To keep the development time short, as many existing components as possible were used. In addition to the F-16 fly-by-wire control system, the Have Blue aircraft used F-5 ejector seats, landing gear, and cockpit instruments. The J85-GE-4A engines were supplied by the navy from its T-2B trainer program. The Have Blue aircraft were built by hand, without permanent jigs (like […] As each part was designed, the plans were sent to the shop for fabrication. The work was done in a cordoned-off section of the Burbank plant. The two planes did not receive any air force serial numbers or designation, so Lockheed gave them the numbers 1001 and 1002.[361]
Two test pilots were selected to fly the Have Blue. Lockheed test pilot William Park would make the first flights. Park was so highly regarded at the Skunk Works that Ben Rich obtained a special exemption from the air force so he could be chief test pilot for the Have Blue. (He was not a test pilot school graduate, nor did he have an advanced engineering degree.) Years later, he recalled his first impression of the Have Blue: "Aerodynamically, it didn't look like it could fly at all… It really looked like something that flew in from outer space."[362] Lieutenant Colonel Norman Kenneth "Ken" Dyson would serve as the air force project pilot. As events turned out, he would do the RCS testing.
As with other Dark Eagles, the Have Blue personnel had their own patch.
It showed the cartoon character Wile E. Coyote holding a blue lightning bolt, signifying control of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the colorful code name. (The Road Runner, Wile E. Coyote's uncatchable nemesis, had been used in the 1960s as the symbol of the A-12 Oxcart.) The completion of Have Blue 1001 was complicated by a strike at Lockheed. When the strike began in late August 1977, the Have Blue was in final assembly, with no fuel or hydraulic systems, no electronics, no ejection seat or landing gear. A thirty-five-man shop crew was put together from managers and engineers to complete it and check out its systems. They put in twelve-hour days, seven days a week, for two months. The initial engine test runs were done on November 4. To hide the plane, 1001 was parked between two semitrailers and a camouflage net was draped over them. The tests were done at night, after Burbank airport had closed. The only attention the tests attracted was a noise complaint.
Following the tests, the wings were removed and the plane was loaded aboard a C-5A transport for the flight to Groom Lake. The delivery was made on the morning of November 16, 1977. This was the first time a C-5 had flown from Burbank, and quite a crowd gathered. After arrival, the plane was taken to one of the old Lockheed A-12 hangars at the south end of the Groom Lake complex. Have Blue 1001 was reassembled in short order and engine thrust checks were made. Three days before the first flight, these tests uncovered a serious overheating problem. The engines were removed and a heat shield was added. This was made from an old steel tool cabinet.
The Have Blue then underwent four low- and medium-speed taxi tests. During the third run, the brakes overheated. This was to be a nuisance throughout the program. The functioning of the computer-stability system was also checked out, and minor adjustments were made in the yaw gains. The drag chute was also tested, and the plane was judged ready for its first flight.[363]
HAVE BLUE TAKES FLIGHT
Shortly before 7:00 A. M. on December 1, 1977, Have Blue 1001 was taken from its hangar and taxied to the end of the runway. The extreme security measures continued even at Groom Lake. The Have Blue 1001's entire surface was painted in patterns of light gray, black, and tan. This was not camouflage in the traditional sense, but was meant to hide the shape of the aircraft. Anyone observing the plane, either from the ground or from the air, would have difficulty seeing the faceting.[364]
As a further step to limit the number of people who knew of the project, everyone at Groom Lake not connected with Have Blue had been herded into the cafeteria before the plane left the hangar. The test was so secret that Lockheed Chairman Roy Anderson could not attend. The flight was also timed so that no Soviet reconnaissance satellites were in position to photograph Groom Lake during the flight. Both the White House situation room and Tactical Air Command Headquarters were monitoring the activities.
With security in place and the plane ready, Park made a final check and ran up the engines. The engines were quiet compared to a normal jet, due to the radar-absorbing grids. Park went to full power and released the brakes.
