by Peter Brune
For the second time within a year the post of Chief of the General Staff (CGS) required a new appointment. Blamey lost little time in cabling Menzies offering his services back home in any capacity Menzies deemed fit. Northcott, who was at that time Deputy Chief of the General Staff, might have considered himself a chance for the position, and so might Lavarack, who had filled the post before the war. In the end Sturdee was given the job on 30 August 1940.
Not to be outdone, Bennett also put his case before the Prime Minister in a letter dated 2 September. In part, his letter stated that:
When this war commenced, I was the senior officer in the Australian Army, but was superseded by Blamey, Lavarack, Mackay and Sturdee.
My age (53) and my service in the last war and in the Citizen Forces since then, surely justify my appointment. The only reason for my supersession is the attempt on the part of the Permanent Staff to have all higher appointments in the AIF reserved for themselves. This is not in the interest of the AIF nor the Citizen Force Officers.
I would appreciate your support when your Cabinet considers the matter this week and would like my appointment, if made, to date my seniority in the AIF so that my position on the list will be restored.27
A. B. Lodge in The Fall of General Gordon Bennett:
Such a letter of demand, permeated with evidence that Bennett still harboured a deep resentment of regular officers, served only to highlight those aspects of his character which indicated unsuitability for a command in the AIF. Had he been prepared to come to terms with a new situation in which prewar position in the army carried little weight and stressed instead his desire to work with officers regardless of their service backgrounds he may have had more success.28
Sturdee, now acting as the new CGS, suggested that Gordon Bennett be given command of the 2nd Division (a militia appointment) and that Northcott fill the vacant 8th Division command. The War Cabinet delayed its decision pending Blamey’s counsel—the substance of which can well be imagined. In the end, Bennett was appointed to command of the 8th Division on 30 September 1940.
It is at this juncture that a new character enters our story. Wilfred Kent Hughes was born in East Melbourne on 12 June 1895. He had served with distinction during the Great War at Gallipoli, Palestine and in Syria: as staff captain of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade he had won an MC in 1917; and he had served as the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General (AA&QMG) of the Australian Mounted Division during 1917–18. Kent Hughes was mentioned in despatches four times. During the period 1927–49, he would serve his state of Victoria as a MLA (for Kew); after the Second World War he was destined to become the Minister for Transport and Electrical Undertakings and Deputy Premier of Victoria from 1948 to 1949; he was further destined to serve his nation as a Member of the House of Representatives from 1949 until his death in 1970. During his period in federal politics, Kent Hughes was the Minister for the Interior and of Works and Housing from 1951 to 1955. Perhaps one of his greatest achievements was as chairman of the Olympic Games in Melbourne, for which he would be awarded a KBE—he was indeed a distinguished Australian. Wilfred Kent Hughes will influence our wartime story in Singapore where he was subsequently a prisoner of war and will prove a major character in events after the war.
Major Wilfred Kent Hughes had been appointed to the Headquarters of the 8th Division by Sturdee. The day before Bennett arrived to assume command of the division, Kent Hughes was a witness to an extraordinary display of antipathy towards the new 8th Division commander: Major-General Gordon Bennett.
In a letter written on 24 January 1952, as the Minister for the Interior in the Menzies Government, Kent Hughes told the Minister for Defence P. A. M. McBride that:
I was the first Staff Officer to go into camp in Rosebery Racecourse when the 8th Aust. Div. was first formed. I was both ashamed and disgusted when two Duntroon [Staff Corps] Officers stated publicly in the Mess the day before General Gordon Bennett arrived to take over his Command, that they disapproved of his appointment and were not prepared to cooperate with him.29
The two officers were Colonel Henry Rourke, GSO1 8th Division, and Colonel Ray Broadbent.30
Lodge has claimed that Bennett’s forthright letter to Menzies requesting command of the 8th Division ‘served only to highlight those aspects of his character which indicated unsuitability for a command in the AIF’. Further, he has stated that Bennett should have ‘stressed instead his desire to work with officers regardless of their service backgrounds’. Sturdee’s recommendations to White and Miles, and his answers to Miles’s four questions in his letter of 9 May 1940—that is, the full answers—surely adequately answer Lodge’s allegation.
