The Main Directorate ‘SMERSH’ has information that some counterintelligence units have considerable quantities of unofficially acquired vehicles and various trophy properties.
These properties were not registered with and evaluated by ‘SMERSH’ organs. This leads to their inappropriate usage and storage and creates the conditions for violations of the law.
To establish order in the keeping, accounting, and use of properties in ‘SMERSH’s’ possession, I order:
The immediate organization of all SMERSH properties. Detailed descriptions should be reported to the Main Directorate ‘SMERSH.’ All properties should be sealed and their use forbidden…
Heads of ‘SMERSH’ organs who continue to hold unaccounted properties, or to embezzle valuables, will be court-martialed regardless of their positions.27
Abakumov did not apply this order to himself: a search of his two huge apartments after his arrest in 1951 yielded a long list of items stolen in Germany.
Despite a clear preference for Abakumov, Stalin did not dismiss Serov, and Serov continued to report on SMERSH in Germany. In September 1946, he described the situation during 1945 in a letter to Stalin claiming that Abakumov ‘used to call Vadis or his deputy Sidnev on the phone and demand that they not report to [Serov] or follow his orders. [Abakumov] threatened them with reprimands and even arrest.’28 Serov also complained about SMERSH’s activity:
During the last period, when ‘Smersh’ was no longer subordinate to me in operational work, I received numerous reports about its outrageous activities, and I always informed Zelenin [head of the UKR of GSOVG] about these cases and even reported common occurrences to the Ministry [MGB]…
For instance, in the evening, drunken ‘Smersh’ officers went to a field near the city of Halle to carry out death sentences decreed by the Military Tribunal. Because the officers were drunk, they buried the bodies carelessly. Germans passing along on a nearby road in the morning saw two hands and a head sticking out of the ground. They dug out the corpses, saw bullet holes in the backs of their heads [a Soviet method of execution], gathered witnesses, and reported to the local police. We were forced to take urgent measures.
The same year two German women, arrested [i.e., kidnapped] in the British zone of Berlin, escaped from ‘Smersh’s’ custody in the division commanded by General V.[asilii] Stalin [Stalin’s son]. After their escape, they told the British that they had been arrested by the Russians. ‘Smersh’ officers tried to conceal this fact, but General V. Stalin found out and informed me about the situation. We took the necessary measures.29
Although Serov did not identify the particular ‘urgent measures’ that were taken in the first case, the Germans who found the bodies were most likely arrested and sent to a concentration camp. In the second case, since Vasilii Stalin was involved and had probably told the story to his father, the guilty SMERSH officers were most likely arrested and tried.
Zhukov Leaves Germany
Vasilii Stalin’s complaints to his father about the poor quality of Soviet planes compared with American aircraft led to SMERSH’s last arrests of high-ranking generals, to Zhukov’s downfall and to the discrediting of Georgii Malenkov.30 The story began in 1943 when air force commander in chief Aleksandr Novikov complained to Stalin about the undisciplined behavior of Vasilii, Stalin’s 21-year-old son, who was a military pilot. Vasilii was unhappy with Novikov’s order that he fly only one plane as the other pilots did, and not three planes, as he wanted.
That year Stalin promoted Vasilii from captain to colonel—two ranks higher. Soon Vasilii was appointed commander of an air force corps, but three months later the Air Force Military Council dismissed him when an officer was killed during one of his drinking parties, and eight others, including Vasilii, were wounded. Stalin approved the dismissal: ‘Colonel Stalin is dismissed from the position of corps commander for drunkenness and debauchery and for corrupting the corps.’31 Vasilii continued his service in 1944, but Stalin did not talk to him until the Potsdam Conference. Vasilii accompanied his father to Potsdam and used that opportunity to complain about Novikov.
In early December 1945, Novikov (now Chief Marshal of Aviation and Commander of the Air Force, having been twice awarded the Gold Star for Hero of the Soviet Union) did not sign a document approving the promotion of the 24-year-old Vasilii to the rank of major general. On New Year’s Eve, Stalin suddenly called Novikov at home to ask why.33 Novikov explained that Vasilii was too young and had a poor professional education, having graduated from an aviation school rather than the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy. Stalin ordered Novikov to put Vasilii’s name on the general list of promotions.
