When the air force pilots flew the MiG 21, the results were a draw — the F-4 would win some fights, the MiG 21 would win others. There were no clear advantages. The problem was not with the planes, but with the pilots flying them. The air force pilots would not fly either plane to its limits. To avoid accidents, restrictions had been placed by the air force on air combat maneuvers.
One of the navy pilots was Marland W. "Doc" Townsend, then commander of VF-121, the F-4 training squadron at NAS Miramar. He was an engineer and a Korean War veteran and had flown almost every navy aircraft. When he flew against the MiG 21, he would outmaneuver it every time. The air force pilots would not go vertical in the MiG 21. Townsend would make his pass, then pull up into a vertical climb, do a roll as he came over the top, spot the MiG 21, then line up on its tail. He recalled years later, "It was a piece of cake… Easiest plane I've ever fought in my life."
The Have Doughnut project officer was Tom Cassidy, a pilot with VX-4, the navy's Air Development Squadron at Point Mugu. He had been watching as Townsend "waxed" the air force MiG 21 pilots. Cassidy climbed into the MiG 21 and went up against Townsend's F-4. This time the result was far different. Cassidy was willing to fight in the vertical, flying the plane to the point where it was buffeting, just above the stall.
Cassidy was able to get on the F-4's tail. After the flight, they realized the MiG 21 turned better than the F-4 at lower speeds. The key was for the F-4 to keep its speed up.
On the third day, Townsend and Cassidy met for a final dogfight. The fight started with the F-4 and MiG 21 coming toward each other. When Townsend spotted the MiG, he lowered the F-4's nose and pulled into a high-g turn, maintaining a speed of 450 knots. The MiG 21 could not follow and lost speed. Townsend then pulled the F-4 into the vertical. The MiG 21 lacked the energy to follow, and Cassidy dove away. Townsend rolled over the top and pulled behind the MiG 21. Nothing Cassidy did could shake the F-4. Finally, the dogfight was called off when the MiG 21 ran low on fuel.[641]
What had happened in the blue sky above Groom Lake was remarkable.
An F-4 had defeated the MiG 21; the weakness of the Soviet plane had been found. The means to reverse the 2 to 1 kill ratio was at hand. It was also clear that the MiG 21 was a formidable enemy. United States pilots would have to fly much better than they had been to beat it. This would require a special school to teach advanced air combat techniques.
And it would require more MiGs.
007 AND THE WAYWARD PILOTS
The Iraqi MiG 21 pilot saw the two Israeli Mirage III fighters closing in.
The MiG pilot reduced his speed, wiggled his wings, and lowered his landing gear. When one of the Israeli planes pulled alongside, the MiG pilot signaled he wanted to land. The Israeli pilot indicated the MiG was to follow him. It was August 16, 1966, and the first MiG 21F-13 fighter had reached Israeli hands.[642]
At a press conference that evening, the Iraqi pilot, Capt. Monir Radfa, explained that he had defected due to his revulsion against attacks on Kurds in northern Iraq. He was also a Roman Catholic, one of only five or six in the Iraqi air force, and he felt discriminated against in the predominately Moslem country. He had requested a transfer to MiG 21s and spent four months training in the Soviet Union. Once he decided to defect, he had sent his family out of Iraq. He also sent a letter to Israel announcing his intention to defect. Dated August 3, it said in part,
I am a MiG 21 pilot of the Iraqi air force and I have decided to come to your country. This decision I have arrived at after very hard thinking and for important reasons that I shall explain to you personally…
I plan to carry out this decision within three or four weeks from now. Please tell your pilots not to shoot me down because I come for peaceful feelings. I should come in high altitude between 0700 and 1100 hours G.M.T. flying east to west and over the Jordan River near the Dead Sea. With the help of God I hope to land at one of your bases.
It was signed, "Yours faithfully, a MiG 21 pilot."
