The quality of the U.S. MiG pilots was also high. During the spring of 1977, a MiG 21 reportedly suffered a landing gear problem. The air force pilot was able to keep the skid under control and fairly straight. This limited major damage to the landing gear and the engine. The MiG was restored to operational status within a few days. Such high-quality flying and maintenance were critical. The MiGs were irreplaceable assets.
As during the Have Drill period, control of the MiGs was a source of conflict. During 1977, the air force and CIA fought over the planes. It was reported that the air force was barely able to retain custody of the planes and responsibility for their operation. It may have been that the value of the MiGs for training and evaluation outweighed any use the CIA may have had for the planes. It is worth noting that the Have Blue project was nearing its first flight. The Have Blue was tested against Soviet radar; it would be probable that the MiGs would also be used.
In 1977 there was a second leak about the existence of the U.S.-operated MiGs. The September 1977 issue of Armed Forces Journal carried a two-page article titled, "Soviet Jets in USAF Use." It began, "The United States has been flying a squadron of stolen or captured Soviet-built fighters for years. Some of the planes are very recent models; others date back to the Korean War. By one informal estimate, close to 20 MiGs are now in USAF service. Another source says that the U.S. has managed to obtain more than 25 planes, but has been able to keep only about five in flying condition on a regular basis." The article reported that the MiGs were being flown from "at least one base" in the United States to perfect air-to-air tactics. (The name Groom Lake had not yet been published.)
The magazine said it had been about to publish the MiG article several months before but had held off because of an "informal" request by a "senior official." Armed Forces Journal subsequently learned that the existence of the MiGs, as well as some test data from joint air force-navy tests, had inadvertently been compromised to a potentially unfriendly nation.
The article noted that estimates varied on the total number of MiGs the United States had. One source said it was about twenty, while another said it was about half that, "say eight, ten, or maybe twelve." Still another source, who said he had checked with "someone who knows," said that twenty "is high by a factor of four or five" (i.e., there were only four or five MiGs). In retrospect, the lower end of the range was more accurate.
The article also estimated that about one hundred U.S. pilots had flown the MiGs, while three or four hundred pilots were given the opportunity to fly against them. The article noted that this included pilots from the navy and Marine Corps. Again, these numbers seem high. Assuming four to eight MiGs operational at a given time, six to ten pilots would be involved (one and a half pilots to one plane). The Have Drill flights were limited to Top Gun instructors, a few selected fleet pilots, and senior officers like Gen. Marion Carl. A more probable guess would be around seventy-five pilots involved with the MiG operations in one way or another by 1977.
On a more whimsical note, the article asked, "Does USAF's secret air force explain a lot of verified, but unexplained UFO (Unidentified Flying Object) sightings?"[682]
THE EGYPTIAN MiGS
As the 1970s neared their tumultuous end, U.S. MiG operations were undergoing another change. In the late 1960s, the MiG 17 and MiG 21F were still frontline aircraft. A decade later, they had been superseded by later-model MiG 21s and new aircraft, such as the MiG 23. Fortunately, a new source of supply was available — Egypt.
In the mid-1970s, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union had become strained, and Soviet advisers were ordered out. The Soviets had provided the Egyptian air force with MiGs since the mid-1950s. Now, with their traditional source out of the picture, the Egyptians began looking west.
They turned to U.S. companies for parts to support their late-model MiG 21s and MiG 23s. Very soon, a deal was made.
