Federalist Oliver Wolcott of Connecticut recorded an interview he had with a prominent (unnamed) Virginian in 1794, in which this southern hostility toward Burr comes across. Wolcott’s source compared Burr to Hamilton, and said he wished that Burr was a Federalist so that Virginians could sink the popularity of both men at once. Burr was dangerous because “he is determined the play the first part” (i.e., win the presidency), and could easily become a “leader of a popular party in the northern states,” which threatened to “subvert the influence of the southern states.” This seems a more likely explanation for Burr’s lack of acceptance in the South than the imagined prospect of his defecting to the Federalist side. We must bear in mind, too, that Jefferson himself viewed the election of 1796 as a sectional contest. In a letter to Madison the previous year, he described the Republican Party, in no uncertain terms, as that party which embodied the “Southern interest.” The idea that Burr might stray had less to do with his avowed principles than with his regional identity. Political parties had arisen in the 1790s largely in order to protect group self-interest and broader sectional interests, making it unlikely that Virginians—the party of established planters—would ever really trust Burr.56
Senate Republicans finally agreed that a Jefferson-Burr ticket was the best answer to Federalism. And in spite of southern resistance, Burr had already mustered considerable support for his candidacy. In June, Beckley confidently wrote Madison that in Pennsylvania “the whole body of Republicans are decidedly in favor of Burr.” Burr’s friend Albert Gallatin, the scientist David Rittenhouse (a prominent member of the Democratic Society of Philadelphia), and Chief Justice Thomas McKean of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were all listed by Beckley as firmly in Burr’s camp. That support would never wane: Burr received 13 electoral votes (just 1 shy of Jefferson) in the Keystone State.57
At the same time, Beckley assured Madison that Burr could count on the votes of the new states in the West, Kentucky and Tennessee. Why did these states not share the sectional bias of the Virginians? Because, as in Pennsylvania, Burr had friends and allies actively promoting his cause there. Republican senator John Brown urged Burr’s candidacy in Kentucky, and knew firsthand of Burr’s decisive role as a partisan leader in the Senate. Though born in Virginia, Brown was raised by a Presbyterian minister (recall that Reverend Aaron Burr was a Presbyterian). He joined the freshman class at Princeton just two years after Burr graduated. Later, as their friendship deepened, he would accompany Burr on his notorious western journey in 1805. Tennessee presented an equally favorable political climate. William Blount and William Cocke were that state’s first U.S. senators, and also active party managers. Burr had led the charge for Tennessee statehood in the Senate early in 1796, winning friends in Knoxville and Nashville. During the campaign, Blount wrote to Tennessee’s governor, Revolutionary War hero John Sevier, that Burr “may be ranked among [Tennessee’s] very warmest friends.”58
Federalists, too, noted that Burr and his associates in the Senate were “quite zealous” in securing Tennessee statehood. New Englander Chauncey Goodrich tartly observed that Burr’s efforts were simply “one twig of the electioneering cabal for Mr. Jefferson.” Burr genuinely favored western expansion, which made him unusual for a New Yorker. Yet Westerners had good reason to be wary of the northeastern states. In 1786, another New Yorker, John Jay, attempted to negotiate a treaty with Spain that restricted Americans’ right to freely navigate on the Mississippi for the next thirty years. The West could not expand without the Mississippi—it was the economic artery of the region. Two years later, in 1788, men like John Brown felt that the northeastern states were intentionally trying to stall western expansion by delaying Kentucky’s admission as a state. Regional distrust was reignited once more, in 1796, over Tennessee statehood, as Federalists blatantly blocked admission.59
Western expansion and western conspiracy conjoined the careers of Blount and Brown. Blount would be expelled from the Senate in 1797, when he was placed at the center of an intricate plot, involving Americans, Britons, Canadians, and Indians, to invade Spain’s North American colonies. Blount’s design was to proclaim New Orleans a free port and to ensure the unrestricted use of the Mississippi for Americans. Brown had even earlier been associated with the “Spanish Conspiracy” of 1788, an abortive scheme to separate Kentucky from the union and establish friendly relations with Spain. The issue, again, was control over the Mississippi River. Unlike Blount, Brown’s rumored conspiratorial activities did him no harm. Kentucky voters never deserted him. He was elected to the first two U.S. Congresses, and served in the Senate from 1792 to 1805.60
During the 1796 presidential election, the Mississippi again became a campaign issue. Federalists hoped to capitalize on a recent diplomatic success. Thomas Pinckney emerged as the Hamiltonians’ candidate after he negotiated a popular treaty that gave the United States free navigation of the essential river. Unlike the Jay Treaty, the Pinckney Treaty was warmly received by Federalists and Republicans alike. It was New York senator Rufus King who suggested to Hamilton that he consider the South Carolinian. “Should we concur in [Pinckney,] will he not receive as great, if not greater, southern and western support than any other man?” King observed. The senator, of course, was unduly optimistic: the western vote went to Jefferson and Burr. Perhaps more than Jefferson and Madison’s quiet efforts, it was Burr’s skill at forging meaningful political alliances in the Senate that best explains the Republicans’ success in the West.61
