by Nick Thomas
Training continued, now with a greater focus on battle climbs, the RAF’s Nos. 1 to 6 Attacks and mock combats. There was a definite sense that what they were doing was for real. This couldn’t have been more true than when Brothers flew mock combats using cine camera guns for the first time on 10 January, ‘Three of the new Hurricanes were fitted with cine camera guns to help improve our gunnery skills. We operated in pairs and with the gun cameras, flew mock dogfights. The film was exposed by pressing the gun button. Back on the ground the film was analyzed; it helped us master deflection shooting.’
The Hurricanes were fitted with a reflector gunsight, so called because of the red dot on the underside of the angled sight. The target’s wing dimension was fixed on the scale at the base of the gunsight against which the pilots could set a rotating marker. This latter feature helped pilots to correctly judge their distance, which ideally should be 250 yards, although many pilots preferred to get closer. Later in the war the gyroscopic gunsight was introduced – in time for the campaign in Northern Europe.
When firing at a moving target the pilots had to take into account that the enemy aircraft would have moved its position by the time the bullets reached their target. The relative speeds and flight path of the gun platform and target had to be taken into consideration; it needed to fly into the stream of the bullets, this was the essence of deflection shooting.
There was a ground covering of snow for much of January and February 1940, severely limiting flying time. Everyone lent a hand to clear the dispersal points and runway once the temperature began to rise and there was the threat of enemy air activity. The Hurricane’s Merlin engine had to be run every half-hour or so in order to keep it warm enough for an immediate scramble.
During 10 February a number of fighter patrols were made, Brothers taking part in an uneventful convoy escort, ‘We relished the possibility of getting to grips with the enemy, but would soon tire of the monotony of the seemingly endless defensive, convoy, and escort patrols.’
When approaching a convoy, Brothers would bring his formation in on a wide arc, to let the spotters identify his silhouette, ‘The Navy gunners had a reputation of being trigger-happy and would throw up flak at anything that approached them’.
In the hope of combating this problem, from November 1939, Royal Navy vessels had carried an RAF officer to assist with identifications, while patrols would use coloured flares to identify themselves as ‘friendly’, but this did not prevent further incidents occurring.
March began as February had ended, with the patrols stepping back up between the second and twenty-seventh: ‘We operated out of our forward base at Manston, returning to Gravesend between dusk and dawn’.
Manston was the RAF’s closest base to enemy occupied Europe and No. 32 Squadron was just one of many units to use the airfield as an advanced base. Here, they landed, refuelled and took off on convoy escorts or Channel patrols. Scrambled from Manston, however, the squadron’s Hurricanes would have little time to gain altitude before engaging the enemy, making them particularly vulnerable to being ‘bounced’ by the enemy fighters. Even with the use of long-range radar, the RAF only had twenty minutes advanced warning, while it took three minutes to scramble and a further twelve to attain operational altitude. There was little room for error.
On 7 March, No. 32 Squadron temporarily transferred to RAF Manston to relieve No. 79 Squadron, which flew to Biggin Hill two days later. Back flying out of Gravesend, No. 32 Squadron lost Flying Officer Bowler (flying N2531) while on patrol two miles off Folkestone on 23 March. Although not due to combat, this was nevertheless the squadron’s first wartime casualty and brought the realities of the conflict home to the pilots and ground staff alike. Flying Officer (39431) Lancelot Gordon Bowler, RAF, was the son of Ernest and Sarah Bowler, of Wavertree, Liverpool. He was 22-years-old. Bowler is remembered on the Runnymede Memorial, Panel 5.
Pete’s ‘B’ Flight returned to Biggin Hill on 1 April, to be joined a week later by ‘A’ Flight, which had spent the week flying out of Manston. There would be further changes over the next few weeks and months. On 8 April No. 79 Squadron’s ‘B’ Flight, which had been flying out of Biggin Hill, returned to Manston until 15 April, from when they operated out of Biggin Hill again. Meanwhile, ‘A’ Flight proceeded to Manston on 22 April. Between 1 – 10 May, No. 79 Squadron continued to operate out of Biggin Hill and Manston. On 6 May, No. 32 Squadron’s ‘A’ Flight returned from Manston, being relieved by No. 79 Squadron.
