Public diplomacy practitioners were quick to point out that post-9/11 studies on public diplomacy were “overwhelmingly interested in what could be done in Washington; very few addressed what happens overseas. The views of the people responsible for implementing public diplomacy overseas were largely absent.” 33 Former ambassador William Rugh wrote that most commission members “had not been career officers with field experience; instead they have been Washington-based policymakers or short-term political appointees.” 34
The many commissions seemed to skate over empirical data from public opinion research, echoed by a few experienced voices that put forward a similar message: the problem lay in U.S. policies, not the messaging programs. Rugh, a public diplomacy officer who served most of his career in the Arab world, wrote that “despite 60 years of U.S. public diplomacy programs trying to reach Arab public opinion, Arab criticism of the United States reached unprecedented levels largely because of disagreement with U.S. policies themselves.” 35
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) took a pragmatic approach, looking into staffing since the 2002 implementation of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which was meant to remedy years of budget cuts that had left the State Department without the personnel to fill overseas positions. The study found that the DRI, which enabled the State Department to hire one thousand additional employees, had been consumed by the insatiable need for staffing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Public diplomacy positions suffered some of the most severe staffing gaps.36 Several embassy cables support this analysis. Even Embassy Riyadh, surely a crucial post-9/11 operation, wrote, “Our greatest need in Saudi Arabia is for qualified officers and staff to carry out this PD strategy. For most of the past two difficult but critically important years, we have been operating at half strength in terms of American officers, yet we have seen more than one promised public diplomacy hand diverted to other posts. We need to assign language-qualified, at-grade, PD-cone officers to the existing public diplomacy positions at Embassy Riyadh and the two Consulates General in Dhahran and Jeddah. In addition, in order to implement this strategy successfully, we need four new public diplomacy officer positions.” 37
The GAO also focused on the foreign language deficit. Two of its studies from 2006 and 2009 concluded that more officers need to speak more languages—and at higher levels of proficiency.38 In 2003, former ambassador Edward Djerejian had said that within the entire foreign service, only five officers spoke Arabic well enough to discuss and debate issues on Al Jazeera television.39 His observation quickly became the new benchmark for language proficiency. GAO studies bought into the idea of increased language competence, along with more officers and more programs. But the focus on language leaves unanswered the question of why so many Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America, including Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela, also have abysmal anti-American numbers, despite the fact that many foreign service officers speak fluent Spanish.
The Office of Management and Budget was even more harsh, rating public diplomacy field operations as “not performing—results not demonstrated.” Its study claimed overseas programs had difficulty measuring impact; that few public diplomacy programs linked budgets to performance; and that there was not a broad overarching U.S. public diplomacy strategy.” 40
This deficiency in assessment is striking. While the many commissions in Washington agonized about public diplomacy, few grappled with what metrics might offer an impartial way to judge success. Despite their convenience, public opinion polls cannot be a reliable standard for gauging the effectiveness of public diplomacy actions. Too many variables influence public attitudes, and an isolated incident in one place may pull down numbers everywhere. Nonetheless, it is clear that between 2006 and 2010 the public diplomacy community had not been able to offer its own standards for effectiveness, and in the words of practitioner Joe Johnson, “If you cannot define success, you’ll never succeed.” 41
THE IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED REPORTING
The many panels neglected to examine one important trend: the impact of congressionally mandated reports. By their nature a scorecard-type evaluative report, they unmistakably sound like judgments on the policies, culture, and cooperation of other countries. This reporting work, which draws heavily on embassy staff time, helps fuel anti-American resentment. Even the friendliest nations bristle at the presumptiveness of the United States passing judgment on how they handle sensitive areas such as human rights, religious freedom, and counternarcotics.
One safely retired practitioner wrote, “It strikes many of us as ludicrous, for example, that our small embassy staff in Reykjavik has to devote many hours to preparing an annual human rights report. Instead of repeating, year after year, that the government of Iceland respects in every important particular the liberties of its citizens, they could be out talking to Icelanders about America.” 42 Such brave sentiment emerges from those currently serving who make a similar point by chronicling foreign governments’ outrage.
Embassy Moscow wrote about the blistering reaction to the International Religious Freedom Report, saying that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sneered: “It seems that the authors decided not to bother themselves with releasing updated information” and called the IRF report “a politically biased document distorting the facts, which deliberately misrepresents the Government of Russia’s stellar record of protecting religious freedom.” 43 The report attacked an increasingly authoritarian Russian government for its treatment of minority Russian religions as well as its judicial restrictions against Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Scientology. The cable writer could not resist a sneer right back, acidly noting, “Since other countries may not be familiar with Russia’s long tradition of inter-faith harmony, the MFA kindly offered to ‘try to help them understand.’”
