The theory of mutual assured destruction is based on a false premise. It assumes that the United States and the Soviet Union are equal threats to peace and that both must be deterred from launching a nuclear attack. And while a persuasive case can be made for the theory in the abstract, a fatal flaw undercuts it: For the strategy to work, it must be mutual. Not only the United States but particularly the Soviet Union needs to subscribe to its tenets. If only one side adheres to the strategy, it assures not mutual destruction but unilateral superiority for the other side. The problem is that the Kremlin leaders have never signed on. If the United States had stood pat with its strategic bomber force of the 1950s, Moscow would have a total first-strike capability today. If we stand pat with our current strategic forces, the danger is that the Kremlin might be able to achieve a first-strike capability in the decades ahead.
As President, I did not subscribe to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction—and I knew Moscow did not either. I won a hard-fought struggle to get congressional approval for an ABM system to defend our strategic forces. When I signed the ABM Treaty, I was not returning to a strategy based on mutual assured destruction. I traded limitations on defensive systems for a cap on the offensive threat. Moreover, in my administration’s annual reports on the state of the world, I explicitly moved American policy away from mutual assured destruction, a shift upon which all subsequent administrations built.
Moscow still believes in military superiority. Its leaders accept the fact of mutual assured destruction but not the theory. If our strategic forces can survive a first strike, the Kremlin leaders will accept American deterrence as a fact of life. But facts change. Moscow will not view American deterrence as a permanent reality and will do everything within its power to change it. When Secretary McNamara unilaterally limited the size of American nuclear forces, Kremlin leaders pushed ahead with theirs. When President Carter canceled or slowed down American strategic programs, Kremlin leaders accelerated theirs. Moscow viewed American restraint as an opportunity to gain an advantage.
Advocates of mutual assured destruction also fail to realize that advances in the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles will create the possibility of a surgical first strike, perhaps as early as the turn of the century. Strategic weapons used to be crude weapons which were so inaccurate that they could only hit a target the size of a city. That is no longer the case. Both sides today have missiles accurate enough to land a warhead on a target the size of Yankee Stadium on the other side of the world. Technological advances will soon make it possible to target the opposing team’s dugout. That means it will become increasingly feasible for one side to destroy the other’s retaliatory forces. A first strike that is now possible only in theory might become possible in practice.
A strategy of mutual assured destruction would leave the United States with no viable options if deterrence were to fail. If war were to break out, an American President would be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans. That is unacceptable and not credible. Even worse, any policy based solely on the threat to kill millions of civilians is profoundly immoral, especially if an effective alternative exists.
Our ability to launch an all-out retaliation might deter an all-out attack. But deterrence must also cover limited attacks. If the United States cannot meet a limited challenge with a limited response, an American response becomes less likely and an American threat to retaliate less credible. That, in turn, makes the Soviet challenge more likely. It is no longer tenable to base our deterrence solely on a threat of mutual suicide.
Those who advocate mutual assured destruction fail to see that the strategy does not fit the times. Negating the U.S. nuclear deterrent still stands as a principal Soviet objective. Moscow’s strategic buildup has already made American land-based missiles and bombers vulnerable to a first strike. Advances in technology could in the coming decades create the possibility of a successful surgical attack against all of our nuclear forces that would leave the United States without the ability to retaliate. That weakness would not only prompt greater Soviet aggression below the nuclear level but also reduce the American willingness to run risks needed to turn back Soviet challenges.
What does the United States need to do to maintain deterrence in the years beyond 1999? We must have strategic forces that achieve three essential purposes:
No first-strike vulnerability. At a minimum, the United States must have strategic counterforce weapons that the Soviet Union cannot destroy in a first strike. Without retaliatory forces that can survive an attack and that can be used against military targets in the Soviet Union, deterrence evaporates. This capability is doubly important for the United States because Soviet superiority in conventional weapons forces us to rely much more heavily on the threat of nuclear retaliation. We must not allow the strategic balance to deteriorate further and must take measures to reduce the current vulnerability of our land-based forces.
Equivalent capabilities. Our strategic forces must match Moscow’s in terms of capabilities for conflicts other than all-out war. This is most important in a superpower crisis. If the Soviet Union were able to threaten to undertake a limited nuclear strike knowing that the United States did not have an equivalent capability, the Kremlin would have a decisive advantage. It could exploit its greater flexibility and its nuclear superiority through intimidation and nuclear blackmail.
Extended deterrence. We must have nuclear forces that will extend our deterrence to prevent Soviet aggression against key U.S. allies and friends. We have maintained our extended deterrence for forty years through the threat to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons if Moscow moved against our allies. That worked when the United States had nuclear superiority. Kremlin leaders are still faced with the problem that the United States might escalate to the nuclear level to stop Soviet aggression. But we must recognize that, since the Soviets have achieved a margin of nuclear superiority over the United States, the threat has lost much of its credibility.
