by Peter Brune
And in an effort to assist Percival, Wavell offered late the same day to fly from Java to Singapore. His offer was accepted.
During Wavell’s seven-hour visit, he discussed with Percival a plan for further fighting in Johore, a withdrawal plan to Singapore Island should Johore be lost, and a plan for the defence of the Island. Wavell believed that the Japanese would land on the north-west coast, whereas Percival thought they would land on the north-east shoreline. The Supreme Commander did not interfere in Percival’s appreciation, bowing to the judgement of the responsible commander on the spot. It was agreed that the soon-to-arrive British 18th Division and the Australian 8th Division were to occupy the two most likely landing areas. According to Wavell’s biographer, ‘then, with Wavell sitting beside him, Percival drafted a new batch of orders for Heath, Gordon Bennett and Keith Simmons’.30
In essence those orders envisaged a new defensive line from Mersing on the east coast (Brigadier Taylor’s Eastforce) to Kluang (9th Indian Division), then to Ayer Hitam (27th Brigade AIF) and on to Batu Pahat on the west coast (11th Indian Division). There was to be no withdrawal from any part of this line without the express orders of General Percival, and in the event of a general withdrawal to the Island, the three main roads which converged on Johore Bahru were to be used, facilitated by suitable demolitions and anti-tank obstacles. When Percival had finished writing these orders, his Supreme Commander witnessed his signature, placed a copy in his briefcase and promptly flew back to Java.31
Given that Wavell had ordered Percival to fortify Singapore’s defences weeks earlier, and that he had discovered through his liaison officer that Percival had, as late as 19 January, not framed a withdrawal plan from Johore to the Island, and worse, had still not addressed the issue of fortifying the ‘fortress’, his trip to Singapore and his signed copy of Percival’s belated new orders would seem to suggest that Wavell was covering himself against future criticism. And in the light of Churchill’s very recent and forthcoming signals to him, such behaviour is understandable.
Churchill had begun to ask pertinent questions while in Washington on 15 January, and the day after, Wavell had begun to answer them. The news that nothing had been done to fortify the northern side of Singapore Island profoundly shocked the Prime Minister:
So there were no permanent fortifications covering the landward side of the naval base and of the city! Moreover, even more astounding, no measures worth speaking of had been taken by any of the commanders since the war began, and more especially since the Japanese had established themselves in Indo-China, to construct field defences . . .
Now, suddenly . . . I saw before me the hideous spectacle of the almost naked island and of the wearied, if not exhausted, troops retreating upon it.
I do not write this in any way to excuse myself. I ought to have known. My advisors ought to have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked. The reason I had not asked about this matter, amid the thousands of questions I put, was that the possibility of Singapore having no landward defences no more entered my head than that of a battleship being launched without a bottom.32
On 19 January, in a minute to General Ismay for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Churchill was under no illusion as to the possible political ramifications: ‘I warn you this will be one of the greatest scandals that could possibly be exposed.’33
And what would Churchill have thought if he had known that a highly trained chief engineer had arrived in Singapore on 5 August 1941 with express orders to construct the very fortress that he, Churchill, was advocating and had taken for granted? What would the Prime Minister have thought had he known that that appointment had been made without Simson having written orders? It is suggested that if such revelations might have caused an outburst, then Churchill’s rage might have known no limits had he then been told that the Chief Engineer had made a detailed reconnaissance of the Malay Peninsula, suggested the implementation of a series of defences down that feature, had endorsed General Dobbie’s line of fortifications planned in 1938, had a detailed plan for fortifications for Singapore Island, and, critically, had discovered that the materials for the task lay readily at hand. And what scandal might have followed if the final lesson in the Prime Minister’s education had contained the knowledge that Generals Percival, Heath and Simmons had all personally rejected Simsons’ expert and practical plans, and in the case of Percival, had not carried out an order from Wavell to fortify the Island?
We now return to the defence of southern Johore and the subsequent withdrawal to Singapore Island during the period 24–31 January 1942.
While Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson’s column was involved in its fighting withdrawal from Bakri, events at the west coast town of Batu Pahat were delicately poised. Three key roads ran from Batu Pahat: one to Yong Peng, one to Ayer Hitam and the third along the coast through Senggarang, Rengit, Benut and Pontian Besar before reaching Pontian Kechil, where it then turned inland to join the Trunk Road near Skudai. Batu Pahat, with its rubber plantations and mines, was far from an ideal defensive locality, and lent itself to potential Japanese encirclement.
General Nishimura saw two options for the future employment of his Imperial Guards Division. The first was a thrust upon Yong Peng, and the second was a southward advance along the coast road to cut off the British force at Batu Pahat. With the 5th Division already at Labis on the Trunk Road, he decided to head southwards. To this end he ordered his Guards Reconnaissance Battalion to attack Batu Pahat from the north-east while his 4th Guards Regiment moved south to link up with the battalion which he had deployed earlier near Senggarang. This would see the south road cut and the British at Batu Pahat encircled. At the same time, by sending his 5th Guards Regiment to cut the Ayer Hitam–Batu Pahat road, any British attempt to rescue the besieged defenders at Batu Pahat would be forestalled.
Brigadier Challen wanted to withdraw from Batu Pahat. Percival refused the request on 23 January, probably believing that the 5th Norfolks, due to arrive the next day, would strengthen Challen’s force sufficiently to hold the town. And in a further endeavour to reinforce the west coast, the 53rd Brigade (the 3/16th Punjab and 6th Norfolks) was extricated from the Bukit Pelandok area—after having a costly encounter with Japanese tanks in the process—and sent westwards to Skudai and then to Benut. The Loyals were sent to reinforce the 27th Brigade AIF on the Trunk Road.
On 25 January, Brigadier Challen again sought permission to withdraw his 15th Brigade from Batu Pahat. At a conference that day, with intelligence indicating that the Japanese were now near Sengarrang, Percival issued orders for Challen to withdraw to the Sengarrang area and that a staged withdrawal to Singapore Island be planned. The final crossing to the Island was scheduled for 31 January 1942.
The 15th Brigade—the 2nd Cambridgeshire, the British Battalion, the 5th Norfolks and a portion of the 6th Norfolks—withdrew from Batu Bahat during the night of the 25th/26th. But about six-and-a-half kilometres short of their Sengarrang objective they ran into an enemy roadblock. As Anderson and his column had found on the road to Parit Sulong, the block was well sited, amidst ‘close and swampy country’34 which made passage around it by vehicle impossible, and by infantry difficult. In an effort to clear the 15th Brigade’s escape route, General Key ordered Brigadier Duke to send his newly arrived 53rd Brigade from Benut northwards along the road to Challen. Just after midday, Duke despatched a column consisting of about 100 men of the 6th Norfolks, armoured cars, carriers and artillery, and commanded by a gunner, Major Banham, to occupy Rengit. But when that column—having made the critical error of moving in close formation—reached a Japanese roadblock just north of the village, it was all but annihilated.35 Banham, in a noteworthy individual performance, occupied the only carrier to reach Sengarrang. Given that the relief column had been reduced to a single carrier, and that Barham informed him that he had passed through six roadblocks, Challen did not need much convincing as to his next move, and immediately ordered the destruction of his guns and veh
icles, that the wounded were to be left under the care of the Red Cross and Padre Duckworth, and finally, that two parties of infantry were to make good their cross-country escape to Benut. On this occasion there was no massacre of the wounded.
While the Japanese captured Rengit on the night of 26/27 January, the two parties left Sengarrang. The first, numbering around 1200 men, travelled east or inland from the coast road, and were guided by a Malayan police officer. Those exhausted soldiers reached Benut during the afternoon of 27 January. Brigadier Challen, meanwhile, led the second party which moved westwards between the road and coast. When Challen’s group struck a river obstacle that night, the brigadier attempted to reconnoitre a crossing and was captured. Colonel Morrison now led the party to the coast and concealed it on ground consisting of swamp and coconut trees, while his Brigade Major journeyed by boat to Pontian Kechil to report to 11th Indian Division HQ.
