On March 31, B-20 was shot down over China. This time the news coverage was vanishingly small — the entire New York Times article read: "The Peking radio said an unmanned United States reconnaissance plane was shot down over south China today by a naval anti-aircraft battery."[237]
On April 2, the Chinese put B-21 on display in a military museum in Peking. The aircraft was readily identifiable as a modified Firebee drone.
Some thirty thousand Chinese marched past the wreckage. The Hsinhua press agency said the shooting down of three of the drones was "a serious warning to United States marauders who are now extending the flames of their aggressive war in Indochina and conducting constant military provocations against China." The New York Times article on the U.S. response to the display read: "The Defense Department has not denied occasional reports that the United States has been sending drones over Communist China for reconnaissance purposes. Its standing policy has been to refuse comment on such reports."[238]
The following day, April 3, the Chinese announced the fourth drone had been shot down. B-23, nicknamed "Crazy Legs," was lost over central south China. Hsinhua said it was "the second espionage plane of the same type to be shot down within three days." Again, the press took little notice.[239] The fifth 147B was lost over China on April 18, 1965.[240]
On April 20, the Chinese put three of the captured drones on display at the Chinese People's Revolutionary Museum in Peking. A photo of the drones was published on the front pages of American newspapers the next day. The San Diego Union noted, "The new photo and others released in the past have left little doubt the planes in Chinese hands are Firebees." Ryan responded by neither confirming nor denying it.[241]
On August 21, a sixth 147B drone was shot down over Hainan Island by an air u n i t of the Chinese navy. Again, the U.S. press paid little attention.[242]
The Chinese issued their statements and photos and displays, but few took notice of those small, almost toylike airplanes. Within a few days, events pushed them aside, and the memory faded. The concept of using an unmanned drone for high-risk overflights, and simply not commenting on any losses, had proved valid. The Lightning Bug was still a Black airplane.
CHANGING OF THE GUARD
By New Year's of 1965, it was clear the 147B drones were a success.
Soon after the end of the holidays, Ryan Aeronautical began work on an improved version of the high-altitude 147B. This was done without a formal contract. Ryan and the air force had developed a good working relationship, and the effort could get under way without waiting for the paperwork.
The new version was the 147G drone. The major change was a more powerful engine for a higher altitude over the target area (at the cost of a shorter range than the 147B). A contrail suppression system was also added to the engine. This would lessen the chance of a visual sighting. The fuselage was stretched to 29 feet, while the wings spanned 27 feet. The formal contract for the 147G was issued in March 1965, and the first was delivered in July 1965.[243]
At this same time, the first changing of the guard was made in the skies of North Vietnam. During a photo run over Haiphong Harbor, an air force U-2 was fired on unsuccessfully by an SA-2. In response, a dual mission was planned — a 147B drone was to fly over an area defended by the SAMs, while a U-2 remained just out of range to observe. As the U-2 pilot watched in awe, an SA-2 rose up and consumed the drone. U-2 overflights of North Vietnam ended. They were shifted to "signals intelligence" missions. This involved flying long hours outside North Vietnamese airspace to pick up radio and radar transmissions.[244] The 147B reconnaissance drones took over high-altitude, photo-reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam.
That fall, there was another changing of the guard. The first 147G mission was flown in late October 1965. The new drone soon replaced the 147B, which made its last flight in December. The first 147G lost over China was shot down on February 7, 1966. (This was the seventh drone brought down by the Chinese.)[245] The Chinese destroyed another 147G drone on March 5, 1966, over the central south region. They said the drone was on "a provocative re-connoitering flight." The New York Times carried the story on page 54.[246]
As the U-2s were giving way to the 147Bs, and they, in turn, were replaced by the 147Gs, work also began on a drone using a completely different mission profile. The normal weather pattern over North Vietnam was for clear skies between May and September. During the winter monsoon season, between November and March, there were thick clouds and heavy rain, with ceilings down to 500 feet.[247] Even with clear weather during the summer, smoke and ground haze would often cause the photos from high-altitude drones to be poor.
