by Peter Brune
Saturday 12 April 1941:
Find Rourke, Derham & Broadbent inclined to discuss among themselves the Taylor incident. Apparently based on investigations by Derham during recent trip. Not sure that Derham’s investigation & opinion will be sound—inclined to be swayed. So far he has not discussed the episode in detail. Broadbent came to me today & suggested that unless complete confidence betw [sic ‘between’] T & me is restored then the healing of the breach is not desirable. He considered the cause a clash of personalities. I resent this slightly. Surely in an army such a clash must show the junior to be wrong. A junior must be subservient to a senior & shd [sic ‘should’] not clash with him. I don’t like the whisperings that are going on behind my back. It is un military.
Thursday 29 May 1941:
Secret & confidential letter from Percival was addressed to me personally but was opened by Rourke who must have seen the address which was written in large lettering & enclosed in 2 envelopes. Was annoyed that he shd [sic ‘should’] open it.
Friday 30 May:
Strange how Rourke and I always seem at cross purposes. I find that he is all the time watching my words to see if I am agst [sic ‘against’] his kind & he comes straight back with an unhesitating contradiction. He still has the Staff Corps complex agst [sic ‘against’] mere civilian soldiers—inferior beings, ignorant etc etc. It is really a sign of inferiority complex [on Rourke’s part]. I feel sure he will get over it—especially when fighting starts, if, indeed, he is here then. I feel that he is all the time working with his friends in high places for another appointment. He is against Kappe & Beale the only others on Div HQ. who are permanent officers . . .
They have their failings—like the rest of us myself & Rourke included.
Saturday 31 May 1941:
My mind has been running on Rourke, who impresses me as an arch intriguer, spending more time worrying about his position & prestige than on his work. He resents me dealing with any member of G Staff. Yet he omits to keep me in touch with things himself. He has told at least one of his staff that I am unapproachable & must not be worried with any matters . . . He seems to have his mind engrossed with defending the regular soldiers against the mere civilians. That is a subject that never intervenes with me. I fear that he realises his own incapacity in certain directions & allows this obsession to obtrude itself.26
However, a change was coming. On Friday 4 July, Bennett noted in his diary:
Rourke & Broadbent out for dinner. That left Kappe Gordon & self. How different the atmosphere! R is evidently ill either physically or mentally or both. He is unnecessarily harsh with his own G. officers. He snaps at Walker re the Mess. He whispers to Broadbent & Derham & succeeded in making them disgruntled though Broadbent is too loyal & sensible to be party to intrigue. If Derham was not so ill, he too wd [sic ‘would’] refuse to be drawn in. I fear that Rourke is a very unhappy man.27
And three days later, when Rourke was temporarily in hospital, Bennett noted that: ‘Spirit at HQ . . . cheery once again. All on their toes & keen. What a difference one man makes!’28 On Wednesday 16 July, Bennett wrote:
During dinner recd wire—appointing Rourke to AIF [as Commander Royal Artillery 7th Division] with para ‘propose THYER as G1.’ Alls [sic] well that ends well. Told Kappe he was to be cmd Sigs. Sent for Thyer & we all celebrated. It seems to me most likely that this has been engineered [Bennett had ‘for some time’ after this sentence but had crossed it out].29
The next day Bennett stated that:
Rourke doesn’t seem too happy at the idea of going to M East. He told me that he wd [sic ‘would’] just as soon have gone to Aust: that he was beyond the age when he wanted to be in the fighting zone. He also told Kappe that his health was far from good.30
Colonel Henry Rourke left for the Middle East on 21 July 1941. From the time of his arrival in Malaya he had acted upon his pledge made at the 8th Division HQ in Sydney the day before Bennett arrived to take command. Rourke was subsequently appointed as BGS (Brigadier General Staff ) to General Rowell at Ist Corps during 1942 and saw out the war as a liaison officer to the Joint Planning Committee at the War Office London from 1942 to 1945. For a considerable portion of the war he attained his ambition—that he was ‘beyond the age when he wanted to be in the fighting zone’.
