* * *
There were a few other situations that Mandela sought to address, committed as he was to the principle of extending the culture of human rights across the continent. There was a corresponding pull from the peoples of those countries from the south to the north who felt that South Africa had a moral obligation to come to their aid in recompense for their support of the liberation struggle.
For the continent to survive, however, there was a need for the creation of a climate conducive to investment. The turmoil and strife often had their origins in unstable economic circumstances. Addressing this issue, Mandela said, ‘We need support from the old industrial countries. They owe us that support, not as a question of charity but because we are entitled to it. Our region and many others were subjected to the most brutal form of exploitation in the colonial era.’19
As usual, while Mandela had effectively written the playbook on the merits of reconciliation, which was aimed at securing the future, he was equally reluctant to let the iniquities of the past, such as the impact of colonialism, go unaddressed. Africa’s rebirth would not be possible in isolation; it had to happen in collaboration with the rest of the world.
* * *
In his almost two thousand days as president of the Republic of South Africa, Mandela brought an intense spotlight on his country, and simultaneously engaged South Africa – a country that had been engrossed in its own drama – in world events. The adulation showered on a black person by admired luminaries, especially from the Western world, edified a sizeable section of whites. Of greater importance was the acceptance of South Africa in prestigious world bodies and the abolishment of the country’s status – felt more acutely by white people during the boycotts and embargoes – as a skunk among nations.
The emergent South African foreign policy, evolved in part from the multifaceted relations developed by the ANC over the years, which had more foreign missions than the apartheid government, reflected the dynamic changes the world was going through with the end of the Cold War.
Alongside South Africa’s focus on African renewal, relations with countries of the south occupied a vital place. Mandela outlined his vision in his address to a summit of Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur – the Southern Common Market), which comprises several Latin and South American economies, in 1998. He spoke of the ‘unity of experience of the developing world and the great potential for strengthening the South through cooperation and building relations amongst ourselves and at the same time how this could be the basis for advancing a mutually beneficial partnership with the countries of the North …
‘Common contexts led us both – in the Southern part of Africa and in the Southern cone of Latin America – to establish and build regional associations informed by a commitment to democracy; by the imperatives of development in a rapidly globalising world economy; and by the recognition that peace and security are dependent on development, social equity and proper environmental management in the context of the goal of sustainable development …
‘Amongst the greatest opportunities for fruitful cooperation lies in coordinated interventions in multilateral organisations in order to promote policy and action that is in the interest of developing countries …
‘One thinks, as a striking example of the potential for such cooperation, of the initiative on nuclear matters of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic, which includes both Mercosur and SADC members.
‘In advancing the idea of linkages and cooperation between the world’s four existing or prospective nuclear-weapon free zones, the organisation has pointed a way towards consolidating the status of a Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas free from the threat of nuclear weapons.*
‘Such a development, built on the fact that the four zones and demilitarised Antarctica comprise more than half the earth’s land mass, could promote non-proliferation and reinforce progress towards nuclear disarmament. The success in achieving consensus on such a complex matter indicates the potential of South–South cooperation for helping shape the emerging world order. The fora for such concerted action are numerous. Democracy has brought South Africa the opportunity to play its part in this process, and it is strongly committed to doing so to the full; whether as a new member of the African–Caribbean–Pacific group of countries; as a member of the Organisation of African Unity and SADC; as chair of UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development]; or a member of the newly established Indian Ocean Rim Association.’20
Four years earlier, when delivering his first speech as president of the United Nations Assembly, Mandela had stressed the urgency of reshaping the priorities of the international community and the interdependence of nations and regions.
‘The very response of the international community to the challenge of apartheid confirmed this very point that we all understood, that as long as apartheid existed in South Africa, so long would the whole of humanity feel demeaned and degraded.’21
The United Nations, he said, ‘understood this very well that racism in our country could not but feed racism in other parts of the world as well. The universal struggle against apartheid was therefore not an act of charity arising out of pity for our people, but an affirmation of our common humanity.
‘We believe that an act of affirmation requires that this Organisation should once more turn its focused and sustained attention to the basics of everything that makes for a better world for all humanity.’22
Mandela was a firm believer in the capacity of the multilateral bodies to effect change, no matter how long it took. For him it was satisfying to watch a trend take shape; while this was born of common sense – the understanding that the more consensus there was to deliver a decision, the more legitimate it would be – it was also based on the strategic culture of the ANC. The journey towards the establishment of a democratic South Africa – the various steps from negotiations to the signing off on the new constitution – had been characterised by a painstaking adherence to the principle of consensus. Mandela had faith in the sensibility of a collective coming to a decision that would change society.
