Moreover, there was absolutely no talk of trying to grab Iraq’s oil for the United States, or any discussions about Bush the younger finishing the job begun by his father during Desert Storm. Nor did the president express any revenge, wanting to get even for Saddam’s attempt to assassinate his father. Quite the contrary—from the beginning, the focus was on al-Qaeda and clearing out the camps in Afghanistan, the safe harbors where the terrorists had trained under the leadership of Osama bin Laden.
Then came the CIA report of potential weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the reconstituting of al-Qaeda, driven out of Afghanistan by our troops, but now present in remote parts of Iraq. This exponentially heightened our concerns that Saddam would provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who had already proven their willingness to use them.
During 2002, the National Security team engaged in intense meetings about thwarting the Iraqi threat to our nation’s safety. The history of Iraqi defiance was clear. In 1998, Hussein demanded that international weapons inspectors cease their work and leave his country, and the inspectors had complied. The US Congress responded by passing the Iraq Liberation Act that President Clinton signed into law. It established a regime change in Iraq as official US policy and provided $100 million to fund groups who worked for Hussein’s ouster.
Saddam continued to flout the UN resolutions to send inspectors into his country to certify he did not have weapons of mass destruction, whether chemical, biological, or nuclear. His Iraqi jets repeatedly violated the UN-mandated no-fly zone prohibiting Iraqi planes from flying in certain parts of the country—safeguards put in place after Desert Storm partially to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiite Muslims in a large portion of southern Iraq. The NFZ was enforced primarily by British and US fighter jets, and Saddam made a point of challenging the enforcers, firing on US and coalition forces more than a thousand times.2
I believe I attended virtually every meeting of the National Security Council and every meeting of the principals committee3 focused on Iraq and the dangers Saddam Hussein posed. It was obvious the president and the principals believed Saddam was a threat to his people, to the countries in the region, and, ultimately, to us.
The president did not respect Hussein and regarded him as a dangerous bully. Bush was clearly frustrated that the UN wouldn’t do more to force Saddam to comply with his international obligations. Consequently, during the summer of 2001, the National Security team engaged in intense discussions about an effective strategy against this tyrant.
The September 11 attacks heightened our concerns over Iraq. Although the intelligence community quickly concluded that the attack was the work of al-Qaeda, we initially questioned whether that group was capable of pulling off such a horrendous event without help. Because Hussein’s hatred for America was well known, Saddam was suspect number one. But Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell all concurred: Iraq was not connected and had no responsibility for the attacks on America. Powell even warned that if we took action against Iraq right now, Saddam would prove he was not complicit in the attacks, which would actually impede our international support for the war on terror.
By May 2002, coalition troops had made good progress in Operation Enduring Freedom, destroying al-Qaeda’s camps and toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan. Consequently, the National Security team turned their attention to other trouble spots around the world, including Iraq. The congressional resolution in 1998 stated that a regime change in Iraq was the policy of our nation. In other words, Congress wanted to see Saddam deposed and went on record saying so. That did not authorize military action, or covert action necessarily, nor did it encourage the assassination of Saddam, which would violate our stated values against the assassination of civilian officials. But essentially it said: because of Hussein’s ongoing despotic actions, we’d like to see new leadership in Iraq.
We had quietly been discussing this possibility with our Arab friends. They agreed that Saddam needed to go, Powell reported, but that we must be swift and successful. The European Union would be looking for moral and legal justification, and the Iraqi people were looking for assurances that regime change was really going to happen this time. Their hopes had been dashed when Desert Storm stopped short of replacing Hussein, and some of them had paid a high price for their public opposition to Saddam in 1991. They were not about to make that mistake again based on vacuous promises from the United States or anybody else.
Secretary Rumsfeld warned that we needed to vastly improve our intelligence, especially intelligence inside Iraq, where we feared WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and missile sites existed. I sensed an uneasiness among all of the NSC members about “not knowing what we did not know,” but the group shared concerns about another terrorist attack, and a genuine worry that Saddam’s WMD might fall into the hands of al-Qaeda.
We also discussed possible contingencies that might force our hand. What would America do, for example, if Saddam complied with UN resolutions and allowed inspections? What if he shot down one of our aircraft? What if there was another terrorist attack? What would we do if Saddam attacked the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq? How would we respond to an attack on Israel?
We had lots of tough questions and few easy answers. Although nobody had yet suggested going to war, I made a note to myself to explore and confirm our legal authorities to take those actions; I also concluded we needed to examine our presidential findings authorizing covert actions. Something told me we might need both.
Ten days later, on May 10, I attended another Iraq briefing in the Situation Room. We discussed budgeting for a possible future conflict with Iraq. I didn’t know whether we had received some new intelligence showing increased threats, nor was I told why, all of a sudden, we were so worried about how to pay for another war. We were already shelling out millions of dollars to pay for the war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, I made arrangements to visit with John Bellinger, the National Security Council lawyer, to examine all the legal work to justify use of force in Iraq.