Meanwhile, Hitler was preparing to strike again, to secure Norway and the port of Narvik through which Germany imported Swedish iron ore for its war machine. On 9 April, Hitler’s forces launched Operation Weserübung, initially targeting the airfields and ports. Both France and Great Britain dispatched expeditionary forces, which were doomed from the start, the campaign ending in defeat on 10 June.
The House of Commons began debating the Norway campaign on 7 May, Lloyd George summing up the House’s feelings when he said, ‘I say solemnly that the Prime Minister should give an example of sacrifice, because there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice the seal of office.’
Chamberlain’s majority was cut from 213 to eighty-one and privately he admitted to Churchill that he could no longer continue in office.
Meanwhile, back at Biggin Hill, Squadron Leader R.A. Chignell was posted away on 6 May. Chignell flew at least one operational sortie with No. 145 Squadron to qualify for the Battle of Britain clasp, although not serving with them. He was posted to the Far East and killed at Kallang on 14 February 1942 when the Japanese strafed the boat in which he was escaping following the fall of Singapore. By then he was a Wing Commander. Chignell is remembered on the Singapore Memorial. He was posthumously Mentioned in Despatches on 1 October 1946.
Squadron Leader John ‘The Baron’ Worrall, formerly Senior Controller at Biggin Hill, took over command. Worrall would need to get flying time under his belt if he was to become as accomplished on Hurricanes as most of the pilots under his command. In the meantime he relied on his flight commanders, Brothers and Crossley, who would bear the brunt of the combat in the air – neither would be found wanting.
Worrall joined the RAF in 1930, flying with No. 1 Squadron before transferring to No. 208 Squadron on 28 February 1933. Commanding No. 32 Squadron during the Battle of France and the early phases of the Battle of Britain, Worrall was awarded the DFC (London Gazette, 6 August 1940). Soon afterwards he returned to his role as Fighter Controller at Biggin Hill, finally retiring at the rank of Air Vice-Marshal on 1 January 1963.
Chapter 4
Blitzkrieg to Dunkirk
The war entered a new and dramatic phase on 10 May when Hitler launched his Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries.
The German plan anticipated the Allies’ advance to counter their invasion of neutral Belgium. German armour would then spring the trap, bypassing the Maginot Line via the supposedly impenetrable Ardenne Forest, swinging northwards to the Channel and cutting off the Allies in their advanced positions.
At around 0400 hours German land forces began the assault, coordinating with air raids on road and railway junctions and other infrastructure. Half of the Belgian Air Force was destroyed on the ground, while many French airfields were badly hit.
Much now rested on the small RAF contingent operating in France. During the afternoon, thirty-two Battle light bombers of the Advanced Air Strike Force (AASF) made their first major raid, attacking German columns in an attempt to slow their advance through Luxembourg. Thirteen were lost and the remainder damaged. Outnumbered ten to one, the one hundred strong fighter force of the AASF and Air Component accounted for fifty enemy aircraft, losing fewer than ten of their own machines, with three pilots wounded.
Throughout what would become known as the Battle of France, it was the Hurricane squadrons that bore the brunt of the action rather than those operating with Spitfires. With a wider and more forward set undercarriage, the Hurricane would co
pe better with the rough airstrips, while their largely fabric-covered fuselage could be repaired on squadron. Added to this, Dowding was reluctant to deploy his Spitfires and would later threaten to resign if ordered to deplete Home Defence in this way.
During the morning No. 32 Squadron made patrols over Middlekirk and Zeebrugge, before returning to base at 0945 hours. There was little further activity until the early evening when Squadron Leader Worrall led a fighter patrol. Brothers recalled, ‘we pursued two suspected enemy aircraft over the Channel, but they dived into thick haze as we tried to overhaul them.’
Meanwhile, No. 79 Squadron, operating out of Biggin Hill and Manston, received orders to ‘proceed to aerodrome in France’, setting up a temporary base at Merville. Their role at Biggin Hill was taken by No. 610 Squadron’s Spitfires, which flew down from Prestwick, operating in No. 11 Group until the end of August.
