Ironically, when long-delayed security upgrades resulted in a building boom of dozens of new embassy compounds situated far from urban areas, diplomats fruitlessly complained that they were now working in fortresses that kept them away from terrorists and contacts alike. Some saw the new fortress mentality as a challenge—just another security hurdle to be overcome in a world full of locked safes and doors. Then, fourteen years after Bushnell’s Nairobi experience, Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues were killed in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11–12, 2012.
Stevens, part of a new generation of diplomats, was a prime exemplar of the “transformational diplomacy” both Secretaries Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton advocated. He had lived and worked in the region for years, spoke fluent Arabic, and performed the job he’d been asked to do—reaching out to segments of Libyan society during a troubled transition after the overthrow of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. The question of how much the State Department knew about the deteriorating Libyan security situation would derail Susan Rice’s ambition to follow Hillary Clinton as secretary of state and colored Clinton’s last appearance before the Senate as she ended her tenure. The Benghazi tragedy illustrates the tension between the security demands for safety and diplomats’ need to get out of fortresslike embassies and meet with local people.
The U.S. Congress has an abiding interest in American diplomacy, and its engagement with diplomats encompasses Senate confirmation hearings for ambassadorial nominees and senior State Department officials; embassy efforts to broker meaningful in-country visits for congressional delegations; and Congress’s interest in diplomatic reporting. Many of the 133,887 unclassified cables in WikiLeaks demonstrate the enormous growth of congressionally mandated cables. This category includes reports written to a one-size-fits-all template. Some examples include the annual Human Rights Report, the Trafficking in Persons Report, the International Religious Freedom Report, and the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Others are specific to certain groups of countries, such as the Special 301 Report, which rates countries’ compliance with intellectual property rights, and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR.
The main categories of secret, confidential, and unclassified are just the beginning. Official-informal cables are often written in the first person by ambassadors, such as Christopher Dell’s now well-publicized assessment of Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe. Scene setters are required in advance of visiting American policymakers, ranging from congressional delegations and administration officials up to and including cabinet officers and the president; such visits are always followed by a cable describing the visit, cleared when possible by the delegation head. Embassies also craft and update biographic profiles of heads of state, cabinet ministers, and parliamentarians, along with high-profile leaders from civil society, with the idea that any abrupt change of government should not leave Washington starting from scratch.
Foreign service officers also file spot reports, meant to be quick updates on unexpected developments, and election reports before, during, and after foreign voters go to the polls. Many embassies also submit daily media reaction, in which staffers translate excerpts from editorials and op-eds that cover themes Washington has flagged in a weekly watch list. During a crisis, embassy officers file situation reports, or sitreps, meant to provide the State Department’s operations center with daily—or even hourly—updates. In the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake of January 12, 2010, there were dozens of sitreps from the embassy in Port-au-Prince. (More were likely sent after February 28, beyond the end date of the WikiLeaks release.)
Sometimes the demand for embassy reporting becomes insatiable. The State Department inspector general’s May 2012 report on Embassy Islamabad came down hard on Washington’s “intense and at times intrusive involvement and voracious appetite for information on Pakistan . . . consuming extraordinary amounts of the mission’s time and energy and adding significantly to the stresses at the already stressed post.” 11
But when all of the above is accomplished, diplomats carve out time to record their own impressions, unbidden by Washington. These cables, akin to feature stories in journalism, are slices of life, things that catch the eye or ear of a curious diplomat. They round out the routine reporting and are among the best of the WikiLeaks release. Some of the more widely publicized cables chronicled weddings in Dagestan and conversations in cafes or corridors of power. Reading them offers insight into why people would do this work, despite the hardships of unaccompanied tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. They want to experience something no Washington cubicle can offer. The cables illustrate too that the real meaning of living in Laos won’t be found sitting behind the embassy walls of Vientiane.
Of course, cables are not the only way, nor always the best way, to communicate. Diplomats also use phones, and the frequency of visitors from Washington, as well as chances to return to headquarters for consultations, offer ample opportunities for face-to-face conversations, none of which are part of WikiLeaks. The leaked cables have their limitations. The format and intended audience predispose writers to portray countries through a solidly American lens—not always the best way to uncover more subtle distinctions. Officers are trained from the outset to link their cables to Washington interests and to anticipate and answer the “so what?” question.
Globalization has made countries more similar—especially in capital cities. Foreign ministries tend to organize themselves and operate in recognizable ways. Outside their doors, brand-name clothing stores, fast food outlets, and international manufacturers are familiar. Often, it is only when diplomats leave the embassy behind and travel beyond the capitals and government districts that countries appear different. Sometimes writers let go of the American lens and describe a country, its people, or an event in its own right. Unsurprisingly, these are often the most interesting cables.