The war in Afghanistan was still the main subject of continual congressional curiosity and scrutiny, but inside the White House, there were quiet conversations about Iraq as well. On May 13, I attended another meeting in the Situation Room with the president, and again, the subject was Iraq.
Colin Powell spoke about the need for a strategy in dealing with Iraq at the UN and the EU. I admired Secretary Powell for his wisdom and experience. He knew firsthand the challenges ahead if we ever went to war with Iraq, having served on the battlefront during Desert Storm. “This will be a long-term proposition,” he said, speaking of another potential war in Iraq. “It will require a lot of money, and we need to understand this is probably a long-term commitment of our troops.”
In years to come, Vice President Cheney would receive a great deal of criticism for his support of the war in Iraq, but in this early-morning May 2002 meeting, he was the first to challenge the justification for military action. “What is the case?” he asked. “Is the case strong enough to justify our military actions? Is the case strong enough for our allies to join us?” The vice president used the words casus belli, a Latin phrase meaning an act or event that justifies war. He was warning that we must have a legal justification for war, both for the American people and for our allies.
In a June 3 NSC meeting, the president and the members discussed the possibility that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles, including unmanned drone-like helicopters. The statements from the military and from intelligence sources painted a picture of Iraq as sophisticated and defiant.
Every day, new legal questions arose in connection with a possible conflict in Iraq if the president decided the United States needed to take action. The lawyers explored the legal authority for the use of military force as well as covert actions. We were also asked to look at practices and rules governing the spoils of war. For example, who would have legal rights to Iraq’s oil fiel
ds? The president challenged his advisors in these meetings, asking questions and posing hypothetical situations with which we might have to deal if we liberated Iraq. I watched and listened in admiration as Powell and Rumsfeld detailed opposing views on a variety of issues. They were like two heavyweight boxers, experienced and savvy. Powell was conservative and careful when it came to talk of war. He was a career soldier, a patriot as well as a diplomat. Rumsfeld was a street fighter, wise in the use of the bureaucracy of war. He was also an innovator, always looking for the best ways to streamline so we could fight more effectively. Some people said he was a difficult boss at the Department of Defense, but his subordinates all seemed to respect and admire him. I know that Jim Haynes, his top legal counsel with whom I had many dealings, had the utmost regard for Donald Rumsfeld, and I did too.
The president wanted a coalition of friends if he decided it was necessary to take action, and the military considered the nation of Turkey critical for quick access to Iraq from the north. Saudi Arabia would also be important for overflight rights. Like the vice president, President Bush vocalized his concerns about casus belli. “Do we have casus belli?” he asked. “What does that look like?” I sensed his caution about using military force to oust Hussein. Still, although the president didn’t have a future leader of Iraq in mind, he did say, “Whoever replaces Saddam Hussein will be better for the Iraqi people and for the world.”
On July 11, the NSC meeting once again focused on Iraq. Most of us had come to appreciate how crucial Turkey would be to any quick and successful regime change in Iraq. We didn’t expect them to do much militarily, but it was important that Turkey permit coalition invasion troops to transit across their country—to create a noose around the country and to keep terrorists and Saddam’s troops from fleeing. But the Turks were playing hardball. The Turkish government wanted money, billions of dollars, before they’d even present our request to their parliament, and even then, there was no guarantee of approval. Although we needed Turkey’s support, Secretary Powell questioned whether now was the right time to present a plan to them, since their own government was shaky.
We also discussed CIA involvement in Iraq, whether and how they could provide money to opponents of the regime and engage in covert, nonlethal disruptive activities.
We wondered aloud whether we should issue an ultimatum to Saddam regarding weapons inspections. He had already defied sixteen UN resolutions since 1991 demanding complete, open inspections, and an end to Iraq’s support for terrorists; so there was little hope that he might regard another UN resolution as meaningful. An ultimatum from the United States might be effective. Some members of the NSC suggested that defiance of the UN resolutions and Saddam’s refusal to allow future weapons inspections provided casus belli already.
At a 7:00 a.m. principals committee meeting in the Situation Room on July 24, 2002, I witnessed a remarkable discussion of the merits of US military action in Iraq. Sitting next to Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld suggested that if the president gave the order to liberate Iraq based on casus belli, the military commanders preferred to go in the winter, rather than the summer. The president had already talked about a possible window between the November elections and Thanksgiving.
Sitting across the table from Powell, Dick Cheney countered that the longer we waited, the more likely Hussein could hurt us.
Rumsfeld responded that the driver in this situation was the coalition of countries we hoped to help us. How long would it take to get others on board? And what demands on Saddam would other countries want to make before participating?
Vice President Cheney reminded everyone that making demands on Saddam would not solve the problem. He expressed concern about relying on Hussein to make our task easier. “This is wrong,” he stated bluntly. “We need to be honest with the American people. This is the most important obligation for the president.”
Secretary Powell added, “We’re not there yet internationally.”
