by Burl Barer
Dr. Tappin saw St. Pierre three times in January, and again on February 4. “Mr. St. Pierre did not exhibit any symptoms of a profound thinking disturbance,” reported Tappin. “He is insightful, and perceives his present difficulty as being directly related to an overly suspicious aspect of his personality. He admits to very poor control over his aggressive impulses. He has difficulty controlling his murderous feelings toward other inmates, and wanted to kill the inmates he believed were talking about him.”
The evaluations noted that despite the preponderance of evidence against him, Paul St. Pierre maintained an unrealistic view of his situation, expressed feelings of grandiosity, and insisted that he could be the best adviser in his own case. “He depicts his behavior in the courtroom, with his first lawyer,” said Tappin, “as an indication of his ‘power.’ ”
Dr. Tappin believed Paul St. Pierre understood the charges against him, but was incapable of cooperating effectively with his defense attorney. “Because of his highly suspicious attitude, the likelihood of dangerous and explosive behavior in the courtroom, the grandiose concept of himself, and a suicidal tendency,” Tappin concluded, “Mr. Paul St. Pierre is not competent to stand trial. He should be committed to Western Washington State Hospital for treatment of his paranoid personality disorder.” Tappin added that Paul St. Pierre was “fully aware of the rightness and wrongness of his actions, and therefore should not be considered as legally insane with respect to the crime.”
On February 11, 1985, Judge Stone delayed the trial, setting a new date of March 27. He also ordered another complete psychiatric evaluation of Paul St. Pierre by Dr. Joseph Lloyd, MD, staff psychiatrist of the Mentally Ill Offender Program at Western State Hospital.
Lloyd described Paul St. Pierre as “a powerfully built, somewhat disheveled young white man” who denied physical distress, but was obviously anxious during the entire interview situation. “He was cooperative within the limits of his ability to cooperate,” said Dr. Lloyd, who also reported that St. Pierre was “globally paranoid,” not sure that he could trust anyone except himself, and doubted his ability to cooperate with his attorney. “He was maintaining his self-control only by the narrowest of margins,” observed Dr. Lloyd. “Perhaps small amounts of medication might help him think more clearly and organize his thoughts in a better fashion.”
Dr. Lloyd’s diagnostic impression was identical to those of Muscatel and Tappin: “Paranoid Personality [and] Adjustment Disorder with disturbances of emotions and conduct as a result of incarceration in the isolation cell at the jail. Psychosis is highly possible at any time,” said Lloyd, “I concur with Dr. Tappin and Dr. Muscatel that he is barely competent at the present time. Continued segregation is likely to worsen his mental state.”
On March 7, 1985, the first competency hearing of Paul St. Pierre began at 9:45 A.M. Prosecutor Hultman delineated the hearing’s fundamental purpose. “Today is the date set for the court to determine and review the competence of Paul St. Pierre. His competency was put into question as a result of examinations and reports received from doctors Kenneth M. Muscatel and Charles Tappin, retained by the defense for that purpose, as well as ours, Dr. Joseph Lloyd. The court also directed that the defendant be examined at the Pierce County Jail by a member of the staff for Western State Hospital.”
“The obvious issue,” interjected David Murdach, “is whether or not Mr. Paul St. Pierre is competent to go to trial. My client, by virtue of these reports, is incompetent to stand trial.”
Under Washington State law, the defense attorney’s opinion as to his client’s competency is accorded great weight. He, as well as the experts, plays a part in the court’s decision regarding the defendant’s competency to stand trial and assist in his own defense.
The first witness called on behalf of Paul St. Pierre was Dr. Joseph Lloyd. Lloyd, at the request of the prosecutor’s office, had interviewed St. Pierre on February 22, 1985.
“He was right on the edge between being able to perceive reality and being psychotic,” Lloyd testified. “My impression was that Mr. St. Pierre was in and out of competency.” Dr. Lloyd further testified that Paul St. Pierre could get worse if not taken out of solitary confinement, but did not agree that St. Pierre should be sent to Western State Hospital. “I don’t know what the purpose of him going to Western State would be. Mr. St. Pierre is not in so bad a shape that it would require in-patient care.”
