Someone Wishes to Speak to You
Page 19
‘Indeed, you may be surprised by other things I have to say – but we’ll come to those. The Organisation of African Unity, which included a number of the newly independent African Commonwealth leaders, was led by President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda in trying to pressurise Harold Wilson to use military force to bring down Ian Smith’s illegal Rhodesian régime. Wilson publicly stated that the OAU had no hope of persuading his government to use force. The declaration was reported to have come as no surprise to Ian Smith and his Cabinet – they had already heard through their security channels that as far as Britain’s Chiefs of Staff were concerned, any thought of military action would be a non-starter. You see, that would be quite logical to anyone who understood the intimate and integrated relationship that existed between the British Army and Air Force and the Rhodesian forces, and the great loyalty and dedication which Rhodesia had always shown throughout the Second World War, and more recently during the Malayan Emergency.
‘So, it’s to Wilson’s credit that in spite of the OAU and the African Commonwealth leaders persistently pressing him to supply arms and money, he publicly flatly refused the requests, and was reported to have stated that “All their arguments and blandishments failed to change our minds”. So it seemed at the time that Wilson had learned from history not to fall into Sir Anthony Eden’s 1956 Suez-style fantasy in thinking that Britain had the military capacity, or the willingness of its forces, to overthrow the Smith régime by military intervention.’
‘I heard there were calls for Britain to use military force to bring Rhodesia into line,’ said Mathew, ‘and that Wilson was being put under pressure to do so, but I didn’t think it would happen.’
‘I’m telling you this in the strictest of confidence, you understand,’ continued Sir Roger, ‘but just after UDI had been declared, the British very nearly invaded Rhodesia. For during the months leading up to Ian Smith’s declaration of independence from the UK, and in spite of Harold Wilson’s aversion to making war on our “kith and kin” in the colony which he referred to as “rebel Rhodesia”, the situation did not prevent the defence planners of the Chief of Staff Committee from drawing up contingency plans for invading the Country.’
Sir Roger continued, ‘The first file that I was given to read had been marked “U.K. Eyes Only, Top Secret” which recorded that the plan must avoid risks which in other circumstances would be acceptable, and strongly advised the fledgling Wilson government against military intervention, for it said the consequence of failure would be appalling. It also mentioned that the current intelligence assessments did not give any ground for supposing that there would at present be anything but whole-hearted European opposition to any UK force introduced into Rhodesia. It also highlighted that striking the first blow at Rhodesia forces would have the most severe implications, and could well put strain on the loyalty of some of our own units. The report also warned against underestimating the strength of Rhodesia’s RRAF, and the capabilities and resilience of Rhodesia’s military units.
‘In a subsequent Air Ministry report I was given to read prior to my appointment here, it stated that at the end of November 1965 Aden’s RAF station Khormaksar had been put on stand-by, all leave stopped, and the 105 Squadron and other flying units put to “immediate readiness”. It wasn’t until a senior air staff officer addressed the officers to tell them they were going to invade Rhodesia that anyone knew what it was all about.’
Mathew listened intently as Sir Roger went on to tell him the details of the strategy that had been devised for the invasion. The aircraft were not only going to come from Aden, but also from Cyprus and the UK. It was emphasised that this was a top-secret mission and that the plan was for the Argosy Force, comprising of ten aircraft, to depart at fifteen-minute intervals, starting at 0400 hrs, and fly to Nairobi’s Eastleigh Airport in Kenya to refuel and then onto Southern Rhodesia to airdrop 1 Para Brigade on the military side of Salisbury’s civil airport at New Sarum, as well as on the commercial airport itself. Once the airports had been made secure, for little resistance was expected, the planes were to land, refuel, and return to Nairobi to collect more troops and equipment. The plan had been that once the Argosy Force had completed their mission, returned to Kenya and got their aircraft turned around and refuelled, there was to be a steady stream of more Argosies and Hastings aircraft arriving at Eastleigh until the airport was full to capacity.
