by Peter Brune
It will be remembered that on the previous day in the Northern Area, General Heath had abandoned the naval base and had moved his 53rd and 8th Brigades into an arc facing north-west and extending from the River Simpang southwards to a point a little west of the Nee Soon road junction, and had sited his 28th Brigade further south in reserve. At daybreak, the Japanese attacked the 8th Brigade near Nee Soon along the southern portion of that newly occupied arc. This attack was directed at the 2/10th Baluch, which was astride the Mandai Road, and the 1/8th Punjab, which was on its right flank. When the Punjabis ‘began to disintegrate’38—the term used by Kirby to describe a panic-stricken flight from the area—there was a very real chance that the 53rd Brigade to the north would be cut off. Key immediately sent elements of his reserve 28th Brigade to fill the gap.
During the morning of the 12th, Percival visited Massy Force HQ and Bennett’s Western Area and became very conscious of the possibility of a Japanese breakthrough down the Bukit Timah Road and into the heart of Singapore Town. Aware of his heavy losses in men and material during the previous day, and the fact that only scant defences in depth lay along that vital Bukit Timah axis, he now, in consultation with Heath, determined that the continued occupation of the northern and eastern shores of the Island was a redundant measure given the Town’s vulnerability.
Percival would later write that:
. . . the time had come to take up a perimeter defence round the town. Such a perimeter defence must of course include the water supply. So I instructed Heath to withdraw his troops from the northern beaches and to select and occupy a position covering the water supply and linking up on the right with Southern Area which would be holding the Kallang aerodrome.39
Malaya Command’s final perimeter was to be occupied during that night (12/13 February) and was to extend from Buona Vista on the south-west coast inland to Tanglin Halt (1st Malayan and 44th Brigades); from Tanglin
Halt to near the Bukit Timah–Farrer Road junction (8th Division and 2nd Gordons); from Bukit Timah Road–Adam Road to MacRitchie Reservoir, Thomson village, Woodleigh crossroads (Massy Force and Tomforce and the 18th Division); from Woodleigh crossroads to Paya Lebar airstrip (11th Indian Division); and from that airstrip to Kallang airfield (2nd Malaya Brigade).
After his orders were given for the final Singapore perimeter, Percival called on the Governor, who soon gave instructions for the destruction of the Broadcasting Station which was only about a kilometre inside the new perimeter, and for the burning of the remaining currency notes at the Treasury. By this time, the war had come to Government House in the form of enemy shelling. On 12 February, Sir Shenton Thomas recorded the effects of a blast on his back verandah under which ‘many of our boys were sheltering’.40 ‘During a lull I crawled under the House with Dawson and Simson and found several bodies . . . No signs of wounds, and death must have been instantaneous from blast—all covered with yellow dust and almost unrecognisable.’41
The 12th also saw another significant casualty. By the early morning of that day, the pressure had got the better of Brigadier Taylor:
Tired though I was, I could not sleep, and about 0700 hrs I realised that I would have to get a few hours rest in a quiet spot; my brain refused to work and I was afraid that if I carried on without rest the Bde would suffer. I accordingly sent for Lt Col Varley, who had been in reserve with the 2/18 Bn since 1800 hrs the previous day. Shortly after he arrived everything went black and my legs gave way.42
Before being sent to hospital Taylor called on Bennett. It was an acrimonious conversation which saw Bennett relieve Taylor of his command of the 22nd Brigade. The 2/18th Battalion’s Lieutenant-Colonel Varley was promoted and replaced him.
The fight for the Island had rapidly degenerated into a last-ditch stand for Singapore Town itself. By Friday 13 February 1942, however, the issue of stragglers and the associated problems of drunkeness, looting and lawlessness at the docks had reached alarming proportions.
22
FINAL DAYS
The defence of Singapore Island during the period 9–12 February 1942 on the north-west coast, around the Jurong Line and Bukit Timah had been nothing short of a military disaster, and the consequences for Singapore Town itself were no less catastrophic. We have noted that a great many stragglers had been created by that desperate, confused fighting, and caused in no small measure by the often disjointed and piecemeal senior command response to the enemy advance.
