Our knowledge of events in Africa following these events is obscured, due to our few surviving sources, but in 210 BC Syphax sent an embassy to Rome reminding them of his enmity to the Carthaginians.94 What he was hoping to gain from this embassy Livy does not relate, but the most logical conclusion is that he was expecting some form of Roman help to regain his chiefdom. All he got in return was a Senatorial embassy which presented him with gifts of a purple toga and tunic, an ivory chair and an amount of gold. Given this turn of events, it is hardly surprising that when we next encounter Syphax, in 206 BC, we find him back in command of the Masaesulians and a firm Carthaginian ally. With Syphax defeated and cowed, the Carthaginians were able to secure their control of North Africa, aided by Roman indifference to the region.
However, following his victories in Spain, P. Cornelius Scipio turned his attention to North Africa. Naturally, any Roman invasion would have been greatly aided by having allies in the region. Thus once again, the Romans turned their attentions to the Numidians and in particular Syphax. After sending his legate C. Laelius to meet with Syphax, Scipio then apparently sailed to Africa himself. This bold move is given a dramatic twist in the sources, as he apparently arrived to meet Syphax at the same time as the Carthaginian commander, Hasdrubal. Livy puts this down to Hasdrubal retreating from Spain whilst Appian has him there seeking to secure Syphax’s allegiance to Carthage. In both sources, this scenario ends with Scipio and Hasdrubal dining together at the same couch in the presence of Syphax, who then secretly pledges his allegiance to Rome.95 Needless to say, we must take this story with a large pinch of salt. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the importance that the Numidian tribes had taken on in the oncoming battle for Africa.
Given that the balance of the war had shifted considerably in Rome’s favour by 206 BC, it was not surprising that Syphax had apparently agreed to side with Rome. However, with Scipio out of the way, Syphax soon reversed his allegiances and agreed an alliance with the Carthaginians, sealed by his marriage to the daughter of Hasdrubal. Why Syphax chose to ally with the Carthaginians over the Romans in the face of an impending Roman invasion of Africa is an interesting question, and one that was to have far reaching implications for the history of North Africa. It certainly proved to be a fatal miscalculation on the part of Syphax, as into this breach stepped the figure of Masinissa. According to Appian, Masinissa, who had been a loyal Carthaginian ally fighting for their cause in Spain, had been promised Hasdrubal’s daughter in marriage and when he discovered that his enemy Syphax had been granted her, he then defected to the Romans.96
However, Appian’s account of the Punic War is inferior to that of Livy, who presents us with a large digression on Numidian affairs.97 Though he does not give us an exact dating of the events, the detail gives us a clear idea of the clouded world of Numidian affairs at this time. Central to this process was a succession crisis and civil war amongst Masinissa’s tribe the Massyli, sparked off by the death of Masinissa’s father Gala, and his own absence fighting in Spain. During the struggle Masinissa’ main rival, Mazaetullus, sought refuge first with Carthage and then with Syphax, both of which naturally antagonized Masinissa.
Encouraged by Hasdrubal, Syphax declared war on Masinissa and it was probably now that the two agreed a marriage alliance. For Syphax, this war made perfect sense, given Carthaginian backing and a weakened enemy. For the Carthaginians, though, we must question whether African security was best guaranteed by an ongoing war between the tribes. We can only assume that they believed that the security of North Africa would best be served by one strong Numidian kingdom, securely allied to them, rather than the usual near constant state of war between the tribes. Ironically, it was the same policy that Rome was to use so effectively against them.
Syphax and Masinissa met in battle, with Masinissa being defeated and forced to flee to the mountains. Carthage’s policy had appeared to pay off rich dividends, with Syphax easily gaining control of the Massyli and uniting all of Numidia under his rule. Masinissa was reduced to the status of a bandit, being chased by Syphax or the Carthaginians. As is usual in these cases, Livy reports a romanticized narrative involving dramatic chases, escapes and hiding in caves.98 Following an undetermined period of time, Masinissa made a fresh attempt to reclaim his tribe, raised a new Massylian army and began attacking both Syphax and Carthaginian targets. Once again Masinissa and Syphax met in battle and once again Masinissa was defeated and forced to flee. This time, however, he fled to the Romans and offered Scipio his allegiance.