After this conversation, the frustrated Novikov called Zhukov and told him of Stalin’s demand. Zhukov said: ‘You can’t do anything, this is an order!’ Since Zhukov’s telephone was tapped, SMERSH now knew there was a connection between Novikov and Zhukov.
As a first step, SMERSH operatives arrested Marshal Sergei Khudyakov while he was on his way to Moscow from the Far East.34 Khudyakov was an Armenian, and his real name was Armenak Khanferyants. During the war with Germany, he had been Novikov’s deputy; then he had commanded the 12th Air Force Army that successfully fought against the Japanese. During the investigation, SMERSH operatives put Khudyakov in Sukhanovo Prison. Accused of having been a British spy, Khudyakov (under torture) signed testimony that Aviation Industry Commissar Aleksei Shakhurin and his subordinates had conducted activities to sabotage aircraft production. His statement also mentioned Novikov, Zhukov, and some others.
Stalin read the transcript of Khudyakov’s interrogation, and on December 29, he instructed the Politburo to dismiss Shakhurin from his post. Shakhurin was accused of looting for bringing in seven cars from Germany, and Stalin soon ordered Abakumov to arrest Shakhurin on charges of building defective planes. On April 4, 1946, Abakumov’s operatives arrested Shakhurin. The arrests of the other members of the so-called ‘Aviators Case,’ whose names Khudyakov was forced to mention under torture, continued through April (Appendix I, see http://www.smershbook.com). As a result, Aleksandr Repin (Chief Engineer of the Air Force and Novikov’s deputy); Nikolai Seleznyov (who during the war headed the Main Directorate of the Air Force in charge of ordering military equipment); Nikolai Shimanov (a member of the Air Force Military Council); and two administrators at the Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee, A. V. Budnikov (head of the department that managed the building of airplanes) and G. M. Grigoryan (head of the department that managed the manufacture of airplane motors), ended up in Lubyanka Prison.35
On April 11, Stalin sent a letter to the Politburo members and the newly appointed heads of the military aviation industry, accusing Shakhurin and the other arrestees of accepting, during the war, newly built military planes that had defects in exchange for being rewarded for having a high number of new planes in the air force. The letter ended with the statement: ‘Front pilots helped us to discover this affair. The guilty have already been arrested—Shakhurin, Repin, and Seleznyov, as well as a member of the Air Force Military Council, Shimanov. Testimonies of the arrested are attached. Secretary of the Central Committee J. Stalin.’36 In fact, there were no ‘front pilots’ except Vasilii Stalin, who complained to his father about Novikov, while the attached ‘testimonies’ had been falsified by Abakumov’s investigators and signed by the arrestees under torture. In support of Stalin’s accusations, a special commission headed by Nikolai Bulganin concluded that the air force had accepted and used newly built military planes that had defects.
On April 22, 1946, a group of SMERSH operatives arrived in Novikov’s apartment. This was the last arrest Abakumov made as head of SMERSH. Novikov’s daughter Svetlana recalled:
Abakumov himself showed up during the search [of the apartment]. Behaving like the owner of the apartment, he went through all rooms, inspecting the whole interior. Apparently, he wanted to take something. He came up to the radio-record player machine, the most advanced technological achievement of the time. He pu
t a record on the player and listened to the music, then stepped back. Obviously, he did not like the machine: the sound was not good, and the machine did not look great. He did not look at us [Novikov’s family members]; we were useless to him. He strolled through the rooms one more time and left, clearly dissatisfied.37
It was common that while arresting a person and searching his room or apartment, security officers grabbed some valuables for themselves. After Novikov had been arrested, Vasilii Stalin took Novikov’s dacha (country house). Novikov and all the arrested generals were deprived of their military ranks and awards.