Rourke’s departure, however, did not assure harmony. Broadbent, Derham and Bennett clashed during late August over the AIF’s transfer to the area of responsibility for the defence of Johore and Malacca. The subject was the incidence of malaria. On 22 August 1941, Bennett wrote that:
Broadbent discussed changeover and made an appeal about some alteration & said ‘I am afraid there will be a great deal of Malaria & I want you to realise the position so that if there should be an investigation from Australia as to the cause of so many cases the blame will be attached to you’ [sic].
I hit the roof & made mention of people ‘covering themselves as they were afraid to take responsibilities.’ He said that A.D.M.S. and Malaya Command were against it. I asked who on Mal. Comd. And he answered ‘Hill’. Now Hill is Fortress Q—who has tried to block our taking over the area at all. My comments on A.D.M.S. [Derham] were terse. I saw I’d have to make a change if he could not become more military and less namby pamby. Then Broadbent asked if Taylor had been one to protest. I said No, and that Taylor did not seem to mind sending his men out on 5 day treks into unprotected areas.31
By ‘coincidence’ Broadbent told Bennett the next day that Brigadier Taylor had requested a meeting to discuss the malaria question. Bennett—understandably—wrote:
Broadbent said Taylor had rung & wanted to see me personally on the malaria question—arranged Monday. I suspect the thing is due to Broadbent’s wrangling. If so, there is a lack of loyalty that cannot go on.32
The subject of malaria in the 8th Division in Malaya has been covered by the Australian Official Medical Historian, Allan Walker:
During the first phase of the Malayan experience the incidence of malaria was low in the A.I.F. Control was good in the settled areas, and the influence of the Institute of Medical Research at Kuala Lumpur was most valuable. When jungle training began the incidence of malaria increased, particularly where troop movements were not correlated to anti-malarial measures. When the Australian troops took up battle stations, malaria became common.33
Broadbent’s outburst to Bennett lacked substance and was delivered in an insubordinate fashion. The War Diary of the 8th Division Administrative HQ for the period August–October 1941 clearly shows that either Broadbent was a very poor judge of the issue of malaria, or that, perhaps, he had other motives. The entry for 2 September cites the wastage report for malaria as ‘good’—and for mumps ‘on the decrease’ and VD ‘fair’; on 15 October the diary stated that there had been only 35 cases of malaria in six weeks, that VD was down to a very low level, and that hospital admissions were as low as they had been since the arrival of the 8th Division in Malaya. On 30 October, the diary stated that the malaria position was ‘quite satisfactory’ as the total cases of the disease since the 8th Division’s arrival in Malaya—some eight-and-a-half months—was 297 compared with 76 new cases in Johore in two months.34 These figures must reflect favourably on Derham’s work in the clinical sense, but very poorly on his and Broadbent’s behaviour—and motives—in their treatment of Bennett regarding the subject of malaria.
In early September 1941, Bennett was confronted by enquiries from Australia. Bennett’s diary 6 September:
Recd cables Aust—complaining about food for tps replied accordingly
Ano [sic another] cable—suggesting concessions for travel on leave etc
Ano cable Military Bd concerned lack amenities etc very annoyed—cabling reply—looks as if Stantke is trying to pillory me.35
Bennett had long suspected that the Adjutant-General at Army HQ in Melbourne, Major-General Victor Stantke, had been doing all in his power to frustrate his command of the 8th Division. Lodge has noted that Bennett’s assessment
‘was probably correct’.36 Further, we have noted that during the interwar period, not just Bennett, but even Blamey had also suspected that Militia officers were being sidelined for key promotions in the army. The truth is that, rightly or wrongly, the Staff Corps exercised considerable control over the Australian Army through its power on the Military Board. Major-General Stantke’s hindrance to Bennett’s command of his division continued through 1941: when in March he communicated directly with the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, he was told to refrain from doing so by the board; his request for a VD hospital was denied; his request that he be allowed to grant promotions within his division was also denied, which resulted in some of his requests being allowed and others turned down. In short, Bennett was being thwarted by fellow officers both in Australia and in 8th Division HQ.