Upon the eve of the Roman invasion of Africa, the internal situation very much favoured the Carthaginians. The two main Numidian tribes had been united by Syphax who was now attached to the Carthaginians. How firm this attachment was is a matter of debate, considering that approaches had been made by both sides for Syphax to become a Roman ally once more. In the end though, they came to nought, and the Romans had to content themselves with having only Masinissa, an exiled prince with a small force of cavalry as African allies. Nevertheless, the Romans would have been hoping that he could be used as a figurehead to stir up revolt in the Massylians and undermine Syphax. The wider implications were that the balance of power in North Africa had been irrevocably disrupted. Constantly warring tribes had been replaced by a strong monarch uniting all of Numidia under his rule. In the short term this was ideal for the Carthaginians, in order to present a united force to resist the Roman invasion. In the longer term, it had the potential to backfire on them, overturning a long-standing policy of keeping their North African enemies disunited and thus weakened.
As events turned out, it was Scipio and the Romans who determined the future of North Africa. The Roman invasion of Africa and their subsequent victories fall outside the scope of this work, having been covered in great detail in a number of other works, both on the Punic Wars and Scipio ‘Africanus’.99 For this study, it was the consequences that are far more important. Syphax having attached himself so firmly to the Carthaginian side, his defeat became one of Scipio’s priorities, which was accomplished by a combined Romano-Massylian force led by Masinissa and C. Laelius. By the end of 203 BC Syphax had been defeated and Masinissa had not only retaken command of the Massyli, but also conquered Syphax’s own tribe of the Maesuli, including the capital city of Cirta (modern Constantine). Syphax himself was wounded and taken prisoner and transported to Rome as a trophy, where he soon died, most probably of his injuries.100
It may seem strange to state that the Romans were not the true victors of the Second Punic War in Africa; after all, Scipio had defeated Hannibal at Zama and taken the title of ‘Africanus’. Yet when the dust cleared the new power in North Africa was Masinissa and his newly-united kingdom of Numidia. Just fifteen years earlier, Masinissa’s family had been the rulers of the Massyli tribe, sandwiched between the might of Carthage to the east and their traditional enemies the Masaesulians in the west. Yet the peace treaty that ended the Second Punic War gave Masinissa an unparalleled position. Firstly, Carthage was forced to recognize his annexation of Syphax’s kingdom and the de-facto creation of the kingdom of Numidia. Secondly, and more importantly, the Carthaginians were prevented from making war in Africa without express Roman consent and authorization. Thus for Carthage, not only had a new power been created on their borders, but they were prevented from defending themselves, and Masinissa knew it.
For Rome, the situation seemed ideal. Not only had Masinissa been a loyal ally in the African War, overlooking his earlier fighting against Rome in Spain (above), but a strong Numidia would be the perfect way of keeping Carthage in check in Africa. Following two Punic Wars the Romans had annexed Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and coastal Spain, but had clearly no wish to annex Africa at this point. In truth Spain was probably considered to be a step too far for the Romans at this point, but could clearly not be allowed to fall back into Carthaginian hands. Thus, using the client kingdom of Numidia to keep Carthage in check seemed ideal.
The problem was whether the jailer was more dangero
us than the prisoner. The Second Punic War had radically altered the situation in North Africa. Through the interventions of both main protagonists, instead of a patchwork of warring tribes, there was now a united Numidian kingdom, first under Syphax and then Masinissa. On the Carthaginian side, this was a matter of expediency, needing a united front in the face of a Roman invasion. The Romans, however, through their peace treaty, not only confirmed this change as permanent, but altered the balance in favour of Numidia. Blinded by the dangers of Carthage, they had laid the foundations for a potentially stronger North African power, something that they were slow to see.