SECRECY VERSUS DIPLOMACY
WikiLeaks claimed the cable dump was “the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain,” a claim that needs examining. It makes the feat sound more sensational than it actually was. Only about 6 percent of the cables—some 15,652—are classified as secret. Those marked confidential number 101,748. That means that a little more than half, or 133,887, are unclassified. The reason for this is obvious. Much of diplomatic work is routine, and diplomats frequently write with a wide audience in mind.
Much of the initial reporting about WikiLeaks focused on the sheer volume of the release. But volume does not equate to insight or revelation. Size is also relative. In the period from 2006 to 2010, the U.S. government disseminated 2.4 million cables, ten times as many, through other systems.12 Seen that way, the total amount of classified data held by the U.S. government makes the WikiLeaks release look almost small.
News articles about WikiLeaks didn’t mention that the officer writing the cable decides its level of classification—and gives a date upon which the cable may be declassified. What makes a cable deserving of classified status? The need to protect sources, along with the need to protect the U.S. government. Officers are told to ask themselves how damaging the information would be to national security were it to be disclosed. The government requires that the classification “secret” be applied to information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security. “Confidential” should be applied to information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.
This very imprecise, almost theological distinction assumes all officers define national security the same way. It also assumes an officer sitting in a remote posting would be able to know precisely how much damage disclosure of the information would cause. Sometimes the classification is obvious; other times it is arguable. Officers tend to overclassify on the theory that a secret cable will get more attention in Washington than a confidential one, and a cable marked unclassified must not say anythi
ng of importance. Former secretary of state George Shultz makes the point, “The higher the classified level of secrecy, the quicker you will report it.” Thus relative importance tends to creep upward as officers consider how to classify their writing. And although the WikiLeaks release was an embarrassment to the U.S. government, potential embarrassment is not a classification factor.
The WikiLeaks organization made its selection of cables sound calculated and intentional. In fact, the feat was the electronic equivalent of sticking your hand into a bag of candy and scooping up as much as possible. In this case, the grab covered the period from December 28, 1966, through February 28, 2010, although the bulk of the cables are from January 2006 through February 2010. They originated from 275 American embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions.
WikiLeaks director Julian Assange told the media that the cables showed “the extent of U.S. spying on its allies and the UN; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuses in ‘client states’; backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for U.S. corporations; and the measures U.S. diplomats take to advance those who have access to them.”13
That is one interpretation, and some of the cables published in the New York Times, the Guardian, and elsewhere lend that view some credence. But lost in all the controversy is the understanding that the leaked cables are only half of the equation—they reflect the view from the field, not the home office. Assange was shooting the messenger, who, the cables show, was making the best of instructions that were not always feasible.
Assange also castigated diplomats for lobbying for corporations. Indeed, that is a straightforward part of their mission, and one that Congress and the corporate world emphatically expect. Seeking a level playing field when U.S. corporations are bidding on lucrative tenders is a time-honored part of diplomatic work. And in a world where bribery, corruption, and lack of transparency are too frequently the norm, it is a necessary part of the job.
WikiLeaks misunderstands the purpose of diplomacy by confusing it with secrecy. Assange’s overriding contempt for the American government blinded him to some subtle aspects of the practice of modern diplomacy. He was sure the cables showed “duplicity and mendacity in action.” Journalists were largely unpersuaded, with Fareed Zakaria noting, “There is little deception.” A more considered explanation is that the cables show the analytical value added of officers in the field and demonstrate the reason all countries have embassies. If Washington needed only facts, policymakers could read the New York Times and watch CNN. Diplomats are trained to provide far more. Like reporters, they rely heavily on sources, and for the same reasons they would not survive if they were, as Assange believed, duplicitous and mendacious.
Ambassadors enjoy enviable access and go where reporters often cannot. They are invited to the inner sanctums of presidents, ministers, and parliamentarians. Working-level diplomats seek out thinkers behind ideas and causes that may or may not coincide with U.S. interests. Where it exists, they engage with civil society. With resources unmatched by any but the wealthiest of NGOs, they go everywhere. Diplomats stay in one country for only two or three years, but over the course of a career they learn to find the right people, ask the right questions, and make the most of their limited time. Timothy Garton Ash noted the similarities between diplomats and foreign correspondents, but he also drew a distinction. “There is a particular quality to what a head of state or government—the king of Saudi Arabia or the French president—says to the ambassador of a superpower—which, of course, gives it a different quality. It’s not just like talking to the New York Times.” 14
Diplomats also deliver messages, but doing that well is a two-way street. They are not only adept at writing to Washington but invaluable at helping foreign leaders decode messages from Washington. While onetime presidential candidate Ross Perot famously said that diplomats could be replaced by fax machines, he ignored the real art in delivering a message that offers an opportunity for a conversation. Diplomats listen for the reaction. In many cultures a diplomat has to know when yes means no, or maybe, or we’ll see. The most skillful diplomats not only deliver messages but explore them with the recipients, test out scenarios, suggest ways of using the information, and discuss the implications of the message. This is hard work. Assange’s rant falls far from the reality.