But given Kent Hughes’s observation in the Mess at 8th Division HQ on the day before Bennett’s arrival to assume command, such an accusation might have also applied to Rourke and Broadbent. Here we have two so-called ‘professional soldiers’ who have two very clear alternatives: the first is to give absolute loyalty to their appointed superior officer, or secondly, to request an immediate transfer. At no time did Bennett proclaim that he would not work—or ‘co-operate’—with anyone, which is more than can be said of Rourke and Broadbent. Further, in an interview with the Official Historian in June 1952 in Melbourne, Rourke claimed that ‘we tried to see that Bennett was not appointed’.31
Lodge also points out that it was ‘rumoured’ that a senior officer of the Staff Corps had ‘threatened that the 8th Division would never function as a complete formation under Bennett’s command’.32 He then states that Bennett believed this officer to be the Adjutant-General, Major-General V. P. H. Stantke.33 Bitter conflict between Bennett and Stantke will unfold after the former’s arrival in Malaya, and during the postwar controversy of his escape from Singapore.
A part of the predicament Bennett found himself in was of his own making. His attack on the Staff Corps was ill-considered and, put simply, flawed. Lavarack, Rowell, Berryman, Vasey, Clowes and Robertson were distinguished examples of regular officers who performed well as senior commanders.34 Bennett’s assessment of regular soldiers as fighting commanders was thus inaccurate. Second, he should have been astute enough to realise that by criticising the Staff Corps, he was in fact alienating a significant portion of the very power base of the army, who had a direct say in the selection of field commanders. Third, his criticisms of government defence policy and funding did not endear him to a number of his political masters. Bennett could have, and indeed should have, suggested that all appointments to senior commands be decided on merit, and softened his criticisms of government policy—in short he was not diplomatic. There aren’t many ‘feathers’ in a small army, and it is therefore best to ruffle as few as possible.
When General Gordon Bennett assumed command of the 8th Division, he inherited a staff which had been selected by Sturdee. The Division’s Chief of Staff (GSO1) was Colonel H. G. (Henry) Rourke, who had served as a major in the artillery during the First World War, and had ‘passed through the Staff College at Quetta, India. Later he instructed at the Royal Military College Duntroon and at the command staff school established in Sydney in 1938’.35 The senior administrative officer (AA&QMG) was Colonel J. R. (Ray) Broadbent, who had also graduated from Duntroon and had served at Gallipoli. Broadbent had resigned from the army in 1926 and become a grazier. It will be remembered that Rourke and Broadbent were the two Staff Corps officers whom Kent Hughes has identified previously as having stated that they ‘disapproved of his [Bennett’s] appointment and were not prepared to cooperate with him’.36
The 8th Division’s artillery commander was a Militia officer, Brigadier C. A. (Boots) Callaghan—nicknamed ‘Boots’ because he owned a number of shoe shops—who ‘in the 1914–1918 war had won his way to command of a field artillery brigade. This was followed by continuous service in the militia, including command of the 8th Infantry Brigade from 1934 to 1938.’37
The senior signals officer was Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. (Jim) Thyer and the senior engineer was Lieutenant-Colo
nel E. G. H. Scriven. Both were permanent soldiers. Lieutenant-Colonels Byrne and Stahle, the commander of the Army Service Corps and the senior ordnance officer respectively, were both Militia officers, while Colonel A. P. (Alf ) Derham, the 8th Division’s Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS), was also a Militia officer.38
On 4 July 1940, the headquarters of the new 8th Division was established at Victoria Barracks in Sydney, and on 1 August it was transferred to the Rosebery Racecourse. The three brigades of the 8th Division were originally the 22nd, 23rd and 24th. As the 23rd Brigade did not serve in Malaya or Singapore, it is beyond the scope of our story, and therefore will not be examined. In September 1940, it was decided to raise the 2nd AIF’s fourth division—the 9th. Rather than use corps troops and reinforcements from Australia, General Blamey recommended that Bennett’s 24th Brigade be transferred from the 8th to the 9th Division. The 27th Brigade was soon raised as its replacement for service with the 8th Division. Bennett’s 22nd and 27th Brigades are therefore at the heart of our infantry journey. The 22nd Brigade consisted of the 2/18th, 2/19th and 2/20th Battalions. It was commanded by Brigadier Harold Taylor. Lionel Wigmore:
