Plutarch raises a different factor, namely that the Cimbri were awaiting the arrival of the Teutones and Ambrones, in order to combine their might, though he himself questions how they could remain ignorant of the result of Aquae Sextiae, which must have been common knowledge throughout the Alpine region. Plutarch does, however, state that when Marius met with the Cimbric ambassadors prior to battle, they once again demanded land to settle on.406 Given that they already occupied Cisalpine Gaul, it does add weight to the theory that they intended to settle in Italy, north of the Po, which would have returned Rome to the position of over 100 years earlier. Nevertheless, even if they had not been buoyed up by the victory at Aquae Sextiae, neither the Senate nor the People of Rome, let alone Marius himself, would have countenanced a hostile tribal presence in northern Italy, no matter how much the Cimbri would have professed future friendship. Once again Marius staked everything on a decisive battle.
The location of the battle is an interesting one for a number of reasons. For a start we are not even clear on the location nor the name of the battlesite. Both Velleius (writing less than 100 years after the battle) and Florus state that the battle took place at the Raudian Plain, with neither making any mention of Vercellae (the more commonly known name). The Periochae of Livy unhelpfully omits the name altogether. Plutarch, whose account is the clearest surviving one, names it as taking place on the plain of Vercellae, though even as late as the de viris illustribus (see Appendix V), it is referred to as the Raudian Plain.407
The events leading up to the battle can never be recovered from the few fragmentary, and sometime contradictory, sources we have. With the Cimbri remaining north of the Po, Marius recalled his army into northern Italy and met up with the fleeing/retreating Catulus. Their first thoughts must have been to intercept any Cimbri thrust south, but when none was forthcoming they moved north and crossed the River Po into Cimbric-held territory. As mentioned above, the Cimbri once more attempted negotiation, which proved fruitless. To counter this Plutarch reports that Marius worked on demoralizing the Cimbri by parading the captured Teutones chieftains in front of them.408
However, for both sides, negotiation was not an option. The Romans were not going to let the Cimbri settle and were buoyed by the victory at Aquae Sextiae. The Cimbri too would have believed that they had a strong hand. They had found an agreeable region to settle in and although their allies had met defeat, they themselves had defeated Roman armies on three previous occasions. A fourth would give them the peace they required to settle, at least in their eyes.
In the days leading up to the battle both sides were apparently manoeuvring. Plutarch reports that the Cimbri advanced against Marius, who refused to give battle. Frontinus also reports that Marius forced the Cimbri to march to him rather than the other way around.409 Thus Marius once again got to choose the ground and time of the battle, which he used to good advantage, as detailed below. Having led the Cimbri to his position, a meeting apparently took place between a Cimbric chief, Boiorix, and Marius, to agree when the battle would take place. Thus on the morning of what now equates to 30 July 101 BC, the two armies drew up on the Raudian Plain, for what was to become the final act of a long war.410
The Battle of the Raudian Plain (Vercellae)
Of all the battles in the two wars under examination, it is the Raudian Plain for which we have the best descriptions in our sources, giving us both numbers and tactics. The Roman forces comprised of two consular armies: the victorious army of Marius and the defeated army of Catulus. Plutarch, quoting Sulla’s memoirs, lists Marius’ forces as 32,000 and Catulus’ as 20,300.411 We are not told of the composition of these armies, between foot and cavalry. Opposing them, according to the sources, was at least twice that number, if not three times. Plutarch provides a total of 180,000 for the Cimbri as a whole (including women and children), whilst Orosius gives us a figure of 200,000 in total. Of these, Plutarch states that 15,000 were cavalry, which would far outnumber any Roman cavalry on the field.412
The two Roman armies were combined into one formation, with Catulus’ 20,000 soldiers in the centre and Marius’ army of 32,000 split between the two wings, with himself and Sulla in command of each. Marius was clearly in overall command, though Plutarch reports that Marius placed Catulus in the centre to keep him out of the way, expecting the heaviest fighting on the wings. Plutarch provides us with an excellent description of the Cimbri, based on two eyewitness accounts:
XII. The Battle of Raudine Plain/Vercellae (101 BC), Stage 1
XIII. The Battle of Raudine Plain/Vercellae (101 BC), Stage 2
XIV. The Battle of Raudine Plain/Vercellae (101 BC), Stage 3
their foot soldiers advanced slowly from their defences, with a depth equal to their front, for each side of the formation had an extent of thirty furlongs; and their horsemen 15,000 strong, rode out in splendid style, with helmets made to resemble the maws of frightening wild beasts or the head of strange animals, which, with their towering crests of feathers, made their wearers appear taller than they really were: they were equipped with breastplates of iron, and carried gleaming white shields. For hurling, each man had two lances, and at close quarters they used large heavy swords.413
As is customary in these cases, we have different versions of the battle in different authors. Plutarch’s account is by far the most detailed, but does take a notably different slant than is reported elsewhere. He clearly states that he uses the biographies of Sulla and Catulus for the account, both of whom had became estranged from Marius during their later careers, at the time of writing. This is clearly reflected in the accounts of the battle, with Marius’ role being clearly downgraded, along with a rise in the tension between Marius and Catulus.
