by Peter Brune
There are a number of noteworthy points concerning Percival’s appreciation. His comment concerning the morale of the Indians of the 11th Division is bland. When companies of troops run from a position at the sound of a bridge being blown, it is clearly evident that such troops’ morale is in fact broken and that the situation is far, far more serious than ‘not . . . being as high as one would have wished’. Percival’s reluctance to ‘break up the A.I.F. organization’ would seem to indicate that he was aware of General Gordon Bennett’s charter. Bennett’s diary, 14 December: ‘General Percival called & asked what would be the position if Singapore was attacked and help from A.I.F. were required. I said if troops on the island failed I would have to move to help as we are here to defend this island.’32
Percival’s order to Heath on 18 December that ‘The Commander 3 Indian Corps would select and have prepared a series of positions between Ipoh and Tanjong Malim’ demonstrates yet again that for some unexplained reason Brigadier Simson was still—after the defeats of Jitra, Gurun and the loss of Penang—a redundant resource in the preparation of set-piece, in-depth, and above all, tank defence positions along the III Corps withdrawal route. By obvious extension, there was the need to create a firm base in depth at or near General Dobbie’s suggested line in Johore. By this time it was late, and it was becoming very late—but it was most certainly not too late.
But his order that ‘labour supply priority was to be allotted to the RAF for the maintenance of new air strips on Singapore Island and in southern Johore’ shows all the characteristics of a general who has lost touch with military reality. It is well worth mentioning the state of the RAF at this time. Douglas Gillison, in his Royal Australian Airforce, 1939–1942, quotes a memorandum issued by Brooke-Popham on Christmas Eve:
There have been many cases of gallantry and devotion on the part of individual officers and airmen but there have also been instances where aerodromes appear to have been abandoned in a state of approaching panic. Stores that will assist the enemy in his further advance have been left behind, material that is urgently required has been abandoned and a general state of chaos has been evident.33
After quoting Brooke-Popham, Gillison then states that:
In these depressing circumstances the air force in Malaya had a serviceable strength of only 146 aircraft—40 bombers, 34 torpedo bombers, 38 fighters, 17 general reconnaissance and 17 miscellaneous. Of these only 74 (including the Glenn Martin and Blenheim bombers which could be called scarcely be termed “modern”) could be regarded as current types and even these were no match for the types the Japanese could bring against them in vastly superior numbers.34
But in a chilling footnote to this observation, Gillison pointed out that on 7 December the strength of the RAF was 164, but of the now available 146 aircraft, 52 had been flown in since the outbreak of hostilities: 24 Dutch Martin bombers, nine Dutch Buffaloes, six Wirraways, five Albatrosses, four Swordfish and four Sharks. He then stated that ‘many replacement aircraft had been destroyed by enemy action’ and that ‘nor of course, was the combat efficiency of the aircraft then available nearly as high as at the outbreak of war’.35
Thus, although Percival and Brooke-Popham were loath to see the Japanese acquire airfields in central Malaya, and thereby enhance their ability to attack potential troop reinforcements to Singapore, the stark truth was that such reinforcements of soldiers and material could not, by Percival’s own admission, arrive by sea until mid-January 1942 at the earliest. Given the ground already lost by the 11th Indian Division in just over two weeks, all available labour should have been placed under the Chief Engineer’s control for the preservation of the vital ground—the ground that was always going to decide Singapore’s fate, and that was Johore. The plain truth is that at this critical stage of the fight for Singapore, the army had become the prime force that would determine success or failure, and that while the decision to employ the very limited and obsolete RAF primarily for patrolling and future convoy protection was pragmatic, to deny the army—which was fighting for the very survival of Singapore—much-needed labour was foolhardy. Further, not a syllable of Percival’s appreciation appears to have addressed any of the ingredients of such recent disasters. In short, he expected Heath and his III Corps to carry on the same fight with the same lack of expertise and materials which had delivered nothing more than demoralisation and disaster.