The Rise of a New Power (Numidia 201–150 BC)
When examining the history of this period, there are few greater figures than that of Masinissa.101 In just a few years he had gone from being a prince in a lesser Numidian tribe, and a Carthaginian vassal, to being the king of a united Numidia. Yet his story did not end there. He ruled Numidia for the next fifty years until his death in c.148 BC (aged over ninety), and spent his reign forging the disparate Numidian tribes into a powerful and united kingdom. By his death Numidia was the strongest kingdom in North Africa by far. We have no clear narrative of the next fifty years, but the fragments we do possess allow us to clearly follow his policies. For the rest of his reign it is clear what Masinissa’s most cherished principal was total loyalty, or apparent total loyalty, to Rome and her interests. His success in following this policy can be seen by the high regard he is always held in when mentioned by the ancient (Roman) sources (see below).
The policies of his reign can be broken down into the duel principles of consolidation and expansion. In terms of consolidation, he was faced with unifying the various tribes which formed Numidia into one people under one king. The two biggest tribes, the Masaesuli and the Massyli had been traditional rivals and enemies. Furthermore, there were a number of smaller tribes and princedoms in the region that had to be brought under his control. Under his leadership, the Numidian economy grew, the few cities, such as his capital Cirta, developed, and trade flourished.
The clearest evidence we do have for Masinissa’s activities stem from his foreign policy and his activities concerning Carthage. Rome clearly had in mind the creation of a strong Numidia to keep Carthage in check. Masinissa clearly had in mind the conquest and elimination of Carthage. From 201 to 151 BC, he pursued a consistently antagonistic policy towards the Carthaginians, yet did so in such a way that he would never incur Rome’s wrath. His policy was one of steady encroachment, as Carthaginian territory was raided, their costal towns harassed and settlers placed upon their territories. In response all Carthage could do was appeal to Rome, as they could take no direct action against Masinissa without being considered in breach of the peace treaty with Rome, all of which Masinissa knew only too well.102 Furthermore, he could be assured that his standing with the Romans, and the Scipios in particular, was high.
From time to time, the Senate was forced to answer Carthage’s appeals and send a commission to investigate. Appian claims that the commissioners were told explicitly to favour Masinissa, but it is unlikely that this would have needed to be stated.103 The first commission arrived as quickly as 193 BC and was headed by P. Cornelius Scipio ‘Africanus’ himself. Needless to say, the commission ruled in favour of the Numidians. Thus the tone was set for the next fifty years. Major border disputes flared up in 182, 174 and 162 BC. Each time a Roman commission ruled in Masinissa’s favour. Slowly and surely therefore, Numidian territory advanced and Carthaginian territory shrunk.
Masinissa further proved his use as a Roman ally by providing them with both military assistance (elephants and cavalry) and grain from Numidia, to support their various wars of this period, both in Spain and Macedon.104 He used his largesse to enter onto the wider Mediterranean stage with donations of grain to the island of Delos in the 160s, for which statues were raised in his honour.105 He further established diplomatic links with Egypt, Bithynia and Rhodes and his son Mastanabal was admitted to the Panathenaean games in Greece.106
By the 150s, it appears that the Numidian raids into Carthaginian territory had increased in frequency, perhaps motivated by Masinissa’s advancing age. Though we cannot know for certain what his ultimate ambitions were, it would be surprising if they did not include the annexation of Carthage itself. This last step would require very careful planning if he was to avoid a breach with Rome. Nevertheless, one clear sign of this ambition was the development amongst the Carthaginian elite of a pro-Numidian faction, alongside pro-Roman and nationalist factions.
Although the chronology of events is confused in our surviving sources, it appears that by the late 150s the Numidians made a push into the Great Plains around Carthage, temporarily occupying a considerable part of them. As usual Roman Senatorial commissions were dispatched to arbitrate, in c.153 and again in 152. Both were particularly noteworthy. The commission of 153 BC included an aged M. Porcius Cato (the Elder) who, holding a traditional Roman prejudice, saw the situation as proof of a dangerous rise of Carthaginian power, rather than a Numidian one. This apparently led to Cato’s now infamous statements whenever he was in the Senate that ‘Carthage must be destroyed’, though the surviving sources do not support the often (mis)quoted ‘cathago delenda est’.107
Obviously, the border raids and disputes continued, as in 152 BC another Senatorial commission arrived, this time including P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. In a break from both Roman and Scipionic tradition he ruled in favour of Carthage. Furthermore, back in Rome, he attempted to counter Cato’s influence by arguing for Carthage’s preservation. We can only assume that unlike Cato, he saw through the stereotypes of noble ally and Punic villain and saw the real rising power in the region. This was followed in 151 by the final war reparation payment made by Carthage to Rome, which had two possible effects.
