by Peter Brune
AIF HQ was deceived from the outset. When informed by the Australians that even a force of 3000 men would be partly composed of POWs unfit for manual labour, the Japanese informed them that it would not be required as a working party; that it would be sent to one venue only; and that medical supplies, tools and cooking equipment would be supplied upon arrival at their new destination.
As the Japanese decision to remove all senior officers of the rank of colonel and above was not enacted until August 1942, Brigadier Varley was chosen as the commander of ‘A’ Force. The reader will recall his service as CO 2/18th Battalion and his subsequent command of 22nd Brigade on Singapore Island. Varley’s second-in-command was Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Anderson, VC of 2/19th Battalion and Muar River fame, and the force was structured as three battalions: Number 1 comprised 1000 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, 2/30th Battalion; Number 2 comprised 983 men under Major Kerr, 2/10th Field Regiment; and Number 3 comprised 1017 men under Major Green, 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion. Although about two-thirds of ‘A’ Force was composed of infantry personnel from the 22nd and 27th Brigades, and the artillery and engineers, there was a sprinkling of men from a diverse range of other units. Varley would record that notable amongst these were ‘a number of men who had enlisted in Australia as members of Res MT units [Reserve Motor Transport Units], ages 35–45 yrs. Many are well over 50 . . .’17 An examination of Ramsay Battalion deaths on the Railway reveal that there was a high rate amongst older men—soldiers who would surely have been subsequently weeded out of units had the capitulation not occurred.
We have established that the AIF must have entered Changi with significant funds. Grants of money for ‘up-country’ or ‘overseas’ work forces leaving Changi—as distinct from Singapore Island work parties—and how such funds were administered is critical to our understanding of command on the Railway. Changi’s AIF Quartermaster, Major Alan Thompson, made no mention of money being issued to ‘A’ Force, but recorded funds issued to subsequent forces. Further, we shall see that such money was often spent with command consultation with the force and/or battalion doctors, who were best placed to recommend the types and quantities of food and drugs required. Whether such requests were able to be honoured was another matter, but such a liaison was critical to both the chances of survival for hospital patients, and the ability to influence the general health of those working on the Railway. Captain Rowley Richards, RMO Number 2 Battalion, and subsequently renamed Anderson Force: ‘Varley and his group were with us [in Burma] . . . and we were in pretty close association, we knew what was going on, and I feel quite confident that if he’d had a significant amount of money . . . I’m sure we would have known about it . . .’18 And surely Thompson—meticulous in his records of the administration of Changi—would have recorded such funds.
At 11.00 am on 13 May 1942, ‘A’ Force was inspected and staged a march past in front of the GOC Major-General Callaghan, and Brigadier Varley recorded that ‘Brigs Maxwell, Taylor, Majors Maxwell, Mavor, Lt-Cols Denham, White and others came to say cheerio’.19 ‘A’ Force was moved by truck to Keppel Harbour in three ‘lifts’ commencing early on 14 May. That day was marked by either a prolonged delay awaiting truck transport or a monotonous stay at the docks. With limited water available, and no smoking signs around the docks, the hot, stifling and prolonged wait became too much for a number of men. When taps were approached and discreet smoking began the guards immediately reacted. As had occurred in the past, and would continue to happen, there was no consistency or predictability to those responses. Some received a face-slapping, but the unlucky ones were beaten with fists, rifle butts, logs of wood and one was strung up by the thumbs.20 Life under Nippon was about to take a dramatic turn for the worse. From here on in, thousands of Australians were destined to long for the closed, seemingly protected world of Changi. And when their mode of transport became apparent to them, the men of ‘A’ Force were mortified. Two ships lay at the wharves, the Celebes Maru and the Tohohasi Maru, each of about 5000 tons.