The plane began to slowly accelerate down the long runway. Without an afterburner, it took nearly the whole length to reach flying speed. The little angular airplane finally lifted off and slowly climbed into the winter sky. As it did, Kelly Johnson slapped Rich on the back and said, "Well, Ben, you got your first airplane."
On this first flight, the landing gear was left extended while Park checked the Have Blue's airworthiness. AT-38 chase plane watched over the Have Blue throughout the flight. When the flight was completed, Park made a fast landing on the runway. Due to the plane's semidelta wings and lack of flaps, the landing speed was a very high 240 knots.[365]
Park was elated with the Have Blue's performance. He recalled years later, "It flew great. It flew like a fighter should fly. It had nice response to the controls."[366] The fly-by-wire control system had transformed the unstable airplane.
Over the next five months, the first Have Blue made a total of thirty-six test flights. Park and Dyson covered most of the aircraft's speed and altitude envelope. Only a few RCS flights were made; the aircraft had not really been intended for such tests. Have Blue 1001 provided data on flight loads, flutter, performance, handling qualities, and stability and control. The plane was unstable in pitch at speeds below Mach 0.3, and static directional stability was less than predicted. The plane was directionally unstable at speeds above Mach 0.65. Side forces were half that predicted by wind-tunnel data. These problems were corrected simply by changing the gain in the flight control system.
The platypus nozzles also affected stability — changing the power setting caused uneven heating, which warped their surfaces. This, in turn, generated forces that were picked up by the stability control system. The computer interpreted this as a change in flight direction and moved the fins to counter it. This resulted in the plane flying "crabbed" slightly to one side.
The pilot had to adjust the trim each time the flight conditions changed.[367]
The only major flaw in the design was the high sink rate on landing, which would be corrected in the production aircraft. It was to be the undo-ing of Have Blue 1001.[368]
On May 4, 1978, Park was about to complete the thirty-sixth test flight when the plane hit the runway hard. Rather than risk skidding off the runway, Park took off and went around again. As he did, he retracted the landing gear. Park did not know that the right landing gear had been bent by the impact. When he lowered the gear, the T-38 chase pilot, Col. Larry McCain (the base commander), radioed that the right gear was jammed. Park added power and climbed. Over the next several minutes, he made several attempts to get the gear to extend. This included making another hard landing to jar it loose.
The fuel supply was running low and there was no time for additional attempts. As Park climbed to 10,000 feet, one of the engines flamed out from fuel starvation. When the other engine quit, he would have only two seconds before the Have Blue went out of control. Park radioed, "I'm gonna bail out of here unless anyone has any better ideas."[369] He then pulled the ejector seat handle, the canopy blew off, and the seat rocketed him out of the plane. As it did, Park's head struck the seat's headrest and he was knocked unconscious. His parachute opened automatically, but he was still unconscious when his limp body hit the desert floor. Park's leg was broken, he suffered a concussion, and his mouth was filled with dirt as the parachute was dragged across the desert by a strong wind. By the time paramedics reached him, Park's heart had stopped. The paramedics were able to save him, but Park never flew again. He was named Lockheed's director of flight operations.[370] The wreckage was examined, then buried at Groom Lake.
The accident was the first indication of the program's existence s
ince it went Black. News reports were headlined "Plane Crash Shrouded In Mystery." It was speculated that Park may have been injured in the crash of a TR-1, a modified version of the U-2R which was then about to enter production. Spokesmen refused to comment, citing "national security reasons."
At the end of the articles, "some sources" were quoted as saying it was part of a "stealth program," which was "aimed at developing reconnaissance planes that would be significantly less vulnerable."[371] The true importance of stealth was missed.
RCS TESTING
The second Have Blue, 1002, was delivered in July 1978, two months after the loss of 1001. It made its first flight on July 20. The pilot for this and all its later flights was Lt. Col. Ken Dyson.