The French MFA offered a more sophisticated response to the International Religious Freedom Report for France, having within its bureaucracy a bureau focused on religious affairs. The embassy reported that a follow-up meeting to the report focused on methodology, and the French may have won a point, noting that the State Department quoted results of a poll from Catholic newspaper La Croix, which did not use scientific methods. The French also insisted the burqa debate (the outlawing of women wearing burqas in public places) should be left as a judicial matter.
Embassy reporting reveals that the State Department struggled mightily to gain traction on its annual Human Rights Report. The document ended up prolonging discussion of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, which while uncovered in 2003 lingered long after as a convenient example of U.S. hypocrisy.
China bristled at the criticism in its Human Rights Report, which focused on tight government control of dissent, and the detention, harassment, and house arrest of human rights and democracy activists. “We urge the U.S. to examine its own human rights problems and not use human rights as an excuse or publish human rights reports in order to interfere with others’ affairs,” the government stated. “The U.S. practice of throwing stones while living in a glass house is a testimony to the double standard and hypocrisy of the U.S.” 44
The Czech Republic’s prime minister Mirek Topolánek was irate to read that the State Department did not think the Czechs had a stellar record respecting the rights of the Roma (itinerant people of northern Indian origin who face prejudice and difficulty integrating into European mainstream life). “To the report from the U.S. State Department I can only say that a country that allows torturing of prisoners can hardly teach me about how human rights have been violated here.” 45
The U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires noted that the Argentine government’s extreme sensitivity to any public criticism whatsoever posed a problem for all the annual congressionally mandated reports, even fairly innocuous ones. “The April 1 release of our perennial Investment Climate Statement, which covers the foreign investment climate here, for example, generated concern within the GOA [Government of Argentina] despite its extremely understated tone. We are working to assuage
their unease through private conversations and publicly putting the report in its proper context.” 46
The congressionally mandated reports offer one of the clearest glimpses of the disconnect on anti-Americanism. While idealists may still see the country as the last great hope of the downtrodden, defenseless, and victimized people of the world, its shift in recent years as the world’s foremost military power burdens it with unwelcome publicity about rendition flights, torture at Abu Ghraib, and civilians killed in drone strikes (a report and film of which preceded the WikiLeaks diplomatic release). Not only do the many reports underscore the U.S. loss of credibility, but in countries with single-digit approval ratings, the text of these reports is simply another irritant.
The International Religious Freedom Report, which provides an assessment on the status of religious freedom in every country in the world, presents particular challenges because it illustrates cultural differences. It is a blunt tool with a rigid format that does not allow for context. It leaves Germans feeling that their treatment of Scientologists and the French that their ban on burqas are seen in the United States as equivalent to how the Taliban treats women. A section titled “Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom” speaks approvingly of some German states’ willingness to allow Islamic religious instruction in public school classrooms—something that would be constitutionally challenged in the United States.
American-style religion, with its televangelist millionaires, Westborough Baptist protests at funerals, anti-Islamic rants by pastors, and eternal court fights over prayer in schools and crèches in town halls, may be something of an acquired taste. Embassies run into trouble translating the U.S. constitutional requirement of separation of church and state in countries that see no need for such separation. Other countries are skeptical the separation exists at all, citing U.S. support for Israel, statements from elected officials that the United States is a Christian nation, and President George W. Bush’s previously mentioned remark of a U.S. crusade against terrorism.
Yet another congressionally mandated report, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, exposes the U.S. to gibes that the report comes from a country that fuels demand for drugs and has among the highest number of drug users. Worse still, according to critics, the report is issued by a country where certain states have legalized the use of some drugs, a strategy long advocated by many Latin American countries. Countries wonder why they should continue to work with a partner with such blatant double standards. The reporting template assesses a growing list of countries touched by global narcotics trafficking according to a number of criteria: institutional development, supply reduction, drug abuse awareness, treatment, corruption, national goals, and bilateral cooperation. Some of the countries on the list, such as Afghanistan, undoubtedly pose a threat. Others, such as the UK, Canada, and Germany presumably have adequate laws in place to combat narcotics without scrutiny from the U.S. Congress.
Of course, advocates argue that the virtues of the congressionally mandated reports outweigh imperfections; that the good should not be the enemy of the best. The reports on trafficking and human rights give victims and those who cannot speak for themselves a measure of hope. NGOs also write reports, but none have the universal resources or reach of the U.S. government, which still counts for a great deal. The annual Trafficking in Persons reports seem to come under less attack and have revealed a once invisible group of victims held captive in gruesome circumstances.
Perhaps future rounds of commissions and panels focused on public diplomacy could incorporate more voices from the field and the front lines. They might also explore whether human rights, human trafficking, counternarcotics cooperation, and religious freedom might be assessed in less dogmatic ways that would allow policymakers to preach less and learn more—one of the ostensible rationales for all the reports. But until that happens, it is important for those exploring the roots of anti-Americanism to understand that whatever good the reports might bring must be balanced against the clear opportunity for America-bashing they provide.
