by Peter Brune
Beattie’s records for Quick’s ‘T’ Battalion show 137 deaths on the Railway. Two did not die from sickness: one was bashed over the head with a drill rod at Hellfire Pass, and the other was ‘accidentally shot by IJA’. Twenty-four sickness deaths are cited as ‘dysentery’, and a further thirteen as ‘amoebic dysentery’. Dysentery therefore directly claimed 37 or 27 per cent of the deaths. A further 24 deaths (17 per cent) are attributed to dysentery being a contributing cause of death. The incidence of dysentery in ‘T’ Battalion’s deaths is therefore around 45 per cent.81 While the proportions of deaths due to dysentery are broadly similar, the numbers are not.
We have discussed the multi-layered activities on the Railway with regards to individual and small groups of men being able to scrounge or purchase food and even limited drug supplies. However, for the great majority of POWs who quite simply got up each day and were overworked, abused and beaten, and effectively starved—and were therefore constant victims of the so-called ‘killer cycle’ identified in the last chapter—the influence of a dynamic unit commander who placed himself in a position almost completely subservient to his RMO, and who could procure even small amounts of food supplements and drugs—for all and sundry and without favour—was a critical survival factor. Upon repatriation to Sydney, Captains Newton and Westbrook were confronted with a Bank of New South Wales cheque account bill for some £770 and £120 respectively!82
It should be realised that the men of ‘U’ Battalion suffered under one of the most brutal camp commanders on the line; were exposed to the same working conditions and cruelty from guards as other units; suffered the same weight loss and poor appearance as POWs in other units; but, in the end, the occasional food supplements and limited drugs procured by Newton tipped the balance in favour of survival in the constant fight against that ‘killer cycle’.
During pre-war and in combat Captain Newton was an officer who was strongly disliked by his men. He was seen as bombastic, overbearing, and as an officer who quite simply revelled in ‘parade ground’ pomposity. But from the moment Captain ‘Roaring Reggie’ Newton entered Pudu Prison, it was as if that incarceration was a preparation, an apprenticeship, that would see him triumph during the most demanding stage of his life. Newton chose his officers with great judgement; he knew the importance of his RMO and his need to ‘fire the bullets that Hinder loaded’; he used Boon Pong and the ‘V’ Organisation adroitly; and above all, he brilliantly tamed and bribed the Tiger.
Private Len Gooley: ‘Just about everybody in U Battalion has said the same thing: if we didn’t have Reggie Newton, a lot of us wouldn’t have come home . . .’83
29
‘F’ FORCE
We have noted that ‘D’ Force left Changi to work on the Railway in mid-March 1943. Later that month the 1000-strong ‘E’ Force—of which half were Australians—was sent to Borneo. Like ‘B’ Force before it, this formation was destined to experience the horror of Sandakan. On 8 April 1943, Major Alan Thompson’s Changi diary recorded: ‘UP COUNTRY PARTY. Warning order 7,000 party to proceed overland. A.I.F. allocation 125 officers, 3300 O.R’s 3,425 [total] . . . A.I.F. Party to be known as ‘F’ Force. Personnel to be inoculated & vaccinated.’1 The men of ‘F’ Force were indeed ‘inoculated & vaccinated,’ but because the Japanese raised the force with such speed, only the first of a normal course of two injections against cholera could be given.2 And from an AIF perspective, that speedy raising and departure of the force was made worse by the fact that the first six of the thirteen trains allotted to its movement to Thailand were occupied by the Australians. The failure of ‘F’ Force to be adequately inoculated against cholera would have horrific consequences.
‘F’ Force was the sixth party to be composed of Changi POWs. Command of it was given to the 18th British Division’s Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, while the AIF contingent was to be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Gus Kappe (8th Division Signals). It will be remembered that whilst in Changi, Kappe had been in charge of researching and writing the ‘official’ record of the 8th Australian Division’s campaigning in Malaya and Singapore.