On 12 December 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill sailed to the United States aboard HMS Duke of York to confer with President Roosevelt, with a view to reaching fundamental decisions regarding the future direction of the war. While at sea, Churchill wrote that he ‘had clear convictions which I regret it was not in my power to enforce from mid-ocean’.36
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. [Chiefs of Staff] 15 Dec 41
Beware lest [that] troops required for ultimate defence Singapore Island and fortress are not used up or cut off in Malay peninsula. Nothing compares in importance with the fortress. Are you sure we shall have enough troops for prolonged defence? Consider with Auchinleck and Commonwealth Government moving 1st Australian Division [sic should be ‘corps’] from Palestine to Singapore. Report action.37
After a conference in Singapore on 18 December 1941, attended by representatives from Great Britain, the United States, Holland, Australia and New Zealand, a report was sent to the British Chiefs of Staff. In essence the report requested planes to complete the strength of existing squadrons in Singapore and Malaya, a further four bomber and four fighter squadrons, a new division and a brigade group of infantry, reinforcements for Heath’s III Corps, three light and two heavy anti-aircraft regiments, an anti-tank regiment and 50 light tanks. The conference also approved ‘Percival’s policy of holding the enemy as far north as possible’.38 Churchill was more specific—‘as far north as possible’ meant ‘Johore’.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee 19 Dec 41
Duff Cooper expresses the same anxieties as I conveyed to you in my message beginning ‘Beware’. Duff Cooper’s proposal to concentrate on defence of Johore for the purpose of holding Singapore conforms exactly to view taken by Dill here.
2. After naval disasters to British and American sea-power in Pacific and Indian Oceans we have no means of preventing continuous landings by Japanese in great strength in Siam and Malay peninsula. It is therefore impossible to defend, other than by demolitions and delaying action, anything north of the defensive line in Johore, and this line itself can only be defended as part of the final defence of Singapore Island fortress and the naval base.
3. The Commander-in-Chief should now be told to confine himself to defence of Johore and Singapore. This should not preclude his employing delaying tactics and demolitions on the way south and making an orderly retreat.39
In The Japanese Thrust, Lionel Wigmore quoted parts of the above Churchill cables. But the fascinating point that Wigmore did not pursue was the Prime Minister’s reference to ‘the defensive line in Johore’. Two points are critical: the first is that there was no prepared line in southern Johore. Was Churchill referring to a line on a map? A geographical line only? Surely he was referring to a set-piece defensive line, or in other words, a line of fortifications. Further, Churchill’s reference that such a line ‘conforms exactly to view taken by Dill here’ is significant. Percival was a protégé of Dill’s and had been appointed by him to GOC Malaya. He would surely have been aware of Dobbie’s proposed 1937 line across southern Johore. It will be remembered that Dill was Chief of the Imperial General Staff when Brigadier Simson was appointed to the position of Chief Engineer, Malaya Command, and that, according to Simson, a letter outlining his (Simson’s) position and responsibilities was to have been despatched to Percival pending Simson’s arrival in Singapore. No such letter had been despatched. Wigmore also states that on 15 December Duff Cooper had:
. . . disclosed to Mr Bowden, Australia’s representative in Singapore, misgivings about the military situation, and said he saw the
probability of a gradual withdrawal to a line approximately covering the southern half of Johore, to be held pending arrival of reinforcements about a month hence.40
Duff Cooper was no military genius, but his above point merely repeats what Dobbie had advocated in 1937—along with his GSO1, Colonel Arthur Percival. And it supports what Churchill, Dill and Brigadier Ivan Simson were now proposing as the only realistic plan for the defence of Singapore.
