Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush

by John Yoo

  42 6 The Complete Anti-Federalist 21 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).

  43 3 Ibid. at 115.

  44 3 Ibid. at 38.

  45 3 Ibid. at 414.

  465 Ibid. at 145-46.

  47 3 Ibid. at 233.

  48 Federalist No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  49 Federalist No. 41, at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  50 Federalist No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  51 Federalist No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  52 Federalist No. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  53 Federalist No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  54 Federalist No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  55 Federalist No. 70, at 480 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  56 2 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 495.

  57 Ibid. at 579.

  58 9 Ibid. at 1097-98.

  59 See generally Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers (1974).

  60 Federalist No. 73, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  61 McDonald, supra note 35, at 206.

  62 Federalist No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  63 Federalist No. 73, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  64 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 184 (2005).

  65 Federalist No. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  66 See, e.g., Michael Rappaport, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 113 (2007). For similar views, see Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 865 (1994); Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 5 (2006), available at www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf. Those taking a different view include Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case Western Reserve Law Review 905 (1990); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa Law Review 1267 (1996); and Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown Law Journal 217 (1994).

  67 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 University of Chicago Law Review 887 (2003).

  68 2 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 450-51.

  69 Amar, America's Constitution, supra note 64, at 179.

  70 Federalist No. 74, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  71 On this point, see generally Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace, supra note 21, at 30-87; Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 25. For criticism of this theory, see Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, supra note 25.

  72 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 18 (1960).

  73 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, supra note 33.

  74 See, e.g., Frederick Marks, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution 52-95 (1986).

  75 Federalist No. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  76 3 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 59-60.

  77 Rakove, supra note 14, at 276-77.

  78 Ibid. at 1282.

  79 10 Documentary History, supra note 41, at 1281.

  80 See John Yoo, Globalization and the Constitution, 99 Columbia Law Review 1955 (1999).

  CHAPTER 3: GEORGE WASHINGTON

  1 See Glenn A. Phelps, George Washington and American Constitutionalism 44-46 (1993).

  2 Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History 27 (1948).

  3 Phelps, supra note 1, at 145-49.

  4 The story of the Washington-Hancock tiff is retold in James T. Flexner, Washington and the New Nation 230 (1970).

  5 See Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington 39-40 (1974).

  6 Ibid. at 39.

  7 30 Writings of George Washington 344 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).

  8 Ibid. at 334. For the view that Washington's move to control the machinery of the Continental Congress is more ambiguous because of the unusual change between forms of government, see Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Michigan Law Review 545, 637-41 (2004).

  9 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (quoting Daniel Webster).

  10 10 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791, at 718-20 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds, 2004).

  11 Ibid. at 738-40.

  12 Ibid. at 868.

  13 I have been guided through the various debates and changes in the statutory proposals by Saikrishna B. Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell Law Review 1021, 1029-34 (2006). The debate is also recounted prominently by David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801, at 36-41 (1997); Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789, at 140-65 (1923); and James Hart, The American Presidency in Action 1789, at 155-89 (1948).

  14 Some have argued that Congress's actions indicate that the Treasury Department was not even an executive department, but rather an administrative agency outside of direct presidential control. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Columbia Law Review 1, 28 (1994). Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash have shown their arguments on this score to be off the mark. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale Law Journal 541 (1994). Indeed, Madison's arguments in the House that the Treasury Department ought to be unified under one secretary accountable to the President defeats their claim. For some interesting applications of this theme to Congress and the federal courts, see Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 Virginia Law Review 1779 (2006). For the claim that the Decision of 1789 is more ambiguous, see Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 656-64.

  15 1 Annals of Congress 379 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).

  16 Ibid. at 463, 547.

  17 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, supra note 10, at 890, 893.

  18 Stanley M. Elkins & Eric L. McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800, at 53-54 (1993).

  19 Forrest McDonald: The American Presidency: An Intellectual History 227 (1994).

  20 George Washington to Henry Knox, Sept. 20, 1795, in 34 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 315.

  21 Various Senators and commentators have urged such a role for the Senate over the years. See, e.g., David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale Law Journal 1491, 1502-12 (1992). Arguments against include John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Texas Law Review 633, 638-39 (1993).

  22 Thomas Jefferson to Heads of Departments, Nov. 6, 1801, in 9 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 310-12 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).

