This lack of a clear plan for the war was supported by the chaotic political situation in Rome during both years, which only contributed to the uncertainty. In 111 BC Memmius stoked up the desire to treat Jugurtha as an enemy of Rome and then called him to Rome under the protection of the people, as a witness in a political witch-hunt. The following year, the chaos surrounding the tribunician elections kept the consul in Rome for far longer than he was meant to be, which left his army in the command of his even more inexperienced brother.
This brings us onto our third point, the quality of the commanders chosen to face Jugurtha. Although both Calpurnius and Postumius seem to have been perfectly competent commanders in their own rights, both were inferior in military experience and tactics to Jugurtha. In fact Jugurtha probably had more experience in Roman warfare than either of his two opponents, having served though the Numantine War (though we do not know where either man served prior to their consulships).
The next obvious point concerns the quality of the Roman army in Numidia. Despite Sallust’s work on the war, he provides little in the way of military details. The only clear figure we have for troop numbers comes from Orosius, writing in the fifth century AD (though he may have used Livy – see Appendix V), who puts Postumius’ Roman forces at 40,000 strong, which is perhaps a higher figure than we would expect for a campaign of this nature, at this time. The only other detail comes from Sallust who states that the Third Legion was present at the Roman defeat in 110. However, aside from the numbers and identities, the most important observation regarding the Roman army in Numidia concerns their quality, or lack thereof.
Both during the winter of 111/110 BC and the winter campaign of 110/109, the sources report that discipline, both in camp and in the face of the enemy, was poor.
In the first winter we have reports of desertions, banditry and collusion with the enemy, whilst in the following year, even allowing for Sallust’s usual charges of bribery, there was desertion and flight in the face of the enemy, and the ineptitude (or bribery) involved in allowing the Numidians to draw up a large force to attack the Roman camp undetected. In short, this was a continuation of the poor quality and training of the recruits that had been seen in the Numantine War some twenty years before. In this case, it contributed to the Romans withdrawing from Numidia in defeat and disgrace.
Summary of the Early Campaigns – Numidia
For the Numidians, at first glance the war to date had been a complete success. The Roman invasion of 111 BC had soon been blunted by negotiation and its renewal in 110 BC had resulted in a complete Roman defeat. However, as Jugurtha would have well known, the point of no return had been passed in the winter of 110/109 BC. As pointed out above, for the majority of the first two campaigns the Romans did not know what type of war they were pursuing and this was partly down to Jugurtha’s skill in not overtly appearing as Rome’s enemy. This was aided by his sensible decision not to face the Romans in battle, knowing only too well their military superiority in face-to-face conflict and their weaknesses when faced with a guerrilla campaign (of the type he had witnessed first-hand in Numantia). This policy meant that even by the winter of 110/109, he was still not an implacable enemy of Rome and that is the main reason why Aulus Postumius was still willing to negotiate, rather than solely due to the familiar allegations of bribery.
However, in attacking and routing a Roman army, not to mention forcing them under the yoke, he had clearly abandoned this previous policy and crossed the line into becoming a full-blown enemy of Rome. He would have known only too well what the reaction in Rome would have been and that now he truly was at war with Rome. There are two possible reasons for this change of tactic. Firstly, he saw an unparalleled opportunity to inflict an easy defeat on Rome, which would not come again nor could be easily passed up. Secondly, it was likely that he was under pressure at home to stand up to the Romans rather than prevaricating, however successful it had been. For the Numidians as a whole, they had just gone through a long civil war and now had Roman armies attacking their cities, ostensibly for the actions of their king. It is entirely possible that Jugurtha was under pressure to deliver, which he did in spectacular form. Orosius notes that following this victory he consolidated his position in North Africa by adding a number of smaller territories to his own, but no details are given.200 Certainly, this victory would have enhanced his reputation as a great African leader.
