse was still pulling its load—back to Germany for retraining on Panther Model As. The reorganized battalions were impressive on paper: 4 companies each of 22 or 17 tanks, plus 8 more in battalion headquarters. First Panzer Division welcomed its new vehicles in November. Others followed, army and SS, the order depending on which division could best spare a battalion cadre. By the end of January 1944 about 900 Panther As had reached the Russian front, in complete battalions or as individual replacements.
As good as they were, the Panthers were a drop in the bucket compared to the mass of Soviet armor facing them. As compensation the High Command began considering a Panther II. Beginning as an up-armored Model D, during 1943 the concept metamorphosed—or better said, metastasized—into a lighter version of the Tiger. Weighing in at over 50 tons, it was originally scheduled to enter service in September 1943, but was put on permanent hold in favor of its less impressive, more reliable forebear.
The same might have been better applied to another armored mammoth. The Panzer VIB, the “King Tiger” or “Royal Tiger,” could trace its conceptual roots all the way to the spring of 1941. Prototypes emerged in 1943; the first production models appeared in January 1944. The VIB was best distinguished by a redesigned turret with a rounded front and a cupola for the commander. Its second characteristic feature was an 88mm L/71 gun (that translates as 19 feet long!) that could take out any allied tank at extreme ranges. Its frontal armor, more than seven inches in places, was never confirmed as having been penetrated by any tank or antitank gun. Its Maybach 700 horsepower engine gave it a reasonable road speed of 24 miles per hour. But if the King was dipped in the River Styx for strength, it was also left with an Achilles heel. Its weight was immobilizing. Only major road bridges could support it. The tonnage increased fuel consumption when fuel supplies were a growing problem, and also overstrained the drive system to a point where breakdowns were the norm.
The point was initially moot, since only five VIBs were in service by March 1944. But the situation was replicated in other end-of-the-war designs. The Jagdtiger was a tank destroyer version of the VIB carrying a 128mm gun—not only the heaviest weapon mounted on a German AFV, but an excellent design in its own right. At over 70 tons, however, and with only 20 degrees traverse for its main armament, the vehicle was only dangerous to anything unfortunate enough to pass directly in front of it.
The Panther’s tank destroyer spin-off was far more promising. Indeed the Jagdpanther is widely and legitimately considered the best vehicle of its kind during World War II. An 88mm L/71 gun, well-sloped armor, and solid cross-country capacity on a 45-ton chassis made the Jagdpanther a dominant chess piece wherever it appeared. Predictably, preproduction difficulties and declining production capacity kept its numbers limited.
For all the print devoted to the Panthers, the Tigers, and their variants, the backbone of the armored force through 1945 remained the Panzer IV. Its final versions had little enough in common with the “cigar butts” of 1940. The Model H officially became the main production version in March 1942. Its armor protection included side panels and grew to a maximum of 3.2 inches in front, at the price of increased weight (25 tons) that cut the road speed to a bit over 20 miles per hour. A later J version incorporated such minor modifications as wider tracks and wire-mesh side skirts just as effective as armor plate in deflecting infantry-fired antitank rockets.
Guderian in particular considered the new version of a well-tried system a practical response to the chronic frontline shortfalls in tank strength in the East. The Panzer IV was relatively easy to maintain -and relatively easy to evacuate when damaged. Over 3,000 of them would be produced in 1943, and standard equipment of the army panzer divisions was set at a battalion each of Panthers and Panzer IVs.
Guderian’s opposition to the assault gun had eroded with experience. Not only was its frontline utility indisputable, it could be manufactured faster and in larger numbers by less experienced enterprises than the more complex turreted tanks. Guderian correspondingly advocated restoring the panzer regiments’ third battalions and giving them assault guns as a working compromise.
The vehicles he intended were significantly different from the original assault guns and their underlying concept. The mission of supporting infantry attacks had become secondary at best. What was now vital was holding off Soviet armor. The self-propelled Marders, with their light armor and open top
s, were well into the zone of dangerous obsolescence. In 1943 the Weapons Office ordered the development of a smaller vehicle mounting a scaled-down 75mm gun on the chassis of the old reliable 38(t). The 16-ton Hetzer (Baiter) was useful and economical, and continues to delight armor buffs and modelers. It was, however, intended for the infantry’s antitank battalions, and did not appear in combat until 1944—one more example of diffused effort that characterized the Reich’s war effort.