It was clear the drones would have to go in under the clouds. This would also help them evade North Vietnamese air defenses and make them more difficult to track by radar. The SA-2s could not engage a target below 1,500 feet, but the drones would still face 37mm cannons, 50-caliber machine guns, and even rifle-armed peasants.
In October 1965, a contract was issued to produce the 147J. This was a 147G modified for low-level operation, with a new altitude-control system and camera package. Development proved difficult, with the loss of three prototypes and damage to a DC-130 when 147XJ-2 collided with it just after launch.
To test the 147J's control system under combat conditions, two of the old 147C drones were modified. A new "duck head" nose was added to house a larger camera. Both were soon lost; the C was marginal at best for so demanding a mission.[248]
In all, seventy-seven missions were flown over China and North Vietnam during 1965. These were made up of the last of the 147B drones, the first of the 147Gs, the two 147Cs flown to test low-altitude operations, two 147Ds flown as decoys, and the first of the 147E ELINT drones, in a program called "United Effort."[249]
UNITED EFFORT
With SA-2 sites spreading throughout North Vietnam, the need for the fuze data was all the greater. This mission was undertaken by 147E drones.
These were 147Bs with their cameras replaced by special ELINT equipment.
The data would be retransmitted to an RB-47, even as the drones themselves were destroyed. Three 147Es were sent to Bien Hoa in October 1965.
The first three 147E missions were not successful, due to ELINT package failures. The 147E drones were withdrawn from operations and underwent environmental chamber tests. The problem was traced to overheating of the ELINT equipment, and the drones returned overseas in early 1966.
Success came on February 13, 1966, with the fourth attempt. The ELINT equipment relayed data on the SA-2's proximity fuze, radar guidance after the fuze activated, and the blast overpressure that destroyed the drone.
United States intelligence had been trying for years to get this data. This mission was later described as the most significant ELINT mission since the start of the Cold War. It paid for the whole 147 program. The data was incorporated into the design of new electronic countermeasures equipment (ECM).[250]
The first of this new ECM equipment, the ALQ-51 "Shoehorn," was then tested aboard a drone against SA-2 missiles. Ryan modified a single 147 drone, B-7, to the 147F configuration. The Shoehorn was a large package, and it was difficult to fit it into the drone. The 147F drone was sent overseas and made several flights in July 1966. It was lost on July 22, 1966, but not before ten or eleven SAMs had been fired at it. The 147F was able to prove out the Shoehorn without risk to a pilot.[251]
BORN TO LOSE — THE 147N A N D NX DECOY DRONES
North Vietnamese air defenses had continued to expand and were taking a toll on the drones. Of a series of twenty-four missions, sixteen drones were lost. This loss rate was too high and, in early 1966, the air force asked Ryan to build a decoy drone. This led to yet another branch in the 147 family.
The new decoy effort was given priority to bypass normal procedures, even those of Big Safari. Over a ten-day period, ten Firebee target drones were modified with traveling wave tubes to make them look like larger aircraft. They were designated 147N drones. As the 147Ns were never meant to survi
ve, they had only a ninety-minute fuel supply and no recovery parachute.
The first 147N mission was launched on March 3, 1966. The decoy 147N and a 147G were released from the DC-130 almost simultaneously.
They flew a parallel course until they approached the target area. The two drones then diverged, giving the North Vietnamese two possible targets.
The 147N, with a larger radar return, was flying at a vulnerable altitude. As expected, they went after the 147N, while the 147G returned to Da Nang.
Although all were lost, the eight 147Ns were credited with five MiG "kills." In the first case, a 147N headed out over the Tonkin Gulf with a MiG hot on its tail. The MiG pilot ran out of fuel and had to eject at sea.