According to the 8th Division Provost Company Unit Diary, the Australian Military Police problems began as early as 4 February:
Reports coming in that Australian soldiers are causing disturbances in Singapore. Capt Menz, in company with Major Thompson of HQ AIF., visited all Hotels, Bars, and places where soldiers foregather in Singapore, but could only find two AIF soldiers in the town, and they were sober, but British troops were plentiful. Nearly all British troops are wearing Aust. style slouch hats, which apparently is why AIF troops have been blamed for all disturbances involving troops.1
It is easy to examine the problem merely in terms of ‘stragglers’, and perhaps, in terms of the nationality of those stragglers. But in the final days leading up to the Japanese landings, disorder and panic had begun to permeate both the base troops’ behaviour and to a lesser extent, the civilian population. On 6 February the provosts reported: ‘Very heavy shelling also Air bombing in Bukit Timah and Bukit Panjang areas, owing to which W/shop Units and Vehicle Reception Park moved their locations, but left behind a great many serviceable vehicles of all types.’2
On 8 February the provosts recorded: ‘Civilian and military traffic on Bukit Timah and other main roads very heavy, and difficulty experienced in handling owing to civilian vehicles being so numerous, and desiring to go in so many directions.’3 The following day, as news came of the enemy landings and heavy fighting, the panic increased. Jurong Road became jammed with vehicles, and the provosts discovered that a five-kilometre journey took four hours, and as a consequence reinforcements ‘that should have arrived could not get through’.4
The number of stragglers in Singapore rapidly increased on 10 February as the full effects of the coastal fighting were felt. Lieutenant Hector Chambers, an 8th Division Provost Officer during those last action-packed days, wrote a revealing account of his observations that day:
Owing to the fact that twenty-six Australians preferred being drunk and shooting up civilians and native police to being with their units at battle stations, I and my small unit were tied to the unsavoury job of looking after them . . .
Stragglers were beginning to filter in, wandering along with a bewildered, completely lost look, singly and in twos and threes. A larger number arrived from the by-ways and alleys of the city where they had been rounded up by the Provost patrols who were quartering the whole of the rear area. Our work began in ernest [sic] then. Trucks had to be found, scrounged or just lifted without the owners’ permission, and brought along to our depot; drivers obtained much in the same manner, and the stragglers herded aboard and sent off along the shell bespattered road towards the Botanical Gardens . . .
Let me say here that the accumulation of troops in the city was not confined alone to AIF troops. There were more British troops there, and an infinitely larger number of Indians. I say this, not as an excuse, but by way of explanation. Regiments and battalions which had been fighting on the coast had . . . lost all unity. Officers and NCOs had lost control, and the obvious and natural result was that men would drift back towards the only kind of solidarity and reality they knew . . .
I emphasize this aspect of the situation so that it may be clearly understood that the confidence of the troops in their military leaders was waning rapidly and that their morale was deteriorating with every gloomy day that passed. This state of affairs became more and more evident as the enemy closed in on the city.5
By this time the rapid increase in the number of stragglers was compounded by a tragic but virtually uncontrollable ‘snowball’ effect. We have obse
rved that those stragglers were composed of a mixture of soldiers who were genuinely looking for their withdrawn and scattered units; others who were either totally exhausted or wounded; some ‘shell-shocked’; and others still, who were undoubtedly deserters, fleeing the battle. Of the last category, it would seem beyond doubt that the vast majority of the Australian variety were untrained and untried reinforcements. But it mattered little as these troops wove their way through the countryside or through frequent traffic jams caused by the ‘narrowness of road, bad driving and bad convoy discipline’.6 Kirby called the process ‘disintegration’, while others more bluntly referred to these men simply as ‘deserters’. But the truth is that many undisciplined base personnel who saw the front line troops moving back simply followed suit, or indeed in some cases, after the fate of some of their comrades in dubious formations such as ‘X’ Battalion, had no intention of doing anything other than avoiding action. As the battle raged ever closer to Singapore Town, many resorted to alcohol and looting, while others saw another possible solution to their despair: the wharves and a chance to escape by ship or small boat.