Pleas for reinforcements to Singapore were not confined to the British. General Northcott, who was visiting General Bennett while passing through Singapore after a visit to the Middle East, cabled the Australian Chiefs of Staff on 18 December suggesting all possible reinforcements, and that a machine gun battalion should be sent immediately. General Gordon Bennett had been, through December 1941, communicating with the Australian Chiefs of Staff and the Minister for the Army. On 13 December he told Army HQ that: ‘There is insufficient cover in the air to enable the Army to carry out its role without molestation from the enemy’s Air Force. I fear another Crete.’41 On the same day Bennett told the Minister that: ‘Naturally, our line is thin. The 3rd Brigade of my division would have been a godsend to us now. As you know, it has been repeatedly asked for, and my requests have been repeatedly refused.’42 On 17 December Bennett cabled Army HQ in Melbourne:
I have seen a total absence of the offensive spirit, which after all, is the one great remedy for the methods adopted by the Japanese. Counter attacks would put a stop to this penetration . . .
The position has arrived when something must be done—urgently. I strongly urge that, should the request be made, at least one division of the A.I.F. from the Middle East be transferred to Malaya . . . 43
Bennett’s cable merely reflects his utter ignorance of the Indian Army’s training. It was all very well to advocate an ‘offensive spirit’ and that ‘counterattacks would put a stop to this penetration’, but the prerequisites for success in war are surely training and equipment and support. And training is surely the first requirement.
On 19 December, the Australian Department of External Affairs cabled Mr Vivian Bowden, its Singapore representative, for a report on the state of defences in Singapore. It stated that: ‘This government is far from satisfied with the results of the policy of subordinating requirements of this theatre of war’ and that ‘Brooke-Popham gave us assurances that all was well with Malayan defences . . .’.44 Bowden’s reply, given late on the same day, was to prove prophetic:
I feel strongly that before further Australian troops are committed every possible guarantee should be taken that they will not be abandoned with those already here. In my view real defence strength in Malaya falls far short of previous publicity and I feel assurances should be sought immediately from United Kingdom Government that Malaya will not continue to be regarded as secondary theatre of war and that reinforcements and supplies of modern arms and equipment will be rushed here even at cost of slowing down African offensive. Am convinced that unless reinforcements of modern aircraft and operationally trained personnel are sent immediately Singapore will before long be in gravest danger.45
Prime Minister John Curtin cabled Churchill the next day:
Army authorities are in receipt of disturbing report from Bennett regarding gravity of position and request by him for dispatch of one Australian Division from Middle East. He also refers to inadequate air support . . .
I shall be glad to receive most immediate reply as to military position, the strength of your forces, and measures in hand for reinforcements, if such are required. It would be appreciated if brief report on military situation could be cabled to me say three times a week or more frequently if developments require it.46
On 23 December, Bowden cabled Curtin again:
Expected arrival of modern fighter planes in boxes requiring weeks to assemble under the danger of destruction by bombing cannot save the position.
. . . Reinforcements of troops should not be in brigades but in divisions . . . Anything that is not powerful modern and immediate is futile.47
Bowden’s words ‘anything that is not powerful modern and immediate is futile’ deserve close scrutiny in light of events that were occurring in Washington, London and Canberra at this time. The first consideration is the priority given at the strategic level to the Far East.
Winston Churchill’s trip to Washington aboard the Duke of York to meet with Roosevelt and his advisors in Washington was dominated by his desire to settle arguably the greatest strategic issue of the Second World War: the ‘defeat Hitler first’ proposition. Churchill has stated that:
We were conscious of a serious danger that the United States might pursue the war against Japan in the Pacific and leave us to fight Germany and Italy in Europe, Africa, and in the Middle East . . .