Have Blue 1002 was intended for the RCS tests. As such, it lacked the air-speed boom of the first plane. To provide air-speed data, which was critical to the stability system, six measuring points were located in the upper and lower surfaces, the nose, and windshield center frame. Building an air-speed system that was both accurate and stealthy proved difficult; the design of the airframe restricted where such probes could be located. Have Blue 1002 was painted light gray overall rather than the camouflage finish of the first plane. It also lacked a drag chute and was equipped with a steerable nose wheel, which improved ground handling. Most important, it was covered with the RAM coatings and other materials needed to reduce its RCS.
Following several air-speed calibration flights, the baseline in-flight RCS measurements began. Following completion of the tests, modifications were made based on the initial results. A second series of penetration tests was run against ground radars and infrared systems.[372] A cover story to "explain" how an airplane could be invisible to radar was also prepared. The people involved with the tests were told that an ordinary plane was carrying a "black box" in its nose. This emitted a powerful beam which deflected the radar signals.[373]
In the final series of tests, Have Blue 1002 was flown against a simulated Soviet air defense network. These included the SA-6 Straight Flush tracking radar, and the Bar Lock, Tall King, and Spoon Rest early warning radars. These were either actual Soviet radars captured by the Israelis during the 1967 and 1973 wars, or copies built from scratch or modified from U.S. equipment. Tests were also run against airborne radars.
The results were phenomenal — most SAM radars could not detect the Have Blue until it was within the missiles' minimum range. This made it impossible for the SAMs to intercept it. The best approach was to fly directly toward the radar. This exposed only the Have Blue's tiny head-on radar return. Against VHP early warning radars, such as the Spoon Rest and Tall King, the results were more limited. Even so, the faceted shape reduced the detection range to half that of a normal aircraft. Against these radars, the plane would have to remain out of range, but since these radars were few in number, it would be a simple matter to bypass them. The Have Blue was undetectable by any airborne radar including the E-3 AWACS (airborne warning and command system). Fighter pilots would have to pick it up visually, the same as their World War I counterparts.
The Have Blue showed that further advances in RAM would be needed for operational aircraft. On the RCS tests, special care had to be taken.
Before each flight, doors and access panels had to be sealed with metallic tape and the landing gear doors had to be adjusted for a correct fit. Then after Dyson climbed into the aircraft, the gaps around the canopy and fuel-fill door were filled with a paint-type RAM material and allowed to dry before the plane took off.[374]
On one flight, the Have Blue was picked up at a range of fifty miles. After landing, the plane was given a close inspection. Three screws had not been fully tightened and were sticking up less than an eighth of an inch above the plane's skin. This was enough to compromise the plane's low RCS.[375]
Special efforts such as these were acceptable for a test aircraft, but for the operational aircraft, a more routine kind of procedure would be necessary.
The second Have Blue, 1002, was lost on July 11, 1979, during its fifty-second flight, a test against an F-15's radar. A weld in a hydraulic line cracked, spraying fluid onto the hot section of an engine. The fluid caught fire, and the blaze soon became uncontrollable. Dyson tried to get back to Groom Lake but had lost hydraulic power and was cleared to bail out.
Dyson ejected and parachuted to a safe landing.
The plane crashed near the Tonopah Test Range, in the northern part of Nellis Air Force Base. A tall column of smoke rose above the debris.
Seeing the smoke, a group of people at the test range boarded trucks and headed toward the crash site. To chase them off, the F-15 pilot buzzed the trucks at 600 knots. One truck drove off the road as the fighter blasted past.
The curiosity of the drivers was "satisfied," and they turned around and headed back. A helicopter from Groom Lake arrived and picked up Dyson.[376]
The loss of the aircraft did not affect the program, as it was the next-to-last flight planned, and most of the test data had already been acquired. The wreckage of Have Blue 1002 was also buried at Groom Lake.[377]
Park was philosophical about the loss of the two Have Blue aircraft (and the accident that nearly killed him and ended his own flying career). Years later he noted, "We knew we had a problem but we couldn't fix it without a long delay in the program, and it was vital that we get the information. I don't mean we were going haphazardly. We did [the development] fast with a minimum amount of money. We wrecked two airplanes, but they were prototypes and served their purpose… 1 smile a lot because I am just happy to be here alive. I believe that circumstances can occur that you cannot overcome no matter how good you are."[378]
The shape of the Have Blue remained secret for fourteen years. The code name was revealed in an October 1981 article in Aviation Week and Space Technology. Its existence was officially confirmed in 1988, and Park talked about his crash the following year. It was not until April 1991 that two photos of Have Blue 1001 were finally released.[379] Ironically, it is understood that the photos were released by accident.