At the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit that met in Durban in 1998, Mandela stressed the imperative of reshaping the global order. Formed at the height of the Cold War in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, during the collapse of the colonial system and the rise of the independence struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the NAM was crucial to the decolonisation process and played a key role in the preservation of world peace and security.
Mandela said: ‘We have to remake our common world anew. The violence we see all around us, against people who are as human as we who sit in privileged positions, must surely be addressed in a decisive and sustained manner.’23
He was speaking of the ‘violence of hunger which kills, of the violence of homelessness which kills, of the violence of joblessness which kills, of the violence of malaria and HIV/AIDS which kill and of the trade in narcotics, which kill. I speak of the destruction of human lives, which attends underdevelopment … the violence of war …
‘What I am speaking of are the twin issues of development and peace, which have been the central objectives of our [Non-Aligned] Movement from its foundation and remain its principal challenges.’24
Taking the message to the northern hemisphere, Mandela addressed a joint session of the United States House of Congress. As on previous occasions, he first had to wait until the cheering from an otherwise sedate chamber of grandees had died down before launching into his speech. In the hushed silence, his voice carried to the furthest corners of the hall, the distinguished men and women nodding now and then when the speaker struck a note that resonated with their convictions. He spoke of Martin Luther King, Jr, and quoted T. S. Eliot and Walt Whitman.
‘It will perhaps come to pass, to be that this interconnectedness will produce among you, the distinguished members of these Houses of Congress, as among other actors on the world stage, policies which will spring from a common recognition of the fact t
hat success or failure in the conduct of human affairs, can no longer be measured within the limited sphere defined by national boundaries that are the legacy of an ancient reality, away from which life itself has moved society a thousand leagues. If what we say is true, that, manifestly, the world is one stage and the actions of all its inhabitants part of the same drama, does it not then follow that each one of us as nations, including yourselves, should begin to define the national interest to include the genuine happiness of others, however distant in time and space their domicile might be.
‘You, honourable members of the US Congress, are part of and represent the most powerful nation in our universe. I am, on the other hand, an African.
‘I come out of a continent with whose travails and suffering you are very familiar. You will therefore understand it easily why I stand up to say that for such a powerful country as yours, democracy, peace and prosperity in Africa are as much in your national interest as ours.
‘Because I am an African, you will, I am certain, understand why I should stand here and say that it is our deeply held belief that the new world order that is in the making must focus on the creation of a world of democracy, peace and prosperity for all humanity.’25
He made more overseas visits, building trade and economic ties with countries of the Asia–Pacific region, well on its way to becoming one of the world’s main economic areas. He went first to India and then it was Japan and South Korea and later the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Thailand and Pakistan and, at the end of his presidency, China.
Mandela extended his tours to Scandinavia and Finland too, which had given unstinting support to the ANC during the hardest periods of the struggle. The help had been both material and political and assisted the efforts of almost all of the southern African liberation movements. Late in his presidency, he thanked the Scandinavian people for past support and voiced his confidence in future cooperation:
‘The achievement of our goals depends also on others achieving the same goals. In this modern world, whatever happens in one country has an impact elsewhere, even across the globe. The integrated development of Southern Africa; peace and stability throughout our continent; and the forging of an international order which ensures that world economic growth translates into development are all essential parts of our approach as we establish our place in the international community of nations.’26
Some of Mandela’s initiatives to extend human rights to jurisdictions far and wide – as witnessed by his disastrous interaction with Nigerian general Sani Abacha, as discussed in chapter nine – met resistance and ended in failure. The only sanction against Nigeria for the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni activists was a three-and-a-half-year suspension from the prestigious Commonwealth of Nations. The impact of this experience constituted a broader shift in South Africa’s foreign policy towards a greater involvement of multilateral bodies without closing the space for interventions by President Mandela.
He did, however, manage a breakthrough in the matter of Lockerbie. He had ruffled official feathers in the US when, on a goodwill tour of African states in May 1990, he had thanked Muammar Gaddafi for Libya’s support. He further reacted to the ruins of Gaddafi’s residence, which had been targeted in a 1986 US bombing of Libya, ostensibly in retaliation for an act of terrorism for which Libya was allegedly responsible. ‘Whatever differences there may be between countries, and people,’ Mandela said, ‘it is unacceptable that any one attempts to murder an opponent and his family.’27
By the time Mandela went to Libya again, in 1992, arrest warrants had been issued in Scotland for two Libyans suspected of the bombing of the Pan American passenger plane as it flew over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988. There had been 270 fatalities, including passengers and crew as well as local residents on the ground.