Yet in Burr’s home state of New York, there was little hope of success. Beckley saw that the state assembly, which named the presidential electors, was “wholly Jayite,” that is, under Federalist control. New England, though another Federalist stronghold, held out greater promise, because the electors there were chosen in a general election. Beckley’s agent in Massachusetts was James Swan, a Boston merchant who had met Monroe in Paris and whom Monroe had subsequently introduced to Burr. Swan wholeheartedly backed Jefferson, and was “strongly in favor of Burr[’]s election.”62
Burr preferred to remain optimistic about New England. He relied in part on his own observations; the scouting trip he had taken the year before remained fresh in his mind. His contact in New Haven, Pierpont Edwards—the only one of his close relatives to follow him into the Republican Party—gave added encouragement. By May, hardened Connecticut Federalists were being warned to respond vigorously to signs of support in their state for Jefferson and Burr. Yet Burr, as he had done in the New York governor’s race, refused to leave the campaigning for Jefferson or himself in the hands of others. In September, he headed north again, spending six full weeks electioneering in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont.63
But the campaign soon devolved into fears of schisms and intrigues. Before Hamilton had settled on Pinckney, he toyed with the idea of persuading Virginia’s Revolutionary hero and former governor Patrick Henry to run with Adams. When Jefferson caught wind of the scheme, he felt certain that Henry would never accept. As Henry’s name circulated, however, Jefferson still worried that the orator might split votes in Virginia. Other Republicans meanwhile tried similar tactics in the North, hoping to divide the Federalist ticket. Though he preferred Burr, Bostonian James Swan still suggested to Beckley that Republicans might circulate Robert Livingston’s name as a vice-presidential candidate in New Jersey and New York; this might result, he said, in “a successful diversion” of votes away from Adams, in favor of Jefferson.64
By fall, Federalists and Republicans were imagining all kinds of possible combinations. In November, weeks before election day* but after the selection of electors had ensured a Republican victory in Pennsylvania, Burr’s boyhood friend, the New Jersey Federalist leader Jonathan Dayton, proposed backing him for president. Having failed in Pennsylvania, Adams seemed to Dayton (writing to Theodore Sedgwick) doomed to defeat. He pondered whether the Federalists might not be better off promoting Burr than swallowing Jefferson. “Is it not desirab
le,” he asked, “to have at the helm a man who is personally known to, as well as esteemed and respected by us both?” In a letter to Tennessee governor John Sevier, William Blount also assessed Burr’s prospects. He predicted that in the South and West, Pinckney would only get the votes of South Carolina, and that few northern states would be willing to back either Jefferson or Pinckney. Blount concluded that Burr stood a good chance of winning the vice presidency—not with Jefferson but with Adams. And not because Burr was Federalist in his political tastes, but because his balance and moderation simply made him less objectionable. Burr was the one man in this contest who could potentially transcend sectionalism.65
As late as December, before definite results were reported, Adams admitted to his wife that he would “rather hazard my little Venture in the ship to the Pilotage of Jefferson, than that of Pinckney, or Burr.” If he was going to face defeat, and be saddled with another term as vice president, he preferred losing to Jefferson, his friend of many years, who was older and more experienced than the others. Note, though, that he voiced no particular fear that Burr might win and drive the ship of state aground: Burr was no more undeserving than Pinckney.66
What had occurred? In a climate of uncertainty and anxiety, fueled largely by Hamilton’s plot to sneak Pinckney past Adams, party loyalty collapsed. In its wake, sectional jealousy returned, and now prevailed. Burr’s decision to campaign in New England suddenly caused Beckley, the Virginia Republicans’ watchdog, to view the New Yorker through the eyes of his fellow Virginians. Given that Jefferson was left with little hope of capturing any votes north of Pennsylvania, Beckley retreated from his enthusiastic support of Burr and complained to Madison that Burr’s efforts “are more directed to himself than any body else.” Should Burr succeed, Beckley suggested that Virginia’s electors ought to throw away half their votes on Clinton. Burr’s natural detractors saw his activities differently: Hamilton snoop Stephen Higginson of Massachusetts reported that Burr was doing his best to promote Jefferson. According to Higginson, Burr’s trusted friend Melancton Smith had “sent letters to some of our electors, & I believe to New Hampshire, soliciting Votes for Burr very strongly, & rather pressing for Jefferson.” But for Beckley, a vote for Burr in New England was a vote against Jefferson and Virginia. As Burr made inroads, the threat of a decidedly northern-biased government increased.67