This leaves us with the question of what his long-term aims were now that he had crossed the line and gone into direct conflict with Rome. Jugurtha would have been only too well aware that ultimately he could not win a war against Rome, given the massive disparity in resources. Yet, he possessed a good understanding of the Roman mentality (or at least that of the Senatorial elite). The war was unpopular in the Senate and if he could make it as uncomfortable as possible, by denying them quick victories and using hit-and-run tactics then it was just possible to arrange a negotiated settlement, especially if he could hold out until the barbarian crisis became more acute. However, weighing heavily against this option was his defeat and humiliation of Aulus’ army and the reaction of the forces opposed to the Senate in Rome.
Backlash at Rome
When news of the defeat and humiliating treaty reached Rome, the shock and outrage was understandable. In the Senate, focus immediately shifted to the treaty Aulus Postumius had agreed to and whether the Senate would ratify it. Naturally, this placed the consul Sp. Postumius in an impossible decision. Supporting his brother meant supporting his treaty, which no Roman would ever agree to. Unsurprisingly, the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, using the dubious excuse that no treaty could be binding without the agreement of the Senate and People of Rome. Spurius then made attempts to recover the situation in Africa by raising fresh forces in Rome and from the allies. However, unnamed tribunes prevented him from taking them to Africa.201 He thus returned to the Roman province of Africa himself, to try to rebuild his army, but could take no immediate action against Jugurtha.202
However expected the reactions of the Senate were, the tribunes went a stage further. Not only did they prevent fresh reinforcements from reaching the province, but one tribune, C. Mamilius Limetanus, proposed an extraordinary piece of legislation which created a special court to try those deemed to have aided Jugurtha, either directly or indirectly. Sallust gives examples of those soldiers and officers who sold the Numidian elephants back to Jugurtha, those who deserted the army and Aulus Postumius himself, who had agreed to the disgraceful treaty. This was the first such special court to try those who were suspected of betraying Rome and the looseness of the wording brought all those who were suspected of having been bribed by Jugurtha under its remit.203
Chapter 5
The Jugurthine War: The Metellan Campaigns (109–107 BC)
It was in this poisonous atmosphere that the delayed elections for the consuls for 109 BC were held, with Q. Caecilius Metellus and M. Iunius Silanus being elected. Given the nature of the crisis, both at home and in Africa, the two consuls agreed amongst themselves that Metellus should take charge of the Jugurthine War and we hear of no complaints concerning this breach of usual practice.204
The Roman Commander – Q. Caecilius Metellus
Q. Caecilius Metellus hailed from Rome’s leading family in this period. Between 123 and 109 BC, six different members of the family held the consulship, culminating in the aforementioned double Metellan triumph in 111 BC (see Appendix IV for a fuller description of the Metelli in this period). Thus unlike the two previous Roman commanders, the consul of 109 came from the most prominent Roman military family of the day. This gave Metellus a natural advantage in terms of financial and political support in the Senate. Furthermore, it would have been expected that his command would not have been simply for the year of his consulship, as with the previous two commanders, but that he would take pro-consular authority and retain his command in Africa as long as the war lasted. This was what initially happened in 108 BC and would have continued to have bee
n the case, had it not been for an extraordinary set of circumstances. Given his position he took with him a highly-experienced command staff, which included the veterans C. Marius and P. Rutilius Rufus. His staff also included at least one member of the Numidian royal family, Gauda, a half-brother of Jugurtha.205
The Campaign of 109 BC
Finally, with a high-profile commander and with the humiliation of Suthul fresh in their minds, the Jugurthine War effort took centre stage for Rome. As would have been expected Metellus began meticulous preparations for the war, starting with levying a large army from both Roman citizens, allies and the overseas allies. Once again, however, we are given no precise figures for the size of Metellus’ army. Upon arriving in Roman Africa to take over from Sp. Albinus, Sallust reports that Metellus found the province and the remaining Roman forces in disarray. Discipline throughout the army had apparently collapsed, from Sp. Albinus himself to the lowest Roman soldier. Military regulations had been abandoned with the troops supporting themselves by plundering the local population.