Firstly, it may have created the feeling amongst the Carthaginian elite that their obligation to Rome was now clear and that they were free of all ties (which included those of not going to war without Rome’s authorization). Secondly, it may have created a similar feeling in Masinissa’ mind that Carthage was no longer under Rome’s protection, now the debt had been cleared. In any event it is indicative that within a year from the end of Carthage’s war reparations, open warfare broke out between Numidia and Carthage.
The Numidian-Carthaginian War (151–150 BC)
When war did break out, the immediate cause was the pro-Numidian faction amongst the Carthaginian elite. Perhaps buoyed by clearing their obligations to Rome, the nationalist faction expelled the pro-Numidians amongst them from the city, which occurred c.152/151 BC. These men naturally went straight to Masinissa, who saw his chance to exploit the situation and demanded their reinstatement. What happens next is best described by Appian: Masinissa sent two of his sons, Gulassa and Micipsa to Carthage as envoys, who, after being turned away, were attacked by anti-Numidian elements in Carthage.108 Though they survived, it gave Masinissa the perfect excuse for war and he laid siege to the town of Oroscopa. In response, the Carthaginians, having been harassed for decades by Masinissa and being denied the chance to retaliate, and now perhaps thinking themselves free of Rome, raised an army of 25,000 infantry and 400 cavalry and declared war on Masinissa. They were led by another Hasdrubal, who marched towards the Numidian positions, hoping to engage Masinissa in battle. Along the way they received a boost by the addition of 6,000 Numidian cavalry led by two Numidian chiefs, Asasis and Suba, who had fallen out with Masinissa’ sons.
What followed was a battle between the Numidians, led by the aged Masinissa and the Carthaginians led by Hasdrubal. According to Appian, this battle had a special observer, as P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (grandson of Africanus) had come to Numidia to procure elephants for the war in Spain. Appian states that the forces totalled 110,000 men, which places the Numidian forces at 80,000 men (which is clearly too high). The battle apparently ended with no clear winner and both sides entrenching.109
However, what could not be accompli
shed on the battlefield was accomplished during the stalemate as hunger and pestilence swept through the Carthaginian camp, destroying their army. Having no other option, Hasdrubal apparently agreed to peace terms. Interestingly, Masinissa’s terms were another fifty years of war reparations (totalling 5,000 talents of silver), this time payable to him, as well as the return of the deserters and most probably the territories around the town of Emporium. With the deal apparently agreed, Hasdrubal then marched his survivors back to Carthage, when Gulassa, one of Masinissa’s sons, attacked them with his cavalry. A massacre ensued, leading to the deaths of Hasdrubal and the survivors of the Carthaginian army. Appian puts the total Carthaginian losses at 58,000, which is surprising given the fact that they left Carthage with 25,400 and gained an additional 6,000.110 Where the additional 27,000 men came from is never explained.
For Masinissa, despite the way it was obtained, his victory was total. Carthage’s army had been destroyed, additional territory had been gained and Carthage was now beholden to him in terms of war reparations. Clearly, Carthage was now firmly in his sphere, not the Romans’. Carthaginian territory was now restricted to a coastal strip (which later became the Roman province of Africa) with Numidia dominating the plains of Libya. However, his victory was short-lived as events at Rome soon overtook him. As was usual in these cases, the majority of the Senate saw this war as proof of Carthage’s renewed threat, not a Numidian one, and despite Scipio Nasica, the clamour to finish Carthage once and for all was too great. Whether the Carthaginian’s had actually broken the 201 peace treaty now that they had paid off the war reparations is an interesting, but ultimately (especially for the Romans) irrelevant point. The Roman declaration of war and the destruction that followed must have been a blow to Masinissa and his plans.111 As it happens he did not live to see the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, by P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who took his grandfather’s title of Africanus as reward for the slaughter that ensued. The city was destroyed with the survivors sold into slavery, though no salt was sown amongst the ruins, despite modern reports.112
The Crisis of Rome Page 5