The Japanese deceived Malaya Command and AIF HQ from the outset. ‘F’ Force was to be raised so that ‘a large body of prisoners’ could be sent ‘to an area where food was more plentiful and the climate healthier than on Singapore Island’.3 Thompson recorded the seemingly generous Japanese concessions: ‘Heavy baggage allowed to be taken including cooking equipment, electric light motor, typewriters, batteries, medical equipment and stores.’4 Some of the ‘stores’ are of interest: three bands and their instruments—one band per 1000 men; two pianos were to accompany a concert party; and, upon arrival, ‘F’ Force was to have canteens and access to Thai traders in each of their seven 1000-strong camps. Further, the Japanese stated that transport would be supplied for heavy gear and that there would be no long marches.5 Sergeant Stan Arneil, 2/30th Battalion: ‘The news that we would be taken to Thailand and placed in rest camps was believed by all at Changi and those of us selected to go considered ourselves to be very lucky.’6 Wigmore has recorded that the AIF portion of ‘F’ Force consisted mainly of the 27th Brigade which had been ‘kept intact since [the] capitulation’.7 The raising and structure of ‘F’ Force deserves close scrutiny.
We have discussed (in chapter 25) that very soon after assuming command of the AIF in Changi, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan had ordered that it was to be completely reorganised to enable it to perform ‘any role it might be called upon to do’; that in August 1942 unarmed combat classes were initiated; that area commanders were ordered to supply the names of majors and captains who were fit for field officer duty; and that an officer training syllabus was to begin. In an interview with the author, Signalman Jim Ling (8th Division Signals) confirmed that his unit had been trying to maintain their skills in the event of a breakout, or for any other form of operations.8 Captain Hardacre, in The Story of F Force: ‘it was his [Kappe’s] original idea of using this Force as a Brigade Group to link up with the British troops fighting in Burma should the opportunity present itself.’9
The structure of ‘F’ Force reflected this combat interpretation of its role rather than the reality of survival in a harsh and unforgiving Thailand POW environment. This view merely demonstrates the difference between a protracted life in Changi and on Singapore work parties, and the experience of soldiers such as Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Weary’ Dunlop and Captain Reg Newton in camps in Java and at Pudu Prison respectively. When, on 2 May 1943, Kappe and part of his ‘F’ Force trudged past Dunlop in Thailand, the latter recorded that:
Lt-Col. Kappe wearing still his blue brigade armband; Col. Kappe was cheerful but very tired. ‘The Nipponese have a complete brigade to contend with now, ordnance, AASC [Australian Army Service Corps], and everything complete.’ I said, ‘Well sir, I hope that you will remain together, because things are pretty rough up here.’10
In his history of the 2/19th Battalion, Newton would christen the AIF Changi command organisation of ‘F’ Force as ‘one of the biggest “come in sucker” incidents of the A.I.F. P.O.W. period during the 1939–1945 war’.11 Blunt but accurate.
Unlike other formations on the Railway, and in keeping with its ‘combat’ status, ‘F’ Force Battalions were not named by letters—such as ‘D’ Force’s ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘U’, and ‘V’ Battalions—or by the names of their commanders. It consisted of four units: the 2/26th Battalion (Major C. P. Tracey); the 2/29th Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel S. A. F. Pond); the 2/30th Battalion (Major N. Johnston); and a 4th ‘support’ battalion made up of non-infantry units (Major J. H. Parry of the AASC). It is of interest to note that Galleghan did not retain Lieutenant-Colonel Oakes as CO of the 2/26th, but opted to assign that command to an ‘original’ officer in Major Tracey. This may well have been a reaction by Galleghan to the controversial withdrawal from the Causeway Sector during the defence of Singapore Island, which, while ordered by Brigadier Maxwell, was led by Oakes. The Senior Medical Officer of ‘F
’ Force was Major Stevens, who was in command of nine medical officers and around 220 other ranks. As per the ‘combat’ structure of the force, 125 officers were assigned to the command of 3300 ORs. As our story unfolds, we will witness the consequences of Captain Newton’s edict that when selecting his ‘U’ Battalion officers: ‘I was determined I would not have a superabundance of officers and then be at the beck and call of all the Nips for having too many drones around the place.’12 Therefore, whilst Newton left Changi with a ratio of around one officer to 100 ORs, ‘F’ Force left with a ratio of around one to 27. Subsequent events were to prove that there was to be no shortage of ‘drones around the place’ in ‘F’ Force.
On 17 April 1943, Major Thompson recorded the clothing allowance granted to ‘F’ Force. Given the ‘assistance’ provided to Dunlop Force before departure, ‘Weary’ (had he known) would not have been impressed.
