One of the biggest leaps of faith requirements for a UCAV is not technological but conceptual. There is a tendency to think of a UCAV as an unmanned F-16 or B-2. It is not. A UCAV is a unique concept, with its own specific, abilities. Some designs can fly at high altitudes and remain on station for a day or more over enemy territory, all without being detected by an enemy's air defenses. Any military role for a UCAV should capitalize on such capabilities, rather than trying to simply duplicate what manned aircraft can already do.
One operating concept for a UCAV could be "air occupation." A high-altitude, long-endurance stealthy UCAV could be fitted with long-range air-to-air missiles.
It would then patrol an area that would allow its missiles to cover a number of enemy airfields. A single UCAV could "occupy" an area of several thousand square miles. Any enemy aircraft attempting to take off within this occupied zone could be destroyed by the UCAV's missiles as soon as the planes left the ground. Other possible air occupation missions include suppression of air defenses, destruction of ballistic missiles as they are launched, attacks on ground forces, and sea control. An enemy would have no way of knowing if it is in the area until the missiles struck. This would put an enemy on the psychological defensive, making him unwilling to expose his forces to destruction. At the same time, manned aircraft would be undertaking those missions for which they were best suited. Rather than being tied down in endless patrol missions.
The question becomes, however, if the perceived need for air occupation-type missions justifies the money, time, and effort required to develop a UCAV able to meet it. Beyond this, there is the question of whether the existing technology is capable of meeting the mission requirements. The UCAV might require on-board detection and tracking equipment. It might also use off-board sensors from a robot AWACS, as well as have the ability to receive data from ground-, air-, and space-based systems.
A more basic question affecting the future applications of stealth, whether it be manned aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, or UCAVs, is what kind of future wars do you plan for? Will they be like Desert Storm? Desert Fox? Vietnam? the Malaysian insurgency? peace keeping operations? retaliatory strikes? or, as is more likely, something totally unexpected? Certainly the air defense threat environment has changed radically. During the Cold War, the threat was from Soviet-designed missiles and radar. Today, U.S. and Allied forces must potentially face equipment from the old Soviet Union, from Russian and Western and Eastern Europe, from indigenous designs, and even American missiles and radars.
Desert Storm brought a realization of the threat from the spread of ballistic missiles, and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. What were once strategic weapons restricted to the U.S. and Soviet Union are now found in Third World countries. The strong men who rule these countries seem to lack any restraints on using them. During the Gulf War, Saddam fired Scud missiles at Israel with the goal of provoking retaliation from a country which has long been reported to have nuclear weapons. Such behavior is outside classic deterrent theories.
The final problem is the long-term survivability of stealth itself. Various systems, such as bistatic radar or use of ultra-wide band frequencies, have been proposed as counterstealth measures. Each has technical and operational shortcomings.[857] As noted earlier, however, computer technology has advanced at a fantastic rate. Might at some future time, super computer technology be developed to coordinate the widely-spread units, and be able to sort out the very weak and sporadic echoes from a stealth aircraft? In such a case, we would have to revert back to classic countermeasures techniques. It would be ironic if, after all the changes of the past 50 years, simple chaff would be the one constant. Stealth would then both make it more difficult to detect a plane, and easier for an active ECM system to shield it. Also, while an early warning radar with a huge antenna and massive computing capability might detect and track a stealth aircraft, the same might not be true for a missile with an antenna a few inches across.
The advances in computers can equally aid the stealth aircraft. One can speculate that super computers could also make possible "smart" stealth and countermeasures. It might even be possible to succeed where Project Kempster failed, in which case, some future aircraft commander might actually say "Engage the cloaking device."
With the impending arrival of the 21st Century, all of us are setting sail on an unknown sea. We do not know where that voyage will take us, but the stealth experience does offer a guidepost. Stealth was created by a few men with vision, who saw both the need and the possibilities. Their ideas were translated into reality by the support of others with the courage to try. An idea is a fragile thing; it can be crushed by ridicule or extinguished by something as simple as neglect. But it is ideas, in every field of human endeavor, which lead us toward the invisible horizons.
Примечания
1
Daniel Ford, "Gentlemen, I Give You the Whittle Engine," Air & Space (October/November 1992): 88–98.
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2
Dr. Jim Young, "Lighting The Flame: The Turbojet Conies To America," Society of Experimental Test Pilots 1992 Report to the Aerospace Profession, 247, 248.
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3
Don Middleton, Test Pilots: The Story of British Test Flying 1903–1984 (London: Willow Books, 1985), 125, 126.
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4
Ford, "Whittle Engine," 88–94.
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5
David M. Carpenter, Flame Powered: The Bell XP-59A Airacomet and the General Electric I-A Engine (Jet Pioneers of America, 1992), 8-13.
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6
Ford, "Whittle Engine," 95–97.
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7
Carpenter, Flame Powered, 14, 15, 19.
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8
Ibid, 19–22.
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9
Ford, "Whittle Engine," 97. It was General Electric's earlier work with superchargers that caused the British to recommend they produce the Whittle engine.
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10
Carpenter, Flame Powered, 16, 17, 27.
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11
Young, "Turbojet," 254. At the time of the XP-59A test flights, North Base was known as the Materiel Command Flight Test Base or Muroc II.
Similarly, press accounts of the mid-1960s often refer to the "Skonk Works." Rachel, Nevada, was known until the 1980s as "Sand Springs." (It was renamed in memory of the first child born in the town, Rachel Jones.) To avoid confusion, the later names of North Base, the Skonk Works, and Rachel will be used throughout.
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12
Carpenter, Flame Powered, 27–31, 33–35.
