45‘Secretary Kerry’s Interview on Iran with NBC’s David Gregory’, 10 November 2013, US State Department, Embassy of the United States London, website.
46‘Past Arguments Don’t Square with Current Iran Policy’, Washington Post, 27 March 2005.
47S. Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945–55 (Westport, CT, 2002), pp. 164ff.
48Cited by Shawcross, Shah’s Last Ride, p. 179.
49Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to President Gerald R. Ford, Memorandum, 13 May 1975, in M. Hunt (ed.), Crises in US Foreign Policy: An International History Reader (New York, 1996), p. 398.
50J. Abdulghani, Iran and Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London, 1984), pp. 152–5.
51R. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh, 1988), pp. 149–51.
52H. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, 1979), p. 1265; idem, Years of Upheaval; L. Meho, The Kurdish Question in US Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook (Westport, CT, 2004), p. 14.
53Power Study of Iran, 1974–75, Report to the Imperial Government of Iran (1975), pp. 3–24, cited by B. Mossavar-Rahmani, ‘Iran’, in J. Katz and O. Marwah (eds), Nuclear Power in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making (Lexington, MA, 1982), p. 205.
54D. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World (London, 1982), p. 86.
55Ibid., p. 87; J. Yaphe and C. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Washington, DC, 2005), p. 49.
56B. Mossavar-Rahmani, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Power Programme Revisited’, Energy Policy 8.3 (1980), 193–4, and idem, Energy Policy in Iran: Domestic Choices and International Implications (New York, 1981).
57S. Jones and J. Holmes, ‘Regime Type, Nuclear Reversals, and Nuclear Strategy: The Ambiguous Case of Iran’, in T. Yoshihara and J. Holmes (eds), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC, 2012), p. 219.
58Special Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1974), p. 38, National Security Archive.
59K. Hamza with J. Stein, ‘Behind the Scenes with the Iraqi Nuclear Bomb’, in M. Sifry and C. Cerf (eds), The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, 2003), p. 191.
60J. Snyder, ‘The Road to Osirak: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb’, Middle East Journal 37 (1983), 565–94; A. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (London, 1992), pp. 95–102; D. Albright and M. Hibbs, ‘Iraq’s Bomb: Blueprints and Artifacts’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1992), 14–23.
61A. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, CT, 1999), pp. 603–6.
62Prospects for Further Proliferation, pp. 20–6.
63K. Mahmoud, A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects (New York, 1988), p. 93.
64Wright to Parsons and Egerton, 21 November 1973, FO 55/1116.
65F. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, 2012), p. 279.
66Dr A. Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: Capabilities and Potentials of the Kahuta Project’, Speech to the Pakistan Institute of National Affairs, 10 September 1990, quoted in Khan, Making of the Pakistani Bomb, p. 158.
67Kux, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 221–4.
68Memcon, 12 May 1976, cited by R. Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford, 2014), p. 163.
69G. Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York, 1987), p. 22.
70‘Toasts of the President and the Shah at a State Dinner’, 31 December 1977, PPPUS: Jimmy Carter, 1977, pp. 2220–2.
71Mossaver-Rahmani, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Power’, 192.
72Pesaran, ‘System of Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 14 (1982), 507; P. Clawson, ‘Iran’s Economy between Crisis and Collapse’, Middle East Research and Information Project Reports 98 (1981), 11–15; K. Pollack, Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York, 2004), p. 113; also here N. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, 2003), pp. 158–62.
73M. Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York, 1982), pp. 145–6.
74Shawcross, Shah’s Last Ride, p. 35.
75J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Fayetteville, AR, 1995), p. 118.
76A. Moens, ‘President Carter’s Advisers and the Fall of the Shah’, Political Science Quarterly 106.2 (1980), 211–37.
77D. Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran: American–Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution (London, 2010), p. 20.
78US Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Service, 6 November 1979.
79‘Afghanistan in 1977: An External Assessment’, US Embassy Kabul to State Department, 30 January 1978.
80Braithwaite, Afgantsy, pp. 78–9; S. Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Intervention to September 10, 2001 (New York, 2004), p. 48.
Chapter 24 – The Road to Catastrophe
1Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, pp. 178–80.
2Sreedhar and Cavanagh, ‘US Interests in Iran’, 140.
3C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London, 1990), p. 459.
4W. Sullivan, Mission to Iran: The Last Ambassador (New York, 1981), pp. 201–3, 233; also Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 81–7; A. Moens, ‘President Carter’s Advisors’, Political Science Quarterly 106.2 (1991), 244.
5Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (London, 1983), p. 38.
6‘Exiled Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran’, BBC News, 1 February 1979.
7Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 154–6; D. Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam (Princeton, 2005), pp. 99–100, 111–13.
8C. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York, 1983), p. 343; B. Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, his Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY, 1979), p. 173.
9Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkeley, 1980).
10‘Presidential Approval Ratings – Historical Statistics and Trends’, www.gallup.com.
