by Peter Brune
We now come to a critical train of events which yet again demonstrate a totally inexcusable blunder on the part of both General Heath and General Percival. Kirby has stated that: ‘On the same day [23 December] Heath had sent a message to Percival asking that steps should be taken to construct a series of defensive positions south of Kampar on which troops could retire, for he was unable both to fight the Japanese and to prepare rearward positions.’12 Heath’s request was entirely reasonable. However, the circumstances behind that request are intriguing. In his book Too Little Too Late, Brigadier Ivan Simson described a meeting he had with General Heath at his advanced HQ at Ipoh on 22 December. During a conversation with Heath after dinner that night, Simson recorded that he discussed the defences ‘between Ipoh and Singapore’.13 He claimed that Heath ‘thought I over estimated the tank danger’. Simson then gave Heath two rather pertinent examples disputing that view: ‘. . . his own success with tanks against the Italians at Keren in Abyssinia in 1940; and the defeat in which General Percival had been involved with the German panzer break-through in France earlier in the same year.’14 Simson also claimed that during their meeting, he pointed out that the Japanese had tanks and that his Indian soldiers had had neither training or experience in dealing with them. Further, he reminded Heath that his III Corps had no tanks and ‘few anti-tank weapons and mines’. Simson then gave Heath the obvious solution: ‘I did not see how he could stop a determined tank thrust down the road against tired troops unless he had anti-tank defences in depth . . .’15
When, on the following day (23 December), Heath and Simson inspected the defences at Kampar, they noted that these were merely hastily dug and that there was no sign of civilian labour to assist them. Although there were no anti-tank cylinders at Kampar, Simson told Heath that he had supervised the dumping of numbers of them on his way forward two days previous. It would seem that their visit to Kampar had made some impact upon Heath, for that night he raised the subject of anti-tank defences with Simson. It was during that conversation that Heath framed the message to Percival that Kirby mentions above. Incredibly, when Simson asked Heath to sign it, Heath refused. Simson then claims that he asked Heath to send the message to Percival. It would seem, given the passage from Kirby above, that Heath did so. We now return to an extraordinary statement made by Kirby in the British Official History:
Percival arranged in the following week that surplus officers from the Public Works Department should be organized into works groups in selected areas under the State Engineers. He informed both Heath and Bennett of these arrangements on the 29th and said that the State Engineers would report to them for orders, the object being to prepare a series of obstacles, especially anti-tank obstacles, in great depth on probable lines of enemy advance. Since III Corps staff was too much occupied to give time to the construction of such defences well in rear of the fighting line and the P.W.D. officers could not provide sufficient labour, this effort produced little result.16
Kirby follows this revelation with the comment that had Brigadier Simson been placed in charge of all rearward defence works, ‘something useful might have been accomplished’.17
The evidence would seem overwhelming that General Arthur Percival was a very slow learner. It will be recalled that he had, at the outbreak of hostilities only a few short weeks before, ordered defensive positions prepared at Gurun. However, the allotted civilian labourers had failed to turn up. But surely the real indictment is that Percival failed to constructively employ a highly trained professional military engineer under his very nose—and under his command.
After his time with Heath, Simson drove back to Gemas, where he made detailed notes of all available stocks of the ‘more important items we would need for defensive work’.18 He found that there were ample supplies and that these should be employed before stocks further south were used. Simson reached Singapore at around 11.30 pm on Boxing Day 1941 and made straight for Percival’s HQ. He was only too well aware of the importance of his mission. During the following two-and-a-half hours Simson reiterated the arguments he had given Percival on his arrival in Singapore in August. They fell on deaf ears. Simson quoted Percival yet again as claiming that, ‘defences are bad for morale—for both troops and civilians’.19 But, according to Simson, Percival did make one concession. If General Keith Simmons, the Commander of the Singapore Fortress agreed, Percival said he would have no objection to Simson’s proposals for defensive fortifications on the north shore of Singapore Island. Buoyed by Percival’s compromise, Simson yet again broached the subject of such fortifications through Johore—and Percival once again declined. Simson left him at 2.00 am on 27 December.
