Again, we only have scant details for the events of 109–108 BC and even then the exact chronology is not clear. Furthermore, the details of Florus and the Periochae of Livy are at odds with each other. Of the two consuls of 109 BC, we have already discussed Q. Caecilius Metellus; the other consul was M. Iunius Silanus.
The surviving narrative histories give us two principle versions of the events of 109/108 BC. Firstly, there is the version given by Florus:
The Cimbri, Teutones and Tigurini, fugitives from the extreme parts of Gaul, since the ocean had inundated their territories, began to seek new settlements throughout the world, and excluded from Gaul and Spain, descended into Italy and sent representatives to the camp of Silanus and thence to the Senate asking that ‘the people of Mars (Rome) should give them some land by way of pay and use their hands and weapons for any purpose it wished’. But what land could the Roman people give them when they were on the eve of a struggle amongst themselves about agrarian legislation? Thus repulsed they began to seek by force of arms what they had failed to obtain by entreaties. Silanus could not withstand the first attack of the barbarians.236
Secondly we have the shorter Periochae of Livy:
consul Marcus Iunius Silanus lost a battle to the Cimbri. The Senate refused the demand of the envoy of the Cimbri for a home and land on which to settle.237
References to Silanus’ defeat can be found scattered throughout the remaining sources, including Velleius, who states that the battle took place in Gaul, and Eutropius who makes the unusual claim that Silanus defeated the Cimbri in Gaul.238 Given the varying accounts, what are the main differences? In the first place, there are the key questions of where the battle took place and who the Romans were actually fighting.
Florus places the battle in Italy, whilst the others place it in Gaul. Given the Roman loss in the battle, we would expect to hear far more about it had it taken place in Italy, as such a defeat would be on a par with Hannibal and would have left Rome defenceless. Thus we can accept that the encounter took place in Gaul. The other issue we have is with the identities of the enemies facing Rome. Florus believes that Rome was faced with an alliance of the Cimbri, an existing threat, and the Teutones and Tigurini as well, whereas the Periochae of Livy has just the Cimbri returning. Throughout Florus’ account we see this grand alliance of ‘differing tribes’, whereas the other accounts only feature the Cimbri, until c.102 BC (see Chapter 9).
Although the lack of a detailed surviving narrative means we can never rule out the possibility that the other tribes were present, the balance of probability suggests that it was just the Cimbric tribes involved in these early stages.
The next issue concerns the Cimbric embassy, which asked the Senate for land to settle on (foreshadowing what eventually became Roman policy hundreds of years later in the late Imperial period). Florus would place this before the battle, with Silanus waiting for an answer from the Senate. The Periochae of Livy seems to place this after the battle. What is clear is that at some point in 109 BC, the wanderings of the Cimbri brought them back to Rome’s northern borders. Silanus, as consul, was dispatched to Gaul to intercept them. Given the fate of his predecessor Carbo, at the Battle of Noreia, it is possible that Silanus initially received the Cimbric envoys and forwarded them onto the Senate. For the Cimbri, seeking Roman permission to settle in Gaul, on Rome’s borders, would avoid further bloodshed. For Silanus, there was perhaps benefit in seeing whether the Senate would consider the request, despite the bad blood between the two sides. If nothing else it would allow him time to plan a battle were one needed.
It was almost inevitable that the Senate rejected the Cimbric demands, acceptance of which, given the earlier loss at Noreia in 113 BC, would only be taken as a sign of Roman weakness and encourage further uprisings in the region. Once again, we have no description of this crucial second battle against the Cimbri, other than that it was another Roman disaster. Silanus returned to Rome and was left alone for a while until in 104 he was prosecuted for his actions in the defeat, though he was acquitted.239 We are not even sure of the year that the battle took place, with the sources being vague and allowing it to be dated to either 109 or 108 BC. Recently, Evans has speculated that it took place to the northwest of the Alps near Lake Geneva, but there is no clear evidence for such an identification.240
If we are to follow the Periochae of Livy, after the victory the Cimbri sent the demand for land to the Senate, yet we hear no more about it; the conclusion drawn from the sources is that they continued their wanderings. Yet we have to ask ourselves whether this was the case. Twice now the Cimbri had defeated the Romans in battle and southern Gaul was a potentially excellent homeland for them. Given that they had already moved away from southern Gaul after the Battle of Noreia only to be forced back to the region, it does seem that they again left the region having once more proved their military superiority over the Romans. Frustratingly, we are left with nothing more than idle speculation centred on the Cimbri not wishing to remain in a region where there were hostile powers, even ones they could defeat.