Should we be able to persuade the President and the American Service chiefs that the defeat of Japan would not spell the defeat of Hitler, but that the defeat of Hitler made the finishing off of Japan merely a matter of time and trouble?48
Churchill need not have worried, as Roosevelt and his advisors were of the same mind. The ‘defeat Hitler first’ strategy and the ‘Grand Alliance’ were born of that period in Washington. The consequences of that decision were simple: win the battle of the Atlantic to facilitate the build-up of immediate material supplies and eventual troop concentrations; bomb Germany to cause the eventual ruination of its capacity to wage war; win the battle for North Africa; and provide all possible material assistance to the Soviet Union to continue its war on the Eastern Front. The Far East was a subordinate and distant priority. On 17 December, Churchill had said that: ‘The Japanese must be expected to establish themselves on both sides of the Straits of Malacca and in the Straits of Sunda . . . we expect, however, that Singapore island and fortress will stand an attack for at least six months . . .’49
Shortly after Christmas 1941, Churchill perceived that ‘the question of forming a supreme Allied command in South-East Asia and drawing boundary lines was approaching’.50 He was right. The Americans suggested that that commander should be British, and their choice was General Wavell, who had been sacked by Churchill in the Middle East, replaced by General Auchinleck, and was now ensconced in New Delhi as Commander of the Indian Army. Churchill, ever the shrewd politician—and strategist—thought that:
I was complimented by the choice of a British commander, but it seemed to me that the theatre in which he would act would soon be overrun and the forces which could be placed at his disposal would be destroyed by the Japanese onslaught. I found that the British Chiefs of Staff, when appraised [sic], had the same reaction.51
It is clear from the above that both Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff knew that the chances of Singapore holding out were, in the long term, slim, but as has also been intimated, the Prime Minister saw ‘at least six months’ as a survival time frame. A further change to the command structure in the Far East had come on 23 December when Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall arrived in Singapore to take over from Brooke-Popham. This change of command reflected the fact that the Chiefs of Staff had realised that the army was now the chief service for the defence of Malaya and Singapore. Pownall formally assumed command on 27 December, while Brooke-Popham departed Singapore four days later.
The second consideration when assessing Bowden’s ‘anything that is not powerful modern and immediate is futile’, is an assessment of the army reinforcements and the support for them in Malaya and Singapore. On Christmas Day 1941, the War Office in London ordered the 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division to Singapore and a week later the remainder of that division to the Far East. It will be remembered that the 44th Indian Brigade had already been committed.
The reinforcement formations designated for Malaya and Singapore in late 1941 constituted nothing more than a distant exercise in military expediency. At the staff level, it was all too easy to commit the 18th Division and the 44th Indian Brigade to Malaya and Singapore. But in practice, those formations were not in any way ready for
war—especially against an enemy as proficient as the Japanese.
In an extraordinary appendix to the British Official History, Kirby has quoted an account made by Brigadier Ballentine, who commanded the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade. He (Kirby) has also asserted that the following observations applied equally to the 45th Indian Brigade, which will later enter our story fighting alongside the Australians at Muar. Brigadier Ballentine:
The battalions were raised in the autumn of 1940, and the brigade was formed in Poona in July 1941. All battalions arrived in Poona under strength, consisting of equal proportions of trained regular soldiers, reservists and drafts straight from the Regimental Training Centres . . .
Excellent progress in all branches of training, designed solely for Middle East conditions, was made in Poona, but this was largely negatived [sic] by the appalling milking inherent in the large-scale Indian Army expansion. During the six months July to December 1941, each battalion threw off some 250 men . . .
During the last month in India, each battalion took in some 250 recruits to replace wastage, many of whom had only 4 or 5 months service and were under 18 years of age.52
The tale of woe did not end there. The consequence of the above was that many of the recruits had been with their battalions for less than three months and a number had joined their units during their travel to the point of embarkation; the strength of experienced VCOs (holding a Viceroy’s commission and therefore junior to all officers with a King’s or Indian unit’s officer’s commission) and NCOs were few to begin with, and had been greatly reduced by the milking process. Ballentine also stated that after the milking process, there remained, on average, around three British officers per battalion. The remainder were Emergency Commissioned Officers who were ‘drawn from outside India with, at the most, twelve months experience of Indian troops, their ways and their language’. Before the expansion—and the consequent milking—of the Indian Army, the number of British senior officers in an Indian battalion was between twelve and sixteen.53