“What would make the case good enough for them?” Cheney challenged with a rhetorical question, knowing that countries such as Germany and France were making enormous amounts of money from contracts with Iraq.
“Some feel that Saddam has been contained somewhat,” replied Powell.
“Things are different now,” Cheney said. “Saddam has seen how al-Qaeda hurt us. He has smallpox weapons. He has worked hard to develop WMD. He has a lot of the world’s oil reserves. He has enormous wealth. He has become a tougher target over time.” The vice president concluded, “We have to do it; the sooner, the better. Yes, we need allies, but we do not let them set the pace or tell us what to do.”
The secretary of state stood his ground. “Our allies and friends do not agree with that assessment,” he said. “They do not view this as a real danger or a crisis. Our allies know this devil; they do not know the devil that may come. It is not clear that Saddam’s ambition is to go beyond the region.” Powell went on to warn, “If we attack, it will take 250,000 troops to take down the regime. You have to have a strong case before taking action. Can we make the case? Yes, but it will be expensive in terms of international opinion. Some allies will join us, but perhaps tepidly. Also, this will take up our whole agenda for the next four months.”
As he always did, Vice President Cheney responded calmly but firmly. “We have already started the selling process. People think we are going after Iraq anyway. We have today a different scale of threat. And our doctrine of preemption is new and different.”
Secretary Rumsfeld interjected, “We must not forget that the case is most certainly worse than we know. Second, a change will affect Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, and perhaps Saudi Arabia, and others, causing them to behave in a different way. Third, the president is way ahead out there. He is cocked and he needs to fire. Fourth, Congress and the EU have to realize we are now in a new environment. Do we have to wait for another Pearl Harbor–type of attack or is the situation different, that we now have the right and obligation to guard against those types of attacks? If we force the EU to answer this question, they will agree with us on a conceptual basis.”
Andy Card spoke less frequently than the others at these meetings, and I often observed Andy doodling on the agenda page as he listened intently to the discussion. But on this day, he spoke up. “There is no doubt that Saddam is a clear and present danger to the United States. The president has said that we will have the courage to preempt, to prevent future attacks. The case has been made for us. I believe the world will come with us once we act, but will not be with us if we do not act.”
I glanced at Condi. I knew that her relationship with the president was similar to mine, having the freedom to speak candidly with him in private on all national security matters. Although her role in these meetings was that of a facilitator, she spoke forcefully. “The president is ready to go. It is not a matter of provoking Saddam or making demands, but a matter of making the case.”
From her comments, I concluded the president believed in the case to take action, but was concerned whether we could make the case to the American people and our allies. If we could not present a credible case to the world, the president would be faced with an even more difficult decision.
Anticipating casus belli and the removal of Hussein, the discussion moved to a post-Saddam Iraq. What type of government should the United States expect in Iraq after shedding American blood to deliver freedom to the Iraqi people? It seemed unrealistic to think in terms of a Jeffersonian democracy. Our forefathers had forged the greatest democracy in the history of the world after living under a monarchy. But the people of Iraq had never known such a government, and for years had experienced only dictators and tyrants.
While the opinions might not have been unanimous, the vice president summed up the feelings of most people in the room. He said, “We may create problems for ourselves if we do not create a higher bar. We would be viewed as hypocrites, particularly since we just told the Palestinian people they need to make changes toward democracy. That is our
goal here and our regional objective as well.”
The tenor of these meetings took a dramatic turn on August 2, 2002, when, at an afternoon principals committee meeting, the discussion focused on a chemical factory in Khurmal, a small Kurdish town in northeastern Iraq. The CIA asserted that an underground facility was located there, used for testing chemical weapons such as ricin and cyanide.4 Some worried that al-Qaeda might be producing anthrax in Iraq. The CIA also reported that a number of al-Qaeda terrorists, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a high-level al-Qaeda leader, had fled from Afghanistan and had relocated to Khurmal. The presence of chemical weapons and al-Qaeda were serious, and the CIA contended that it would be almost impossible for them to be there without Saddam Hussein’s knowledge and approval. The CIA reported that this was the clearest evidence yet that al-Qaeda was in Iraq, making poison and planning on killing people.
I had not seen the intelligence, but I realized the significance of this report. The vice president announced, “This is a violation of the Bush Doctrine. If you are involved with terrorists, then you have a problem with Bush.” I admired Vice President Cheney’s directness. We did not always agree, but I never doubted his patriotism. The report placed the facility in a remote location, raising the possibility that other factories might be hidden away inside Iraq.
The principals agreed that the United States needed an approach to get in, but not destroy the evidence of the WMD factory. The US government set about strategizing the optimal method to destroy the plant. I focused my attention, along with other administration lawyers, on the legal justification for the use of force in Iraq. One of the theories we discussed was a humanitarian justification, since Saddam was known to have sponsored genocide against his own people. The notion of using force in response to a humanitarian catastrophe appealed to people at the State Department who believed it may encourage other nations to join us.
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