At dawn the following day, No. 32 Squadron flew to Manston, refuelling before taking off at 1640 hours to strafe the recently captured Ypenburg aerodrome, near The Hague.
Looking over to starboard as he crossed the Scheldt and Maas estuaries, Brothers caught sight of a red haze, ‘[which] as we drew closer, I realized was Rotterdam’. Just as the lead Hurricanes reached The Hague the recall order was issued, but the fighters were by then beyond wireless range and the mission continued.
Brothers, who in later years added the words, ‘fired guns “in anger” for the first time’ in his logbook against the flight, recalled the raid:
‘I was leading the squadron because the commanding officer was new, and flying No. 2 to me. We left ‘A’ Flight up above to protect us whilst we went down to ground strafe.
‘There were a large number [sixteen] of Ju 52 troop transport aircraft on the ground. We dived down to find they were already all burned out; only the wing tips and tails remained intact.
‘Coming around again we spotted a single transporter parked between two hangars, so we set that on fire and climbed back up again.’
Only later did Brothers learn of the consequences of the breakdown in communication, ‘the Dutch had recaptured the airfield about two hours before we arrived and burnt out these German aircraft: one had been kept for them to escape to England in’.
In Parliament it had long been clear that Chamberlain was on borrowed time. The Norwegian campaign was on the point of collapse, while the Allies’ defensive lines in North-Western Europe would soon be swept away. Luxembourg fell by the end of the day. While the House of Commons favoured Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, as Prime Minister, it was Churchill who was summoned to Buckingham Palace. By midnight he had formed his Coalition Government, serving as both Prime Minister and the Minister for War.
In his maiden speech in the House of Commons as Prime Minister, Churchill gave his rallying call:
‘We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many months of struggle and suffering.
‘You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory. Victory at all costs – Victory in spite of all terrors – Victory, however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival.
‘Let that be realized. No survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for.’
At 0420 hours on 12 May, No. 32 Squadron took off for Manston from where they patrolled the Dutch Coast, escorting Blenheims seen near Flushing-Zeebrugge. The pilots remained at Readiness until after dusk, returning to Biggin Hill at 1805 hours.
Four additional squadrons of Hurricanes had already been sent to France, with a further thirty-two aircraft crossing the Channel the following day. The equivalent of another four squadrons, including No. 32 Squadron, would soon be operating over France: ‘We took off from Biggin Hill at around 0400 hours, flew ops throughout the day and often didn’t return until after 2200 hours.’
Meanwhile, the land campaign suffered a further disaster when the retreating Belgian Army failed to destroy a vital bridge along the river between Givet and Sedan. The way was thus open for the Germans to roll on through to the French border. Elsewhere, the Dutch had been pushed back to Rotterdam.
Mounting losses amongst the Hurricane squadrons based in France led to the secondment of a number of pilots and, on 14 May, the squadron lost Flying Officer Jones, Pilot Officers Gardner and Rose, along with Sergeant Ware, who were posted to No. 3 Squadron at Merville. Two days later, Pilot Officer Smith and Sergeant Bayley, were sent on temporary postings, both returning on 24 May.
Pilot Officer Jack Rose recalled that there were a number of failings in the rushed secondment, ‘We had no armour plate but all the chaps there did have. Our radios didn’t have the right frequencies so we couldn’t communicate with anybody’.
With the situation in France continuing to deteriorate the French premier, Paul Reynaud, telephoned Winston Churchill on 15 May, conceding, ‘We are beaten: We have lost the battle.’
By that evening the Allies had retired to the River Senne, in Belgium, reaching the Dendre the following day, and the Escaut and the area around the Sedan by 17 May. The situation was grave and Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: ‘We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and parachute and airborne troops in the near future, and we are getting ready for them.’
During the morning of 16 May, Brothers led ‘B’ Flight on a fighter patrol, landing back at Manston before being scrambled at 1230 hours to intercept a raid off the French coast. But the enemy turned back and Brothers was ordered down to conserve fuel.
Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, who had already reported growing losses to the Cabinet on the previous day, wrote a letter in which he expressed his views on sending more fighters across the Channel at the expense of fatally damaging Home Defence. He was duly summoned to No. 10 Downing Street. Churchill explained the predicament and that he had promised to provide more fighters to support the campaign in France. Dowding, however, remained adamant; Home Defence had already been reduced from fifty-two squadrons, the accepted minimum, and could not be further depleted, ‘I am well aware of the situation Prime Minister, but my task at hand is for the air defence of this country and it is my belief that I cannot achieve this if half my aircraft are in France. We are losing aircraft at a far quicker rate than we can produce them,’ adding that his thirty-six remaining squadrons were nowhere near enough for a successful defence of Britain, concluding, ‘We need more aircraft, and more pilots to fly them.’
Churchill flew to Paris for further talks, during which Reynaud stated that France would fall far sooner than he had anticipated. Churchill immediately telephoned the War Cabinet asking for six Hurricane squadrons; they would operate from French bases close to the Channel, from where they could be rapidly withdrawn.
And so, on 17 May, the squadron was up at 0315 hours in preparation to fly over to France from where they would operate that day: ‘we were getting up at about three o’clock in the morning, having breakfast, getting off an hour before first light.’
Taking off at 0825 hours Brothers landed at Abbeville a little under an hour later, where his aircraft was refuelled while the squadron awaited orders, ‘we had no ground crew. We refuelled from tins, and then we had no contact with anybody, the headquarters was on the move somewhere, retreating fast; everything was chaotic and so we’d just go off and patrol around to see what we could find.
‘If you were lucky, you bumped into some Germans. Otherwise you just flew about the sky looking at what was going on down on the ground.’
Occupied by No. 615 Squadron, the airfield and adjacent road, which was already lined by large numbers of refugees, was under artillery fire: ‘615 were pretty jumpy. One of their sergeant pilots hadn’t turned up for breakfast, and when they went to his billet he was lying in bed with a knife stuck in his chest. They didn’t know if it was a Nazi sympathizer or someone trying to rob him or what.’
During a squadron patrol made in the vicinity of Amiens, Peronne, Lacapelle, Mons and Lille, Bro
thers sighted an He 111. This would be his first taste of action. Setting his gun sight to the enemy’s wingspan, Brothers closed to within range and switched the gun button to ‘Fire’. As the Heinkel filled his sight Brothers depressed the gun button, but nothing happened. His guns hadn’t been cocked and failed to fire, ‘I pressed the gun button and nothing happened at all, because the guns hadn’t been reloaded. On landing back, I had the armourer in the office, drew my pistol, and said, “I’ll shoot you if you ever do that again.”’
The weeks of pressure building up to the French campaign had taken its toll on both pilots and ground staff. Brothers recalled that everyone was tired and his actions were out of character.
Meanwhile, an incident which occurred while the squadron was on the ground awaiting orders cemented Brothers’ thoughts on the general predicament: ‘we were refuelling when suddenly a lone Do 17, possibly on a reconnaissance mission, flew across the airfield at about 4,000ft. A French pilot, who was doing aerobatics in a Morane fighter at about the same height, had failed to see the enemy bomber.
‘I thought. Oh Christ, we’re going to be caught on the ground, but he flew straight past us. The French Station Commander was there. I raced to the control tower and shouted, “Tell him about the Dornier and he can shoot it down!”’
‘It is not possible, mon Capitaine,’ was the reply.
‘Not possible?’ shouted Pete, adding: ‘There’s the Dornier,’ gesticulating with his outstretched arm.
‘Not possible, mon Capitaine. You see today he is only authorized for aerobatics, not combat!’
Brothers turned away in dismay, thinking: ‘what have we got for Allies?’
The squadron operated out of Morseele aerodrome, Belgium, on 18 May. Still with no direction on the ground their first real action didn’t come until 1600 hours when they were scrambled to provide an escort to a Blenheim raid. During the patrol two Heinkels 111s were observed below the clouds. Pilot Officer Flinders claimed one aircraft destroyed ‘unconfirmed’.