Metellus was thus faced with a difficult position, despite his undoubted advantages. Much of the campaigning season had been lost due to his late election to the consulship, with the elections having been postponed from 110 to 109, and the time it had taken to assemble a fresh army in Italy. Furthermore, the Roman forces in North Africa were in disarray and it would have taken some time to restore discipline and integrate the forces in Africa with his fresh troops, all of whom would need further training before seeing action. Acting against this, however, was the weight of expectation that came with him. Given his social and political position and the urgency with which the Senate and People would have expected him to avenge the loss at Suthul, Metellus was under considerable pressure to deliver a quick result. Nevertheless, he went about the initial preparations meticulously; discipline was restored and the legions were trained hard, with forced marches and conditions made to simulate being in hostile territory.
For Metellus, his aims for the war were far clearer than those which had faced his predecessors, namely total victory. Yet, this in itself presented a number of problems. This was still not a war of conquest, but was a war against one man, Jugurtha and the war would not end until Jugurtha had been captured or killed. As detailed earlier, the territory favoured the Numidians, mountains and deserts to hide in and wide open plains on which to use the Numidian light cavalry. For Jugurtha, this new campaign must have presented him with an interesting dilemma. He was at the highpoint of his monarchy, king of a unified Numidia, having utterly defeated the invading Roman armies and, as we are told, embarking on a campaign to enlarge his kingdom at the expense of the neighbouring states and tribes. Yet, given his knowledge of the Romans, he must have realized that under Metellus the situation would be totally different. Here was the scion of Rome’s leading family, the position that the Scipios had been in generations earlier. He must have known that Metellus would have settled for nothing less than complete victory and that, after humiliating Rome both militarily with the victory at Suthul, and politically, with the Romans going under the yoke and agreeing a withdrawal, Rome would never have settled for a negotiated peace.
Nevertheless, we are told that he continued with the tried and tested tactic of sending envoys to discuss peace whilst preparing for renewed conflict. This time, however, it appears that he had met his match, as Metellus adopted the same strategy. A Roman invasion of Numidia was accompanied by attempts to turn the Numidian envoys, persuading them to either assassinate or capture Jugurtha. The Roman invasion met with no initial resistance whatsoever, and Jugurtha had the border towns offering tokens of submission to the Romans and supplies for their army. Metellus used this goodwill to take the town of Vaga as a forward base, placing a garrison here and a forward supply centre. Jugurtha once again sent envoys to negotiate, whom Metellus once again attempted to turn to the Roman cause.206 With the preliminaries aside Jugurtha determined to defeat this Roman invasion and set about selecting a position to face the Romans in battle. The place he chose was near to the Muthul River.207
The Battle of Muthul River (109 BC)
If we can see one characteristic of Jugurtha’s military expertise, it comes through his careful selection of his battle sites. In both 110 at Suthul and at Muthul in 109, he used his knowledge of his kingdom’s geography to select sites that maximised his army’s strengths and exploited the Roman weaknesses. At no point had he been forced or panicked into going to battle, and on both occasions, the Romans fought at a location he had selected.
Sallust, for once, provides us with an excellent description of the battle site:
In the part of Numidia which the partition had given to Adherbal there was a river flowing from the south called the Muthul, and about twenty miles from it was a naturally desolate and uncultivated range of hills running parallel with the river. From about the middle of this range an elevation branched off and extended for a long distance, covered with wild olive, myrtles, and other varieties of trees which grow in a dry and sandy soil. The intervening plain (between the spur and the river) was uninhabited from the lack of water except the parts along the river, which were covered with shrubs and frequented by cattle and farmers.