Monir Radfa took off from Rashid Air Base outside Baghdad on a navigation flight, then headed for Israel. As he crossed Jordan, two Hawker Hunter jet fighters climbed toward his plane, but the MiG was flying too high and too fast for them to catch it. He landed at Hatzor Air Base, to the astonishment of the pilots and ground crews.[643]
In fact, the defection was not a spontaneous action. For three years, the Mossad had been attempting to acquire a MiG.[644] The actual planning had taken nearly six months. Reportedly, an Israeli air force pilot had even taken a check ride with him, to ensure he could fly and navigate well enough to make the flight.[645]
The MiG 21 was repainted with the Israeli Star of David insignia, yellow recognition stripes, and the number "007" (a subtle reflection of the secret means behind its acquisition). For the next several months, it was subjected to a series of flights to learn its strengths and weaknesses. These were made by Lt. Col. Dani Shapira, the Israeli air force's chief test pilot. He recalled later, "We found out, for example, that at high speed it had trouble maneuvering as well as the Mirage, which meant we had to try to get it into tight turns at high speeds." (This was the same conclusion drawn in the Have Doughnut tests the following year.) At low speeds, the MiG 21 would tend to spin out in tight, low-altitude turns.
The MiG 21 was then used to train Israeli Mirage pilots. Some 100 hours were spent flying in mock combat with Israeli Mirage III fighters. By the end of the year, every Mirage squadron had been familiarized with the MiG 21.[646]
It was unique information, but it does not appear it was shared. The newspaper Lamerhav said two days after the defection that "supreme political interests" and defense responsibilities required that Israel not give any information to other countries. "The Government would do well if it left no room even for unfounded suspicions," the paper said. The Ma'ariv newspaper said, "Israel should not allow foreign experts to examine the new Soviet plane. The pilot landed his plane in Israel and only Israel should be able to glean benefit from this important event." The reason given was the need to avoid worsening relations with the Soviet Union.[647]
The information gleaned from 007 proved valuable to the Israelis. On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive strike on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. By the end of the first day, the Arab air forces had been destroyed on the ground and Israel had complete air superiority. During the Six Day War, thirty-seven MiG 21s were shot down (out of seventy-two air-to-air kills). Two Israeli aircraft (out of forty-eight lost) were shot down in air-to air-combat — a 36 to 1 kill rate.[648]
It was during the Six Day War that, reportedly, a group of MiG 21s fell into Israeli hands. Six Algerian MiG 21 pilots flew into El Arish Air Base in the Sinai Desert. The Egyptian and Syrian governments had concealed the magnitude of their losses, so the Algerian pilots did not know El Arish had already been captured by the Israelis.[649]
This was not the only example of wayward pilots delivering MiGs to Israeli control. On August 12, 1968, two Syrian air force lieutenants, Walid Adham and Radfan Rifai, took off in a pair of MiG 17s on a training mission. They lost their way and, believing they were over Lebanon, landed at the Beset Landing Field in northern Israel. (One version has it that they were led astray by an Arabic-speaking Israeli.)
The first plane overran the end of the strip, plowed across a field, and stopped just short of a stand of cypress trees. The second MiG 17 circled again and made a successful landing. Neither plane was damaged, nor were the pilots injured. Yossi Yitzhak, who had witnessed the landings while working in a nearby hay field, told them they were in Israel. He was quoted later as saying, "They both went white with shock." Both pilots were taken away as POWs.[650]
The two MiG 17s were repainted with Israeli insignia and red recognition markings, then were test flown from Hatzor Air Base. As with 007, Dani Shapira flew the missions.[651]
The Israeli MiGs had, by this time, acquired an importance far beyond their intelligence value. In the wake of the Six Day War, France cut off military supplies to Isr
ael. Since the 1950s, France had provided most of Israel's aircraft (as well as secret support for its nuclear program). Israel turned to the United States, seeking A-4 attack aircraft and F-4E fighters.
The U.S. government was reluctant, but Israel could offer in exchange captured Soviet tanks, SA-2 SAMs, and the MiGs. A deal was struck, and 007 and the two MiG 17s were shipped to the United States in 1969.
The U.S. MiG operations were extremely secret — personnel connected with the project were told that if they leaked any information, they would "disappear." Therefore, the item in the "Industry Observer" column in the February 17, 1969, issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine came as a shock. It read:
Soviet MiG 21 fighter was secretly brought to the U.S. last spring and flight tested by USAF pilots to learn first-hand its capabilities and design characteristics. The aircraft, which engaged in simulated combat against U.S. fighters, was highly regarded by the pilots who flew it. The MiG 21 was particularly impressive at altitudes over 25,000 ft. The evaluation was part of a broad effort by USAF to detail the threat of Soviet air power in planning new aircraft, such as the F-15 fighter.[652]
Out at Groom Lake, the MiG program accelerated. Again, it was the U.S. Navy that took the lead.
