I was struck by the resolve in the president’s tone. I’d known him for quite a while, and I could tell that he seemed resigned to a course of action in Iraq. It was the first time that I truly believed that war was inevitable. But I definitely believed.
CHAPTER 24
FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND SECURITY
The NSC met with the president at the White House at 9:00 a.m. on January 31, 2003. By the conclusion of this meeting, the president was committed, at least as far as he could be—he had chosen to initiate military action on February 22. Subject to a dramatic turn of events, the air war would begin on March 10, and the ground troops would move into Iraq on March 15. Certainly the plan could change, but we now had a roadmap to follow.
Vice President Cheney reminded everyone that we needed to prepare for all contingencies. Saddam could do anything. There were still off-ramps on the road to war. On February 5, Colin Powell was scheduled to present the case for action in Iraq to the UN, to let them know that time was running out. The president would speak to the nation about Iraq the following day. A second resolution might be presented to the UN on February 7, but that was still very much up in the air.
The president contended, “The military plan should not be geared for diplomacy; it will be geared to win militarily.”
General Franks noted we needed to figure out how we wanted to give advance notice to civilians in Iraq, warning them about the ensuing war. Tommy Franks was a realist. “Ten percent of our munitions might be off,” he said. “There will be civilian casualties.”
On February 3, the principals met to discuss the content of Powell’s upcoming speech to the UN. Colin Powell was a man of great pride in his reputation, and he would never say anything to a government body that he did not believe to be absolutely true. He had only one caveat: “There will be no smoking gun.”
Otherwise, he intended to say straightforwardly that Iraq’s most recent weapons declarations were false and inaccurate. Saddam had not cooperated or complied with the UN requests.
Second, he intended to present a thorough review of Iraq’s weapons programs, including biological, chemical, and nuclear.
Third, he intended to discuss Saddam’s ties to terrorism.
And fourth, he intended to cover Hussein’s human rights violations imposed upon his own people.
I sensed that Secretary Powell was comfortable making the case; he had been screening the intelligence reports and removing any questionable assertions from his presentation. He had even gone out to CIA headquarters at Langley, along with several speechwriters and senior aides, checking and double-checking his facts against the most up-to-date information. The CIA assigned a number of senior intelligence professionals to help check the accuracy of what Powell and his writers were including, but as CIA director George Tenet later acknowledged, “Despite our efforts, a lot of flawed information still made its way into the speech.”1
As planned, on the morning of February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the case for war to the United Nations. Sitting behind him on the platform were John Negroponte, the US ambassador to the UN, and George Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In a dramatic address before the UN Security Council, Secretary Powell did an exemplary job of laying out the case against Saddam. He presented recordings, satellite photographs, and documents that proved Iraq was engaged in WMD activities and defying the UN. Everyone in the room understood the seriousness of the subject and the quiet intensity of the man who presented the US intelligence information. The speech purported to prove that Saddam Hussein had, or could soon have, weapons of mass destruction and a history showing his willingness to use them.
“My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources,” Colin Powell told the UN. “These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”2
Powell left little room for his listeners to doubt his message or Saddam’s ultimate goals. “We have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons,” Powell said. “Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb.”3
Then Secretary Powell drilled down on the chemical plant in Khurmal, highlighting the WMD and revealing our knowledge of al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq. “The Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp . . . and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq.”4 It’s easy to imagine the terrorists in Khurmal starting to pack the moment Powell’s words left his mouth. Their secret was exposed.
Everything I heard Secretary Powell say in his speech was absolutely consistent with the information I had been hearing in NSC meetings and principals meetings for more than a year. Like the rest of us, Powell based his judgment on the intelligence information provided by the CIA. He obviously believed it to be true; the president of the United States believed it to be true; the director of the CIA believed it to be true; everyone on the National Security team believed it was true; and I certainly believed it was true.
Unfortunately, by the time our troops reached Khurmal in March 2003, much of the chemical facility had been destroyed—either dismantled by the operators or demolished by cruise missiles or ground fighting. Clear signs of chemical weapons production were found, however, including chemical hazardous materials (HAZMAT) suits, manuals written in Arabic describing how to make chemical weapons, and traces of deadly toxins, including cyanide, ricin, and potassium chloride.5
No huge stashes of WMD, however, were ever found, which led to the oft-repeated mantra in the media, “Bush lied, people died.”
Bush did not lie; nor did he intentionally mislead. Nor did Tenet or Rumsfeld or members of Congress—both Democrat and Republican—or our allies who came to the same conclusions. And the truth is, we may never know how many innocent people might have died had we not taken action in Iraq.
When the NSC met on February 12, Powell reported that despite his speech, Hans Blix was set to present another nuanced performance to the UN. While Blix would be honest, saying there had been little cooperation by Iraq, he would probably lobby for more time.
The president was done waiting on Blix. “Is February 22 still a good day to initiate military action?” he asked Don Rumsfeld.