  23 McDonald, Presidency of Washington, supra note 5, at 41.

  24 See Phelps, supra note 1, at 140-41.

  25 George Washington to Baron Poellnitz, Mar. 23, 1790, in 31 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 23-24.

  26 I have found invaluable Forrest McDonald's analysis of the Hamiltonian system, and its political effects, in McDonald, Presidency of Washington, supra note 5, at 47-88.

  27 Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 18, at 155-61.

  28 Federalist No. 44, at 302-05 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

  29 19 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 275-80 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).

  30 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 63-134 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965).

  31 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819).

  32 19 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 280.

  33 32 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 16-17.

  34 19 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 280.

  35 Phelps, supra note 1, at 151-52.

  36 Ibid. at 153-54.

  37 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 5 (2006), available at www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.

  38 See generally Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 14.

  39 See Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 Yale Law Journal 1256 (2006); and White, supra note 2.

  40 The discussion of the Whiskey Rebellion is taken from Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 18, at 461-88; McDonald, supra note 5, at 145-47; and Phelps, supra note 1, at 131-36. A sustained scholarly treatment can be found in Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (1988), and a recent journalistic retelling in William Hogeland, The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels Who Challenged America's Newfound Sovereignty (2006).

  41 Proclamation of September 15, 1792, in 32 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 150.

  42 A debate among historians continues to this day about the sources of the Whiskey Rebellion. McDonald has argued that Hamilton deliberately provoked a confrontation in order to create the opportunity for a show of force by the federal government. Others have argued that the sources were primarily economic, in that the tax hit certain classes of Western farmers particularly hard, while recent scholarship argues that the Whiskey Rebellion was the product of a number of social and political developments in the West that led to an uprising that was more popular in its roots.

  43 Stephen I. Vladeck, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 Yale Law Journal 149, 161-63 (2004).

  44 32 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 455 (Whiskey Rebellion); and 32 Ibid. at 386 (Neutrality Proclamation).

  45 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 659 n. 547; see also Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement, 38 American University Law Review 275 (1989).

  46 See, e.g., David Grady Adler, The President's Pardon Power, in Thomas E. Cronin ed., Inventing the American Presidency 209 (1989).

  47 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution (2d ed. 1996); Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair (1990); and Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (1990).

  48 Washington to Moultrie, Aug. 28, 1793, in 33 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 73.

  49 David Currie, Rumors of War: Presidential and Congressional War Powers, 67 University of Chicago Law Review 1, 2 (2000).

  50 See Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802, at 92-93 (1975).

  51 Ibid. at 96.

  52 1 Annals of Congress 715 (Joseph Gale ed., 1789).

  53 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 95.

  54 Kohn, supra note 50, at 97.

  55 1 Annals of Congress 724 (Joseph Gale ed., 1789).

  56 Kohn, supra note 50, at 98.

  57 Ibid. at 96.

  58 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 119.

  59 Kohn, supra note 50, at 103.

  60 Ibid. at 104.

  61 See, e.g., George Washington to House of Representatives, Sept. 16, 1789, 1 Annals of Congress 927-28 (Joseph Gale ed., 1789).

  62 1 Annals of Congress 1772.

  63 Kohn, supra note 50, at 115-17.

  64 1 Stat. 241 (1792).

  65 Kohn, supra note 50, at 116-24.

  66 Abraham Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 119 (1976).

  67 Errors of Government Towards the Indians, Feb. 1792, in 31 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 491.

  68 See, e.g., Fort Harmar Treaty of 1789, 7 Stat. 28 (Jan. 9, 1789); and Creek Treaty of 1790, 7 Stat. 35 (Aug. 7, 1790).

  69 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).

  70 Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 18, at 55-58.

  71 See Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale Law Journal 231, 299-300 (2001).

  72 See Sofaer, supra note 66, at 65-78.

  73 Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 71, at 300-02.

  74 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate (Apr. 24, 1790), in 5 Writings of Jefferson, supra note 22, at 161.

  75 For the relevant historical details, I have relied on Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 18, at 303-73; McDonald, Presidency of Washington, supra note 5, at 113-37; Editorial Note, Jefferson's Opinion on the Treaties with France, reprinted in 25 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 597-602; and Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 Papers of Hamilton, supra note 30, at 297, 298 n.4. These events are also discussed in David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress, 1793-1795, 63 University of Chicago Law Review 1, 4-16 (1996).