Only hours later, Simson contacted General Keith Simmons and was invited to breakfast to discuss Percival’s ‘concession’. During the course of their conversation, Simson pointed out that the Japanese would attack the Island through the ‘backdoor’ or northern coast; that the seaward side or ‘frontdoor’ was effectively ‘bolted’ by Singapore’s large guns, well-prepared infantry positions and the soon-to-be-erected tubular scaffolding to prevent landings by small craft. Simson argued that similar scaffolding on the north shore would serve the same purpose. After giving essentially the same argument to Simmons as he had to Percival, the Chief Engineer was given precisely the same answer. Simmons left the meeting convinced that ‘Singapore was as good as lost’.20
Two questions should be asked concerning Simson’s proposals to Heath, Percival and Simmons. The first is the obvious one: why were they rejected? Simson’s opinion is interesting:
. . . all the senior commanders in Malaya . . . had been taught to mistrust defences because they could become a danger for winning a war. To win a war, a commander must attack, and his troops must be willing to attack . . .
I thought that this doctrine had been misapplied in Malaya where it always appeared prior to the war—and very soon became obvious during it—that the problem was going to be one of ‘survival’ with no question as yet of ‘winning’. Defences are essential for survival of fortresses when fighting a better equipped and trained enemy.21
The second is to what extent Simson’s ideas were in accordance with Brigadier Stewart’s. It should be restated that there were two near perfect static defensive positions in Malaya: General Dobbie’s proposed defence line in Johore and the north shore of Singapore Island. Both, bordered by the sea, thus restricted the enemy potential for outflanking. But with regards to other roads and defiles along the Malay Peninsula, Simson’s proposals were in fact designed to facilitate Stewart’s ideas. By employing anti-tank obstacles—particularly when the British did not possess tanks and sufficient anti-tank guns—the initial enemy advance and rapid movement down a given road could be stopped, or at least stalled. Stewart’s attack drills would therefore have been facilitated, and not retarded, by Simson’s proposals.
By 26 December 1941, in compliance with his orders to fight a delaying action north of Ipoh, Brigadier Stewart had deployed his 12th Brigade in depth along the Trunk Road covering Chemor. During the brief respite around Christmas Day, he had hatched a plan to put his Argylls into a position to attempt a counterattack. He deployed the 4/19th Hyderabads to the left of the road, the Argylls on and to the right of it and the 5/2nd Punjabs around six kilometres ahead with orders to provide ‘maximum delay subject to not being committed’.22 Stewart had 24 guns of the 137th Field Regiment under his command. Given that the area around Chemor was relatively open tin mining ground with some rubber, and therefore offered some artillery observation, the plan was that the 5/2nd Punjabs would withdraw during the night of 26/27 December and then attempt to hold the Japanese astride a track junction. The Argylls, using their practised drill, were to then move through the Punjabs and attack on a two-platoon front. The remainder of the Battalion were to follow up in depth using their well-rehearsed procedure of armoured cars and carriers with their infantry companies. One company of the Hyderabads were to attempt an encircling movement from the east or right flank. The
counterattack was timed to coincide with the artillery barrage, which was further timed to begin when the enemy had ‘closed up in strength’23 against the 5/2nd Punjabs. The plan was, therefore, that when the Japanese were temporarily stalled against the Punjabs, the artillery—having registered on the 26th—would maul the enemy whilst the Hyderabads attacked their flank.
Alan Warren, in his Singapore 1942, records that: ‘At divisional headquarters Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison told General Paris that Stewart’s plan “ought to work well, Sir, provided Stewart has taken the Japanese into his confidence and obtained confirmation that they’ll play their part”.’24 The Japanese didn’t. As had happened so often during the 11th Indian Division’s campaigning in Malaya, the newly arrived Imperial Guards made the first move by attacking the Punjabs at around 7.00 am. With the 12th Brigade attack timed for 9.00 am and the Argylls engaged in their move to their start line, at 8.00 am the Punjabs were forced back about 700 metres. With the planned artillery barrage and the Argylls’ attack now redundant, the attack was called off. This action brought into focus a recurring jungle or ‘bush warfare’ battle problem of the time: communication. While the Hyderabads and Argylls were able to stage a successful withdrawal, the company of the former which had been moving forward for its encircling attack could not be contacted. It was taken by surprise, and in the subsequent action, savagely mauled. Its commanding officer and most of his company were annihilated. In all, the 12th Brigade lost about 200 casualties during this engagement.