During cross-examination by Carl Hultman, Dr. Lloyd reiterated his opinion regarding the negative effect of solitary confinement, and offered that appropriate medications, and a return to general population, could render Paul St. Pierre competent to stand trial.
Dr. Tappin was the next expert called to the witness stand. “What was significant,” Tappin testified, “was a profound disturbance in his ability to trust individuals, or trust the circumstances in which he was living. I felt he was very paranoid. Basically, I came out with the impression that he was suspicious and seemed to bear thoughts of grandiosity to be able to control everything around him, by being a powerful individual. To that extent, I felt his judgment was quite impaired.”
Dr. Tappin also stated that St. Pierre’s feelings of anger, hostility, and fear would negatively affect his ability to aid in his own defense. “I felt, therefore, that he was not competent. I would state that he did not present a classical picture of an incompetent individual. There is a marginal competency.”
Dr. Tappin asserted his firm conviction that two weeks at Western State Hospital could make all the difference, and in his professional opinion, Paul St. Pierre was currently not competent to stand trial.
Dr. Muscatel, the final witness in the hearing, also testified to Paul St. Pierre’s “paranoid personality,” terming him “deeply disturbed.” Muscatel agreed with Dr. Tappin’s suggestion that St. Pierre be admitted to Western State Hospital for further evaluation.
Following a ten-minute recess, David Murdach addressed the court, and described his client as delusional, dangerous, unpredictable, and completely incompetent either to stand trial or assist in his own defense. Murdach based these statements upon his own personal experiences with his troubled client, who spoke of spiders crawling all over him during the night. St. Pierre also told Murdach that he was experiencing the same feelings as when he attempted attacking Carl Hultman in the courtroom. Judge Stone, unfamiliar with the incident, looked at Murdach with increased interest.
“The court was not involved in that proceeding,” Murdach explained, “but Mr. St. Pierre physically went after Mr. Hultman in the prior proceeding some time ago. He’s feeling that kind of emotion coming back on him,” Murdach told Judge Stone. “He has begun breathing heavy, and is afraid he will flip out. He says he cannot take the witness stand because of the possibility of his future actions. My client also related to me experiences in the Marine Corps. He saw a demon or a witch through the window.... The other soldiers told him that the witch was a sign that he was being shown the road to hell.”
Murdach further recounted that Paul St. Pierre saw the ceiling moving when he was in bed, was afraid of talking on the telephone, and assumed there were hidden microphones in the walls. “He also described experiences in the Marine Corps with guerrillas in the jungle, and the marines helping the government hunt them down. He described the combat in that situation.” Paul St. Pierre’s tour of duty in the marines, his lawyer discovered, was during peacetime. His client never experienced combat, and there was no jungle action against guerrillas.
“My problem with Mr. St. Pierre,” stated Murdach, “is the fact that I do not feel he is able to understand the nature of the proceedings. Based on my statements, and all the statements of the witnesses thus far, I think the preponderance of evidence has clearly been shown that Mr. Paul St. Pierre, at the present time, is incompetent to stand trial.”
Murdach recommended that St. Pierre be sent to Western State Hospital for up to ninety days of review and evaluation prior to the court setting a firm trial date. “The only reasonabl
e approach,” he said, “is to set a firm trial date as soon as a report is received back from Western State concerning his competency to go forward.” He also requested that St. Pierre be removed from solitary and returned to the general population.
Prosecutor Carl Hultman expressed his earlier suspicions that Paul St. Pierre was “trying to manipulate things,” but acknowledged that expert testimony said otherwise. “He is just not manipulating the system—this is not some transparent or artificial effort to affect our ability to start this trial. There is another trial date right now, which has not been changed, which involves both the St. Pierre brothers charged with aggravated murder in the first degree relating to the death of John Achord. It is still set for March twenty-fifth, two days before this court’s case—before Your Honor is to begin. I don’t know what more I can say, how frustrating the state finds itself in the position it is in.... The state concedes that it has not presented evidence to refute.”