  76 Treaty of Alliance, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., Treaty Series 82, art. XI, 7 Bevans 777.

  77 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 12., art. XVII.

  78 Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with France, May 6, 1793, in 25 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 665-66.

  79 See Letter from Hamilton to Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14 Papers of Hamilton, supra note 30, at 297-98.

  80 Letter from Washington to Hamilton, Jefferson, Knox, and Randolph (Apr. 18, 1793), in ibid. at 326-27.

  8181 Opinion on the Treaties with France, Apr. 28, 1793, in 25 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 608-18.

  82 Letter from Hamilton & Knox to Washington, May 2, 1793, in 14 Papers of Hamilton, supra note 30, at 367-96.

  83 Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the Alliance with France, reprinted in 25 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 666.

  84 1 Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents: 1789-1897, at 156 (James D. Richardson ed., 1900).

  85 Neutrality Act, 1 Stat. 381 (June 5, 1794).

  86 See Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress 113-18 (1979); and Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution 58-69 (1957).

  87 Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 71, at 325-27.

  88 See Pacificus No. 1, reprinted in 15 Papers of Hamilton, supra note 30, at 33-43.

  89 Jefferson to Madison, June 13, 1793, 26 Papers of Jefferson, supra note 29, at 272-74; see also Jefferson to Madison, June 23, 1793, in 26 ibid. at 346.

  90 Jefferson to Madison, July 7, 1793, in 26 ibid. at 443-44.

  91 See Helvidius Nos. 1-5, reprinted in 15 The Papers of James Madison 66-120 (Thomas Mason ed., 1985).

  92 Helvidius No. 1, in 15 ibid. at 69.

  93Ibid.

  94Helvidius No. 4, in 15 ibid. at 108.

  95See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 18, at 362 (noting Madison's weak performance); but cf. Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic 527 n.18 (1995) (arguing that Madison demolished Hamilton's arguments).

  96Helvidius No. 2, in 15 Papers of Madison, supra note 91, at 82.

  97The Washington administration attempted to prosecute violators of neutrality in the absence of a statutory crime. See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1003, 1039-93 (1985). The issue was not finally resolved by the Supreme Court until 1812, in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), in which the Court held that the federal government could not prosecute individuals for non-statutory common law crimes. See Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale Law Journal 919 (1992).

  98These events are desc
ribed in Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers (1970); Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's Treaty (1923); Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington (1958); Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (1955); and more recently by Todd Estes, The Art of Presidential Leadership: George Washington and the Jay Treaty, 109 Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 127 (2001); and Charles Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States, 1783-1795 (1971).

  99Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 18, at 412; McDonald, Presidency of Washington, supra note 5, at 140.

  100 Phelps, supra note 1, at 174-75.

  101 Writings of Washington, supra note 7, at 2-5.

  102Ibid.

  103 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For critical discussion, see Akhil R. Amar, Nixon's Shadow, 83 Minnesota Law Review 1405 (1999); Michael S. Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-five Years, 83 Minnesota Law Review 1337 (1999). For analysis of the rise of executive privilege, see Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability (2002); and Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege (2003).

  104Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75 Columbia Law Review 1318 (1975).

  105On this point, see John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11, at 242-43 (2005).

  106See, e.g., Ralph Ketcham, Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829 (1984).

  CHAPTER 4: THOMAS JEFFERSON

  1 The two magisterial works covering the Jefferson Presidency are Dumas Malone, Jefferson The President: The First Term 1801-05 (1970) (hereinafter "Malone, First Term") and Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: The Second Term 1805-09 (1974) (hereinafter "Malone, Second Term"); and Henry Adams, History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson (1889-91) (Library of America ed., 1986). Helpful works include Joyce Appleby, Thomas Jefferson (2003); Jeremy D. Bailey, Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power (2007); Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Process of Government Under Jefferson (1978); Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson (1976); Robert M. Johnstone, Jr., Jefferson and the Presidency: Leadership in the Young Republic (1978); David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson (1994); Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (1986); Ralph Ketcham, The Jefferson Presidency and Constitutional Beginnings, in Martin Fausold & Alan Shank eds., The Constitution and the American Presidency 5-27 (1991); Gary Schmitt, Thomas Jefferson and the Presidency in Thomas E. Cronin ed., Inventing the American Presidency 326 (1989); and Gary Schmitt, Jefferson and Executive Power: Revisionism and the "Revolution of 1800," 17 Publius 7 (1987).