The evening of 14 May 1942 was spent loading rice, aviation spirit and other supplies aboard both ships, and late that night the men began boarding. Two thousand and two men consisting of Force HQ, Number 2 and 3 Battalions and the engineers were placed on the Tohohasi Maru, whilst Ramsay’s Number 1 Battalion and the CCS staff under Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton boarded the Celebes Maru. Private Wal Williams was a member of Ramsay Battalion: ‘. . . there was a bloke from Western Australia . . . he knew the bloody ship. He said, “Christ, we used to load sheep on this bloody thing!” ’21 Brigadier Varley immediately reacted: ‘. . . made several representations through interpreter, Captain Drower, for better conditions, and asked for permission to ring Japanese HQ Singapore, but could not get permission to do so.’22 Any examination of Varley’s diary and Ramsay’s ‘A’ Force report shows repeated letters of protest and representations to Japanese commanders all along the tragic path of the Force’s movement to and through Burma and into Thailand. Numerous protests—particularly in writing and kept as evidence for later War Crimes trials—would have their use, but as a means of changing Japanese policies and general behaviour, they were to mostly prove worthless, and bordering on the naïve.
The Australians may as well have been sheep. The 1000 men of Ramsay Battalion were packed into three holds on the Celebes Maru, each with only enough space to lie down but not sit up between the tiers of ‘bunks’; the temperature in the holds of the two ships was over 100 degrees Fahrenheit; added to this was the stench of the perspiring many in the space for a few; and critically, there were a number of men who had dysentery and others who had ‘residual diarrhoea at [the] time of embarkation, and others [who] had a return of symptoms on the ship’.23 The coming sea voyage would produce an almost indescribable stench made up of bowel movements, urine, perspiration, a lack of fresh air, and the refusal of the Japanese to allow men on deck other than in periodic groups to eventually be hosed down with salt water. The latrine facitilties for this mass of humanity were ‘one three-hole at the aft and another at midships, 6 per 1000 men’.24 The established army latrine requirements for the time were 32 per 1000 men. The inevitable fouling of latrines which were emptied but once a day, meant that boots were dirtied and then became the means for filth to be transferred back to the crammed holds where eating and sleeping occurred. And to compound this multitude of sins, the Japanese provided insufficient drinking water, no washing facilities, and only one washing-up tub for all.25
The two ships left Singapore at 9.30 am on 15 May 1942. Their first stop was at Medan on the east coast of Sumatra where the convoy was joined by three ships carrying British and Dutch POWs and Japanese troops. On 20 May the convoy reached Victoria Point in the extreme south of Burma, where the Japanese immediately broke their pledge that ‘A’ Force would not be split up. Upon arrival, Varley was ordered to have 1000 men ready to disembark. He chose Major Green’s Number 3 Battalion comprising 32 officers and 803 other ranks; three officers and 128 ORs of the engineers; four HQ officers and 29 ORs; sixteen sick cases; and he entrusted the medical care of Green’s men to Captain Higgin (CCS). The party therefore totalled 1016 officers and ORs.26
On the 22nd the convoy sailed north to Mergui. That day Varley was informed that 1000 men of Ramsay’s Number 1 Battalion were to be offloaded and an additional 500 British troops picked up in Sumatra were to be added to Ramsay’s command. Varley was now faced with an administrative problem, which was the balance of his now split force: ‘I asked for an exchange of personnel—sending 62 engrs (including 4 pay, records and postal)—to go with Ramsay in exchange 72 CCS personnel, including Lt-Col Hamilton join us. This will equalise engrs and also medical services, also dental.’27
We now come to an astounding revelation. The next day, 23 May 1942, Varley was given approval for this adjustment of his force and although his request to see Ramsay was denied, he then made an extraordinary diary entry for the 24th: ‘1000 hrs. 62 engrs under Lts A. Watson and L. Atyeo left for shore
, and joining of No. 1 Bn. No. 1 Bn also being transhipped to shore by MLCs from their ship. Watson was given and signed for $660, being their proportion of funds given Force ‘A’.’28 We know that the Japanese had agreed to pay its Changi inmates for their labour on 6 June 1942, well after ‘A’ Force had departed from Singapore; we will shortly record that ‘A’ Force payments did not occur until after its arrival in Burma; and that the information above clearly tells us that Varley gave Lieutenant Watson ‘$660, being their proportion of funds given “A” Force’. It would seem that because Varley was denied permission to see Ramsay, Watson was entrusted—and therefore Varley ordered him to sign for the money—with the job of giving Ramsay the $660, which would further indicate that this was one-third of the funds allotted at Changi for ‘A’ Force because Ramsay Battalion was one-third of the total force and $660 was one-third of the total fund. ‘A’ Force therefore most likely left Changi with around $2000, entrusted to Varley’s administration, since the AIF were told that the force would not be split. We should then ask why Thompson did not mention these funds in his otherwise painstaking Changi records. Although only conjecture, it might well have been that at that early stage in Changi’s existence, AIF HQ was reluctant to record such matters on paper for security reasons.