We have no record of any activity in the north by the consuls of 108 BC, which lends weight to the theory that this unnamed battle took place in this year. The year 107 BC saw the situation become much worse for Rome. Being defeated twice in succession by the Cimbri clearly undermined Rome’s status as the hegemon of the region and it appears that the balance of power began shifting away from them. The Cimbric victory apparently stirred a number of local tribes against Rome, though whether this was through deliberate Cimbric agitation is unclear. A new threat to Rome arose in the form of the Tigurini, who came from Helvetia (Switzerland) and invaded the territory of the Nitiobroges, Roman allies in the region. As can be seen, the Tigurini travelled some distance from the Alps to the Atlantic, most probably via the Garonne River valley.241 Thus we see that the Roman control over the region was disintegrating.
Of the two consuls of 107, Marius received Numidia (as we will see in Chapter 7), whilst L. Cassius Longinus received Gaul, with orders to suppress these revolts and defeat the Tigurini. Orosius preserves the fullest report of Cassius’ campaign:
the consul L. Cassius, who was in Gaul, pursued the Tigurini as far as the Ocean (the Atlantic). When he was on his way back, he was surrounded and slain in an ambush laid by the enemy. Lucius Piso, a man of consular rank and at the time the legate of the consul Cassius, was also killed. The other legate, C. Publius, in accordance with the terms of a most disgraceful treaty, handed over to the Tigurini hostages and a half share of all the Roman baggage. This was done in order to save the surviving part of the army, which had fled for refuge to the camp. On returning to Rome, Publius was summoned to trial by the plebeian tribune Coelius on the charge that he had given hostages to the Tigurini. Consequently he had to flee into exile.242
If this was not enough, Caesar adds that the survivors were made to go under the yoke as a token of submission.243 Thus, for a second year in succession a Roman army had been slaughtered by a tribal enemy, this time the Tigurini. Again we have no other details of the battle, such as a location, or how Cassius and his army were able to be ambushed. Once again, we have a tribal army ambushing a Roman one and again we are reminded of the Teutoburg Forest massacre. Not only this, but for the second time in four years, a defeated Roman army had to submit to the yoke.
Thus the Cimbri and the Tigurini roamed free in Gaul, Rome’s military reputation was in ruins, and then we hear that the Volcae, Roman allies in southern Gaul rose up in revolt. As 107 BC ended, the war in Numidia seemed to be a growing irrelevance, with the threat from the north being the main cause of instability. Two Roman armies in two years had been defeated by two different invading barbarian enemies. As yet there was no direct threat to Italy, but given the apparent ease with which the tribes could defeat Roman armies and the collapse of the ‘Pax Romana’ in southern Gaul, it is clear where the real danger to Rome lay.
The Military Reforms of 109 BC
There is a f
urther brief but highly interesting note on the domestic activities of the consuls of 109 BC. Asconius, in his commentary on one of Cicero’s speeches (the pro Cornelio), reports the following Cicero quote:
Gentleman of the jury, there are generally four ways in which a decision about a law can be traditionally taken by the Senate; one of these is a proposal to repeal a law, enacted during the consulship of Q. Caecilius and M. Iunius, in the case of laws which obstructed the military effort.