HAVE DRILL
In April 1969, Jim Foster was named commander of VX-4. He had been an F-8 pilot during the early years of the Vietnam War and had seen the problems with the F-4. He quickly set about to "acquire" the new MiGs for the navy.
Soon after taking command, he selected Foster S. "Tooter" Teague to head the navy exploitation effort. Teague was a fighter pilot who had completed two combat tours in Vietnam. Teague did not know about the MiGs even after his arrival at VX-4. Initially, he was only told he was being sent
"into the desert" for two hundred days. After being told about the MiGs, Teague and his personnel quickly wrote up a test plan for the aircraft. The report was typed and bound in time for the first project meeting. (The air force personnel, in contrast, were only getting started.) The project was code-named "Have Drill."[653]
The Have Drill tests were conducted by a small group of air force and navy pilots under Teague and VX-4 test pilot Ronald "Mugs" McKeown. As with the earlier Black airplanes, the pilots' introduction to the MiGs was a strange and wonderful experience. Foster recalled being taken to the "hidden location" (i.e., Groom Lake) and entering a huge well-lighted hangar where the gleaming silver MiGs were kept. He was amazed by the "secret site." The MiGs' instruments were in Russian, so the pilots had to be briefed extensively. Their systems were very different than those on American aircraft. This made even such basics as taking off and landing a learning experience.
Taxiing was an "unnatural" experience for American pilots, as the MiGs used air brakes activated by a lever on the stick. (United States aircraft used toe brakes on the rudder pedals.) The American MiG pilot tended to wander around as he taxied out to the Groom Lake runway. An F-4 chase plane followed along behind, giving instructions. Before taking off, one of the officers would climb up on the MiG's wing and give the pilot final words of advice.
To lower the landing gear on an F-4, the pilot threw a switch. On the MiG 17, the pilot had to lift a toggle switch, turn on a pump, wait until the pressure built up, and then put the gear handle down. Once the gear was locked, the pilot turned off the pump and closed the toggle switch.
Flying the MiG 17 reminded Foster of the T-33 trainer in the way it handled. Teague called it the best turning aircraft he had ever flown. To demonstrate, Teague would let an F-4 get into firing position on the MiG 17's tail. Within seconds, the F-4 would be out in front and the MiG 17 in firing position. There was simply no way an F-4 could win a close-in turning fight with a MiG 17.
Very soon, the MiG 17's shortcomings became clear. It had an extremely simple, even crude, control system which lacked the power-boosted controls of American aircraft. Although tight turning at low speeds, the control system would lock up at high speeds. At 425 knots, the plane began to roll to the left as the wing began to warp. Above 450 knots, the plane was uncontrollable — it was actually possible to bend the stick without any control response at all.[654]
The solution became obvious — keep the F-4's speed above 500 knots and take advantage of the MiG 17's poor roll rate. One technique for an F-4 to evade a MiG 17 on its tail was to fake a roll one way, then make a hard turn the other direction. When the MiG tried to follow, the F-4's better roll rate and acceleration would open the distance between them, so the F-4 could turn around and reengage. Another maneuver was to make a turn at a right angle to the MiG's flight path, then accelerate away from the MiG.
These maneuvers also made use of the F-4's advantage in acceleration.
The F-4's twin engines were so powerful it could accelerate out of range of the MiG 17's guns in thirty seconds. It was important for the F-4 to keep its distance from the MiG 17. As long as the F-4 was one and a half miles from the MiG 17, it was outside the reach of the Soviet fighter's guns, but the MiG was within reach of the F-4's missiles.
To turn with the MiG 17, a technique called "lag pursuit" was developed.
The F-4 would follow behind and outside the MiG 17's flight path. Rather than trying to turn inside the MiG (which was impossible), the F-4 would stay to the outside. It would use its higher speed and turn rate to stay behind the MiG 17 and close to missile range.[655]
Tests of the MiG 21 indicated a different set of techniques was needed.