Local Virginia Republicans, even without Beckley’s prodding, had already decided to make the election about Virginia, and to put all their efforts behind electing Jefferson, and Jefferson alone. The vice presidency became irrelevant. In a revealing article published in the Richmond Argus in October, the writer insisted that Virginia, because of its extensive territory, wealth, and population, had a superior claim to determine the election. (It was already understood that Virginia held the largest number of electoral votes.) Such displays of arrogance show how little the Virginia Republicans actually cared about winning with a national party ticket. Just as Beckley had advocated, the Argus writer urged that the electors’ second vote should be wasted on unlikely candidates Samuel Adams or George Clinton.68
And that is exactly what happened in Virginia. Jefferson received 20 out of a possible 22 of the state’s electoral votes; Samuel Adams received 15; Clinton 3. John Adams, Burr, Pinckney, and non-candidate George Washington each got 1 vote. The Pinckney plot had caused this confusion, more than any suspicion aroused by Burr’s campaigning. The real fear among Virginia partisans was of Pinckney squeaking past Jefferson (and Adams) in electoral votes. Pinckney had talents, one confidant of Madison’s admitted, but he was plainly a Hamiltonian puppet, who remained vulnerable to “being misled by artful[l] and designing men.” On election day, Jefferson was the only candidate in the eyes of Virginia voters, and he was not, as yet, the head of a national party.69
The breakdown of electoral votes in the 1796 presidential election was as follows:
Candidate
State
Party Affiliation
Votes
John Adams
Massachusetts
Federalist
71
Thomas Jefferson
Virginia
Republican
68
Thomas Pinckney
South Carolina
Federalist
59
Aaron Burr
New York
Republican
30
Samuel Adams
Massachusetts
Federalist
15
Oliver Ellsworth
Connecticut
Federalist
11
George Clinton
New York
Republican
7
John Jay
New York
Federalist
5
James Iredell
North Carolina
Federalist
3
John Henry
Maryland
Republican
2
Samuel Johnston
North Carolina
Federalist
2
George Washington
Virginia
Federalist
2
Charles C. Pinckney
South Carolina
Federalist
1
This meant that Adams would be president, and his Republican rival, Jefferson, his vice president. No one got what they wanted in the end.
We do not know how Burr felt when he learned of the election results. He certainly knew what Hamilton and his allies were up to when he warned a Massachusetts elector about Adams’s “pretended friends” in New York. But he was most likely unprepared for the news that his own party had deceived him. Four years later, he would finally admit that he had “no confidence in the Virginians . . . and they are not to be trusted.” But Burr had no chance of winning the vice presidency in 1796, regardless, unless he secured a good number of votes in New England: indeed, he did not persuade a single elector there. This simple fact explains why he devoted his energies to the New England states. In the South, he lost 28 Republican votes to other candidates; but with that southern support, he would have only reached a total of 58 electoral votes, still 1 less than Pinckney.70
Hamilton’s reaction was predictable. Ignoring his political blunder in making the incoming president his confirmed enemy, he expressed satisfaction that Burr had been soundly beaten. “The event will not a little mortify Burr,” he wrote Rufus King. “Virginia has given him only one vote.” Other Federalists were shocked by what they had not foreseen: “Virginia has treated Burr scurvily in the election,” Chauncey Goodrich observed, “and North Carolina not much better.” Virginia’s desertion embarrassed (but did not surprise) northern Republicans who respected Burr. John Langdon, according to Goodrich, was “simple enough to say he might have known they woul
d lurch him.” Even Abigail Adams was surprised, writing her husband that she was “at a loss for the politics of Virginia,” assuming that those who voted for Jefferson would naturally support Burr.71
On the other hand, there were some southerners who expressed sincere regret for the way things turned out. John Taylor of Caroline, a Virginia elector, wrote Henry Tazewell that he had been “compelled to reluctantly sacrifice Burr.” Whether Taylor took his the orders from Madison or acquiesced to a quiet consensus of provincials, there were signs, at least among Burr’s Senate colleagues, that Virginia had been wrong to disavow him. If the election of 1796 did not make the Virginians appear self-defeating, and their rhetoric of unity hollow, still it was clear that their methods would have to change dramatically, or else the Republicans would never truly be a national party.72
“THE MOST HUMILIATING EVENT OF MY LIFE”
In March 1797, as Burr’s term in the Senate expired, he returned to New York without immediate political prospects. As his onetime friend turned gossipy critic, Robert Troup, observed, the presidential election had left Burr “very much in the background.” His enemies figured that his political career was over, for if his humiliating defeat in the national election did not push him from the national stage, then, as Troup and others believed, “embarrassing” financial engagements would keep him from the public eye.73
Burr’s finances had indeed spiraled out of control, but it was not simply a matter of personal extravagance. The 1790s witnessed two major financial crises: the first, in 1792, was triggered by New Yorker William Duer’s aggressive speculation in bank stock and government securities; and the second, in 1797, was the result of failures in land speculation. “The Bubble of speculation is burst,” Theodore Sedgwick wrote Rufus King, and Burr was rumored to be among the vast numbers “irretrievably ruined.”74
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