Murdach was blatantly stunned when Judge Stone firmly declared, “I am unable to find by a preponderance of evidence whether Paul St. Pierre is unwilling to cooperate with counsel, or whether he is unable to cooperate with counsel. That is the only issue as I see it to competency. The decision the court makes is that I am unable to find that Paul St. Pierre is incompetent. I am unwilling or decline to order him transferred to Western State Hospital for any period.”
Disappointed, Murdach asked Stone why he found Paul St. Pierre competent despite expert medical testimony to the contrary.
“The court was presented with two factors as I understand the law,” replied Stone. “Number one: a person must be able to understand the charges against him, and I presume the consequences. The experts were in full agreement that he did fully understand.
“We then go to the question of cooperation with defense counsel, and it came down to the question of unwilling versus unable. In the mind of the court,” Judge Stone explained, “there has been no preponderance of evidence on that subject. I find him competent today, and I make no apologies for it.”
Stone then informed Murdach and Hultman that he’d requested an appearance by the sheriff’s authorities. The judge wanted a better understanding of the county jail’s policies, especially in regard to Paul St. Pierre receiving the medications suggested by Dr. Tappin and Dr. Lloyd.
Murdach’s irritation with both the decision and the planned proceeding was ill concealed. If the court would not rely on the expert testimony of Tappin and Lloyd regarding St. Pierre’s incompetence, why would the court heed their recommendations concerning medications?
“Because of the predictions,” Stone explained, “the predictions are that as long as he is in isolation, these problems are not going to get better. They will probably get worse. I heard some gloomy predictions ... and I would like every safeguard.”
The following day, March 8, 1985, Judge Stone presided over a hearing he initiated. “Absolutely,” concurred Stone, “there is no question this hearing was initiated by the court. It was not initiated by either the defendant or the prosecutor.” The defense thought the proceeding useless; prosecutor Hultman said, “none of us would have called it.” It was Judge Stone’s hearing, and he had his reasons.
“Yesterday the court heard testimony regarding the competency of Paul St. Pierre,” began Stone. “The testimony was in dispute, but the court made a ruling on competency. As the court interpreted the evidence, regardless of which doctor you listened to, or which attorney you listened to, it seemed almost total agreement that whatever Paul St. Pierre’s condition was, it would not be getting any better in isolation and might very well get worse. I think it is obvious that the court expects to explore the issue on the question of isolation for Paul St. Pierre pending trial.”
Stone then called John Shields, chief of the Bureau of Corrections, to the witness stand. Employed by the sheriff’s department, Shields was responsible for the corrections bureau’s overall operation, including the classification and segregation of prisoners in the Pierce County Jail.
Shields had moved St. Pierre, originally placed in general population, to maximum security. “This is because of his past history of violence, and a future possibility of violence as indicated by his psychologist. The way I see our responsibility,” explained Shields, “we have the welfare in mind of the other inmates, the corrections officers, and the individual himself. We have put everyone on notice that he is dangerous to other people. We have no facility for holding mentally ill people.”
Judge Stone asked Shields how the Bureau of Corrections would feel about the court, if possible and legal, ordering St. Pierre returned to the general population. The answer was swift, uncompromising, and emphatic: “Resistance on our part.”
Stone pondered the situation and found it uncomfortable from whatever angle it was viewed. If St. Pierre stayed in isolation, he would get worse. If returned to the general population, he might improve. He also might kill a fellow prisoner—a possibility honestly acknowledged by St. Pierre himself. The third option, and it was only a possibility, was medication administered in jail whether Paul St. Pierre wanted it or not. The fundamental question Stone needed answered: “Does the court have authority to order the sheriff to do certain things in the jail which is basically the sheriff’s jurisdiction?”