General Paris was now faced with the very same problems that had so beset his predecessor: the fatigue of his forward 12th Brigade and the continuous challenge of a fluid withdrawal. The recent, if short, respite given him by the obstacle of the River Perak, and General Yamashita’s decision to briefly rest his 5th Division and bring forward the Imperial Guards, had not solved these issues. On the night of 26/27 December, General Paris ordered Brigadier Selby’s 28th Brigade and Stewart’s 12th Brigade to withdraw south of Ipoh. In an attempt to keep it as fresh as possible, Paris ordered the 28th Brigade to the right flank Kampar position of Sahum, while Stewart’s exhausted brigade was charged with the task of occupying covering positions from Gopeng to Dipang. Like Murray-Lyon before him, General Paris was attempting to apply the basic principle of the fighting withdrawal: to trade space for time. But during the afternoon of 28 December, the enemy followed up with his usual speed and efficiency. Through that night and the next morning, the Japanese employed both a heavy artillery barrage and low level bombing, which at around noon forced the 12th Brigade to withdraw to within five kilometres of Dipang. General Paris subsequently ordered Brigadier Selby to hold the bridge across the River Kampar pending 12th Brigade’s withdrawal across it at 7.00 pm.
But the fatigued Argylls’ ordeal was far from over. Kirby has recorded that:
At 3 p.m. the Japanese, supported by about eight tanks, launched a strong attack on the . . . Argylls who for the second time that day were in an unprepared position without any effective anti-tank support, since owing to a misunderstanding of orders 2nd Anti-Tank Battery had failed to take its allotted position. The tanks failed to break through, but the Argylls were forced back on to 5/2nd Punjab.25
Stewart would later record that while the Argylls’ anti-tank rifles made no impression upon the enemy tanks, ‘their 38 millimetre guns, and indeed their small arms armour-piercing ammunition, went through our armour like paper’.26 Disaster was averted only by Lieutenant-Colonel Deakin and elements of his Punjabis who, with a troop of the 2nd Anti-Tank Battery, finally hit the leading tank about a kilometre north of Dipang. This action allowed the 12th Brigade to make good its withdrawal over the bridge, which was later blown.
It will be remembered that General Heath had selected two vital points on the Trunk Road south of Ipoh for a prolonged defence of the key town of Kuala Kubu. This was the place where the lateral road stretching eastwards to Raub, Kuala Lipis and finally Jerantut concluded. The first was Kampar and the second was a position just north of Tanjong Malim.
The Kampar area was dominated by a steep jungle-covered hill called Bujang Melaka. This substantial feature, fourteen kilometres long and nine- and-a-half kilometres wide, rose rapidly to a height of about 1240 metres. After reaching Dipang, the Trunk Road ran alongside the western side of Bujang Melaka, while the railway line ran into Kampar from the north-west. Another road ran from Dipang eastwards around the northern extremity of the hill through Sungei Siput, Sahum and southwards to Kinjang. The ground to the north and due west of Kampar was essentially an open tin mining area interspersed with small pockets of rubber. But away to the south-west lay the extensive Cicely Rubber Estate, where there were fields of fire extending up to a kilometre. Bujang Melaka offered excellent artillery observation over the approaches from the Trunk Road, railway and away to the west. Any attempt to outflank the 11th Division’s occupation of Kampar would most likely come via Teluk Anson from a Japanese movement down the River Perak or by sea.
To give depth to his defence of the Trunk Road and also cover the railway, General Paris deployed Brigadier Moorhead’s 15th Brigade with the British Battalion—the amalgamated 1st Leicesters and the Surreys—about one- and-a-half kilometres north of Kampar village. The battalion’s left flank was held by one company, with three ridges to the east of the Trunk Road each held by the remaining companies. These were named Thompson’s Ridge, Green Ridge and Cemetery Ridge. To the British Battalion’s rear, stretching from Kampar village to the Trunk Road and railway junction, were the Punjabis: the 1/14th, 3/16th and 2/16th. The now amalgamated 1/8th Punjab and the Jats—now named the Jat/Punjab Battalion—were deployed as the brigade reserve to the east of the Trunk Road and opposite the 3/16th Punjab. Brigade HQ was sited in Kampar village. Brigadier Moorhead had the 273rd Anti-Tank Battery and 88th Field Regiment in support.