According to Plutarch, the Cimbri opened the battle with a cavalry charge, which soon turned into a feint meant to lure the Roman infantry into breaking ranks and drawing them onto the Cimbric infantry. Plutarch then states that the Roman soldiers, despite their training, usual levels of discipline and direct orders, broke ranks and charged after the Cimbric cavalry thinking that they had broken. At this point the Cimbric infantry then attacked the ill-disciplined Roman soldiers. Even at this early stage we have to question Plutarch’s description, as such a set of circumstances are not only difficult to believe, but nearly always end with the broken side being routed. In response to their soldiers breaking ranks, Plutarch would have us believe that both Marius and Catulus, rather than deal with the situation at the front, then both took time to offer sacrifices to the gods, which should have come before battle commenced.414
It seems that Plutarch has welded two accounts into one as he then has the battle commencing, despite this aforementioned initial cavalry charge and infantry clash, which we hear no more about again. We are next treated to some of the clearest bias against Marius as Plutarch then reports that a giant cloud of dust was kicked up by the armies, which meant that Marius’ advancing wing missed the enemy altogether and spent a good part of the battle wandering around looking for someone to fight, lost in a cloud of dust. This naturally left Catulus and Sulla to do all the fighting, with their commander left to flounder in a quasi-comic turn on the battlefield.
Plutarch then reports that the Romans had the sun in their favour, as they were positioned with the sun at their backs, shining directly into the faces of the enemy, though Plutarch does not ascribe this to good tactical positioning on Marius’ part. Furthermore Plutarch would have us believe that the Cimbri were blinded by bright sunlight whilst Marius was still lost in a dust cloud so dense that he could not locate an army of 200,000 men!
Plutarch goes on to provide the detail that the Cimbri, being used to colder climes, were not used to the bright sunlight and sweated profusely, whilst the Romans were cool and unruffled. Although this is a nice stereotype it overlooks the fact that the Cimbri had spent the over a decade in the centre and south of France, not to mention a few years in Spain and were not fresh from a harsher clime; unless of course he is referring to fresh Ci
mbric reinforcements.
Despite these colourful details, Plutarch’s account is desperately short of tactical analysis or any detail to explain how 50,000 Romans were able to defeat an enemy so superior in both infantry and cavalry. In fact, his only tactical comments are the aforementioned Cimbric feint and Roman breaking of ranks. What we have for the end of the battle is thus:
The greatest number and the best fighters of the enemy were cut to pieces on the spot; for to prevent their ranks from being broken, those who fought in front were bound together with long chains which were passed through their belts. The fugitives, however, were driven back to their entrenchments; where the Romans beheld a most tragic spectacle. The women, in black garments, stood at the wagons and slew the fugitives; their husbands or brothers or fathers, then strangled their little children and cast them beneath the wheels of the wagons or the feet of the cattle, then cut their own throats…. Nevertheless, in spite of such self destruction, more than 60,000 were taken prisoner and those who fell were said to have been twice that number.415
Thus for Plutarch, Roman victory was inevitable; the Cimbri could not take fighting in the heat of the midday sun, or the brave stands of Catulus and Sulla. More lines are devoted to the fascination with the aggression of the Cimbric women and their unwillingness to be taken as slaves, than the battle itself. As for Marius, he seems to have spent the entire battle wandering around in his own personal dust storm.