To which Asconius adds his own note:
He is referring to Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus and M. Iunius Silanus, who were consuls at the time of the war against the Cimbri, a war being conducted inefficiently and unproductively; indeed Iunius himself had little success against the enemy. So he repealed a number of laws passed during this time by the people, which had reduced the length of military service.244
This brief statement is of enormous interest as it appears that the consuls, faced with the renewal of the Cimbric threat in the north and the continuation of the war in Numidia, attempted to increase the pool of available manpower by overturning tribunician laws that restricted military service.
We have no further details as to which laws were repealed, or any resistance to these proposals from the serving tribunes. These issues will be explored in greater depth in Appendix III. What is clear is that the military strain Rome was under, fighting in Gaul, Thrace and Numidia, was forcing the ruling elites to look at ways to increase the available military manpower. Given what occurred under Marius in 107 BC, it is interesting to see an earlier attempt being made in 109 BC.
The Scordiscian Wars II (110–107 BC)
Although the war in the northwest saw a lull between 113 and 109, in the northeast, in Macedon and Thrace it was another matter. Rome’s victories against the Scordisci in 112–111 BC (see Chapter 1) again proved only to be a temporary lull in the fighting. The other consul of 110 BC, M. Minucius Rufus, was sent to Macedon and remained there until 106 and fighting the Scordisci once more, again earning himself a triumph (in 106 BC). Thus, even with war raging in Numidia, Rome was still engaged in wars with the Scordisci in Macedon and Thrace throughout this period.
We have three different types of evidence for Minucius’ activities: from the narrative sources, inscriptions in Greece and from the Fasti triumphales. The surviving narrative histories inform us of the following:
Minucius laid waste all the country [Thrace] along the Hebrus [the modern river Maritsa/Evros245], losing, however, many of his men as they rode across a river covered with treacherous ice.246
Minucius utterly defeated them in a battle near the River Hebrus, which flows from the high mountains of the Odrysae, and after these the survivors were completely annihilated by the proconsul Appius Claudius in a hot fight.247
Minucius crushed them on the frozen Hebrus.248
The general Minucius Rufus, hard pressed by the Scordiscans and Dacians, for whom he was no match in numbers, sent his brother and a small squadron of cavalry on ahead, along with a detachment of trumpeters, directing him, as soon as he should see the battle begin, to show himself suddenly from the opposite quarter and to order the trumpeters to blow their horns. Then, when the hill-tops re-echoed with the sound, the impression of a huge multitude was borne in upon the enemy, who fled in terror.249
About the same time [c.108 BC] took place the famous triumph over the Scordisci of Minucius,250
Proconsul M. Minucius fought successfully against the Thracians.251
[Who were defeated], as were the Scordisci and Triballi in Macedonia by Minucius Rufus.252
Archaeology has revealed that Minucius was awarded an equestrian statue by the people of Delphi, the base of which, and its inscription, still survives:
Marcus Minucius, son of Quintus Rufus, imperator after the Gauls, Scordisci, and Bessi, Thracians were defeated, because of his merits, was dedicated by the people of Delphi.253
Furthermore, the triumphal inscription for Minucius reveals that he triumphed over both the Scordisci and the Thracians.
Thus it is clear that Minucius fought and won a battle against the Scordisci and their allies on the River Hebrus, though at what point we do not know. It appears that this battle was a decisive one and a great Roman victory. Certainly, we hear no more of the Scordisci until the 80s BC, which given their persistence throughout the previous decade must show the size of the defeat. Once again we have the problem that we know almost nothing about the great battles the Romans fought in this region, though the Frontinus extract does give us some details. The Romans were heavily outnumbered by the Scordisci and their allies, but Minucius was able to fool them with a bluff into thinking that they were trapped between two Roman armies and they broke. Furthermore, we know that the battle took place in winter, due to the ice, an unusual occurrence for the Roman military. We do not know when the battle was fought but given that Minucius returned to Rome in 106 for his triumph, it should be placed either in the winter of 108/107 or 107/106. Given that he would need to rest and ensure order back in Macedon before his return to Rome, a longer timescale is the more likely, making 108/107 the most probable date. Thus the wars in the northeast, which had been continuing for over a decade, were brought to an end at the Battle of the Hebrus. This brought to a close one of the three major battle fronts that Rome was fighting on during this period.