11A. Cordesman, The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security, 1984–1987 (London, 1987), p. 26. Also D. Kinsella, ‘Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold War’, American Journal of Political Science 38.3 (1994), 573.
12Sreedhar and Cavanagh, ‘US Interests in Iran’, 143.
13‘Comment by Sir A. D. Parsons, Her Majesty’s Ambassador, Teheran, 1974–1979’, in N. Browne, Report on British Policy on Iran, 1974–1978 (London, 1980), Annexe B.
14R. Cottam, ‘US and Soviet Responses to Islamic Political Militancy’, in N. Keddie and M. Gasiorowski (eds), Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States (New Haven, 1990), 279; A. Rubinstein, ‘The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini’, International Affairs 57.4 (1981), 599.
15Turner’s testimony was leaked to the press, ‘Turner Sees a Gap in Verifying Treaty: Says Iran Bases Can’t Be Replaced until ’84’, New York Times, 17 April 1979.
16R. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York, 1996). Gates says little other than that negotiations were delicate; and that Admiral Turner grew a moustache for the visit, presumably as a disguise, pp. 122–3.
17J. Richelson, ‘The Wizards of Langley: The CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology’, in R. Jeffreys-Jones and C. Andrew (eds), Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA (London, 1997), pp. 94–5.
18Rubinstein, ‘The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini’, 599, 601.
19Gates, From the Shadows, p. 132.
20R. Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (London, 2011), pp. 37�
�44.
21‘Main Outlines of the Revolutionary Tasks’; Braithwaite, Afgantsy, pp. 42–3; P. Dimitrakis, The Secret War in Afghanistan: The Soviet Union, China and Anglo-American Intelligence in the Afghan War (London, 2013), 1–20.
22J. Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, DC, 1986), p. 130; H. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, NC, 1985), p. 1010.
23N. Newell and R. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (Ithaca, NY, 1981), p. 86.
24N. Misdaq, Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference (2006), p. 108.
25A. Assifi, ‘The Russian Rope: Soviet Economic Motives and the Subversion of Afghanistan’, World Affairs 145.3 (1982–3), 257.
26V. Bukovsky, Reckoning with Moscow: A Dissident in the Kremlin’s Archives (London, 1998), pp. 380–2.
27Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 131–2.
28US Department of State, Office of Security, The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, February 14 1979 (Washington, DC, 1979).
29D. Cordovez and S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (Oxford, 1995), p. 35; D. Camp, Boots on the Ground: The Fight to Liberate Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Minneapolis, 2012), pp. 8–9.
30CIA Briefing Papers, 20 August; 24 August; 11 September; 14 September, 20 September; Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 132–3.
31‘What Are the Soviets Doing in Afghanistan?’, 17 September 1979, National Security Archive.
32D. MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record (Washington, DC, 2002); O. Sarin and L. Dvoretsky, The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union’s Vietnam (Novato, CA, 1993), pp. 79–84.
33M. Brecher and J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor, MI, 1997), p. 357.
34Pravda, 29, 30 December 1979.
35Amstutz, Afghanistan, pp. 43–4. These rumours were so strong – and presumably so persuasive – that Ambassador Dubs himself had made enquiries with the CIA to check if they were true, Braithwaite, Afgantsy, pp. 78–9. For gossip spread locally, R. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: Soviet–American Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC, 1985), p. 904. Also here Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, pp. 393–4.
36A. Lyakhovskii, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana (Moscow, 1995), p. 102.
37Braithwaite, Afgantsy, pp. 78–9, 71; Lyakhovskii, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana, p. 181.
38Cited by V. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007), p. 262; Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 48.
39‘Meeting of the Politburo Central Committee’, 17 March 1979, pp. 142–9, in Dimitrakis, Secret War, p. 133.
40Lyakhovskii, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana, pp. 109–12.
41Pravda, 13 January 1980.
42Braithwaite, Afgantsy, p. 77.
43‘The Current Digest of the Soviet Press’, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 31 (1979), 4.
44Zubok, A Failed Empire, p. 262.
45Lyakhovskii, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana, p. 215.
46Pravda, 13 January 1980.
47Cited by Lyakhovskii, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana, p. 252.
48Brzezinski downplays such warnings, Power and Principle, pp. 472–5; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 372–3; Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 176–7.
49D. Harris, The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah: 1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam (New York, 2004), p. 193.
50Ibid., pp. 199–200.
51Farber, Taken Hostage, pp. 41–2.
52Saunders, ‘Diplomacy and Pressure, November 1979 – May 1980’, in W. Christopher (ed.), American Hostages in Iran: Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, 1985), pp. 78–9.
53H. Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (New York, 2001), p. 67.
54‘Rivals doubt Carter will retain poll gains after Iran crisis’, Washington Post, 17 December 1979. See here C. Emery, ‘The Transatlantic and Cold War Dynamics of Iran Sanctions, 1979–80’, Cold War History 10.3 (2010), 374–6.
55‘Text of Khomeini speech’, 20 November 1979, NSC memo to President Carter, cited by Emery, ‘Iran Sanctions’, 374.