The Periochae of Livy has no detail of the battle, but confirms Plutarch’s casualty figures for the Cimbri. The same goes for that of Velleius and Eutropius.416 Florus has an account that bears many of the same dramatic flourishes as Plutarch’s, but adds some additional detail:
The armies met in a very wide plain which they call the Raudian Plain. On the side of the enemy 65,000 men fell, on our side less than 300; the slaughter of the barbarians continued all day. On this occasion too our general [Marius] had added craft to courage, imitating Hannibal and his stratagem at Cannae. For in the first place, the day he had chosen was misty, so that he could charge the enemy unawares, and it was also windy, so that the dust was driven into the eyes and faces of the enemy; finally he had drawn up his line facing the west, so that, as was learnt afterwards from the prisoners, the sky seemed to be on fire with the glint reflected from the bronze of the Roman helmets. There was quite as severe a struggle with the women folk of the barbarians as with the men; for they had formed a barricade of their wagons and carts and mounting on the tip of it, fought with axes and pikes. Their king Boiorix fell fighting energetically in the forefront of the battle, and not without having inflicted vengeance on his foes.417
Thus we have the familiar elements of sun, dust and aggressive tribal women, but we also appear to have a surprise Roman charge, which took the enemy unawares. It is Orosius who adds some important details:
Following Hannibal’s clever plan of selecting not only the day for the battle but also the field, the consuls arranged their battle line under the cover of a mist, but later fought the Gauls in the sun. The first sign of disorder arose on the side of the Gauls [Cimbri], as they realized that the Roman line of battle had already been drawn up ready for action before they came on the field.
In the battle, wounded cavalrymen, driven backward upon their own men, threw into confusion the entire force that was advancing to the battlefield in irregular formation. The sun too was shining brightly in their faces and at the same time a wind arose. As a result, dust filled their eyes and the brilliant sun dimmed their sight. Under these conditions the casualties suffered were so terrible that only a few survived the disaster, whereas the losses on the Roman side were very slight. A 140,000, according to reports were slain in that battle, whilst 60,000 were captured….
Among these many wretched forms of death, it is reported that two chieftains rushed upon each other with drawn swords. The kings Lugius and Boiorix fell on the battlefield; Claodicus and Caesorix were captured.418
Finally, it is Orosius who preserves and transmits some idea of the tactics used and the events of the battle itself. Marius and Catulus drew up their armies into formation before the Cimbri realized what was going on or were fully prepared. There is also the faint trace of a surprise Roman attack on the Cimbri whilst they were still forming up. Even if there was no surprise attack, then it is clear that the Romans’ actions had forced the Cimbri to advance or alter their plans for the battle.
Orosius supports Plutarch’s point on the initial Cimbric tactic being a cavalry assault, though in Orosius it seems that they rushed forward to meet the Roman advance. The clear difference is that in Orosius’ account, the Romans held firm and broke the Cimbric assault which turned their cavalry into the path of the onrushing infantry, causing total chaos and a complete rout. Thus, what Plutarch had as a feint and an ambush, in Orosius apparently reflects the true situation, with the Cimbric cavalry broken and the Roman infantry moving forward to press home the attack.