Abakumov put Aleksandr Leonov, head of the GUKR’s Investigation Department, and two of his ruthless deputies, Mikhail Likhachev and Vladimir Komarov, in charge of the investigation. Additionally, Aleksandr Chernov, head of SMERSH’s Secretariat, and his deputy Yakov Broverman, wrote falsified interrogation transcripts. Likhachev quickly reduced Novikov to ‘a state of physical and moral depression.’38 Another arrestee, Aleksandr Repin, later described Likhachev’s methods: ‘From the first day of my arrest I was deprived of sleep. I was interrogated day and night… After two or three days of this regime… I was reduced to a state where I would give any testimony to stop this torture.’39
Later Novikov told his daughter that he was interrogated during the nights until 5 a.m.40 Then he was forced to have a drink laced with a sleeping drug. A mere hour later, at 6 a.m., all prisoners, including Novikov, were forced to get up. This treatment continued from April 22–30 and from May 4–8.
But even during that hour between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m. Novikov was not able to sleep normally, because a 500-watt light bulb was left constantly on in the cell. Prisoners were forbidden to turn over onto their bellies and hide from the light. After spending six years in prisons, for the rest of his life Novikov always covered his face with a handkerchief before going to sleep.
Soon the real target of the case was revealed: Marshal Zhukov. Abakumov personally forced Novikov to sign a false statement implicating Zhukov.41 A letter from Novikov to Beria, dated April 2, 1953, describes this document:
In a state of deep depression, and exhausted by interrogations that continued without interruption for sleep or rest, I signed a protocol [transcript] of my interrogation, concocted by investigator Likhachev, in which I admitted being guilty of everything I was accused of…
During the investigation Abakumov interrogated me several times. Investigator Likhachev was always present. Abakumov cursed me using unprintable swear words, abused my human dignity, threatened to shoot me, to arrest my family, and so forth…
In the presence of investigator Likhachev he said I had to sign a statement addressed to I. V. Stalin that was already written and typed…
Likhachev gave me pages to sign, one by one… The statement, as I remember it, said that I had conducted criminal actions while working in the Air Force…Then it presented various lies that implicated Malenkov, a Central Committee Politburo member, Marshal Zhukov, and Serov, deputy Interior Minister, as facts that I supposedly knew.42
The mention of Malenkov in the statement was no accident, as the case was part of Stalin’s complicated game to reduce Malenkov’s power because of his GKO coalition with Beria since 1944.43
The statement that Likhachev forced Novikov to sign also included a paragraph about Vasilii Stalin:
Zhukov…supposedly takes care of Vasilii Stalin like a father. However, the reality is different. Recently, before my arrest, I was in Zhukov’s office. I told him that, apparently, Vasilii Stalin would soon be appointed Inspector of the Air Force. I said I didn’t like this appointment and also said other bad things about Vasilii. As we were alone, Zhukov immediately responded with unprintable swearing and other disgusting remarks about Vasilii Stalin, much worse than anything I said.44
Later in Likhachev’s office, Novikov ‘was given some typed material… and forced to rewrite it by hand, which took between five and seven hours.’45 This way the concocted transcript would look like Novikov’s ‘personal testimony,’ and could be presented to Stalin.
Like Novikov, Shakhurin and Shimanov were also reduced to ‘a state of physical and moral depression.’ Shimanov’s real ‘guilt’ may have been his participation in the Air Force Military Council meeting that dismissed Vasilii Stalin in May 1943. Abakumov forced Shakhurin and Shimanov to sign false statements addressed to Stalin. Stalin ordered copies of all statements and interrogation transcripts to be sent to every Politburo member. Thus a trap for Zhukov was set up.
On March 1, 1946, the Council of Commissars approved Vasilii Stalin’s promotion to Major General. Vyacheslav Molotov personally called Vasilii during the night to congratulate him. However, Vasilii was so drunk that at first he could not understand the news.
The same month Stalin summoned Zhukov to Moscow, where he was appointed commander in chief of the Ground Troops, as well as deputy Defense Minister. Army General Vasilii Sokolovsky, his deputy in Germany, succeeded Zhukov as Commander of GSOVG. Pavel Zelenin continued as head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of GSOVG.