On the other hand, the Sturmgeschütz IIIG, with its 75mm L/48 gun, seemed highly suited to tank destruction and was readily available—until Allied bombing intervened. The factory manufacturing the bulk of IIIGs was heavily damaged in late 1943. To compensate, Hitler ordered the available hulls to be fitted to Panzer IV chassis. The result proved practical enough to encourage the production of over 1700 Jagdpanzer IVs by November 1944, despite Guderian’s protest at the corresponding fallout of turreted tanks. The new name of “tank destroyer” suited the vehicles’ new purpose, though their predecessors continued in service under the original title, creating confusion during and after the war that remains exacerbated by the vehicles’ close resemblance.
The Jagdpanzer IVs were intended for the panzer divisions and the assault gun battalions, whose number grew to over three dozen during 1943. A slightly heavier version with a 75mm L/70 gun like the Panther’s and the unflattering nickname of “Guderian’s Duck” began entering service in August 1944. It proved first-rate against armor in Russia and the West; almost a thousand were produced during the war. The “Duck’s” long gun made it uncomfortably nose-heavy (the source of its sobriquet), but by then that was among the least of the panzers’ problems.
Apart from a few emergency variations churned out in the war’s final months, the technical lineup of Hitler’s panzers was complete. As a footnote the design staffs, after years of work, finally developed the war’s best armored car. The SdKfz 234/2 Puma had it all: high speed, a low silhouette, and a 50mm L39 still effective against tanks in an emergency. Unfortunately, by the time the Puma and its variants entered production, the panzers’ need for a long-range reconnaissance vehicle was itself long past. Now their enemies all too often found them.
IV
FOR THE FIRST half of 1944, German strategic and operational attention remained focused on Russia—specifically on a southern sector whose vulnerability had been repeatedly tested and too often confirmed. Guderian spoke for the panzers in a report of March 27, 1944. He bluntly informed Hitler that the war in the east could never be won by static defense. Whenever the panzers’ mobility was disregarded, whenever they were engaged piecemeal, catastrophe followed. The situation demanded the formation of a strong operational reserve to be used in a mobile defense, Manstein-style.
Hitler dismissed Guderian’s urging as nonsense. He described it as criminal to give up anything bought with German blood without another bloody fight to hold it. To make his point, on March 30 the Führer removed Kleist from command of Army Group A and dismissed Manstein as well. The time for operations, he declared, was over. Now was the time for stubborn defense. Any doubt of how that should be defined was also removed when Hitler appointed Ferdinand Schörner commander of the renamed Army Group South Ukraine. Schörner during the war had devolved from an unimaginative field leader to a less imaginative thug with a penchant for ordering drumhead executions.
Manstein’s rechristened Army Group North Ukraine went to Model. His perceived status as “Hitler’s favorite general,” combined with an abrasive personality and a no-excuses approach to command, have combined to reduce his stature as a capable general. He also had some of the best of the new generation of panzer officers: Raus at 4th Panzer Army, Josef Harpe succeeding Hube at 1st, and Breith and Balck commanding corps. Even before Model’s arrival, these men were coming to a consensus, based on their post-Barbarossa, post-Stalingrad experiences, that the army could no longer execute sweeping maneuvers in the Manstein style. The discrepancy in armored forces was too overwhelming. Tactical success was all even the best-executed counterstrokes could achieve, and even those were questionable except under strongly favorable conditions.
Manstein’s approach had another weakness. It reduced the infantry to little more than pawns. Soviet attacks were based on mass and planning. Artillery broke down the defenses; infantry overwhelmed them; tanks drove into the rear zones. Failure at any stage meant repeating the sequence; as many as 30 consecutive attacks in the same local sector had been verified. The increasingly frequent result was the overrunning and dislocation of the defending German infantry divisions. That in turn meant the sacrifice of their antitank capacity. Two-thirds of the infantry division’s guns were towed 75mm pieces too heavy to move in a hurry. The remainder were thinly armored, open-topped mounts vulnerable to almost any heavy weapon.
Infantry without antitank guns were like oysters without shells. Personal weapons, an upscale copy of the US bazooka and the fire-and-forget Panzerfaust rocket, were coming into service and would prove highly effective. Their short ranges, however, made them almost suicidal to use in open country or against tanks massed on Soviet scales. The best the foot soldiers could do was get as far out of the way as possible. And by the time the panzer reserves intervened, they found themselves fighting off the back foot, reacting to superior force as best they could.