The sad and sorry plight of the west coast force ended over the next three nights when around 2700 soldiers were evacuated by sea to Singapore Island.36 And as a result of that evacuation, Heath now realised that with this force cut off and eliminated from the fighting, he could now only look to the greatly understrength 53rd and 28th Brigades to hold the coastal road. Accordingly, he now ordered Key’s 11th Division to withdraw to Skudai on the Trunk Road and cover Westforce’s eventual withdrawal, which was timed for 31 January–1 February 1942.
General Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division had staged a brilliant west coast offensive which had all but dismembered the Indian, Australian and British force opposing it, and in so doing, had gravely threatened the security of the Trunk Road. And for all those great gains, the cost had been around the equivalent of a battalion of his division.
We now cross to the east coast and Brigadier Taylor’s ‘Eastforce’ during this same period.
On 22 January 1942, and in compliance with the withdrawal timetable ordered by General Heath, Brigadier Taylor had withdrawn his 22nd Brigade HQ and the 2/18th Battalion (less one company) to the Nithsdale Estate, around seventeen kilometres north of Jemaluang. While this move was undertaken, his 2/20th Battalion was left to cover the approach to Mersing. Lionel Wigmore:
During the afternoon of the 25th, Brigadier Taylor held a conference of his commanding officers. The day before, when Kluang airfield was endangered and he was ordered to destroy Kahang airfield, he had moved his headquarters to a point east of Jemaluang. He now issued orders for his headquarters to be established on the Kota Tinggi road south of Jemaluang, and for the 2/20th Battalion to withdraw from its strongly prepared positions to Jemaluang crossroads that night.37
Although Taylor’s Eastforce was rightly withdrawing to conform to the general defensive line planned by Percival and Heath, the Australians were still keen to take the fight to their enemy. It would seem that the use of ambushes as a means of inflicting telling casualties upon the Japanese was not confined to General Gordon Bennett and Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan, but was universal within the 8th Division AIF. The 2/18th Unit Diary, 23 January 1942:
Knowing that the 2/20 Bn would be withdrawing through the 2/18 Bn this evening the C.O. submitted a proposal to the Bde Comd for Bn offensive operation against the enemy force in this area. This was approved, plans made and B and D Coy Comdrs with Pl. Comds and NCOs inspected the area. Mersing Bridge blown by 2/10 Fd Coy Engrs 2300 hrs.38
The ‘offensive operation’ was, in fact, a large-scale ambush.
The Nithsdale and Joo Lye rubber estates lay alongside the western side of the road between Mersing and Jemaluang. The 2/18th area stretched from a bridge to the north, and just east of Gibraltar Hill, running about three-and-a-half kilometres southwards along the road, and past both rubber estates. Along the western or left side of the ambush area, was the high ground, with the estates nestled on relatively level ground amongst the hills. On the eastern or right hand side of the road the ground was essentially flat except for one hill which lay about halfway between the two rubber estates. The ground then fell away eastwards into swamp land.
The 2/18th Battalion’s use of this ground was shrewd. D Company (Captain Edgley) was disposed astride an estate road on the left side of the main road; B Company (Captain O’Brien) was some 900 metres south of D Company, and on the eastern or right hand side of the road; A Company (Captain Johnstone) lay astride the road about 500 metres behind B Company, and just after a bend and directly opposite the Joo Lye Estate; and C Company (Captain Okey) was also astride the main road and was disposed about 450 metres to A Company’s rear.
In laying his 2/18th Battalion ambush, Lieutenant-Colonel Varley was anticipating that an enemy force which was reported to be moving from Endau to Mersing would not arrive upon his ambush ground ‘until after daylight 27 Jan 42’.39 The 2/18th Battalion Diary reveals the detail of planning involved in the operation:
. . . telephone communication to be installed to all Coys and D Coy to have 1000 yds of wire forward in attack. It was proposed to allow approx. one Bn of the enemy to pass D Coy and B Coy in ambush, to be blocked by A Coy with C Coy in reserve. Then, with the application of an Arty barrage lasting up to 7 minutes plus similar fire from Bn Mortars, followed by an Arty barrage moving at the rate of 100 yds in [every] 2 minutes, the attacking Coys [D and B] were to attack the enemy north of A Coy’s position. The details of the Arty plan were given to Maj. Kerr, Actg C.O. 2/10th Fd Regt and approved by him. Mortars were placed in position behind Hill 167, JooLye [sic] Estate and four Vickers placed on Hill 167 for supporting defensive task. An Arty C.P. [Command Post] was also to be established on Hill 167 with a commanding view over the proposed battle area.40
All appeared ready. But the Japanese battalion which had been sighted between Endau and Mersing and which had been anticipated to arrive about daylight on the 27th was not the first to arrive. There was another much closer and it was closing in. The well-conceived daylight ambush was now to become a desperate battle in pitch-black darkness.