On 25 May 1942, Brigadier Varley and the remainder of ‘A’ Force arrived at Tavoy. Over the next few months the three battalions were engaged in working on the airfields at Victoria Point (Green’s Number 3 Battalion), Mergui (Ramsay’s Number 1 Battalion) and Tavoy (Varley’s HQ and Kerr’s Number 2 Battalion). Despite the hardship of the voyage, the men’s initial health was tolerable, and the work not too hard.
Ramsay Battalion (now 1500 strong) was initially housed in the local school which was built to accommodate around 600 to 800, but it later managed to move into a bamboo and attap barracks, which was far more comfortable. A hospital was also established. Private Wal Williams was working on the airfield at Mergui with Ramsay Battalion:
Oh Jesus that was a bastard of a job . . . napping stone, you used to sit down with a napping hammer and a bloody lump of granite and just boom, boom and belt it into blue metal size . . . and a couple of blokes had two bamboo poles and a couple of rice bags, or hessian bags, slung through the poles and you’d put it onto that . . . and they’d carry it out . . . and blokes would level it . . . when you’ve got hundreds and hundreds of bloody blokes carting the stuff it’s surprising the amount of stuff that comes up.
They [the Japanese] wanted their pound of flesh, there was no slacking on the job . . . the average bloke was in a lot better condition then to what he was later, and he more or less took it in his stride . . . there were blokes that were crook . . .29
While at Mergui, Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay was able to obtain what he referred to as ‘outside assistance’:
. . . my Adjutant and myself were permitted to visit the village accompanied by a Japanese sergeant for the purpose of making purchases of amenities for the sick, advances of approx. 4000 rupees were made available to me by one or two of the local residents without the knowledge of the Japanese. This fund was administered by Mr. K.M. Bostock, the Australian Red Cross representative, who was a P.O.W. with my force, and enabled me with his invaluable assistance to alleviate the conditions at the hospital.30
The word ‘advances’ would seem significant. We know that Brigadier Varley sent $660 with Lieutenant Watson for Ramsay’s use when they arrived at Mergui. Further, when the Japanese began paying the men for their work, 50 of the 70 rupees paid to the officers per month31 was placed in Bostock’s Red Cross fund, which would have repaid the ‘advances’ and kept some sort of cash flow. On an individual basis, Ramsay also refers to the local Burmese—under great risk of doing so—handing his men fruit and eggs as they departed or returned to camp on work parties. He also referred to ‘medical supplies’ in addition to ‘amenities’.32 These commodities were sparse to say the least, but Ramsay’s purchases would have been invaluable to the hospital and, in a more limited way, the men’s diet. In addition, some POWs engaged in the same activities as had occurred in Changi—individual selling or trading of items for the benefit of themselves and a few mates. Any ability to supplement the poor nutritional value of the Japanese diet with fruit or vegetables was crucial to long-term survival.