THE LEADERSHIP PROBLEM
America’s efforts at public diplomacy are riven with disconnects between Washington and the field that start at the top. Public diplomacy has suffered mightily from poor direction. Three administrations struggled to find and retain adequate leadership, largely because they were unclear about the skill set needed; because finding qualified leaders proved difficult; and in a few cases, because Senate approval was lengthy or uncertain. Underlying all of this was policymakers’ dual uncertainty about the nature of anti-Americanism and the nature of public diplomacy, the tool with which policymakers expected to counter it.
The State Department’s under secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, sometimes dubbed America’s top PR agent, oversees three bureaus: Educational and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs, and International Information Programs. These three bureaus spearhead the nation’s effort to engage foreign audiences. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) handles all manner of youth, academic, and professional exchanges as well as cultural programming. The Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) responds to domestic and international media on U.S. foreign policy topics. It houses the spokesperson’s office and runs the daily noon press briefing, crafts answers to media inquiries, and arranges interviews with State’s top policymakers. The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) creates multimedia and digital communications products to promote people-to-people conversations about U.S. foreign policy priorities.
Since 1999 there have been nine under secretaries, interspersed with vacancies of up to fifteen months at a stretch. A report from the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy noted the position has gone unfilled 30 percent of the time.47 Just as concerning as those long vacancies, the tenure of incumbents has been short, ranging from barely six months (Margaret Tutwiler) through two years, three months (Karen Hughes). There was one under secretary in the waning days of the Clinton administration; four in the Bush administration, and at this writing four in the Obama administration.
Three of the nine had very close connections to the president: Evelyn Lieberman was deputy press secretary and then deputy chief of staff in the Clinton White House; Karen Hughes was a trusted Bush confidante and White House counselor; and Margaret Tutwiler had served as State Department spokesperson and ambassador to Morocco. Three came from industry: Charlotte Beers had been chairman of both Ogilvy & Mather and J. Walter Thompson; James Glassman had been executive editor and/or publisher for magazines such as the New Republic, the Atlantic, and U.S. News and World Report, among others; and Judith McHale was president and CEO of Discovery Communications and creator of the Discovery Channel. Obama appointee Tara Sonenshine had an eclectic career that included ABC’s Nightline, stints at NGOs such as the International Crisis Group and the International Women’s Media Foundation, as well as time spent as executive vice president of the federally funded U.S. Institute of Peace. Kathleen Stephens was a career foreign service officer designated as a placeholder while awaiting Sonenshine’s confirmation (her tenure lasted only two months), and current incumbent Richard Stengel is a journalist with sixteen years of experience as managing editor at Time magazine who also collaborated with Nelson Mandela on his autobiography.
These are all smart people. Every one of these appointees brought impressive accomplishments from lengthy careers—in other fields. Their eclectic professions touched on at least some aspects of public diplomacy—communications, television, advertising, journalism, and publishing. Nonetheless, none had truly successful tenures as under secretary; each struggled to help public diplomacy find a foothold in the State Department; and all failed to make meaningful inroads in combating anti-Americanism.
The State Department publishes an organizational chart on its website, a challenge even for experts in complex structures to comprehend. Critics claim the department has become more unwieldy as it has acquired other agencies such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 199
7 and the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, and taken on additional foreign assistance responsibilities from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The secretary of state heads the department, and near the top of the chart are slots for six under secretaries covering political affairs; economic growth, energy, and environment; arms control and international security affairs; public diplomacy and public affairs; management; and civilian security, democracy, and human rights.
It is telling that many of the State Department’s under secretaries for the other five divisions have been career officers, not political appointees. The nine above-mentioned incumbents’ experience pales against distinguished career officers such as Patrick Kennedy, under secretary for Management, or Thomas Pickering, Marc Grossman, Nicholas Burns, and William Burns, all former under secretaries for Political Affairs. These career officers have all been ambassadors. They brought decades of experience at embassies and consulates as well as intensive experience inside the State Department and an in-depth understanding of other key agencies. They knew how to work with the National Security Council and other interagency players such as the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy. They had connections on the Hill, testified before Congress, tackled the toughest policy issues, and met dozens of times with foreign heads of state.
The resistance by all administrations to entrust this key job to a career officer has not gone unnoticed. In frustration at the long-unfilled gaps, a group of thirty-seven former ambassadors and other retired high-level diplomats sent an open letter to Secretary of State Kerry in May 2013 calling for the position to be filled by “a career foreign affairs professional with years of overseas and Washington experience.” 48 To no avail.
To the Secretary Page 6