Valerius Maximus preserves a fragment of an account, which is also of use:
In the heat of the battle he gave [Roman] citizenship contrary to treaty to two cohorts of Camertes [an Italian people] who were resisting the assault of the Cimbri with extraordinary valour.419
When taken from Orosius’ point of view, the tactics of the battle and its result became clearer: an initial surprise Roman assault; the breaking of the Cimbric cavalry, their retreat into their own infantry, which led to total chaos and slaughter amongst the Cimbri. Thus Marius chose his ground well and used his smaller army in a more disciplined manner, and utilized simple but effective tactics, all of which resulted in the annihilation of the Cimbric tribes, including the civilians.420
Aftermath – The Tigurini
As discussed earlier, there is some considerable confusion as to what role the Tigurini played in the events of 102–101 BC. Some sources dismiss them altogether from these events, as they were not a migrating tribe in the manner of the Cimbri, Teutones or Ambrones. Orosius clearly has them involved with the grand alliance of tribes that determine to invade Italy, though he, and he alone, places them with the Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae and has the Cimbri and Teutones at Raudian Plain (Vercellae).421 Florus, however, also has the Tigurini involved in these events. Rather than having them at either Aquae Sextiae or Raudian Plain, he states that they followed the Cimbri, but did not join them in invading Italy and so avoided their fate in battle:
The third body, consisting of the Tigurini, who had taken up a position as a reserve force among the Norican ranges of the Alps, dispersing in different directions, resorted to ignoble flight and depredation and finally vanished away.422
Thus the last of the four tribes of the anti-Roman alliance, slipped away, after discovering the destruction of their allies. It was not until the time of Caesar that Rome faced them again.
Summary – Rome
Whilst we will be dealing with the aftermath of the wars later (Appendix I), it is appropriate to consider the impact of the campaigns of 102 and 101 BC in ending a series of wars that had been plaguing Rome’s northwestern border for over a decade. Ultimately, we must assess the central figure of Marius himself, and his contribution.
As we can see, not only is our understanding of the campaign and the battle affected by the few meagre sources we possess, but these very sources are highly susceptible to the prejudices of their own original sources. Of the three key commanders in the final battle, two of them wrote memoirs, and did so at times when one had become estranged from Marius and the other had become his mortal enemy (see Appendix V). Both can be seen to downplay Marius’ role and enlarge their own contribution. In the particular case of the Battle of Raudian Plain, there is a constant attempt to downplay Marius’ role and increase Catulus’. This can be seen through the above examples and with an additional piece of information given by Eutropius and found nowhere else:
Another battle [Raudian Plain] was fought with them [the Cimbri], by Caius Marius and Quintus Catulus, though with greater success on the p
art of Catulus…
Thirty-three standards were taken from the Cimbri; of which the army of Marius captured two, that of Catulus thirty-one.423
Whilst we can clearly see that the histories took against Marius, both as a reaction to the man himself, and his later actions (see Appendix I) and due to the fact that his two subordinates wrote autobiographies whilst they were political enemies of him, we need to take a step back and analyse the situation. Raudian Plain/Vercellae was the fourth time a Roman army had faced the Cimbri in a set-piece battle, the previous three being heavy defeats, culminating in the Battle of Arausio, widely accepted as being one of the greatest defeats the Romans ever suffered. The key question we are faced with is what the Romans did on this occasion that they had not done before. The Roman army at Raudian was smaller than the one at Arausio and again seemed to suffer from a joint command.
However, there is a clear difference between quality and quantity. The army of Marius had been in the field since 104 BC and had received vigorous training and re-equipping (see Chapter 11), not to mention its having been battle hardened with the victory at Aquae Sextiae. Furthermore, the two Roman forces acted and fought as one, with a clear overall commander (despite the attempts by certain sources to play up the discord between Marius and Catulus).
In terms of Marius himself, the two battles of the Northern Wars he fought are both marked by a careful selection of ground and tactics to suit (unlike the Battles of Cirta in the Jugurthine Wars). The comparison is a useful one, as Jugurtha always sought to fight on his own terms to make up the deficiencies of a weaker army. It is an interesting question as to how much Marius learnt from his near defeat at the Battles of Cirta, and whether this convinced him never to fight unless it was on his own terms. Furthermore, there are elements of the Raudian battle that point to Marius forcing the enemy to fight before they were fully prepared, thus pushing them into mistakes, much as Jugurtha had tried.
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