The 17 000 tonne Empire Star was one such prize. On the 11th that vessel was busy embarking women and children, nursing sisters and RAF personnel. After an aggressive, armed group of Australians were cleared from the gangway, and after it had been raised only with the assistance of military police that evening, it was discovered at sea that a number of Australian troops had managed to board the vessel, including a captain. It would transpire that the Empire Star and around eleven other ships disembarked about 175 other ranks and that captain at Java. The overwhelming majority of them were Australian Army Service Corps personnel—base troops. assaulted the 1st Malaya Brigade’s coastal area, which stretched from Pasir Panjang village (1st Malays), along the Pasir Panjang ridge to the Raja Road (the 2nd Malays and 2nd Loyals). Despite stiff resistance, the Japanese broke through and travelled some distance eastwards towards Buona Vista Road. After dark, the 1st Malaya Brigade and the 44th Indian Brigade were forced to withdraw to a line running from just east of Buona Vista village northeast to the junction of Depot and Raja Roads, and then to a position near Mount Echo to link with Bennett’s 22nd Brigade. Whilst the 44th Brigade had withdrawn to conform to 1st Malaya Brigade’s withdrawal, Bennett’s 8th Division—bolstered by the arrival during the afternoon of Brigadier Maxwell’s 27th Brigade and with the 2nd Gordons still attached—did not withdraw, which left a large AIF bulge on the western Malaya Command perimeter. This did not seem to bother either Bennett or the Japanese.
As dawn broke on the morning of Friday 13 February 1942, it was crystal clear that Singapore’s final demise was near. The military perimeter lacked depth, both in numbers and equipment; the morale of many of the defenders was at breaking point; significant numbers of them and those to their rear had given up the fight; the critical loss of the Bukit Timah food depots had reduced supplies—other than those still held by individual units and the civil administration—to a paltry seven days; petrol supplies were running very low; and, most obvious to all, was the horrific plight of the civilian population which had swelled to around a million, and who were being mercilessly bombed from the air and shelled from the ground. Wigmore has recorded an officer’s account of the aftermath of one such bombing:
Buildings on both sides of the road went up in smoke . . . soldiers and civilians suddenly appeared staggering through clouds of debris; some got on the road, others stumbled and dropped in their tracks, others shrieked as they ran for safety . . . we pulled up near a building which had collapsed onto the road—it looked like a caved-in slaughter house. Blood splashed what was left of the lower rooms; chunks of human beings—men, women and children—littered the place. Everywhere bits of steaming flesh, smoldering [sic] rags, clouds of dust—and the shriek and groan of those who still survived.7
The Japanese chose to attack but one portion of Malaya Command’s perimeter on 13 February. During the early morning the 18th Division’s 56th Regiment, supported by a concentrated two-hour artillery barrage,
When Percival had planned his last Singapore perimeter the day before, General Bennett had reacted to it by the formation of a final AIF perimeter which was to be manned by nearly all units of his Division. The exceptions to this order were the staffs of a number of hospitals and medical units. By concentrating most of his formations, Bennett was able to provide an all-round defence of his perimeter, and when the Tanglin swimming pool was filled with fresh water and his reserve food stocks were also concentrated, he prepared for a last stand. Brigadier Taylor, now out of hospital, was given the task of forming this new AIF perimeter, which Thyer later recorded, ‘assumed the shape of an ellipse 7 miles [about eleven kilometres] in circumference with Holland Road as the main axis and Div HQ at Tanglin as the centre’.8
While the fighting on 1st Malaya Brigade’s front was in progress, General Percival had called a meeting of both Area and Divisional commanders, and a number of his senior staff officers at Fort Canning for 2.00 pm. What must have started out as a rather gloomy affair later degenerated into a personal attack upon Percival.