On March 15, Malenkov, previously deputy chairman of the Council of Commissars, was not reinstalled in the new government’s Council of Ministers. However, three days later he and Beria became full members of the Politburo. On April 30, Novikov signed the final copy of ‘his’ statement in Abakumov’s office. Apparently this document affected Malenkov’s fate, because a week later the Politburo dismissed Malenkov from his position as a Central Committee secretary. The disgrace was not complete—two weeks later he was appointed Chairman of the Special Committee for Rocket Technology, the second most important military project after the Atomic Project headed by Beria. But Malenkov was sent out of Moscow to Kazakhstan until August 1946, when he was finally appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (i.e., Stalin’s deputy). In 1948, he was reappointed secretary of the Central Committee. However, Malenkov never forgot Stalin’s brief disfavor, and he blamed Abakumov for organizing the Aviators Case.
On Stalin’s order, during April–May 1946 the Politburo members and heads of the aviation industry periodically received Abakumov’s reports on the investigation entitled ‘Summaries of the Results of Interrogations.’46 Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, head of Stalin’s secretariat, personally sent these ‘summaries’ to the addressees. For every aviation-industry addressee, the receiving of a new ‘summary’ was a personal threat. It was clear that if he did not please the dictator, his name would eventually appear in the records of interrogations and then he would share the fate of the previous arrestees.
On May 10–11, 1946, six days after SMERSH was merged with the MGB and Abakumov became MGB Minister, the Military Collegium chaired by Vasilii Ulrikh sentenced Novikov, Shakhurin, and the three other defendants to four to seven years, and two Party functionaries to two years in prison—an unusually lenient punishment for these crimes. All of them were charged with the ‘abuse of power and negligence of duties’ (Article 193-17a). Additionally, the properties of the condemned were confiscated. Immediately after the session Ulrikh sent Stalin a copy of the verdict marked ‘Top Secret.’47
As Molotov recalled later, Novikov and Shakhurin were guilty of making technical modifications to planes ‘in violation of the Politburo’s decision to prohibit any unauthorized alterations in the design of aircraft already operational in the air force.’48 In other words, specialists were forbidden to make professional adjustments in aircraft design after the Politburo had made its decision and the perpetrators were punished as criminals. Novikov was released in 1952, while those who remained imprisoned were released soon after Stalin’s death.
Khudyakov was held in MGB investigation prisons until April 1950, when he was sentenced to death and shot, with Stalin’s approval.49 In January 1951, his wife and two children were arrested as family members of a traitor to the Motherland. The OSO of the MGB sentenced them to exile in the Krasnoyarsk Province in Siberia. After Stalin’s death they were allowed to go back to Moscow, but their former apartme
nt was occupied by the family of an MGB officer.
Zhukov’s new appointment, shortly before his downfall, was a typical Stalin trick. Already on June 1, 1946, at a High Military Council meeting, Stalin criticized Zhukov for his behavior in Germany and accused him of attempted plotting. Zhukov was dismissed and appointed Commander of the Odessa Military District, an unimportant position. Marshal Ivan Konev replaced him as commander in chief of the Ground Troops and deputy Defense Minister. Eight days later Stalin signed an additional top-secret order denouncing Zhukov.50 Stalin, Bulganin, and Vasilevsky prepared the text accusing Zhukov even of failure to conquer Berlin in time.
However, Stalin did not order Zhukov’s arrest, possibly due to Zhukov’s popularity among war veterans. The story continued two years later when Abakumov arrested Zhukov’s former subordinates, including General Telegin, for looting and corruption, and presented Stalin with more material on Zhukov.
In Austria and Hungary
There were no conflicts between SMERSH and the NKVD in the other Soviet occupation zones. By the end of the war, troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, with its UKR under Pyotr Ivashutin, occupied most of Austria and established its HQ in Vienna. At the end of May 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began being relocated from Germany to Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Five armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, including two Romanian armies, joined them, and on June 10, all of these troops were renamed the Central Group of Military Forces (Tsentral’naya gruppa voisk or TsGV).51
Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon: Soviet Military Counterintelligence in WWII Page 62