Chapter 7
The Jugurthine War: The Marian Campaigns (107–105 BC)
As Marius comes to dominate the period that follows, it is clear that we need to see what type of man he was and so we need to examine his background prior to his bid for a consulship of 107 BC. Plutarch provides us with a biography of Marius and a number of other references can be found to his early activities. Evans also provides an excellent summary of his early career.254 Nevertheless, there are a number of elements of his background that remain unclear.
Background and Early Career
Marius famously did not hail from the Roman nobility, but came from an Italian background.255 He was born c.157 BC in the region of Arpinium (as later did Cicero). Plutarch chose to portray Marius as coming from a humble background, but there is much to argue against this. His parents are only named as Marius and Fulcinia, both of whom may have been related to Senatorial aristocracy.256 Thus it is likely that Marius grew up as Italian nobility, albeit crucially with Roman citizenship, which allowed him entry into Roman politics. Throughout the Republic, but especially in the later centuries (such as the second century BC), it was common for Italian nobles to join the Roman aristocracy, bringing fresh blood, becoming so-called novi homines (new men).257 In this respect, Marius appears to have followed the standard pattern for this: military service, followed by junior political office sponsored by a powerful Roman patron.
Marius undertook his military service in Spain, during the Numantine War (see chapter one), though the exact dates are a matter of conjecture. According to Plutarch, he eventually came to the notice of Scipio Aemilianus, who apparently noted his qualities.258 Whether it was a coincidence or a dramatic contrast that both Marius and Jugurtha came to Scipio’s attention we will never know. It is perhaps ironic that both men fought for Rome in the same war and would have at least met, though thankfully we are spared any such dramatic stories of this meeting in our surviving sources.
Such distinguished military service would have given Marius the chance to enter Roman politics, albeit at a low level. Here the sources present us with an issue, as Marius appears to disappear for much of the 120s BC. Evans argues that he spent the time between the end of the Numantine War and his first datable political office (the tribunate of 119 BC) engaged in building up the funds and contacts necessary to pursue a political career.259 The chronology of his earliest attempts at office is hopelessly confused. Sallust speaks of a military tribunate that he was easily elected to, following his exploits in Spain, so this would place it in the early 120s (c.130/129).260 Valerius Maximus also tells us that he failed in gaining elected office back in Arpinium, so this
could account for some of the intervening years.261 Valerius tells us that Marius, once back in Rome, then stood for the Quaestorship, which according to an inscription from a monument in Rome he succeed in obtaining.262 All this came against the backdrop of the Gracchan tribunates (see chapter one).
His first datable office was as a tribune in 119 BC, though we are told that he only succeeded at being elected at the second attempt.263 Plutarch adds that at this point he was being sponsored by the Caecilii Metelli, Rome’s leading political family (see appendix four).264 His tribunate is noted for two main actions: for proposing a law and opposing another. He proposed a law on what seems to be an obscure voting technicality, the width of the passages of the voting pens in judicial cases, through which the citizens of Rome passed. Cicero considers it to have been a sensible move aimed at reducing the potential for the corruption of voters and lets it pass without much comment.265 In Plutarch, however, the law is a deliberate populist measure, in the vein of the Gracchi, aimed at reducing the influence of the nobility.266
Certainly Marius’ law was opposed by many in the Senate and the two consuls, one of whom was a Metellus and thus from the family that sponsored him.267 The Senate voted against the law, purely as an expression of their opinion, as they had no formal veto on legislation. When Marius appeared before them he apparently threatened both consuls with imprisonment unless the Senate’s vote was reversed.268 When he received the support of his nine tribunician colleagues, the consuls and the Senate backed down. This would have given Marius a certain notoriety with the people, but cannot have impressed his sponsors. Perhaps in an attempt to redeem himself he successfully opposed one of his colleague’s proposals for the distribution of grain to the people.269
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