While Green and Ramsay Battalions were thus engaged at Victoria Point and Mergui respectively, Brigadier Varley’s HQ and Major Kerr’s Number 2 Battalion had been landed at Tavoy. Originally quartered in an aircraft hangar which according to Varley, ‘was covered with broken rock, apparently prepared for concreting’,33 the men initially suffered from a lack of water, no cooking utensils, and the threat of being shot should they leave the 100 metre by 100 metre hangar.34
On 2 June 1942, Varley recorded that eight men had attempted an escape. It is highly likely that this escape attempt was driven by the belief that the Burmese were friendly, and would not in any way hamper the effort. The eight were wrong. Although many Burmese continued to give the prisoners food, there were others who were attracted by the bounty being offered by the Japanese for information leading to the capture of fugitives. At 3.00 pm on 6 June Varley was informed that the escapees were to be shot at 5.00 pm and that he was required to witness the executions. Each time he requested permission to see the men and obtain messages for their families, he was told ‘after death talk’.35 When he further requested that the men be given their religious rites by the Church of England and Roman Catholic padres present, he was told ‘after death’. Varley recorded that eight graves had been dug, that the men were blindfolded, and that sixteen guards were used—two to each prisoner—and ‘death was instantaneous’. He later wrote:
Just before death the spirit of these 8 Australians was wonderful. They all spoke cheerio and good luck messages to one another and never showed any sign of fear. A truly courageous end. The 2 padres carried out the final service. Execution took place about 1840 hrs.36
Like Ramsay at Mergui, Brigadier Varley was eventually able to make contacts with the Burmese markets and begin to buy limited stocks of food for the hospital and vary the men’s diet. On 22 June he recorded that he had ‘asked several times about changing our money which we brought with us. No reply.’37 This was the money brought with him from Changi. Five days later he recorded another request to the Japanese for an exchange of currency. But on 28 June he recorded that 1119 rupees and thirteen annas were received as the first Japanese payment for work.38 The problem faced by Varley was that the large note denominations of pay precluded the men from receiving their share in rupees. He was conscious of what he termed as ‘indiscriminant trading’ which would cause prices to soar. But despite these initial problems, Varley noticed an improvement in the men’s health and decreasing numbers of men on sick parade, presumably because of his purchases, the pay and therefore slightly better food.
In his efforts to enhance the quality and quantity of food for his men—particularly when his force was moved into the more remote country where the Railway was to be built—Brigadier Varley was faced with two distinct disadvantages which were not applicable to later forces in Thailand. The first was ready access to supplies. ‘A’ Force was not able to avail itself of the barge passage of supplies along the far-distant River Kwai and, therefore, his efforts to purchase and then transport supplies along the Railway through Burma were subject to pilfering before arrival. And that process began in earnest at Tavoy. The second disadvantage was the paucity of villages and commerce along his jungle oxcart track when compared to Thailand.
On 4 July 1942, the Japanese took Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton (the Chief Medical Officer) and his quartermaster Captain Lee into the Tavoy market to survey the available commodities. Although very limited time was allowed to the resulting purchasing party, some goods were transported back to the camp. Seven days later, another purchasing party was told to report to the camp entrance at 9.30 am, but the Japanese guard did not arrive until two hours later. When the party arrived at t
he Tavoy market the best of the available goods had already been sold, and the prices of rice and, later, eggs began to rise. When the eggs were delivered the following day only half arrived. On 15 July Varley recorded that: ‘Extra eggs etc. ordered from a native from the Tavoy market did not arrive today as expected. He is an Indian trader at the market and apparently as unreliable as other branches of the species we have met elsewhere.’39 Varley’s purchasing problems would only increase later on the Railway.
Brigadier Varley had found the Japanese most difficult in terms of facilitating any sort of effort to enhance his men’s food supplies and the quality of their accommodation. But then on 11 July 1942, he made an interesting observation concerning a number of his ‘A’ Force junior officers and NCOs:
Necessary to speak to Maj Kerr about slackness of some officers. They have no life—no command, and show signs of slack training. This has been particularly noticeable among A.I.F this war. All junior officers, or rather a big majority, also NCOs seem to desire to curry favour with the men and are frightened to take full command. Result is that the men soon sum them up as weaklings and discipline generally is undermined. Offrs must not but do address men and NCOs by their Christian names, also use language in presence of them, thus creating undue familiarity and the second lapse lowers an officer’s status . . .
No army has ever achieved success without strict discipline. The A.I.F. of 1914–1918 had it, despite the exaggerated claims of some to the contrary. If Australia wants to retain an army efficient and capable very stern measures will need to be taken in the future to cut out the cancer which has entered the body of the army.40