According to the confidential report about the raid, the pilots were briefed that if the invasion were to go ahead, they would be departing Nairobi early the following morning, so as to arrive at Salisbury at first light. The idea was then for the Argosies and Hastings to air-drop the Paras onto New Sarum airfield, for the Beverleys to land and unload support hardware, and this to be followed by a stream of Britannias bringing in further reinforcements. The Labour Government’s strategy was to carry out a peaceful takeover of the Smith régime.
On 2 December 1965, the senior air staff officer (SASO) told pilots that the invasion was ‘on’. The RAF planes all had civil aircraft call signals, which was intended to lull the Rhodesians into thinking that there was just one civil aircraft. It was considered that Rhodesia’s Air Traffic Control was not in possession of radar able to detect the huge throng of aircraft flying behind the leader. The report stated that on the flight southwards, the Argosies had been joined by No 41 Squadron’s Gloster Javelins, and some of Aden’s Flying Wing Hunters, to combat any opposition, for the RAF were aware that the Rhodesian Airforce also had Hawker Hunters.
However, as the 105 Squadron flew southwards at the head of what was probably the largest collection of transport aeroplanes over Kenyan skies since the Second World War, when they reached the boundary of Rhodesian airport control’s authority over M’Beya, in Tanzania, they received what subsequently proved to be Rhodesia’s coup d’état. The Salisbury airport controller asked the leading plane’s navigator whether he would like the latest Salisbury weather, and when the reply was to the affirmative, the RAF navigator was given a forecast that could not have been more counter-productive to the invasion plans.
‘Whether the airport controller was pulling the wool over their eyes or not in saying that visibility was down to 400 yards,’ continued Sir Roger, ‘they couldn’t risk it as there was no way of checking. If it was correct the RAF couldn’t drop paratroopers, as they couldn’t see the ground. The invasion was called off at the eleventh hour and the Task Force diverted to Lusaka, over 500 km to the north-west.
‘The next morning, the aircrews were very relieved to hear that the mission was to be abandoned. Apparently, although some furious OAU members threatened to sever diplomatic relations with London, it was Wilson’s Chiefs of Staff that eventually made him drop any future invasion plans, by telling him how reluctant they would be to go to war against a nation that had fought so bravely at their side throughout the Second World War and during the Malayan Emergency. I saw a subsequent report recording how the majority of those in the Middle East Argosy and Beverley Squadrons had nothing but the highest regard for Rhodesia’s security forces, both black and white, who had always treated them with great courtesy and affection during their many training flights to Rhodesia before the UDI. Many Rhodesians had close relatives in Britain, as well as comrades in the respective armed forces. And it wasn’t just an Air Force operation – the Royal Navy were to provide a task force in the Beira Straits to carry additional manpower and military hardware.
‘In my view, if the invasion had taken place it would have been absolutely catastrophic, not just for the military but for Rhodesia’s civilian population, both black and white. It was very fortunate from the British Government’s point of view that the whole operation received no publicity. This unsubstantiated theory that it would be unlikely for it to have experienced any serious opposition could not have been further from reality. The whole operation had not been given adequate thought or preparation, and if it had gone ahead, it would have reflected extremely badly on the British Government, and
its armed forces in general.’
‘We can only be grateful that sanity prevailed in the end – just think how many lives would have been needlessly lost if it had gone ahead. Well, Sir Roger, you’ve certainly enlightened me this morning, I can now see the situation in a very different light.’
Taking into consideration what Sir Roger had told him, Mathew could see a justification for the efforts of the RF Government to slow down ZANU/PF’s and ZAPU’s wish for immediate independence, with one man, one vote elections, in order for them to take over the country’s government. Having had the opportunity to talk to so many people, both black and white, over the last year or so, he had become increasingly aware of how some of the country’s minority and sub-tribal groups, like his Manyika tribal friends, as well as Rhodesia’s European citizens, had become increasingly concerned about their possible alienation by the dominant Shona (and to a lesser extent Matabele) tribal overlords in the future.