Libya didn’t want to hand the suspects over, and the country mobilised the Arab League and the OAU; these bodies were as much concerned about Lockerbie as about the United States’ unilateral imposition of sanctions on Libya and their impact on the rest of Africa.28
Mandela’s approach was that if there was clear evidence of the suspects’ culpability, they should be tried by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, to obviate the humiliation of a head of state. He urged ‘the countries concerned to show statesmanship and leadership. This will ensure that the decade of the 90s will be free from confrontation and conflict.’29
Mandela had spoken to a series of international representatives about his statement. Hank Cohen, US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, confirmed that the statement tallied with a resolution on Lockerbie due to be adopted by the UN Security Council later that day. Others on Mandela’s list were UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UK Minister for Overseas Development and Africa Lynda Chalker and the Spanish and French embassies.
Notwithstanding this flurry of activity, the UN Security Council had imposed air-travel sanctions on Libya because the suspects had not been handed over. On his way to a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Scotland, Mandela called on Gaddafi, hoping to convince him to reach an understanding with the West.30 Before arriving in Libya, Mandela called for the lifting of sanctions against Libya, a position adopted by the OAU summit earlier in the year.31
This time, Mandela entered Libya by car from neighbouring Tunis to avoid violating the UN embargo on air travel to Libya. Addressing the media in Libya, he reiterated his position:
‘The Organisation of African Unity has called for the … suspects … [to] be tried by a neutral country. That is a position, which I discussed in 1992 with the Americans, with President [Jacques] Mitterrand, with King [Juan] Carlos of Spain, as well as Prime Minister [John] Major. Our position is that the suspect must be tried by a neutral country. We cannot accept that one country should be complainant, the prosecutor and the judge at one and the same time. Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done.’32
Asked if the angry reaction, especially from the US Government, affected him, Mandela responded: ‘Well, a politician must not have a delicate skin. If you’re a politician, you must be prepared to suffer for your principles. That is why we chose to remain in prison for twenty-seven years because we did not want to change our principles.’ Gesturing to Gaddafi, he said, ‘This is my friend. He helped us at a time when we were all alone, when those who are now saying we should not come here were helping the enemy. Those who say I should not come here have no morals and I’m not going to join them in their lack of morality.’33
The negotiations became protracted and combined the efforts of Mandela, his envoy, Jakes Gerwel, the Saudi diplomat Prince Bandar bin Sultan and the UN. These worked on a solution that involved three countries and their leaders, that is, Gaddafi, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The initiative was bolstered by growing multilateral support within the OAU, NAM and the Arab League, and by a ruling from the International Court of Justice that it had jurisdiction over the Lockerbie matter; this implied that it was a legal matter rather than a matter of international security for the UN to deal with.34
Within this context, Mandela and his envoys created a space publicly for negotiation towards compromise while persuading, and even applying pressure, in private. For instance, he would praise Gaddafi in public, bestowing on him the highest honour that could be bestowed on citizens of other countries. In private, however, when he felt it was necessary, he would admonish Gaddafi about the need to speak civilly of others, such as the United Nations, even if he did not agree with them.35 Mandela used his personal relationships with Gaddafi, Clinton and Blair during these crucial moments, exemplifying the role of direct personal relations among leaders in his approach to negotiations and conflict resolution.
The upshot of this diplomacy was that, on 19 March 1999, Mandela was able to stand tall and tell the Libyan people that the Lockerbie matter had been concluded. ‘It is with great admiration for the Libyan people that I can today announce to the world that Libya has decided to write to
the secretary-general of the United Nations to give a firm date for the handing over for trial in the Netherlands of the two Libyan nationals named as suspects in the Lockerbie case … You the Libyan people have proved Africa’s potential to be the leaders of peace, equality and prosperity for all as we enter the new millennium. We salute you and wish you well and Godspeed.’36
* * *
Some of the choices that Mandela made were uncomfortable but they were taken in the broader interests of the country. One such case was the policy switch that South Africa had to make when it chose to derecognise the Republic of China in order to recognise the People’s Republic of China.* Jakes Gerwel remembered the moment when it was no longer possible for Mandela to postpone the decision:
He always said: ‘Look, we cannot indecently end the relations with Taiwan because of what they had done prior to the elections.’ Suddenly, one morning, he told me: ‘The time has come.’ I always said to others, in the beginning one got the sense of being a political adviser to Madiba – but Madiba is in some sense inadvisable; he’s got what the Germans call that ‘finger-tip feeling’. The old man sometimes makes a political call because he has an intuitive sense for timing. That’s what happened. He woke up one morning; he first called the ambassador to tell him that we were going to go this route, and then made the announcement.37
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