Heath, citing the poor physical and mental condition of the troops, strongly advocated an immediate capitulation, which was endorsed by Bennett and all senior commanders present. In answer to them, Percival stated that not only should the fight be maintained as long as possible, but that he was considering a counterattack to retake the critically important Bukit Timah area. Percival’s stance—however futile—was probably driven by a telegram received from Wavell that day.
General Wavell to General Percival 13 Feb 42
You must fight it out to the end as you are doing. But when everything humanly possible has been done some bold and determined personnel may be able to escape by small craft and find their way south to Sumatra through the islands.9
After replying that such a counterattack had already failed, and that a fresh reserve was not available, Heath again advocated capitulation, and for a second time the senior commanders present endorsed him. According to Percival’s biographer, Clifford Kinvig, Percival then stated: ‘I have my honour to consider and there is also the question of what posterity will think of us if we surrender this large army and valuable fortress.’ Heath’s insubordinate reply brought with it a brief awkwardness and resulting wall of silence: ‘You need not bother about your honour. You lost that a long time ago up in the north.’ Percival finally replied with two calm sentences. ‘I cannot accept your proposal that we should surrender. We will go on fighting as long as we can.’10 Kinvig has described Heath’s slur as ‘cruel, insolent and public . . .’11 He was right. Despite other failings, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival’s honour should never have been questioned.
In The War In Malaya, Percival also stated that the conference members expressed concern for the civil population of Singapore should Japanese troops become involved in street fighting inside the town.12 He might have added that if British prestige had already suffered greatly after the loss of Penang, and then during the sustained Japanese bombing of the Town, then a wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians—and soldiers untrained for such skilled street fighting—would have further eroded that already fragile status. And, given the military performance of his army, that agony would have been short-lived and therefore futile. After the conference, Percival rightly decided that he should contact Wavell.
General Percival to General Wavell 13 Feb 42
Enemy now within 5,000 yards of sea-front, which brings whole of Singapore town within field artillery range. We are also in danger of being driven off water and food supplies. In opinion of commanders troops already committed are too exhausted either to withstand strong attack or to launch counter-attack . . .
There must come a stage when in the interests of the troops and the civil population further bloodshed will serve no useful purpose. Your instructions of February 10 are being carried out, but in above circumstances would you consider giving me wider discretionary pow
ers?13
In his usual docile, diplomatic manner, Percival was in fact merely asking for the proper right to capitulate when he—the man on the spot—realised that it was appropriate. One suspects that he agreed with his commanders, but was attempting to satisfy all and sundry.
Wavell’s reply came the next day:
General Wavell to General Percival 14 Feb 42
You must continue to inflict maximum damage on enemy for as long as possible by house-to-house fighting if necessary. Your action in tying down enemy and inflicting casualties may have vital influence in other theatres. Fully appreciate your situation, but continued action essential.14
That same day, a weak Wavell had an each way bet with the Prime Minister in an insipid telegram:
General Wavell to Prime Minister 14 Feb 42
Have received telegram from Percival that enemy are close to town and that his troops are incapable of further counter-attack. Have ordered him to continue inflict maximum damage to enemy by house-to-house fighting if necessary. Fear however that resistance not likely to be very prolonged.15
In view of his own very recent visit, and Percival’s telegram to him the previous day, Wavell must have known that Singapore was on its very last gasp, and that all would be lost in a matter of a few days if not hours. So much for Percival’s chances of achieving a ‘vital influence in other theatres’. The last outcome of the conference at Fort Canning on 13 February was the decision to evacuate all female nurses, certain staff officers and technicians. That evacuation was to be undertaken on the night of 13/14 February using all of the remaining small ships in Singapore Harbour. Around 3000 persons were to be selected, and of that number, 1800 positions were allotted to the army. The AIF received an allocation of one hundred. Bennett decided that Colonel Broadbent, his chief administration officer, would head the AIF group.