The first clue as to the possible nearness of the enemy came at 6.00 pm on 26 January, when a recce patrol from each of A and B Companies encountered an enemy patrol. The second came not long after when the foremost northern section of D Company first identified a patrol moving through the Nithsdale Homestead followed by ‘Japanese troops in column of route, by pls marching south past their position . . .’41 At about 2.00 am a section of Lieutenant Warden’s 9 Platoon, A Company, was assailed by a Japanese platoon. Warden and two of his soldiers were killed during the action and when, at 3.00 am, A Company came under a company strength attack and enemy troops in numbers were noted northwards in D Company’s perimeter, Varley decided to instigate the artillery and mortar support plan, which was the agreed prelude to the Battalion operation.
At 3.15 am the artillery opened fire which was followed 30 minutes later by Captain Edgley’s D Company advance. To the amazement of the Australians, they encountered anything but a stiff fight, as the Japanese had, on the commencement of the barrage, scurried up onto the hill on the eastern side of the road between the forward 2/18th D and B Companies, and as well-drilled troops are liable to do, had furiously dug and scraped small pits into which they withstood much of the barrage. When Edgley reported to Varley that he now intended to withdraw to B Company’s lines, he was informed by the CO that he could expect a strong Japanese presence between him and that company. This was the last contact with Captain Edgley. It transpired that between the artillery barrage and the efforts of the two forward companies, the Japanese both inflicted, and took, heavy casualties.
At 4.15 am the artillery barrage stopped and D Company, now in the vicinity of the Nithsdale Homestead, moved south along the road. When they arrived adjacent to the hill on its eastern side—and about halfway back to B Company—they came under concentrated Japanese machine gun fire from both sides of the road. Edgley now ordered a two-platoon attack with the third moving around the left flank. The fighting during that night and into the next morning became a series of isolated, confused and desp
erate hand-to-hand battles, which saw neither side give ground. It transpired that many of D Company were overwhelmed, but its soldiers all fought to the last, and took an equally heavy toll of the Japanese. Sometime during that night and early morning Captain Edgley was killed. While this battle raged, B Company had also been attacked, but facing a smaller enemy force, had repulsed it.
When daylight came B Company advanced to render assistance to D Company. It too ran into strong enemy positions and heavy fire. But at 7.30 am, Varley had some critical intelligence, which came from the Intelligence Section’s Sergeant Wagner, who had miraculously moved from A Company’s perimeter through enemy lines and contacted B Company’s 11 Platoon and Lieutenant Simmons’s platoon of A Company. The 2/18th Unit Diary recorded that:
This information gave the C.O. the dispositions of B Coy, one pl of D Coy, and approximate location of balance of D Coy and also positions thickly held by the enemy including Machine Gun and mortar positions. With this information the Arty were given tasks . . . and the resultant fire produced excellent results.42
With B Company in the process of assisting the forward D Company, Varley now planned to send Captain Johnstone’s A Company to stage a counterattack to aid them, but, just as this plan was about to be implemented, Brigadier Taylor contacted him. When Taylor had endorsed Varley’s ambush plan four days previous, he had stipulated that General Heath had made it absolutely clear that the withdrawal timetable to Kota Tinggi and thence to Johore Bahru must be strictly adhered to, and that, any attacking 2/18th Battalion companies must be prepared to withdraw immediately. Varley had no alternative. D and B Companies would have to make their own way out. The 2/18th withdrawal to Jemaluang was essentially uneventful—the Japanese did not follow up.