The MiG 21 was almost as fast as the F-4, so running was not an option.
The MiG 21's afterburner put out only a few hundred pounds of thrust.
Foster noted, "I hit the burner and I didn't feel any thrust." The delta-wing design of the MiG 21 also lost energy in turns faster than the F-4 did. The technique therefore was to force the MiG 21 to make vertical turns until its air speed fell below a critical value. With the MiG slowed down, the F-4 was in the superior position.
In a turning battle, as first discovered in the Have Doughnut tests, the F-4 had to keep its speed up, to insure the turn rate was even. The MiG 21 was also optimized for high altitudes — above 30,000 feet. At lower altitudes, the F-4's higher-thrust engines gave it an advantage.[656]
The data from the Have Doughnut and Have Drill tests were provided to the newly formed Top Gun school at NASA Miramar. The Top Gun instructors had been studying the Ault Report, accounts of dogfights, and intelligence reports on North Vietnamese tactics for six months. Now they were shown a film of the Have Doughnut tests; then they were given clearances to see and fly the MiGs.
The selected instructors would fly in pairs to Nellis Air Force Base to be briefed by Teague or his assistants. They would be told to fly to "a certain spot" and wait for the MiGs. The event was eagerly anticipated; the instructors had known for weeks they would be going up against the MiGs in simulated combat. One instructor later recalled his heart racing as the MiGs drew closer on radar. Finally, at about three and a half miles, they were spotted visually.
The first step was for the MiGs to pull alongside the F-4s so the instructors could get a good look at them. The MiGs were not much to look at; there were bumps and rivets that would never have been on an American plane.
The F-4 would then follow along behind as the MiG 17's good low-speed and poor high-speed maneuverability was demonstrated. The tendency of the MiG 21 to lose speed in turns was also shown. The flights were very helpful in a number of areas. Ironically, although the instructors were combat veterans, few had ever seen a MiG. A close-up view of the MiGs lessened the surprise. The radar intercept officers (RIOs — the rear seat crewmen who operated the F-4's radar) also got the chance to study the MiG's radar return. Finally, the instructors were able to actually try out the techniques they had been developing with the "real thing."
By 1970, the Have Drill program was expanded; a few selected fleet F-4 crews were given the chance to fight the MiGs. Eventually, for the vast majority who could not go to Top Gun or participate in Have Drill,
a thirty-minute film called Throw a Nickel on the Grass (the name of a fighter pilot's song) was produced. It was shown to every navy squadron. In the film, Teague noted, "The most important result of Project Have Drill is that no Navy pilot who flew in the project defeated the [MiG 17] Fresco in the first engagement."[657]
The Have Drill dogfights were by invitation only. The other pilots based at Nellis Air Force Base were not to know about the U.S.-operated MiGs.
To prevent any sightings, the airspace above the Groom Lake range was closed. On aeronautical maps, the exercise area was marked in red ink. The forbidden zone became known as "Red Square."[658]
Although much of the MiG operations were connected with such training, tests were also being conducted. Several MiG 17 flights were made to test fire the plane's twin 23mm and single 37mm cannons. (When the two MiG 17s landed in Israel, their cannons were fully loaded.) A special dogfight test was conducted with navy and air force F-4 crews. The navy RIOs were specially trained for their task; in contrast, the air force used pilots for the position. The tests showed that the navy's pilot-RIO team worked better than using two pilots. The navy crews were able to detect the target at longer ranges and go over to the offense faster. The air force crews scored fewer simulated kills. Soon after, the air force started specialized training.[659]
The MiGs were also used for familiarization flights by high-ranking naval officers. At the 1969 Tailhook Convention in Las Vegas, Foster convinced several admirals to go with him to Groom Lake to fly the MiGs.
Once special permission had been granted, Foster loaded them into a transport and flew them out to Groom Lake. The admirals were carefully briefed, then strapped into the MiGs. The Have Drill personnel were worried about the high-ranking pilots flying the irreplaceable MiGs. At one point, Teague, who was flying chase, thought that an admiral was flying a MiG 17 too hard. He radioed, "Goddamnit, Admiral, put it on the ground."[660]
Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 32