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13
Ford, "Whittle Engine," 88–90.
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14
Young, "Turbojet," 254.
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15
A. M. "Tex" Johnston and Charles Barton, Tex Johnston, Jet-Age Test Pilot (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 59.
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16
Young, "Turbojet," 254. The open cockpit did reduce the maximum speed and altitude the first XP-59A could reach. (The observer had only a plastic windshield for protection from the slipstream.) Later, Brown Recorders were installed and an instrument panel was fitted into the aft fuselage. This panel was photographed in flight to provide a continuous record.
The XP-59A did much to usher in the modern era of flight test instrumentation. Today, hundreds of separate readings are transmitted to the ground in real time. When the first XP-59Awas given to the Smithsonian, the observer's cockpit was removed and the aircraft was restored to its October 1–2, 1942, appearance.
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17
Carpenter, Flame Powered, 40, 41. It is often thought the fake prop was used as cover throughout the XP-59A program. It appears, from photographic evidence, that it was used
only during the move and while at Harpers Lake. The photos of the plane with the fake prop have become a symbol of the secrecy that enveloped the project.
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18
Young, "Turbojet," 256.
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19
Carpenter, Flame Powered, 27, 40–48, 51, 55, 56.
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20
Young, "Turbojet," 259. An aspect of jet flight that prop pilots had to get used to was the slow throttle response of jet engines. It took much longer for the turbine to spin up compared to a piston engine. On the positive side, the jet pilot did not have to deal with prop pitch, mixture, mani-fold pressure, and the roar and vibration of a propeller airplane.
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21
Richard P. Hallion, Test Pilots: The Frontiersmen of Flight (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981), 172, 173.
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22
Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson with Maggie Smith, Kelly: More Than My Share of It All (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 96–98.
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23
Curtis Peebles, Guardians (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987), chap. 1.
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24
Paul F. Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird (Osceola, Wis.: Motorbooks, 1986), 9.
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25
Curtis Peebles, The Moby Dick Project (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 99, 100, 119, 120.
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26
Paul Lashmar, "Skulduggery at Scuhhorpe," Aeroplane Monthly, (October 1994): 10–15.
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27
Robert Jackson, Canberra: The Operational Record (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 60. These early overflights took advantage of the commitment of the Soviet air force to the Korean War. The first Soviet MiG 15s saw action in November 1950. Between then and the spring of 1953, when the Soviet "Honchos" were withdrawn, a full twelve air divisions had seen action. The result was to strip the western Soviet Union of air defenses. The story is told of an RB-45C that overflew Moscow.
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28
Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, ed., Strategic Air Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 95, 96. The mission was as much a show of force as it was for reconnaissance. Strategic Air Command chief Gen. Curtis E. LeMay later said that the loss rate of SAC bombers, had there been a war with the Soviet Union during the 1950s, would have been no higher than that of the peacetime accident rate.
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29
Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax, 1983), 10–12.
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30
Jay Miller, The X-Planes: X-l toX-31 (New York: Orion, 1988), 131-33.
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31
Miller, Lockheed U-2, 12, 15–18.
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32
Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Special Aircraft for Penetration Photo Reconnaissance, (Washington, D.C.: May 12, 1954).
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33
Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), 8.
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34
Edwin H. Land, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, B.C.: November 5, 1954).
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35
A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.: November 24, 1954).
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36
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 17, 22, 185.
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37
Pocock, Dragon Lady, 10–14.
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38
Miller, Lockheed U-2, 19, 20.
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39
U.S. Air Force Oral History Interviews, Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, March 19–24, 1974, vol. 1, 142-44 (Edwards AFB History Office, Ritland Files).
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40
Brackley Shaw, "Origins of the U-2: Interview with Richard M. Bissell Jr.," Air Power History (Winter 1989): 18.
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41
Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson and Maggie Smith, Kelly: More Than My Share of It All (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 122, 123.
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42
Pocock, Dragon Lady, 14.
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43
Miller, Lockheed U-2, 20.
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44
Johnson and Smith, Kelly, 123-25.
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45
Skip Holm, "Article Airborne," Air Progress Aviation Review (1986): 25–29. Different sources give contradictory dates for the U-2's first flight.
This article is composed of the transcripts of the radio communications, notes, and LeVier's postflight reports.
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46
Pocock, Dragon Lady, 15.
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47
Miller, Lockheed U-2, 22, 23.
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48
Pocock, Dragon Lady, 19, 20; and Kenneth W. Weir, "The U-2 Story," Society of Experimental Test Pilots 1978 Report to the Aerospace Profession, 186. Officially U-2 stood for "Utility," a cover for its reconnaissance role (much as the "X" was a cover for the X-16).
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49
Shaw, "Interview with Bissell," 18.
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50
Pocock, Dragon Lady, 16, 17, 20–23. The X-16 cancellation was also a case of history repeating itself — although Bell had invented the Black airplane with the XP-59A, it was Lockheed's P-80 that won the production
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51
Pocock, Dragon Lady, 22. Comparing the X-16 and the U-2 indicates just how farsighted Johnson was. The X-16 represented aeronautical conventional thinking, a conventional aircraft that attempted to perform an extraordinary mission. Johnson realized it would take an extraordinary aircraft. In contrast to the large X-16, Johnson used as his model the aerodynamic efficiency of a glider. One example of this was the two engines of the X-16.
Conventional wisdom held this made the aircraft more reliable. However, if an engine was lost, altitude could not be maintained. In reality, two engines meant more weight and complexity. None of the U-2s lost over "denied areas" — the USSR, China, or Cuba — was due to flameouts.
Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 42