It is questionable as to what real damage Rourke, Broadbent and, to a lesser degree, Derham had imposed upon the working efficiency and morale of 8th Division HQ. Lodge states that ‘. . . there could be found on the staff of Headquarters 8th Division several key officers who shared Taylor’s opinions of Bennett, some of whom, like Taylor, were also militia officers’.37 During the period January–December 1941, ‘several’ were, in fact, Rourke, Broadbent and Derham. There may have been others who privately held varying views, but there seems no evidence of conflict or disloyalty—or a failure to work together. Further, there were certainly other officers who were quite content working under Bennett: for example, Kent Hughes, Stahl and Maxwell. The truth is, as David Horner has pointed out in his examination of the Staff Corps vs Militia argument, that there were widespread instances of various Militia officers not getting along, just as there were examples of Staff Officers doing likewise. The plain and simple truth is that Rourke, Broadbent and Derham were negative influences on Bennett’s staff; that Taylor and Bennett had never got on, and their poor relationship in Malaya was primarily the result of Taylor’s insubordination.
In a further attempt to discredit Bennett, Lodge states twice within a page-and-a-half in his book that: ‘Bennett apparently was oblivious of the irony in arguing that he was not against regular officers while having only three on his staff.’38 And ‘It must be remembered, however, that 8th Division Headquarters nevertheless had the fewest staff college graduates of any of the AIF divisions, including the 9th which was still then in the process of being formed.’39 Yet, a mere 30 pages before these comments, Lodge acknowledges that the original GOC General Sturdee—a Staff Corps officer—chose the staff of the 8th Division.40 Furthermore, when Rourke left his post, Bennett proceeded to appoint another Staff Corps officer to replace him. The Official Historian has also made it very clear that Sturdee chose the 8th Division Staff.41
The Second World War had not begun well for Major-General Gordon Bennett. Possessed and driven by enormous ambition, he had seen himself overlooked to command the 6th, then 7th and, initially, the 8th Divisions. And if this perceived injustice was not galling enough, he had been forced to witness the promotion of his arch enemy Blamey to raise and then command the 2nd AIF and its 6th Division, to be followed by a further promotion to the command of a corps. A frustrated but determined Bennett was lagging behind.
By the outbreak of hostilities in early December 1941, during his roughly eleven-month period as GOC 8th Division in Malaya, Bennett had experienced further testing times. Denied the concentration of his three brigades in Malaya, he had experienced the wrath and resentment of Staff Corps officers both within his midst in Malaya and in positions of power on the Military Board. He even had to gain permission of the board to be able to communicate directly with the Minister of the Army.
It is an inescapable conclusion that the sheer hatred and devious behaviour of the likes of Rourke, Broadbent, Derham and Taylor in Malaya, and Stantke at home, were, in simple terms, a fundamental breach of loyalty to both Bennett, and the army and nation they all purported to serve. There was a war on—and another on the horizon.
Gordon Bennett has received criticism for his attitude towards, and dealings with, the British in Malaya and Singapore during his tenure of command before the Pacific War began. Such criticism deserves close scrutiny.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, and when, as GOC 6th Division AIF, General Blamey realised that his force was to go overseas, he ‘knew that occasions would arise when an Australian force commander would have different views from those of the British theatre commander under whom he was serving’.42
The experience of serving under the British in the First World War had convinced Blamey ‘of the necessity of a very firm statement’.43 That he took the matter seriously is demonstrated by the fact that he consulted Generals White and Squires, and Sir Owen Dixon, a Justice of the High Court. Meanwhile, Charles Bean, the Official Historian for the First World War, had written to Prime Minister Menzies ‘about the problems of cooperating with the British’.44 General Blamey’s charter became the basis for a similar document for all independent Australian commanders serving overseas. David Horner: ‘It was a declaration that Australia was an independent nation, whose forces remained under its command even when operating under a British commander.’45 Blamey’s charter was formally recognised by the British Government on 26 March 1940 and the Minister for the Army issued it to him on 19 April.