“It is probably in violation of the law,” offered Carl Hultman. “The Washington Administrative Code makes it clear that the chief of corrections, the person responsible for running the jail, has the responsibility to identify and classify and segregate. There is an awful lot of attention given to safety of all inmates.” Hultman referred to specific provisions of the state code stating: “Problem prisoners who endanger the health and safety of other prisoners or themselves shall be segregated.”
The defendant unquestionably fulfilled the state’s criteria for segregation, and the court had no legal authority to tell John Shields which prisoners should be segregated, and which ones belong in general population.
Judge Stone questioned the safety of other patients and hospital personnel were he to order St. Pierre sent to Western State Hospital. “I didn’t advocate Western State,” interjected Hultman. “I am very concerned about Mr. St. Pierre being at Western State Hospital except under the most extraordinary tightly supervised security.”
David Murdach, advocating his client’s transfer to Western State Hospital, advised Judge Stone that St. Pierre would be in a locked ward, not wandering the hallways, strolling the grounds, or stalking its residents.
“What is needed here,” insisted Murdach, “is an evaluation of Mr. St. Pierre under the guidance of trained professionals in a hospital setting with twenty-four-hour monitoring. They will have a complete hospital record, and can finally make a recommendation as to competency.” The defense felt that allowing two weeks for evaluation at Western State would “fit nicely” with the start of the trial.
Judge Stone, constrained by the law itself, expressed his frustration. “The court has the very distasteful alternative of sending somebody to a hospital when we say he is too dangerous for the jail, or at least a portion of the jail. OK, the court will decline to order the sheriff to do anything. This case won’t go away, I know that. The problems of it won’t go away. I had hoped they might get better instead of worse, and maybe my hopes are in vain. The court makes a nonruling on my own suggestion.”
David Murdach immediately referred Stone’s competency ruling to the Washington State Court of Appeals. “I was a little surprised when it was stated that something was before the court of appeals,” said Judge Stone. “Not that I’m surprised on the merits, but I didn’t know you could take one to the court of appeals before the judge had entered any written order.”
The idea of his ruling being reversed by the court of appeals didn’t bother him. “Frankly, it’s happened plenty of times, and over many years, and it will happen again in what I hope to be many years to go on the bench. There is no question on the competency ruling,” said Stone, “this court got led by
a capable doctor who made a prediction how he felt the whole problem could be sort of avoided. And frankly, the prediction in my opinion was logical. I don’t know whether the court should reconsider or not reconsider the decision.”
“In light of the court’s comments,” Murdach said, “I would move the court for reconsideration of its decision that Mr. Paul St. Pierre was competent to stand trial.”
“What is it specifically you are asking the court at this time? What specific remedy?” asked Stone.
“The remedy I’m asking for,” answered Murdach, “is for him to be transferred to Western State Hospital consistent with the recommendation of Dr. Tappin. It’s for him to be committed for ninety days. Then, after ninety days, if he is still incompetent, to be committed for another ninety-day period. I urge the court to reconsider its decision, and to have him declared incompetent at the present time. The reason is, he is in and out of competence. Quite frankly, I don’t know, from one day to the next, what day he is competent and what day he is incompetent. And if at trial he is fluctuating—going in and out of competency—I don’t think we can receive a fair trial. Paul St. Pierre is incompetent as far as Dr. Tappin and I are concerned, and we need to have more assessments done of him to really determine if he is truly competent to stand trial. There is no sense having an incompetent person languishing in some cell if he never is going to regain competency. On the other hand, the state is allowed to proceed in the case if in fact competency is restored.”
Stone, faced with endless ambiguity as to Paul St. Pierre’s competency, and the rising specter of increased psychosis were the defendant to remain in isolated segregation, reconsidered his previous ruling. “My previous ruling seemed logical at the time,” remarked Stone, “but not necessarily consistent with the testimony of the experts or the opinions of the attorneys. The court will, in effect, reconsider, and the court now makes a finding of incompetency.”