To cover the road from Dipang around the eastern side of Bujang Melaka to Sahum, Paris deployed Brigadier Selby’s 28th Brigade. It initially had the dual roles of primarily blocking enemy penetration and attacking the Japanese line of communication once it had become established along the Trunk Road, towards Kampar village. The Brigade’s 2/9th Gurkhas were deployed in depth along the road from Sungei Siput towards Dipang; the 2/2nd Gurkhas were astride the road about midway between Sahum and Sungei Siput; and the 2/1st Gurkhas were stationed astride the road about five kilometres south of Sahum. Selby’s HQ was located at that village. The 28th Brigade had the 155th Field Regiment and the 215th Anti-Tank Battery in support.
To cover possible Japanese outflanking attempts via the sea or the River Perak, Paris deployed Brigadier Stewart’s worn 12th Brigade at Bidor, while the 1st Independent Company and 3rd Cavalry were ordered to guard the approaches to Teluk Anson. Brigadier Stewart’s support consisted of the 137th Field Regiment and two troops of the 215th Anti-Tank Battery. At Temor, General Paris held the 5/14th Punjab, a mountain battery and an anti-tank battery as his divisional reserve.
The Japanese plan to capture Kampar involved three thrusts. The first was a direct attack down the Trunk Road at Kampar, to be undertaken by the 5th Division’s 41st Regiment (Colonel Okabe). The second was an encircling movement from the west against the 11th Indian Division’s left flank. The 42nd Regiment (Colonel Ando) was allotted this task. The third was to land the 11th Regiment (Colonel Watanabe) at the mouth of the River Bernam subsequent to an attack upon Teluk Anson and thence to the Trunk Road south of Kampar to cut the British line of communication. In the event, Ando’s 42nd Regiment’s operation against Kampar’s left flank was stalled by swamps on both sides of the River Kampar, which caused his troops to spend a tough three days’ ‘march’ before their belated arrival at their designated position. By this time, the regiment was too late to play any significant part in the operation.
During the period 30–31 December, the Japanese began to show their hand. On the 30th their patrols were sighted to the east of Sungei Siput near the Sahum Road. This enemy activity, and the fact that Brigadier
Selby had been ordered to remove his 2/1st Gurkhas from their Sahum–Kinjang Road position, caused him to now pull his exposed 2/9th Gurkhas from Sungei Siput to replace the 2/1st. The following day Japanese patrols were seen to the south-west in the Cicely Rubber Estate. On 31 December, air reconnaissance reported ‘small convoys of boats off Pangkor Island’.27 And during the afternoon of the 31st, a patrol of the Independent Company identified enemy troops at Lumut and east of Simpang Ampat.
General Paris reacted to this intelligence by moving his reserve from Temoh to the Kampar–Changkat Road in order to facilitate a counterattack against these Japanese moves from the west.
At 7.00 am on New Year’s Day 1942, following a heavy artillery barrage, the 41st Regiment attacked down the Trunk Road. Their objective was the ground held by the British Battalion, and their first assault was made against Thompson’s Ridge. Despite the fact that the British artillery was able to maul the attack, the enemy managed to gain a tenuous foothold on that feature. But a two-platoon counterattack led by the commanding officer of D Company, Captain Vickers, ejected the enemy. The Japanese then resorted to a heavy artillery and mortar barrage of that ridge during the night. Kirby has recorded that during the evening of 1 January:
. . . a flotilla of seven small steamers, each towing several barges and landing craft, was reported off the mouth of the Bernam River and at about 7.30 p.m., one and a half battalions of the Japanese 11th Infantry Regiment, which had embarked at Port Weld, began landing at Utan Melintang. Driving back a patrol of 3rd Cavalry, the enemy had by 8 p.m. gained possession of the village and of the crossroads about half a mile north.28