“Yes,” the secretary of defense replied bluntly. He reported that reconnaissance flights were already occurring over Baghdad.
Bush questioned how we should respond if Hussein attempted to flee the country.
Cheney responded that we needed to be careful about letting Saddam out of Baghdad to reestablish himself someplace else, where he could use his billions of dollars to assist terrorism. Then, in a moment of almost stunning candor, the always-direct vice president said, “We need to study carefully whether we should let him leave or whether we should kill him.”
I assumed Cheney was not suggesting political assassination, but was reminding us that Saddam was the commander in chief of an opposing force and therefore a lawful military target.
On Valentine’s Day, Hans Blix delivered another report to the UN Security Council, advocating more time for Saddam. Blix’s report questioned the accuracy of some of Colin Powell’s assertions before the Security Council. It also cited increased cooperation by Iraq, although it did not conclude that Saddam would allow access to inspectors, or that he was in compliance with the UN resolutions. But the Blix report provided enough cover for countries who wanted to sit on the sidelines.
People in the White House, not surprisingly, were not in a conciliatory mood. More importantly, we were hearing that some of our Middle Eastern partners were growing impatient and nervous, and though they had privately pledged to be with us when we liberated Iraq, they were expressing increased skepticism and questioning our resolve, due to the delays. In the NSC meeting that day, President Bush seemed concerned about Great Britain’s resolve more than ours. He asked Tommy Franks, “If Great Britain doesn’t go, can we go?”
“We do have a contingency plan,”
Franks replied.
Bush responded, “Contingency may happen.”
I was not sure the president would seriously entertain an attack scenario without Great Britain; I thought he was simply expressing frustration over the UN’s fickleness. Nonetheless, the president had information that I did not.
He seemed greatly concerned about Iraq’s oil fields being booby-trapped and set on fire by Saddam supporters. The oil fields were a valuable asset for a post-Saddam Iraq, and the president wanted to make sure they were as safe as possible. He posed a hypothetical question to Tommy Franks: “If Saddam attempts to blow up the oil fields, how long would it take to get equipment there to put out the fires?”
“A month,” Franks estimated.
The president frowned at Franks’ comment, but nodded that he understood.
Turkey was a concern. While Tommy Franks had hoped to gain some tactical and strategic advantage by moving troops and supplies through Turkey, the country’s new leaders were cautious, but also anxious for assistance to help modernize their economy.
At the NSC meeting on February 8, we discussed options on how best to support our military aims and Turkey’s interest in modernization.
The following day, Condi, Andy, and I met with the president to discuss targeting issues. I expressed concern that in a push to win a decisive and quick victory, we must not forget our legal obligations as a nation under the laws of war and applicable international treaties. We suggested to the president the importance of reminding our military that while we want to win quickly, if opportunities existed to minimize civilian casualties, we should attempt to do so.
President Bush scowled at us and said that we were stating the obvious. The president eyed Condi, Andy, and me standing around his desk. “This is a cover-our-ass discussion,” he said. “I’ve decided to move forward in Iraq regardless of the political consequences.”
“We understand that,” I said, “and we support it. I’m just saying that we need to follow certain rules.” I reiterated that civilian casualties should be proportional to the value of the military target. “We should try to warn civilians before the attack, and we should do what is feasible and consistent with military necessity to minimize casualties among civilians.”
The president agreed.
At an NSC meeting shortly after that, President Bush turned to Tommy Franks and said, “It should be clear to our military that I expect everything to be done to minimize the loss of innocent life and still win the war.”
“I understand,” Franks replied.
The president glanced at me as if to say, “There, is that what you wanted to hear?”
I nodded discreetly and forced myself not to smile.
We then discussed efforts to minimize loss of life, beginning by dropping leaflets over Iraq and doing radio broadcasts two to five days in advance of an attack without naming the site of the attack. At forty-eight hours, we would alert media to vacate. At twenty-four hours, we would broadcast more radio warnings, as well as television, warning civilians to stay away from military targets. At one hour before the attack, we would broadcast again, advising people to flee selected, specific targets.
This was a fine line to walk between warning civilians and alerting the enemy, which might put our own troops at risk. The president expressed his concern about tipping our hand. “It’s important to give warnings, but not to jeopardize our initial strikes.”
Two targets we discussed—a downtown hotel and a communications center—were particularly troublesome. The president asked if we needed to hit the hotel. “Yes,” came the answer, because of certain equipment Saddam had placed inside it. Earlier that day, I had conferred with Jim Haynes about potential targets near a “protected site,” such as a hospital or mosque, or a “sensitive site,” where civilian casualties might exceed thirty. Haynes reported that our military had to get permission before hitting these sites.
Regarding a Baghdad mass communications site, the president asked, “What happens if we do not destroy it?”
Franks responded, “This is an important target. We need to hit it to destroy command and control.”