That evening, Mathew accompanied the Willocks to a reception at the South African Embassy, at which Sir Roger introduced him to Lieutenant General Keith Coster OBE. Coster, like Sir Roger and his father, had served in North Africa in the Second World War.
After the afternoon’s conversation with Sir Roger, Mathew was keen to get an opinion from this wise and highly experienced soldier. ‘I’ve already lost far too many friends, both European and African, through insurgency attacks from across the borders,’ he told Mathew gravely. ‘I don’t know where it’s going to end up, but make sure you take the utmost care in the Vumba, don’t take your safety for granted.’ Mathew was glad to have made the acquaintance of the General; he found him to be a gentleman of considerable integrity and hoped their paths would cross again in the future.
Before Mathew returned to his camp at Castle Beacon, he spent a few days with Simon and Anna Vaughan-Jones, mostly to compare respective vervet monkey observations with Anna. Mathew showed Anna a series of facial mask drawings he had done on his vervet group, which vividly illustrated the elaborate facial signals that individuals use to communicate and when compared with those of his Stairs’ monkey family, showed how diverse the signals were. He had rather hoped that he would have the opportunity to meet Jan again, but when Anna told him that she was away staying at the citrus estate that her father managed at Mazoe, he could not help feeling slightly relieved at not being plunged into more emotional turmoil. However, he was still determined to meet her again, in order to find out definitively whether his feelings were reciprocated.
On his return to Castle Beacon, Mathew soon settled back into his field studies. He had also agreed to take tape recordings of the monkey’s vocalisations on Anna’s behalf. The columns of the Umtali Post had begun to record some of the devastating events that were occurring in the newly independent Mozambique. It was reported that the Roman Catholic Church had been driven underground and baptism banned; the country’s legal code had been abolished and replaced by military tribunals; an estimated 50,000 people, including 150 Catholic priests, had been incarcerated in concentration camps; and Mozambique’s President, Samora Machel, had declared his country to be on a war footing with Rhodesia. After Mathew had read this, he was surprised to learn that Harold Wilson’s Labour Government had only recently given £15 million of humanitarian assistance to Mozambique.
A radio broadcast brought some welcome news at the end of April, announcing that Ian Smith was about to bring a number of black ministers into the government, and that this was to include Bishop Muzorewa. Mathew saw this as an encouraging first step toward realising a peaceful political settlement for Rhodesia. This small beacon of hope was completely overshadowed when, on the 16 June, the South African police were reported to have shot at and killed children in the Johannesburg township of Soweto. When an estimated 20,000 high school students in Soweto started a march in support of better education, the police responded to the protest with tear gas and live bullets, which resulted in the killing of 176 of the rioters.
The slaughter immediately gave rise to an international outcry against the killing of children; the UN Security Council passed Resolution 392 which strongly condemned the incident and South Africa’s apartheid régime. In South Africa, many white citizens became outraged by their government’s actions. Over 300 white students from the University of the Witwatersrand marched through Johannesburg in protest against the killings; black workers went on strike and riots broke out in the black townships of other cities in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) exiles called for international action and more sanctions against South Africa, and issued posters calling for the release of Nelson Mandela from imprisonment on Robben Island.
In early July, Mathew received a message via Edgar that his father, Chief Chidzikwee, wished to have another meeting with him and that he would be grateful if he could go with Edgar to his Manyika Tribal Trust Lands at the earliest opportunity. As Edgar emphasised the urgency that his father put on having this one-to-one talk, Mathew agreed to visit the chief on the following Sunday.
Before the meeting, Mathew was aware that due to the increased security measures which had recently been put into operation in the region, he would have to inform both his friend the District Officer, Jim Prior, and the BSAP Superintendent that he had been directly involved with in Umtali since the establishment of his camp in the Vumba. Due to his well-known friendship with the chief and Edgar, Mathew was confident that he would get their written clearance to pass through the various security road blocks and permission to cross into the chief’s particular TTL, to which entry had now become restricted to serving members of Rhodesia’s security forces.