He had gained a commission in the militia in 1913 and, during the war of 1914–1918, served with distinction in France as an infantry officer. After returning to Australia he resumed militia service and, in 1939, when he was given the 5th Militia Brigade, had successively commanded the Sydney University Regiment, the 18th Battalion, the New South Wales Scottish Regiment, and the 56th Battalion. In civil life the quality of his mind was evident in his having become a Doctor of Science in 1925. He had become Deputy Government Analyst of New South Wales in 1934.39
Taylor chose commanding officers with First World War experience, ‘young militia officers as seconds-in-command, and a sprinkling of veterans among his N.C.O’s and men’.40 This provided each unit with a sound core of experienced soldiers who, it was thought, would have a decisive influence in both early training and in initial action. He also gave permission for each CO to enlist recruits from their own areas. Thus, the 2/18th Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Varley, had a strong Armidale contingent, while Lieutenant-Colonel Jeater’s 2/20th Battalion had a large number of recruits from Newcastle and Sydney. Lieutenant Jim Howard, 2/19th Battalion:
There was a Militia Brigade in a ninety-day camp in Wallgrove. And they were the 56th Battalion which was Riverina; the 54th Battalion which was Central West; and the 20/19th Battalion were Newcastle and the northern side of Sydney. Now . . . the country blokes, the 56th Battalion—there were quite a lot of officers and NCOs—enlisted in the 2nd AIF, and went straight into the 2/19th Battalion. About July or August 1940, we got a trainload, some hundreds of blokes, like 400, or 450 out of Wagga Showgrounds, which was a reception depot for the Riverina. These blokes . . . some had full uniforms, some had giggle suits on, and some were in civvy clothes. The greatest ragtail mob you’d ever want to see! We equipped them though, and that’s how the battalion was formed. They were top blokes, top blokes, and most of them could shoot. They’d been popping rabbits with a twenty two rifle from about the age of eight. A bloody rifle—it fitted, second nature.41
From 15 July 1940 the officers and NCOs of the 22nd Brigade went into training at Wallgrove Camp, about 40 kilometres from Sydney, and just south of the main road to the Blue Mountains. The Brigade moved to Ingleburn from 20 August. In broad terms, the leadership of the Battalions of the 8th Division and their training in Australia followed a familiar pattern. The ‘bull-ring’ method of basic training was adopted, whereby instructors repeated lessons as section-sized groups of recruits rotated through their roughly hour-long lectures and/or demonstrations.42 A number of these 22nd Brigade soldiers had already had some Militia experience.
During the course of the Division’s training, General Bennett’s influence was substantial. The very qualities that Sturdee had identified in his letter to White and Miles in May of that year were shown in abundance during the last months of 1940 and during early 1941: an aggressive attitude to training, efficiency and physical fitness, and as Sturdee had noted, to the training of his officers.
During this period both Bennett and Rourke made frequent trips through New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia inspecting the 8th Division’s far-flung units. In addition to the administration and training of the Division, General Bennett was in charge of all corps troops in New South Wales. On 13 November 1940, the HQ of the 27th Brigade opened at the showgrounds in Sydney. The Brigade was to consist of the Queensland 2/26th Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes), which went into camp at Grovely in Queensland; the 2/29th Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson), which went into camp at Bonegilla in Victoria; and the 2/30th (Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan), which went into camp at Tamworth in New South Wales. By the end of 1940, therefore, Bennett had his 22nd Brigade in camp at Bathurst in NSW; his 23rd Brigade in camp at Bonegilla in Victoria; and his 27th Brigade spread through NSW, Victoria and Queensland.