The vice president agreed. “If we leave them in place, it makes the battle harder and we might suffer more casualties.”
I watched the president’s face as he considered each protected or sensitive target. “We need to use accurate weapons,” he said. “If we want to minimize loss of life and win the war, we need to use the most accurate weapons we have.”
The president then raised a good question relating to the costs of rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq. “If we destroy the telephone system, I presume we get to pay to rebuild the system,” he said. This was certainly a difficult consideration in waging war in a relatively modern, developed country such as Iraq. We had to destroy some of the infrastructure to defeat the enemy, but we would then spend American money to rebuild that same infrastructure after the war.
When we discussed hitting the Al Rashid Hotel, the president again voiced concern for civilians nearby or in the hotel. “We need to make sure our warnings are effective,” he said. He cautioned also about the Baghdad main exchange at Khag and the Baghdad television studios. “Don’t you want to strike these targets at night?” The president recognized that while our military possessed the technology to be as accurate as possible, civilian casualties would be unavoidable.
“How many military targets have you decided not to hit?” he asked General Franks.
“None,” Franks replied. “Every target we want to hit is on the list.”
“Can you achieve success without bombing downtown Baghdad?” he asked.
Rumsfeld replied, “We need to hit Baghdad to weaken Hussein.”
Franks said, “We will not destroy power grids and bridges because we will need them. But as the war progresses, we will continue to analyze and decide if we help or hurt ourselves by taking out a target.”
By now, the National Security team was meeting daily on the subject of Iraq, but the meeting on the afternoon of February 20 was highly unusual. An Iraqi military general had indicated that he wanted to attempt the assassination of Saddam Hussein. The principals committee discussed the proper response to such an offer, then decided that because of bans on assassination, we could not overtly encourage the general’s plan, but would simply say that Saddam’s death could possibly prevent a war. We also discussed whether the United States should promise immunity to an assassin, and again the answer was no.
At the February 26 NSC meeting, Powell remarked that although Japan was with us, the prime minister was facing public pressure. It would be helpful to tone down any rhetoric about Japan’s involvement. “Our largest challenge is Mexico,” Powell said. “As Mexico goes, so goes Chile.”
Despite President Bush’s friendship with Mexican president Vicente Fox, Bush speculated, “If Mexico goes with France, America will treat them the same. Mexico needs to understand that our reaction to the French is real, and they do not want that same reaction.”
On February 28, the president said, “We are through speculating; we are moving forward.” He peppered the National Security team with questions about post-Saddam Iraq. “Have we thought through what we want to see in Iraq?” he asked. “How do we hold people accountable?” After a briefing on how Iraq might function following the war, the president asked again, “How do we keep things going within the country? How do we provide services to the Iraqi people?”
These were simple yet profound questions, signifying Bush’s intentions. They also set the tone, prior to the war, for how the United States hoped to help Iraq after Saddam was removed.
Preparations moved into March. During all that time, I never saw one report or piece of new information to discredit our assumption that al-Qaeda was operating freely in Iraq, or that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. We did note some conflicting reports regarding the amount of WMD Saddam had, but without full inspections, there was no way to be sure.
After months of negotiati
ons and cajoling, Turkey continued its noncommittal attitude, Powell reported. While overflights might not require the Turks’ parliamentary approval, moving ground troops and supplies through their country would. Tommy Franks wanted to bring the Fourth Infantry Division into northern Iraq through Turkey, but with the Turks stonewalling, we were in limbo. The principals suggested that we needed to reassess our monetary assistance to Turkey, given the timeliness and scope of their cooperation. Rumsfeld put it bluntly, “Our clear message to the Turks should be that we are going to be in the north, even if we have to come in from the south.”
Tommy Franks reported some good news: the oil platforms in Iraq had not been dynamited and should be easy targets to capture. He explained that he planned to do hundreds of sorties (defensive attacks) over Iraq to do reconnaissance but also to condition the Iraqi people to hearing large numbers of aircraft overhead. Franks used the term shock to describe the Iraqis’ anticipated response to the initial attack.
“Yeah,” Bush deadpanned. “I read about the shock in the New York Times.” He was referring to an article published by the newspaper over DOD objections that the article might risk American lives. The reporter revealed detailed information based on classified war plans, declaring the United States planned to move forces into Iraq from the north and the west by racing through Turkey. Ironically, the paper’s attempt at a scoop may have assisted our troops, since Saddam’s generals prepared for an attack through Turkey, despite the fact that after all our efforts, Turkey’s Islamist-dominated parliament did not approve the US transit request.6
President Bush raised another interesting question to his top advisors: “Are we telling the Iraqi Republican Guard that they will be war criminals if they use WMD against their own people or others or destroy the oil fields? We need to be sure our declaration to them is clear. I would say it every day if I had to.”
True Faith and Allegiance Page 30