Clothing 25% of all clothing held by Command issued to ‘F’ Force, A.I.F. issued with 762 boots, 1,344 vests, 138 cardigans, 167 shirts, 245 shorts.
A.I.F. Kit Store issue 1,000 pullovers, 20 hats, 200 socks, 400 stockings, 1,000 hosetops, 10 bags comforts, 10 bags braces, 100 sports shirts, 200 white bags, 150 underpants, 250 singlets, 100 pyjama coats, 50 gaiters, 100 trousers, 100 jackets, 2 bags clothing material, 6 machine needles, 10 reels cotton, 200 scarves, 150 singlets in lieu of towels, 30 rubber chaplis [footwear].
I.J.A. state that extra blankets, clothing, boots, mosquito nets being sent to destination in bulk.13
The initial standard of health of ‘F’ Force also deserves mention. Wigmore has stated that the Japanese demanded that the full quota of 7000 men was to be supplied, and as the force was supposed to occupy healthy camps and enjoy better amenities than Changi, up to 30 per cent of its establishment could be composed of unfit men. He quotes the British as sending about a thousand unfit men away and the AIF ‘perhaps not more than 125’.14 Given that a substantial number of the 27th Brigade’s POWs had participated in Singapore Island work parties, their health on departure must have been reasonable—comparable to the men of ‘D’ Force. However, the fate of the thousand British POWs also classified as unfit was to be a dire one.
According to Thompson, ‘F’ Force was granted around $14 000, at a rate of approximately $4 per man—as per ‘D’ Force—with the CO of each battalion being given $500.15 The remaining money was to be administered by Lieutenant-Colonel Kappe.
While ‘F’ Force was destined to suffer because of deficiencies in structure and planning, and an excess of cumbersome equipment, its most crippling disadvantage would lie in the nature of its Japanese administration. Unlike preceding forces, which were commanded by the Japanese Railway administration in Thailand, ‘F’ Force was to be administered from Singapore. This would have horrendous consequences, as the supply and management processes were all conducted from afar—and the rigid, compartmentalised nature of the Japanese Army would only exacerbate that disadvantage. On top of all that, ‘F’ Force was to suffer arguably the worst Australian senior leadership on the Railway.
Our ‘F’ Force case study, with some digressions, will concentrate on Lieutenant-Colonel Pond’s 2/29th Battalion.
Sergeant Stan Arneil, 2/30th Battalion Diary: ‘On our last night at Changi we ate lots of little rice cakes and as much stew as we could eat. It was a great feasting just in case the food is not so hot on the trip.’16 The trip, and certainly the food, would indeed prove to be ‘not so hot’. ‘F’ Force was moved from Changi to Singapore Railway Station by truck convoy, and then boarded thirteen trains each carrying 600 POWs.
As had occurred with previous forces on departure from Changi, the men of ‘F’ Force encountered their first rude awakening in Singapore. Signalman Jim Ling was a member of train number 1, which left at 6.50 pm on 18 April 1942:
The optimism went out of me and me mates . . . Suddenly there’s a new type of Jap!—belting everybody round about, and pushing and screaming . . . from the moment we got on that station and got pushed into the rice trucks . . . God! . . . they were entirely different from the Japs we’d been used to, both on working parties and at Changi.17
Lance-Corporal John Roxburgh, 2/29th Battalion:
I don’t recall any ventilation . . . we had 28 men in our truck going up. We used to have to work in stages of some standing up while others had a bloody sleep. An absolute nightmare going up. Unbelievable, just shoved in and, ‘Kurrah! Kurrah!’ [Hurry! Hurry!] And the doors were just slammed and there you were!18
And as had occurred with ‘D’ Force, sanitary arrangements during their train journey were non-existent. At railway stations along the route the local population witnessed ‘crowds of men bogging all over the station yard’.19 It was both humiliating and sickening.