During January 1941, Bennett conducted TEWTs (Tactical Exercises Without Troops) at his HQ and held a conference of commanders. In addition, he gave exercises for Divisional HQ in daily movement for up to five days at a time. These exercises were also used to test the signals from division to brigade and to units.43 By the time the 8th Division left Australia, it was at least as well trained as the 6th and 7th Divisions.44
After the decision was made in October 1940 to send an Australian brigade group to Malaya to operate directly under the British Malaya Command, Brigadier Taylor’s 22nd Brigade was chosen for the task. But that plan ‘had given way to a decision to send also a part of the divisional headquarters, on the ground that the staff of a brigade was insufficient to handle an Australian force in an overseas country’.45 In his book, The Fall of General Gordon Bennett, Lodge claims that the decision to send a portion of the 8th Division’s HQ to Malaya ‘probably stems from Bennett’s distrust of regular officers’.46 According to the Official Historian, the units which sailed on the Queen Mary were: the 22nd Brigade (the 2/18th, 2/19th and 2/20th Battalions); the 2/10th Field Regiment; a battery of the 2/4th Anti-tank Regiment; the 2/10th Field Company; the 8th Division Signals; the 10th Advanced General Hospital; the 2/4th Casualty Clearing Station; the 2/9th Field Ambulance; the 2/2nd Motor Ambulance Convoy; the 2/5th Field Hygiene Section; the 2nd Bacteriological Laboratory; the 17th Dental Unit; the 4th Supply Personnel Section; a Reserve Motor Transport Company; a field bakery; the 2/4th Field Workshop; the 2/2nd Ordnance Store; the 8th Division Cash Office; the 8th Division Provost Company; the 8th Division Postal Unit and other headquarters details—in all around 5750 personnel.47
Major Kappe, GSO2, left Australia on 31 January while General Bennett flew out four days later. The 22nd Brigade and its attached units—codenamed ‘Elbow Force’—departed Sydney on board the Queen Mary on 2 February 1941. With the Queen Mary sailed the Aquitania and the Dutch ship Nieuw Amsterdam, which were carrying troops to the Middle East. The convoy was escorted by HMAS Hobart. Two days out from Fremantle, the Mauretania joined the convoy.
The Unit Diarist of the 2/18th Battalion has left us with a stirring account of the eventual splitting of the convoy on 16 February 1941, with one part heading for the Middle East, and the other to Singapore:
Day dawned hot and steaming and Ships ploughed their way through the placid sea at 14 knots . . . At 1430 hrs a ship, which we later knew to be H.M.S. Durban, appeared dimly outlined on the N.W. Horizon. As we came closer she crossed our bows and swung into line abreast to starbd [sic] of H.M.A.S. Canberra. This was the dispersal point for the Convoy and on two blasts of the “Queen Mary’s” siren the “Q.M.” swung to the port making a complete circle behind the other ships of the Convoy. After they were in formation again the “Queen Mary” increased her speed from 14 to 30 knots in 10 minutes and soon overtook first, the “Mauritania” [sic] and then the “Aquitania”. As we passed the “Mauritania” about 300 yds on our port side we noticed t
hat the soldiers had gained every vantage point, with the Nurses amidships at the highest and best point of all, as though at a given signal, wild bursts of good Aussie cheers and cooees rent the air, and was fittingly replied to in a similar manner by the entire personnel of this marvellous ship., the “Q.M.”. We soon left the “Mauritania” and overtook the “Aquitania” where again this most inspiring and never-to-be-forgotten performance was repeated. To most of those who were capable of fine and deep feelings will remember this day forever and all must have been almost overcome with emotion and after these last farewells, the convoy consisting of “Aquitania”, “Mauritania” and “New Amsterdam”, headed by H.M.A.S. Canberra, circled to the west and set course along the path of the sinking sun. The “Q.M.” and H.M.S. Durban on the other hand, moved in N.E. direction . . .48
Perhaps Lieutenant Jim Howard’s sentiments were those of many on board: ‘. . . very emotional. I suppose one of the things that goes through your mind is, “I wonder how many of us will see this out?”’49 None of them could have guessed that in a symbolic sense, they were amongst the last of the empire’s men. If the sun was setting on the Queen Mary’s horizon, irresistible forces were at work against a continuance of European colonial rule in Asia—the sun was indeed setting. And the cost to Britain and two of her dominions would be horrendous.
The Queen Mary arrived at the naval dock at Singapore on 18 February 1941. Among the multitude of coolies and British troops on the wharves was a gathering of British dignitaries to greet them: the GOC Malaya Lieutenant-General Bond, and the Governor Sir Shenton Thomas and his wife. According to Don Wall, 2/20th Battalion, the troops ‘showered them with coins’.50 Perhaps Reg Newton was a little more explicit when he decribed a number of ‘practical jokers’ who engaged in ‘the heating of pennies and throwing them down onto the wharves among the coolies and British troops’.51 To another onlooker aboard the Queen Mary the multitude of uniforms worn by the welcoming party ‘might well have come from the wardrobe of a theatrical company’.52