UNVEILING STEALTH
The Have Blue was a particular shade of Black. The concept of faceting and, more importantly, its accomplishments were the darkest shade of Black. With a single pair of prototypes, every radar ever built had been rendered blind. The Have Blue had turned SAMs into expensive fireworks.
Strategic airpower had undergone a revolution as great as that brought about by nuclear weapons.
The idea of stealth, however, was known. Because Project Harvey had been unclassified, the existence of a stealth demonstrator was also known.
As time passed, it was becoming harder to keep the program a secret.
A 1979 article in the Las Vegas Review-Journal was one example. Its coverage of stealth was little better than gossip. The article described "an airplane so secret that 'whenever it comes out of its hangar, or when it comes in for a landing, a siren goes off and all personnel (except a select few) have to lie face-down on their stomachs to make sure they don't look at it.'" The article also talked about "the super-secret Stealthfire spy plane, which is supposed to be 'invisible' to radar." The "Stealthfire" was built of materials that were "non-reflective" to radar and had "a technological breakthrough which 'disperses' engine heat." This was described as "the only other way it could be tracked on radar." The article said that three Stealthfires had been built, but two had crashed—"one last year near Las Vegas and one more recently, perhaps in the past few weeks."
It also described "a new top secret fighter-bomber, tentatively known as the F-20." It claimed, "This plane would be outlawed by the proposed SALT II Treaty, but is secretly being developed in case the pact fails, the source claimed. The F-20 would be an advancement on the old B-l design, which was scrapped last year by President Carter."[380]
The article did more to confuse than inform about stealth. The F-20 was only an improved F-5 fighter, which had nothing to do with the SALT II […] radar can not pick up the hot exhaust of a jet. Even so, t
he article caused major damage on several fronts.
During the summer of 1980, the pace of stealth leaks picked up. In the week of August 10, Aviation Week and Space Technology, the Washington Post, and ABC News all carried stories on stealth. (Up to this point, the popular press had ignored stealth.) The stories said that stealth technology was being developed for several types of aircraft, including bombers. They reported that it used RAM and curved surfaces to reduce the radar return.
(The latter was entirely inaccurate.)
President Carter and Defense Secretary Brown said later that they had considered three options to deal with the leaks. Saying "no comment" would only fuel speculation. Disinformation — attempting to discredit the stories through false information — was also ruled out. It was seen as counter to the post-Watergate attitudes. The final option was to confirm the reports, in order to create a "firebreak" to additional leaks.[381]
And 1980 was also an election year.
Carter had been elected on the promise to cut defense spending, and during his presidency there was a major decline in U.S. military power. Funding shortages had caused over 7 percent of air force aircraft to be grounded due to a lack of spare parts. Air force crews wore flight suits that were so old the flame retardant had been washed out, but there was no money to buy new ones. The navy was particularly hard hit; it had half the number of ships of ten years before and could not fully man them. Nor was there enough ammunition to fill every ship's magazine. Enlisted personnel were so poorly paid — below minimum wage — that they had to put their families on food stamps or work second or third jobs.[382]
By 1980, the American public had become convinced the nation was in decline, pushed around by Third-World countries like Iran and facing a growing Soviet threat. The breaking point came with the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held by the Iranians. The scenes of abandoned helicopters and burned bodies at Desert 1 damaged American confidence in a way even Vietnam did not. Unveiling the revolutionary possibilities of stealth seemed to be a way to counter Republican charges that President Carter had neglected defense.
Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 21