Through its continuing strategic buildup, the Kremlin threatens our ability to achieve all these goals. But we can counteract Moscow’s efforts in three ways. We can build up our offensive strategic forces, especially our land-based missiles. We can deploy a strategic defense. We can negotiate an arms-control agreement with Moscow that creates a stable and enduring balance of power. Our objective must be to undercut the military value of Soviet first-strike forces. No one of these approaches would be adequate by itself. But action on all three fronts could provide the deterrence we need.
Alone, a buildup of our offensive forces in fixed silos would be counterproductive. It would put us on a hopeless treadmill. An offensive arms race favors an offensive power. Increasing the number of warheads is easier than increasing the number of missiles, because each missile can carry several warheads. The largest Soviet land-based missile has ten warheads, but could be equipped to carry as many as thirty. Even if three Soviet warheads are needed to destroy one American missile, the United States would, at best, need to deploy three times as many missiles as the Soviet Union to reduce the vulnerability of American forces.
An alternative would be to develop mobile land-based missiles, like the proposed Midgetman. I strongly endorsed this concept when it was recommended by the Scowcroft Commission. I still favor it, but it now faces two major problems. First, it is unlikely that the American public and Congress will agree to allow nuclear missiles to roam over the wide areas a mobile system needs to be invulnerable. Federal-government reserves might not be large enough to make the missiles invulnerable, and deploying these weapons on the U.S. railroad or interstate highway system would prompt great opposition. Second, if the Soviet Union continues to develop its strategic defense capabilities, the United States needs to develop multi-warhead, not single-warhead, missiles. If we commit a large proportion of our resources for strategic weapons to a fleet of single-warhead mi
ssiles, even a moderately effective Soviet strategic defense could seriously cut down the effectiveness of an American retaliatory strike. Small, mobile missiles should be a significant part of our deterrent force, but unless these problems are solved they cannot play as big a role as we hoped when the Scowcroft Commission first made its report.
We can and should build strategic weapons capable of hitting hard targets so that we can put at risk a significant portion of the Soviet arsenal. We have done so with the deployment of the first group of MX missiles and with the future deployment of the new Trident II missiles. But that is inadequate. The United States plans to build only forty MX missiles and has deployed them in fixed silos vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The new Trident II is invulnerable at sea, but communication with submerged submarines is difficult at best. The fact is that we still need to build a more substantial land-based force that can survive a Soviet first strike.
A push to deploy a strategic defense to protect the American population, as advocated by many of the proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative, would not solve our strategic problems. The idea of building a defense that would render nuclear weapons obsolete is a myth. It would have to be perfect to work, and not even the most optimistic advocates of the idea believe it would be technologically feasible until well into the next century.
But it is possible to build a limited defense that makes our strategic weapons less vulnerable and that could protect the country against an accidental launch of a few weapons or against a small attack by a nonsuperpower. That kind of defense does not need to be perfect. Even if it were only 50 percent effective, it would so complicate the calculations for executing a Soviet first strike that no Soviet leader could ever be confident of success. Under the best of circumstances, a first strike would be a dicey gamble. With a limited U.S. strategic defense, Moscow’s odds would become even longer. The threat of a Soviet first strike would lose its credibility, and the Kremlin therefore could not use it to blackmail the United States in a superpower crisis.
A limited strategic defense is the key to solving the critical problem of the vulnerability of U.S. land-based forces to a Soviet first strike. President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative not only has been useful in forcing the Soviets to negotiate seriously but also has created the possibility of deploying a limited defense. Though the call for a perfect defense is unrealistic, he deserves high praise for pressing forward with SDI. We should direct the bulk of research and development funds in the Strategic Defense Initiative toward designing a limited defense of our strategic forces, rather than toward the unrealistic hope of a nationwide population defense. An attempt to build a total defense would give us only the chimeral protection of an electronic Maginot Line. We should not pursue the unattainable at the expense of the achievable.
A limited defense would remedy the problems with both the MX and the Midgetman missiles. Putting an MX missile in a fixed silo does not improve the survivability of our forces—but with a limited defense it would greatly improve our security. Deploying Midgetman missiles on federal reserves might leave them vulnerable to a saturation attack—but with a limited defense they would improve our security and improve strategic stability. We should therefore move forward with both a modernization of our offensive forces and a deployment of defensive forces.
We should not bog ourselves down in a legalistic argument about what kind of research, testing, and deployment the ABM Treaty of 1972 permits. I signed the treaty because it served American security interests in the strategic setting of the early 1970s. It was an important achievement and has lasted longer than any other major arms-control pact. To engage in a debate over whether the treaty should be broadly or narrowly interpreted is neither useful nor necessary. When the United States enters into a treaty, we should abide by its terms and not try to squirm out of them by legalistic maneuvering. The treaty specifically provides that either side can opt out on six months’ notice if it finds that events have “jeopardized its supreme interests.” We should determine what we need to do to assure our security. If that requires a limited strategic defense, we should find out what kind of a defense is feasible and then take the steps to develop and deploy it. If that requires the renegotiation of provisions of the ABM Treaty, we should put our demands on the superpower agenda. If Moscow refuses to negotiate, we should then invoke our rights under the treaty to suspend its provisions after a six-month notice.