According to one account, two MiG 23 fighter bombers were given to the United States by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. The planes were disassembled and shipped from Egypt to Edwards Air Force Base. They were then transferred to Groom Lake for reassembly and study.[683]
The MiG 23 Flogger had a very different design philosophy than previous Soviet jet fighters. The MiG 17 and MiG 21 were small, short-range, tight-turning, point-defense fighters. The MiG 23 was more akin to multi-role Western fighters. For one thing, it used variable sweep wings. They could be pivoted forward for takeoff and landing, then swept back for high-speed flight. The aircraft was larger and heavier than earlier MiGs. It was also faster, had a longer range (some three times the MiG 17's range and half again that of the MiG 21), and a heavier weapons load (four air-to-air missiles versus two for the MiG 21). The MiG 23 could function both as a fighter and a bomber.[684]
Unlike earlier Soviet fighters, the MiG 23 had a high-wing loading and thus poor maneuverability. In fact, the F-4 was more maneuverable than the MiG 23. The U.S. fighter closest in performance was the F-104. (Both planes went like a bullet and turned like one.) Like the F-104, the MiG 23 was a demanding aircraft; it had a high accident rate in Soviet and Warsaw Pact service. On the plus side, the MiG 23 had a radar comparable to that in the F-4E. (Radars had been a weak spot in earlier MiGs.)[685]
According to some reports, the U.S. MiGs also received special designations. There was the practical problem of what to call the aircraft. This was solved by giving them numbers in the century series. The MiG 21s were called the "YF-110" (the original designation for the air force F-4C), while the MiG 23s were called the "YF-113."[686]
With the MiG 23s, operations expanded. Up to 1978, North Base at Edwards Air Force Base was largely inactive. The hangars were used for storage by NASA. Soon after, new security arrangements were put into place. It now appears they were in support of the MiG operations. It also appears that the MiG squadron was reorganized. The 4477th TES was replaced by the 413th Test Squadron (Special Operations) at some point in the late 1970s-early 1980s. The unit patch showed a Russian bear wearing a red hat, six red stars, and the slogans "Red Hats" and "More With Less."[687]
U.S. MiG 23 TRAINING
The would-be U.S. MiG 23 pilot underwent a three-phase training program. Phase I involved both ground training and six flights. Ground training covered review of the flight manual (general aircraft information, engine fuel system, electrical system, auxiliary equipment, operating limitations, flight characteristics, stall-spin characteristics, system operations, normal and emergency procedures, and performance data). The pilot then underwent ejection seat training, three hours of cockpit training, and briefings on the local area traffic patterns, restricted areas, and navigation aids. The U.S. MiG 23 pilot would then undergo written proficiency and emergency exams and an oral emergency exam.
In preparation for flying the MiG 23, the pilot would make a supervised engine start and then a high-speed taxi. The six flights were broken down into familiarization (TR-1, 2, and 3), MiG systems (TR-4, and 5), and a qualification check (TR-6).
Phase II was mission qualification training. The pilot would have to demonstrate his knowledge of flight test techniques and effective aircraft-systems handling. This demonstration could be made during or after the TR-6 flight.
Phase III was continuation training, in which the pilot was required to demonstrate mission qualification events, approach, and a normal landing.
This phase underlined the low flight rates of the U.S.-operated MiGs. Only one flight every forty-five days was required. Clearly, the MiG program was more akin to the flight rates of the X-planes, rather than the day-in, day-out operations of a regular fighter unit. If a pilot did not make the minimum of one flight in forty-five days, he would have to be recertified. Depending on the time elapsed, this would vary from reviewing the exams and procedures, then making a flight, up to undergoing nearly the complete training cycle, A U.S. MiG 23 pilot could also be upgraded to instructor following a single flight to demonstrate mission qualifications, instructional capability, and situational awarenes
s. All the pilots had to complete open- and closed-book exams and make an annual qualification check flight.[688]
LEAKS
Coinciding with the arrival of the Egyptian MiGs, there were several leaks about both the MiGs and Groom Lake. In September 1978, a man named John Lear took a panoramic photograph of the Groom Lake facility from public land at the north end of the lake bed. When enlarged, it showed a MiG 21 on the parking apron. It appears to be one of the later model MiG 21s, with a broader tail and larger dorsal hump than the MiG 21F. (The photo was not published until 1991.)[689]
The following year came the notorious Las Vegas Review-Journal article on Groom Lake activities. In addition to naming Groom Lake as the location of the test site and revealing the existence of the stealth test aircraft (while getting the details wrong), it also stated that "three unrelated sources" had said two MiG 23s had been provided by Egypt.[690] During the early 1980s, several different photos were published of U.S.-operated MiG 21Fs.[691]
At the same time, the U.S. MiG squadron grew considerably. According to one account, there were about twenty MiG 21s and four MiG 23s in service by the mid-1980s. They operated not only from Groom Lake and North Base at Edwards, but also from the Tonopah Test Range,[692] during this same time as the first F-117As were becoming operational at TTR. Over all, U.S.