When Mathew and Edgar drove down from the Vumba early on Sunday morning, they passed through three separate road blocks manned by BSAP personnel, who looked at their pass documentation with considerable suspicion. On arriving at a fenced-in guard post by the entrance to the TTL, a young second-lieutenant from the Rhodesia Light Infantry (RLI), backed-up by three African askari’s brandishing FN MAG general-purpose machine guns, kept them waiting while he carefully examined their documentation. The young officer asked Mathew the reason for his visit to the chief, then went to his wireless operator to check with his regional commander in Umtali whether or not to allow Mathew’s Land Rover access to this military-protected safe zone. The response from the RLI HQ was that they could only spend two hours in the TTL, and therefore would have to return to the same gate of entry by 1300 hrs.
After having driven away from the guard post, Edgar said, ‘We’re meeting my father at the village of my cousin, Gabriel Nkulu. My father says he wishes to draw as little attention as possible to the fact that he is having a private meeting with a European.’
Mathew guessed that whatever he was about to be told by the chief, it would be important for him to deal with in the most diplomatic fashion, for he recognised only too well how apprehensive and sensitive matters had become between the African and European communities.
Chief Chidzikwee was already waiting in Gabriel’s spacious rondavel, and greeted Mathew warmly by grasping his hand in his vice-like grip before leading him to the far side of the dwelling, where their conversation would not be overheard. Soon after Mathew was handed a cup of black coffee, both Gabriel and Edgar left so that the chief could talk in complete confidence, which he knew Mathew would respect.
During the next hour and a half, the chief brought Mathew up-to-date with regards to his considerable concern about recent events that had taken place within his TTL.
‘Recently ZANU/PF political activists and ZANLA insurgents from across the border have started to exert an increasing amount of pressure, sometimes even intimidatory threats, against any of my tribesmen seen to be cooperating with the country’s security forces and Ian Smith’s government. I regret to say that some of the younger members of the tribe are so influenced by ZANU/PF’s propaganda that without any consultation with the elders, they have decided to cross the border into Mozambique and join the ranks of ZANLA.’
Chi
ef Chidzikwee went on to say that due to the Selous Scouts recently implemented counter-insurgency policy of taking the war to the enemy, a strategy that had been promoted and very much supported by the government’s Minister of Defence, P.K. van der Byl, some of the young Manyika tribesmen who had been involved in the fighting had been killed. Also, due to the subsequent success of the Selous Scouts’ hot pursuit raids on terrorist forces across the border, the number of these deaths had increased, which had given rise to anti-white feelings among his Manyika tribe.
‘You see, Mathew, all the turmoil being caused by this Bush War has made it very difficult for me to be seen to be cooperating with the security forces, or even now to be seen having a private talk with a European. It puts my authority in question. That is why I wanted our meeting to be secret. What I have to say is of the utmost importance. These frequent insurgency attacks from across the border and the growing degree of anti-white sentiments among some of my tribespeople mean that with the utmost regret, I can no longer direct Edgar to keep a watchful eye on the security of your camp, or act as a guarantor of your personal safety in the Vumba. Please listen to me Mathew and take heed – you must close down your research camp and leave the Vumba at the earliest opportunity. Only return if, and when, a peaceful settlement is reached.’
‘Thank you for speaking so openly with me, Chief Chidzikwee. Rest assured I will think carefully about what you’ve said.’
The two men said their farewells and shook hands for what they both knew could be the last time in the foreseeable future.
Although Mathew was grateful to the chief for expressing such a degree of concern about his safety, he was reluctant at this stage of the terrorist insurgency to heed his advice, for the Vaughan-Joneses were scheduled to visit his camp in early August. During his last stay with them, Anna told him how very keen she was to make some further recordings of the communicative vocalisations of his habituated family group of vervet monkeys, particularly when the monkeys were confronted by a potential predator. She said that should a live predator fail to put in an appearance, Simon had volunteered to bring with them two museum specimens, one of a caracal and the other of a python, in order to stimulate the monkeys’ warning responses to the respective marauders. He didn’t want to disappoint them unless it was absolutely necessary.