We should declare that we intend to deploy a limited defense as early as technological advances permit. We should indicate that we prefer to do so through a negotiated timetable but that we will go forward alone if talks fail to produce a timely agreement. The issue of early deployment should be negotiated, but negotiations should not stop us from deploying a system as soon as possible.
While a limited strategic defense would solve some of our problems, it would not solve all our problems. We need to complement it with additional offensive forces. We should not seek a first-strike capability. That would turn out to be politically impossible because the American people would not support it and technologically impossible because the Soviet Union would adopt countermeasures, like its own strategic defense, to render our effort futile. But we still need to deploy new strategic weapons which would, if war broke out, provide an American President with more options than mutual suicide and surrender.
Arms control alone cannot solve our strategic problems, but it can play a major role in doing so. Those who oversell arms control do their cause great damage. While Americans tend to view arms control as an end in itself, the Soviets consider arms control a means to an end. Moscow is right. Arms control alone cannot produce peace or ensure our security. It is only one part of our overall defense policy. It is not an end in itself but a means to maintain our security. To improve our security and mutual stability, defense and arms-control policies must go forward in a coordinated fashion. Each can reinforce the other. It is ironic that so many arms-control proponents oppose SDI, because if President Reagan had not proposed SDI the Soviets would not be negotiating arms control.
A properly negotiated arms-control agreement can be constructive in three ways. First, it can help to produce the strategic stability which could reduce the chances of a crisis escalating into a war. Strategic instability results when either side or both sides deploy weapons that create the potential for a first strike. This in turn creates an incentive to use these weapons in a crisis in order to gain a decisive advantage. The danger is greatest if these weapons themselves are vulnerable to a first strike because in a crisis a leader would be tempted to use his arsenal before he loses it. An agreement that prevents either side from attaining a first-strike capability would enhance strategic stability and reduce the likelihood of war.
Second, an arms-control agreement limiting offensive weapons can increase the effectiveness of a limited strategic defense. Without such an agreement, the Soviets could try to increase their offensive forces in order to overwhelm our defense. Since our defense would seek only to achieve the limited aim of protecting our strategic forces, a Soviet buildup would almost certainly fail to restore its present advantage. But the fact remains that an arms-control agreement capping the level of offensive forces enhances the prospects for an effective strategic defense by limiting the threat.
Third, a serious effort to negotiate on arms control is a political imperative. Western leaders will not be able to mobilize public support for defense spending without a credible arms-control policy. We should not argue about whether or not to negotiate. Those who initially refuse to negotiate, like the superhawks in the Reagan administration, will sooner or later be forced to negotiate by Congress or public opinion. Our focus should be on how to negotiate in a way that serves our interests.
As the United States and the Soviet Union look toward a future strategic-arms-control treaty, we must ensure that it meets four conditions:
Equality. It must be based on equality. Equality in numbers is important, but numbers alone should not be t
he sole measure of equality. We should negotiate the number and size of missiles and the number of warheads so that each side has the same military capability. In this respect, the capability of each side to destroy hardened targets of the other is the most crucial measure. It is vitally important therefore that the sublimits—which are limits on specific types of weapons included under the overall limit—be designed to provide qualitative equality.
Warhead-to-target ratio. It must not allow either superpower to have a credible first-strike capability. It must reduce the ratio of Soviet first-strike warheads to American first-strike targets below the present level. If an agreement allowed an offensive power like the Soviet Union to maintain or increase its present advantage in first-strike weapons, it would actually increase the danger of war and of defeat without war.
Modernization. It must have ironclad provisions against upgrading old missiles into first-strike missiles. Both SALT I and SALT II tried to deal with modernization but failed. The Soviet Union not only violated the spirit of the agreements by exploiting ambiguities in their language to modernize their weapons but also violated the letter of the treaties in deploying more new systems than allowed. If we are to sign an enduring strategic-arms-control agreement, we must treat modernization as a central issue, not as a sideshow.
Verification. It must provide means for each side to verify the compliance of the other. We have relied in the past on satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means of verification. But advances in military technology now require that we settle for nothing less than on-site inspection. The Soviets have always rejected such provisions in the past, but have agreed in the INF Treaty to compromise on this point. This is a good start, but it is not enough for START. We must insist that the provisions for on-site inspection are more than cosmetic. We must make the Soviets understand that two thirds of the Senate will vote for ratification only if we have absolute confidence that both sides will carry out the agreement.
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