After a miserable five-day journey, each trainload of around 600 men arrived at Bampong. The first consisted of Major Parry’s Battalion of mixed support units. Upon arrival, each battalion was ordered to stockpile its heavy gear and trunks. Left without adequate supervision, the dump was rapidly rifled by the enthusiastic local population, most likely with the Japanese taking their cut. After being forced to carry their remaining possessions to a camp around a kilometre away—and making two trips for their cooking equipment—two profound shocks awaited them. Their staging camp was the first. Here was no ‘holiday’ rest camp, but a miserable collection of four dilapidated, filthy huts standing on a sea of fouled ground, with a grimy well which could barely provide enough water for cooking and for filling water bottles.20 It took the new arrivals a day and a half to ‘clean up’ the camp. But the biggest shock came with the news that all POWs were to be provided with a number and were to prepare for a ten-day march. Captain Ben Barnett, 8th Division Signals, was a member of Parry’s first train, and on 22 April 1943 he recorded that:
. . . the only gear that could be taken was that which could be carried. This was quite contrary to information given at Changi. Men immediately began to repack and sell anything that was not absolutely essential. Officers [sic] trunks and cooking gear could not be taken. These were left stacked and W/O Allen (Englishman) was left behind to look after the gear and endeavour to get it transported to our destination. The time of departure was originally given as midnight, but this was subsequently changed to 24 hours later.21
How long Warrant Officer Allen remained at his task is unknown, but the fate of nearly all of that heavy gear and officers’ trunks is known: most of it was systematically looted, including some medical supplies.
As had occurred with Newton’s ‘U’ Battalion arrival, a cheap and thriving market almost immediately materialised at Bampong, and after the first day’s march, at Kanchanaburi. A number of experienced scroungers got up to old tricks. Private Paddy O’Toole, 2/29th Battalion: ‘I don’t think the Japs gave a stuff much at Bampong . . . we knocked off a bit of stuff there too, knocked off a box of tea, a tea chest from the Jap stores . . . and we split it up, blokes had billy cans . . .’22 This short ‘F’ Force interlude at both the Bampong and Kanchanaburi camps is of interest. While Newton’s men had had a precious week at Kanchanaburi to buy foodstuffs, the ‘F’ Force units were able to not only procure food, but also to sell off many more personal items due to their abundance of gear—despite the fact that their stay was of a far shorter duration. Sweaters went for $2, shirts $3, sheets $2, blankets $10 to $15, and despite this frenzy of selling, many men still began the march with ‘assets’ which were lugged and sold as soon as possible.23 We shall discover that significant numbers of men began the trek with a private stash of money, or were a part of small groups which pooled their cash and had the money held by a ‘banker’. Another striking feature of the impending march north would be the unavoidable splintering of trainload formations, as numbers of men succumbed to the rigours of the trek, or were required to form carrying parties. As a consequence, they were left behind to the care of succeeding groups. We have noted Newton’s policy of holding back a trusted officer with limited funds to provide some sort of
organisation to those left behind. This would not always be the case with ‘F’ Force groups. The issue is a significant one. Private Jack Coffee had travelled in the second train with his 2/29th Battalion, but had suffered the misfortune of being left behind at Kanchanaburi because of illness. Later joined by small numbers of his unit who had dropped out along a succession of camps, he was subsequently assigned to a unit and to a camp of ‘strangers’. He well remembered the consequences:
There was no unity, with all these different organizations, there was [after the march north] only twenty-three of the 29th and we only had two officers [2/29th], maybe three, I might have missed one, but I only remember two officers being there, one was the weakest bloke we’d ever had there, a fellow by the name of Lieutenant ________ . . . when we got up there he lined all us 29th blokes up and said, ‘Now look fellas, we’ll all stick together up here, we don’t know what it’s going to be like, but I’ll keep you posted.’ And that was the last we saw of him till we came out six months later! He was there hidden somewhere, as for reporting to us, no way in the world . . . you’re working alongside a couple of 30th blokes or Divvy Sigs, but blokes who you’ve never seen or heard of before, there’s just no unity.24
No unity, no organisation, and therefore the battle for survival became that much tougher. Officers too often had been selected for their combat promotion status, and not handpicked for their ability to deal with the very different challenges posed by captivity.
The forced march by ‘F’ Force from Bampong to the Three Pagodas Pass area near the Thailand–Burma border was a nightmare. Private Paddy O’Toole, Pond’s 2/29th Battalion:
The first couple of days were alright, the first couple of nights not bad, but the further we went the worse it got. It became very, very difficult because of the situation where you was carrying blokes and carrying gear . . . I very rarely arrived at the next day’s camp with my own gear, I usually had someone else’s as well . . . ‘Give us your pack!’ . . . you’d just throw it over the other shoulder . . . hope for the best, expect the worst, and take what you bloody well get! . . . I used to say to them, ‘This is your lot, make the most of it!’25