As Raus dryly noted, the Soviet system was foolproof as long as the Germans did not interfere. Instead Army Group South’s command team favored a “battle-zone defense” that could be as much as 25 miles deep. The infantry manning the front lines would fall back to prepared positions a mile or so in the rear just before the Soviet hammer fell. The artillery would simultaneously switch to prepared alternate firing positions. Extensive minefields covered by antitank guns would channel the Red Army onto killing grounds. Panzer battle groups reinforced by antitank and assault guns would be available for immediate intervention to choke off local breakthroughs and mount local counterattacks, enmeshing the Soviets in a modern version of the Roman arena’s retiarius-secutor gladiatorial combats.
What Model and his principal subordinates had in mind was a long way from Hitler’s primitive concept of defense. Both nevertheless dated to the Great War. The Führer had been imprinted by his experiences in 1914-15, under a doctrine that stressed holding and retaking ground at all costs. By 1917 a more flexible approach had developed, much along the lines of thinking in Army Group South, with armor added to the counterattack punch. It would require excellent communications and careful timing. But a combined-arms zone defense in earlier versions had worked for Model at Rzhev and against him at Kursk. At least it gave the Landser a fighting chance. On the other side of the war zone, Erwin Rommel was simultaneously advocating a similar approach based on similar reasoning to resisting Allied landings whose success would also depend heavily on mass and firepower.
Panzer purists in East and West objected vehemently. Balck in particular held his ground so stubbornly that Model unusually gave up the argument and resolved the issue by transferring all of Balck’s panzer divisions to other commands. The deeper significance of the issue, however, lies in the armored force’s growing institutional acceptance of a strategic, operational, and tactical environment mandating a fundamentally defensive focus.
Armies are not infinitely, or even significantly, malleable institutions. They tend to finish much as they began; learning curves seldom imply paradigm shifts. The German army of World War II was unusually successful in reconfiguring itself in the middle of a conflict. Nevertheless, seen from a bit of distance and with a bit of irony, the zone defense concept amounted to the inversion of the approach that the panzers had so effectively employed in 1940, though restoring the all-arms cooperation significantly disrupted by the exigencies of the last 18 months in Russia.
The new order’s prospects in the East were, however, limited in view of the storm brewing on the Russian side of the battle line. For mid-1944 Stavka planned a series of mutually reinforcing strategic offensives along several axes.
The initial operation proposed for 1944 was a drive into Romania: a follow-up of the winter’s successes in the Ukraine intended militarily to open the way to the Balkans, politically to force Romania out of the war, and economically to deprive Germany of Romanian oil. Simultaneously, pressure in the Leningrad sector and Byelorussia would be renewed, eroding German resources and pinning their forces in place. The offensives on the flanks would be followed by Operation Bagration: a massive blow against Army Group Center with the intention of annihilating the forces in that sector and compelling the Germans in the north and south to retreat or risk envelopment. If success reinforced success, as Stavka expected, the entire German front might well dissolve, opening the way to Berlin and Western Europe before the British and Americans did more than gain a foothold on the continent.
This was the broad-front Grand Design Stalin had sought from the beginning. The program was ambitious, but the Red Army of 1944 had the material strength to implement, and the operational sophistication to plan, the largest, most geographically extensive, coordinated strategic offensive in the history of war. Technically, its armored forces in particular had also moved to an advanced stage.
In 1942 and early 1943 the Red Army’s crucial problem had been maintaining inventory. Design innovation had been suspended. Production increases combined with the advent of the Panthers and Tigers to encourage new developments. In April 1944 the T-34/85, armed with an 85mm gun in a three-man turret, began entering service. Arguably a cut below the Panther technically, the T-34/85 was a battlefield match for both the big German cats—and it could be manufactured in far larger numbers. The KV was replaced on Soviet assembly lines by the JS, named for Josef Stalin. Its definitive World War II version, the JS II was armed with a 122mm gun: the largest caliber used in any numbers by any army. Its low velocity compared to the Panther and Tiger was balanced by the 55-pound weight of its shell: enough to crack open any armor at battle ranges. At 46 tons, its 600 horsepower engine gave the JS a road speed of around 23 miles per hour, and its well-sloped turret armor conferred solid protection from glancing hits. It took the field at the same time as the T-34/85, and was an even less pleasant surprise to German tank crews and panzer commanders.
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