Black airplane activities in the early 1980s rivaled those of the 1960s. Not only the MiGs, but also the F-117A, HALSOL, and possibly another Black airplane were undergoing flight tests. The MiGs operated by the United States during this time were "new" aircraft. The original group of MiGs had been retired. The two MiG 17s and 007 had been returned to Israel in the mid-1970s. One of the MiG 17s and 007 were placed on display at the Israeli Air Force Museum. The other U.S.-operated MiG 21s were apparently retired, stored, stripped of useful parts, or scrapped. One of the MiG 21s was later used by the navy as an RCS test article.[693]
Despite the leaks, only minimal attention had been drawn to U.S. MiG operations. Then, in the spring of 1984, a crash would make it front-page news.
THE DEATH OF GENERAL BOND
At 10:18 A.M. on April 26, 1984, a plane crashed on the Nellis Air Force Base range. Witnesses at a cafe in nearby Lathrop Wells reported hearing an explosion and seeing smoke in the area of Little Skull Mountain.[694] A few hours later, the Air Force Systems Command at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, D.C., issued a brief statement: "Lt. Gen. Robert M. Bond, vice commander, Air Force Systems Command, was killed today in an accident while flying in an Air Force specially modified test aircraft."[695]
General Bond was a thirty-three-year veteran of the air force, had flown in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and had more than five thousand hours of flight time. He was alone in the aircraft when it crashed.
Three-star generals do not generally fly test missions, so Bond's death attracted press interest. The fact that the air force also refused to identify the type of plane also raised questions. Early reports claimed he had been flying "a super-secret Stealth fighter prototype."
Within a week, stories were published that it actually was a MiG 23. It was said that the MiG 23 was used to test the Stealth fighter in simulated combat and that Bond might have been involved in such tests at the time of the crash.[696] Still later, it would be claimed that the crash was caused by a loss of control at high speed.[697]
The flight was the second of two orientation flights for General Bond.
The mission was planned to include a high-speed run, followed by a systems-radar familiarization. Bond's aircraft was accompanied by a T-38 trainer as chase plane. Engine start, taxi, and takeoff were normal. The two planes climbed to 40,000 feet while ground control reported they had about fifteen minutes of airspace time. Ground control gave them the distance to the turn point. Reaching it, they turned right. The T-38 pilot told Bond to check his fuel and calibration. They had descended slightly to about 37,000 feet, and Bond climbed back to 40,000 feet.
Bond increased the throttle and began the speed run. Bond then reported to ground control that he had reached the planned speed without problems.
The much slower T-38 was now some distance behind. Ground control radioed Bond that he was four miles from the next turn. At 10:17:50 A.M. Bond asked, "How far to the turn?" Ground control responded at 10:17:53 A.M. with "Turn now, right 020." Bond responded with two clicks of the radio.
At 10:18:02 A.M. Bond radioed, "I'm out of control. I'm out o f…"
Ground control informed the T-38 pilot that Bond was twenty-two miles away. At 10:18:23 A.M. Bond radioed, "I've got to get out, I'm out of control." Ground control warned the T-38 pilot that Bond's plane was nearly at the edge of the airspace. Soon after, radar contact was lost.
Bond had ejected, but he was killed.
An investigation was started, even as speculation about the accident grew. The plane had hit the ground in a high-speed, 60-degree dive and was destroyed. Three major sections were examined — the tail, the engine compressor and turbine blades, and the engine inlet. Examination of the debris showed that all the damage was due to ground impact. The engine was running normally, at a throttle setting of about 80 to 90 percent. There was no evidence of fire, an "overtemp," heat distress, or an engine stall. Checks of the fuel, hydraulic fluid, and lube oil showed no contamination or abnormal wear. The accident report concluded that the plane had crashed due to loss of control during high-altitude, supersonic flight.[698]
Although U.S. MiG operations continued after the death of Bond, its days were numbered. The TTR operations were closed down in the mid-1980s, apparently due to the growth of F-117A activities. It was reported that in late 1988 or early 1989, the MiGs were grounded. This was caused by the problem of getting spare parts. Most of the planes were placed in storage at North Base at Edwards Air Force Base. Others were described as being on display at Groom Lake.[699] It seemed that MiG operations had ended.