On the hill then, which flanked the Romans’ line of march, Jugurtha took his position with his line greatly extended. He gave command of the elephants and a part of the infantry to Bomilcar and placed his own men nearer the mountain with all his cavalry and the best of his infantry.208
Thus Jugurtha had chosen an ideal place for an ambush, occupying the higher ground and potentially trapping the Roman army between his own forces and the river (see battle diagram). Furthermore, his army was utilizing the cover of thickets on the hill to conceal his force’s true size from the enemy. However, Metellus, an able commander soon spotted the Numidian army and brought his force to a halt and altered formation to meet the ‘surprise’ attack:
I. The Battle of Muthul River (109 BC), Stage 1
His right flank, which was nearest the enemy, he strengthened with three lines of reserves. Between the maniples he placed the slingers and archers, while on the wings he stationed all the cavalry and after a brief address, which was all that there was time for, led the army down into the plain in its new formation, with what had been its front, marching at right angles to the direction of the enemy.209
As the Romans marched down into the plain, the Numidians held their ground. This led Metellus to believe that Jugurtha planned a series of skirmishes to wear down the army rather than an outright attack. To secure his position he sent Rutilius Rufus and a force of cavalry and lightly armed troops to secure a site by the river for a camp, should one be necessary overnight, thus giving the army access to fresh water. Metellus remained in command of the cavalry at the head of the column, with Marius in command of the main force behind him. Once Metellus’ army had entered the plain, Jugurtha sent a force of 2,000 infantry to block the route the Romans had come from and prevent a possible retreat.
With the trap now in place Jugurtha’s forces attacked:
The rear of Metellus’ column suffered heavy casualties, and both flanks were harassed by mobile assailants who pressed home their attacks and spread great confusion in the Roman ranks. For even the men who resisted with the most courage were disconcerted by the irregular manner of the fighting, in which they were wounded at long range without being able to strike back or come to grips with their enemy.
Jugurtha’s horsemen had been given careful instructions beforehand. Whenever a squadron of Roman cavalry began a charge, instead of retreating in one body, they scattered as widely as possible. In this way they could take advantage of their numerical superiority. If they failed to stop their enemy’s charge, they would wait until the Romans lost their formation, and then cut them off by attacks in the rear and on their flanks.210
Thus, we can see the key to Jugurtha’s strategy: to harass the Romans at distance, by shot and cavalry and deny them their superiority in close quarter
infantry combat. Furthermore, the widespread attacks and the terrain acted to disrupt the Roman battle discipline and tight combat formation. We do not know how long this struggle went on for, but the impression Sallust gives is that it continued for some time. As Sallust himself comments, the Romans had both superior quality and number of soldiers, but the Numidians had the ground in their favour and the style of combat played to their strengths.211
Nevertheless, the key to the Numidian victory would have been the collapse of the Roman formation and an attempted withdrawal. Effectively the Romans were boxed-in, with Numidians ahead and to the right, as well as blocking the route behind them, with the river to their left. Had the Roman troops broken they would have been massacred. Sallust points out that this point was not lost on Metellus who wasted no time in informing his men that retreat was not an option.212 Furthermore, the Numidian attack was a series of strikes rather than close-order combat. With this in mind, Metellus ordered an advance uphill towards the Numidians, to force them to fight in close quarters or retreat. Faced with a Roman advance and not wanting to engage the legionaries at close quarters, the Numidians broke and scattered into the mountains.
Attention now shifted to Rutilius’ force by the river. At some point before battle had started, Jugurtha dispatched his lieutenant, Bomilcar, along with a force of forty-four elephants and accompanying infantry to attack the Roman advance force, now making camp by the river. Sallust states that Bomilcar attempted to launch a surprise attack on the Romans using the cover of the wooded region between the two forces. Given that his force had over forty elephants in it, a surprise attack does seem unlikely to have succeeded, especially given the presence of Roman pickets. Upon seeing the massive cloud of dust kicked up by Bomilcar’s force, Rutilius gathered his men into formation and charged out to meet the enemy.
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