THE DIPLOMATIC FALLOUT
In Buenos Aires, the chargé told his colleagues, “We have two bad choices: try to run and hide or go out and take a beating.” He chose to engage the press and defend diplomacy—with a dose of humility.15
Half a world away, the political officer’s cell phone rang out in the cubby, and the call rolled over to her desk phone. An old source, sounding more bemused than worried, wanted to know if he would be featured on WikiLeaks.
Throughout the week of November 29, 2010, American diplomats around the world were receiving similar phone calls and queries. At best, their contacts were unsettled. At worst they felt betrayed.
Obama administration officials were quick to deplore the leaks but almost equally quick to minimize them. Members of Congress were also out of sync. Some took a hard line, such as Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, who called Assange a “high-tech terrorist,” and Senator Lindsey Graham, who said “People who do this are low on the food chain, as far as I’m concerned.” On the other side of the question, if not the aisle, former Representative Ron Paul said the leaks had caused “no harm to any individual,” and that “the hysterical reaction makes one wonder if this is not an example of killing the messenger.”
Former Arkansas governor and presidential candidate Mike Huckabee said, “Anything less than execution is too kind a penalty” for the source of the leaks. Former senator Joe Lieberman offered an assessment worthy of a middle school principal with the underwhelming suggestion that the New York Times was guilty of “bad citizenship.”
Every aspect of the circumstances surrounding the leak was contentious. Some Washington columnists pointed to the more gossipy bits of the cables as proof that the reporting should not be taken seriously; others used examples from the same cables to argue that it should be. One victim of the difficulty in striking the right tone was State Department spokesperson P. J. Crowley, who was forced to resign on March 13, 2011, after describing the conditions under which Private Chelsea Manning was being held as “ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid.”
The diplomats in the field kept their own counsel, having been stunned twice. It was bad enough to deal with the publication of writings about sources they still saw on a daily basis, but now they were thrown off balance by the whipsaw PR offensive in Washington. While most of those currently serving refrained from speaking, they counted on their retired colleagues to defend and explain their work. The retirees took a predictable line.
Former ambassador Ronald Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy, told NPR, “I’m amused by the fact that people are finding it surprising that cables are frank. . . . They think because we’re not always frank in public that we can’t be frank with each other.” Speaking on the same program, former ambassador Christopher Hill, now dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, said WikiLeaks would have a chilling effect. “It’s hard to have a senior official of a foreign government say things in front of a note taker just to begin with, and now to worry that those notes will be not only turned into a cable but that the cable will be turned into a newspaper article is worrisome.” 16
Former ambassador to NATO and Greece and current Harvard Kennedy School professor Nicholas Burns said the damage was enormous. “I think the leaking of these cables has been a travesty,” Burns said. “He [Assange] has done great harm to our diplomacy, because it strikes at the heart of what diplomacy is: The building of trust between people and between governments. The leaks violate that trust and are going to make some people, not everyone or every government, but some people, much more reluctant to discuss their affairs with American diplomats.�
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Stephen Hadley, former national security advisor, said on the PBS NewsHour that in the short run, “It’s going to have some very deleterious effects . . . if we cannot keep the secrets and the confidences of other governments, they will be reluctant to share their innermost thoughts with us. It also is corrupting because our people in diplomatic posts overseas want to be able to give their candid assessments about people with whom they’re dealing . . . It’s important to inform the president, secretary of state. They will now be reluctant to be as candid in the reporting cables.” 18
Speaking on the same news show, former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, also inclined to the long view, breezily described the leaks with a phrase he said dated back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire: “It’s catastrophic, but not serious.” Brzezinski also deprecated the impact of leaked biographic reporting: “Who cares if Berlusconi is described as a clown? Most Italians agree with that. Who cares if Putin is described as an alpha dog? He probably is flattered by it.”
Secrecy is a troubling concept for the American body politic. John Campbell, writing in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Expert Roundup, noted that WikiLeaks offends a fundamental American assumption about openness.19 Taking that argument further, the idea of secret cables contradicts the Wilsonian view of diplomacy that has worked its way into the American consciousness as evinced in the first of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” Such ringing words sound great but reveal a naiveté about how modern diplomacy works.
To the Secretary Page 3