So it seemed.
A MiG OF ONE'S OWN
Ironically, as the U.S. MiG operations were ended, MiG 15s and MiG 17s began arriving on the civilian market. Communist China and the Eastern European countries began selling the old MiGs to anyone with hard currency. By the early 1990s, supersonic MiG 19s and MiG 21s were for sale. A MiG 15 could be bought for $175,000 (a fraction the cost of a flyable P-51 Mustang) and operated for about $10,000 per year. This made it practical to fly the planes for air shows and movie work.[700] For anyone who grew up during the Cold War, it was a strange and delightful experience to see a former Communist-bloc MiG sitting on the ramp of a U.S. airport. As one aviation magazine put it, "Watching an American citizen strap into a MiG 15 is a lot like watching Captain Kirk flying a Klingon battle cruiser."[701]
Among those who took advantage of the privately owned MiGs was the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School. In 1992, students at the school were given the opportunity to fly in a MiG 21U Mongol (the two-seat trainer). One student found it responsive, given its age. He judged the engine very good. The flights were short, on the order of twenty minutes in length (understandable, given it was designed as a "manned SAM" for point defense of targets).[702]
Two years later, a MiG 15UTI Midget trainer was used at the school for student flights.[703]
There was also an attempt to organize a White version of the MiG operations. In 1988, Combat Core Certification Professionals imported from Poland four MiG 15s, a MiG 15UTI, and six MiG 17s for the Defense Test and Support Evaluation Agency (DTESA). They were intended to be used in air-combat training for both U.S. and Allied forces. One such exercise was reportedly held at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, in September 1988. The program ran into a legal problem, however — the MiGs had been acquired through "sole source procurement." This was a violation of Department of Defense policy. As rules were judged more important than results, the MiGs were put into storage at Kirtland until the legal problems could be sorted out. Soon after, the U.S. MiG program ended. [704]
FADE TO BLACK
The most significant information to
be revealed about U.S. MiG operations was published in the 1990 book Scream of Eagles. Although prima-rily concerned with U.S. Navy air combat over North Vietnam and the founding of the Top Gun School, it did include material on the MiGs. It revealed the acquisition of the MiG 21 in 1967, the Have Doughnut tests, the Have Drill activities, and the film "Throw a Nickel on the Grass." The account was based on interviews with the navy pilots who had taken part in the tests.[705]
The following year, a few of the MiG 21s came out of storage. The unveiling was as clandestine as the planes' original acquisition. In March 1991, the Strategic Air Museum at Offutt Air Force Base received a call from the Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. They were told that a new airplane would be arriving soon. The caller did not identify the type of plane nor any details. The next morning, when the SAC Museum employees arrived at work, they discovered four large crates had been dropped off by their back fence. It literally had been done in the middle of the night. When they opened the crates, they found a MiG 21F.
When it was put on display a year later, questions arose about its source.
A civilian employee of air force intelligence said that the U.S. government had agreed never to divulge the source of such planes, even years after the deal was made. The director of the museum, Jim Bert said, "Officially, the Air Force neither confirms nor denies the existence of that aircraft."[706]
Another MiG 21F was given to the National Air and Space Museum. It was explained that it had been used in a classified display of Soviet weapons, and that, with the end of the Cold War, the display was dismantled.[707]
Still another MiG 21F was put on display at the USAF Armament Museum at Eglin Air Force Base. A close examination showed the plane had Chinese characters inside some of the access panels. It is actually a J-7, a Chinese-built version of the MiG 21F.[708] The final example was a MiG 21U trainer on display at Wright-Patterson. It had been used to train intelligence officers in determining the capabilities, performance, and technology of enemy aircraft.[709] The DTESA MiG 15s and MiG 17s were also loaned to museums in 1992. The Pima Air Museum received a MiG 15, MiG 15UTI, and a MiG 17. None of the later-model MiG 21s (understood to be in storage at North Base) nor any MiG 23s were released.[710]
Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 34