Other kills were "friendly fire" — a SAM was launched at a drone but destroyed a MiG. Still another MiG was shot down by its wingman.[252]
Their success led to a follow-on decoy. Despite expectations, several of the 147Ns had survived to reach Da Nang. Without a parachute, however, they could not be recovered. In August 1966, another order was placed for ten decoys. Like the 147Ns, these were to be Firebee target drones equipped to make them appear as bigger targets. Unlike the earlier decoys, the 147NX also carried an inexpensive, low-resolution camera. From medium altitude, it could take photos with a six-foot resolution. The 147NX could be used to spot trucks and provide general indications of activity. The first 147NX missions were flown in November. They would function as a confusion factor for the high-altitude 147Gs, rather than cover specific targets. If the 147NX made it back, the photos were a bonus.[253]
LOW OVER THE RICE PADDIES — THE 147J
In late March 1966, the 147J began low-level operations over North Vietnam. It used a barometric low-altitude control system (BLACS) to remain a preset height above the ground. A dual camera system was added — one camera looked front and rear, the second looked left and right. The most visible difference with the 147J was the paint finish. All the earlier, high-altitude drones had been painted black; because the 147Js would fly at low altitude, they were painted gray on the upper surfaces and white underneath.
The 147Js soon were showing greater survivability over the target. They flew below the effective altitude of the SA-2 SAM. J-14 came back with photos of a SAM being fired at it. The SAM missed, and J-14 made it home.
(The last of the 147Ns were used as decoys for the 147Js.) J-4, the prototype drone, was sent to Bien Hoa and flew five successful missions over three months.
The 147Js also showed an improvement in recovery. There had always been some damage due to ground impact, so a midair recovery system was used for the 147J (as well as later drones). A helicopter grabbed a small parachute with cables rigged between two poles. Once it was secure, the main parachute was released, and the helicopter's winch pulled up the drone.[254]
The 147Js, along with the high-altitude 147Gs, were used in support of attacks on North Vietnam's supply of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).
By the end of July 1966, 70 percent of North Vietnam's known bulk storage of POL had been destroyed. The effort was frustrated, however. Drone photos showed the North Vietnamese were storing oil drums along the streets of villages, which they knew the United States would not bomb.[255]
In all, 105 missions were launched in 1966 over North Vietnam and China. This consisted of 147Gs, which made up the bulk of the flights, the 147J drones, the 147E and 147F ELINT missions, and the 147N and NX decoys.[256]
ONE BY NIGHT, TWO BY DAY — THE 147NRE, NP, AND NQ
By early 1967, the 147J missions had shown the value of low-level coverage. There were concerns the supply of 147Js could run out before a specially designed low-altitude drone could be ready. As a short-term solution, additional 147Gs were converted to the J configuration. Ryan was also requested to build an interim low-altitude, day photo reconnaissance drone, based on a new version of the original 147A. This was the 147NP. It had a stretched 28-foot fuselage, a 15-foot Firebee wing, and the original low-powered engine.
Before the 147NP was ready, a new requirement emerged. Much of the supplies the North Vietnamese were sending south were moved at night.
Four of the 147NP drones were diverted from the production line and modified as night reconnaissance drones. These were fitted with a two-camera package sequenced with a flashing white light mounted in the drone's belly.
The planned altitude and ground speed had to be programmed into the strobe. For an altitude of 1,200 feet, the light would flash at the rate of once per second. The drone itself could not be seen, but the flash was very visible. If the drone was in clouds, the whole sky would be lit up. The new system was designated the 147NRE (night reconnaissance-electronic).
Two of the drones were sent to Point Mugu for testing. The results were so encouraging that the air force decided to send all four NRE drones to Vietnam. Supplies were very short — there was literally only one box of the special film used by the camera.
NRE-1 was flown on May 25, 1967. The launch was successful, but the drone did not return. Despite the failure, the NRE had beaten the NP into action. The first 147NP day reconnaissance drone was flown a week later, in early June. Unlike the black-painted NREs, the NPs had a camouflage finish.
NRE-2 was flown in the early morning hours of June 5, 1967. It survived its trip north and headed to the recovery zone. As the recovery sequence began, the main parachute separated, and the drone fell toward the jungle north of Da Nang. The small midair recovery parachute caught the tops of the trees and the drone landed intact.