56Ibid.
57Ibid., 375.
58‘The Hostage Situation’, Memo from the Director of Central Intelligence, 9 January 1980, cited by Emery, ‘Iran Sanctions’, 380.
59Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 475.
60Ibid. Also G. Sick, ‘Military Operations and Constraints’, in Christopher, American Hostages in Iran, pp. 144–72.
61Woodrow Wilson Center, The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Cold War International History Project Document Reader (Washington, DC, 2004).
62‘NSC on Afghanistan’, Fritz Ermath to Brzezinski, cited by Emery, ‘Iran Sanctions’, 379.
63‘The State of the Union. Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress’, 23 January 1980, p. 197.
64M. Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (2006), pp. 359–61.
65J. Kyle and J. Eidson, The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander (New York, 1990); also P. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Annapolis, 1985).
66S. Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York, 1996), p. 298.
67Brzezinski to Carter, 3 January 1980, in H. Brands, ‘Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran: Was There a Green Light?’, Cold War History 12.2 (2012), 322–3; also see O. Njølstad, ‘Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years’, Cold War History 4.3 (2004), 30–8.
68R. Takeyh, ‘The Iran–Iraq War: A Reassessment’, Middle East Journal 64 (2010), 367.
69A. Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the US (Washington, DC, 1991), pp. 13, 70–1; D. Hiro, Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (New York, 1991), pp. 71–2; S. Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment (New York, 2008), pp. 16–17.
70Brands, ‘Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran’, 321–37.
71K. Woods and M. Stout, ‘New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era’, Intelligence and National Security 25.4 (2010), 558.
72‘Transcript of a Meeting between Saddam Hussein and his Commanding Officers at the Armed Forces General Command’, 22 November 1980, cited by H. Brands and D. Palkki, ‘Saddam Hussein, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?’, International Security 36.1 (2011), 145–6.
73‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and High-Ranking Officials’, 16 September 1980, in K. Woods, D. Palkki and M. Stout (eds), The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime (Cambridge, 2011), p. 134.
74Cited by Brands and Palkki, ‘Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb’, 155.
75‘President Saddam Hussein Meets with Iraqi Officials to Discuss Political Issues’, November 1979, in Woods, Palkki and Stout, Saddam Tapes, p. 22.
76Cited by Brands, ‘Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran’, 331. For Saddam’s paranoid views, see K. Woods, J. Lacey and W. Murray, ‘Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside’, Foreign Affairs 85.3 (2006), 2–27.
77J. Parker, Persian Dreams: Moscow and Teheran since the Fall of the Shah (Washington, DC, 2009), pp. 6–10.
78Brands, ‘Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran’, 331.
79O. Smolansky and B. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, NC, 1991), pp. 230–4.
80‘Military Intelligence Report about Iran’, 1 July 1980, cited by Brands, ‘Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran’, 334. Also H. Brands, ‘Why Did Saddam Hussein Invade Iran? New Evidence on Motives, Complexity, and the Israel Factor’, Journal of Military History 75 (2011), 861–5; idem, ‘Saddam and Israel: What Do the Ne
w Iraqi Records Reveal?’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 22.3 (2011), 500–20.
81Brands, ‘Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran’, 323.
82Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 313–14; J. Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation (Manchester, 2005), p. 171.
83Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 504.
84J.-M. Xaviere (tr.), Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini: Political, Philosophical, Social and Religious: Extracts from Three Major Works by the Ayatollah (New York, 1980), pp. 8–9.
85E. Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (London, 1989), p. 51.
86T. Parsi, The Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States (New Haven, 2007), p. 107.
87R. Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel’s Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam Hussein the Bomb (New York, 2004).
88Woods, Palkki and Stout, Saddam Tapes, p. 79.
89‘Implications of Iran’s Victory over Iraq’, 8 June 1982, National Security Archive.
90The Times, 14 July 1982.
91G. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power and the Victory of the American Deal (New York, 1993), p. 235.
92B. Jentleson, Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990 (New York, 1994), p. 35; J. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 42–4.
93‘Talking Points for Amb. Rumsfeld’s Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein’, 14 December 1983, cited by B. Gibson, Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988 (Santa Barbara, 2010), pp. 111–12.
94Cited by Gibson, Covert Relationship, p. 113.
95H. Brands and D. Palkki, ‘Conspiring Bastards: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic View of the United States’, Diplomatic History 36.3 (2012), 625–59.
96‘Talking Points for Ambassador Rumsfeld’s Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein’, 4 December 1983, cited by Gibson, Covert Relationship, p. 111.
97Gibson, Covert Relationship, pp. 113–18.
98Admiral Howe to Secretary of State, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons’, 1 November 1983, cited by Gibson, Covert Relationship, p. 107.
99Cited by Z. Fredman, ‘Shoring up Iraq, 1983 to 1990: Washington and the Chemical Weapons Controversy’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 23.3 (2012), 538.
The Silk Roads: A New History of the World Page 82