Blamey’s desire for a charter was shrewd and was put to the test on a number of occasions. His Chief Staff Officer 1, Colonel Syd Rowell, would later write:
. . . the national commander is given a charter by his government which is agreed to by the senior partner. While this charter usually places the national commander’s force at the disposal of the superior commander, it also imposes on the former certain very specific obligations. It gives him the right and indeed the duty of direct communication with his government . . . Most importantly, the charter provides that the main force may be broken up into smaller formations only with the express concurrence of the national commander.46
Therefore, it is important to realise that Major-General Gordon Bennett’s charter was nothing new, and that problems with its implementation were not peculiar to himself or the challenges he faced in Malaya and Singapore. Bennett’s charter stated that:
(a) The Force will retain its identity as an Australian force;
(b) No part of the Force is to be employed apart from the whole without your consent;
(c) Should the G.O.C. Malaya in certain circumstances of emergency insist on an extensive operational dispersal of your Force you will, after registering such protest as you deem essential, comply with the order of the G.O.C. Malaya and immediately report the full circumstances to Army Headquarters, Melbourne.47
Given the range of Bennett’s First World War service, both the need for, and the content of such a charter, would have been appreciated by him no less than people such as Blamey and Bean. We now examine Bennett’s implementation of his charter.
The first problem concerned Malaya Command’s desire to involve the AIF in breaking a plantation workers’ strike for improved pay. Bennett’s diary, 14 May 1941: ‘Attended King’s House at request Governor who had asked that AIF supply tps to quell strike. I refused & explained Australia’s policy. He asked me to attend daily conference at 9 am.’48 The next day, during a clash with troops, four workers were killed. Bennett recorded that he ‘Recd letter Malay Comd saying that AIF was legally bound to prevent civil strife & cd [could] not refuse duty and asking for my views . . .’.49 Malaya Command also pointed out that the Governor would examine his ‘views’. But Bennett was not about to be intimidated: ‘Have wired Aust. and also replied.’ One week later Malaya Command received notification from Australia that the AIF was not to be used for strike breaking. According to Lionel Wigmore, ‘Bennett learned subsequently that India had also objected.’50 It is of interest to note that the British Government had ratified Blamey’s charter in March 1940. It would therefore seem that, in the interests of both harmony and efficiency, the British might have seen fit to enlighten all subsequent co
mmanders of the Australian charter.
The second problem Bennett faced was the discipline of the AIF in Malaya. On 4 April 1941, the AIF opened its detention barracks. Bennett: ‘Port Swettenham detention barracks commenced. Was told by staff to expect 100 prisoners. I divided this by 2 as my estimate. Actually there are only 7. It is said that the name “sweetin ’em” has frightened away a lot of crime.’51 The truth is that the AIF’s behaviour from the 22nd Brigade Group’s arrival in January 1941 until the outbreak of hostilities on 8 December ‘caused little trouble for the [Australian] military police’.52 It would only be during the final stages of the campaign—especially after the troops had withdrawn across the causeway onto Singapore Island—that the trouble and controversy began.
Glenn Wahlert, in The Other Enemy? Australian Soldiers and the Military Police, has argued that:
If the AIF had any problems with the military police in Malaya, it was with the British Red Caps rather than with the Australian Provosts. The Australians viewed the British MPs as inflexible, intolerant, and unnecessarily harsh. As one Australian saw it, they were ‘pure bastards: they gave their own no quarter.’ As had occurred in the Middle East with the 6th Division, in at least one incident in Malaya the actions of the Red Caps so incensed the Australians that a near riot occurred: ‘One of our fellows [from the 4th Anti Tank Regiment] had been beaten up by the Red Caps in Singapore, not far from the Union Jack Club . . . He was probably drunk and a bit cheeky to the Brits, but he didn’t deserve the hiding he got . . . When we got the news we all grabbed our rifles and headed out to shoot the bastards [the Red Caps]. Just as well they had been warned off.53