Ed Christian, a Ryan camera specialist, volunteered to go after it. Armed only with an M16, a pistol, an axe, and a safe-conduct pass, Christian was lowered into the jungle. A Viet Cong patrol was also after the drone. Christian chopped open the fiberglass cover and removed the film from the two cameras. These were sent up a cable to the waiting CH-3 helicopter. He then destroyed the cameras with the M16 and tried to punch holes in the fuel tank so he could set the drone on fire, if necessary. By this time the helicopter was low on fuel and it headed off, leaving Christian in the jungle. Two marine gunships soon arrived and started strafing the Viet Cong.
A second helicopter arrived to try to recover the drone. Christian attached the cable, but as the drone was lifted, the fuel poured out, and he was sprayed with it. Another five minutes passed before the first helicopter returned and lifted him out of the jungle, even as the Viet Cong neared.
The photos from NRE-2's mission showed the drone had covered the target, but subsequent flights indicated the 147NRE's navigation system lacked sufficient accuracy; the field of view of the strobe was so small the drone would have to fly directly over the target. There was, however, a great deal of bonus intelligence picked up by flying the 147NREs almost at random. There was also harassment value due to the brilliant strobe light. It was decided to build a specialized drone for night reconnaissance.
In all, seven 147NRE missions were flown between May and September 1967, while the 147NP drones flew nineteen missions between June and September. As it turned out, the supply of 147Js proved adequate.
The 147NP was followed by another low-altitude drone, the 147NQ. It was equipped with a higher-resolution camera than the NX. The main difference between the 147NQs and earlier drones was the control system.
Rather than being controlled by a flight programmer, it was hand flown by a crewman aboard the DC-130. Its primary target was shipping in Haiphong Harbor. Missions were flown nearly every day between May and December 1968, when the last one was lost.[257]
THE GREAT WHITE HOPE — THE 147H HIGH-ALTITUDE DRONE
While the low-altitude 147Js, NREs, and NPs were making an increasing share of the drone missions over North Vietnam, the high-altitude 147Gs continued operations. By March 1967, the third-generation, high-altitude 147H drone was ready to begin operations. It used the same engine as the 147G, but with a highly modified airframe. The wings were stretched from the 27 feet of the 147B-G to 32 feet, and fitted with internal fuel tanks to increase its range.
The longer wings, plus a lighter airframe, meant the 147H could reach altitudes of over 65,000 feet. The 147H was also equipped with a new Hycon camera that could photograph an area 780 nautical miles long and 22 miles wide, with a better resolution than the earlier drones.
With the growth of both Chinese and North Vietnamese air defenses, the 147Gs were suffering an increased loss rate over the 147Bs. The radar-absorbing blankets and the 147N and NX decoys were not enough. Accordingly, the 147H was also fitted with several different types of countermeasures. These included "Rivet Bouncer," which jammed the SA-2's guidance radar; a coating in the intake to reduce its radar reflection; systems that would trigger evasive maneuvers if the 147H was illuminated by either MiG or SAM tracking radars; and an improved contrail suppression system.
The 147H was one of the most difficult of the drones to develop, and it took nearly two years before it was ready. With its higher altitude, longer range, and countermeasures equipment, the 147H was the "great white hope" of the drone program.[258]
The first 147H mission was flown in March 1967. The 147Hs and Gs continued to operate side by side until the final 147G flight in August. In some cases, a DC-130 would carry one G and one H under its wings.[259]
The start of 147H operations in the spring of 1967 coincided with an increase in the number and intensity of U.S. airstrikes on North Vietnam.
The first targets hit were power plants in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. By mid-June, 85 percent of North Vietnam's electrical capacity had been destroyed. In late July, attacks were approved on more targets within Hanoi and Haiphong. Starting on September 4, navy planes began cutting rail, road, and canal links to isolate Haiphong. In the end, the 1967 bombing effort proved futile. The North Vietnamese put out "peace feelers," and President Johnson ordered a bombing halt of targets in central Hanoi. The pattern reverted to that of 1965-66—a greatly reduced scale with frequent interruptions.
Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 14