Unlikely Allies

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Unlikely Allies Page 27

by Joe Richard Paul


  If Deane had taken public funds, what did he do with them? He clearly had not spent significant funds on his living expenses. He lived modestly throughout his tenure in Paris, and since Franklin’s arrival he had lived free at Valentinois. He had spent far more of his own funds to support himself and to acquire supplies than he had received from Congress. Although two years earlier Deane was a wealthy merchant, his own finances now showed that he was seriously in need of money and depended on the support of his friends, including Franklin.

  Some of Deane’s contemporaries also charged that Deane invested some of his own money with Bancroft and Beaumarchais in the London stock exchange hoping to profit by short selling British stocks when the British suffered defeats in North America. There is no evidence that Deane received significant profits from stocks. Moreover, even if this charge were true, there would have been no conflict between his duties as an American agent and his willingness to short British stocks.

  After more than five months and a dozen unanswered appeals to Congress for an opportunity to respond to the charges against him, Deane decided that he would appeal to the public directly. Deane thought that the public should know about the factionalism that divided Congress. “I feel it a Duty which I owe my honest and abused Countrymen,” Deane explained to his brother Barnabas. In December, Deane published a blistering broadside in The Pennsylvania Packet attacking the Lee-Adams Junto and exposing to public view for the first time the machinations of Congress’s foreign policymak ing. In a 3,000-word essay Deane exposed the nasty underside of American foreign policy and the fractious politics of the Lee-Adams Junto in Congress. Deane wrote that he had decided to make public his grievances not for his own purposes, but to protect the “general weal” from being subordinated to the ambitions of certain individuals. “While it was safe to be silent, my lips were closed. Necessity hath opened them, and necessity must excuse this effort to serve, by informing you.” In an age when it was still routine for even major figures like Hamilton and Franklin to publish under pseudonyms, Deane’s address was a daring move.

  Deane described his relationship to his two colleagues in Paris: “honored with one” and “saddled with another.” He bluntly traced the long history of his difficulties with the Lee brothers: “I shall make no other observation on the fruitful topic of their manners and deportment than this, that unfortunately for you [the public], those gentlemen so highly elevated, and so widely entrusted, gave universal disgust to the nation whose assistance we solicited.” Deane disclosed that Arthur Lee had shared secrets with Lord Shelburne and expressed his “contempt” for France, causing the Americans great embarrassment. Lee “was dragged into the treaty [with France] with the utmost reluctance,” and even though the commissioners had agreed to keep it secret, Lee disclosed it to the British government through Lord Shelburne.

  Deane explained how Lee’s misrepresentations had led to his recall, and how Lee’s friends in Congress had denied Deane any opportunity to respond to the unsubstantiated charges made against him. Yet Congress never inquired into the allegation, made by Deane, that Arthur Lee was involved with Dr. William Berkenhout, an alleged British spy jailed in Philadelphia who was mysteriously released with the intervention of Richard Henry Lee. In closing, Deane warned his countrymen that the Lees and their friends were threatening to undermine America’s reputation in Europe.

  The effect of Deane’s broadside was unimaginable.

  THIRTY-FOUR

  SAFETY LIES IN SILENCE

  Philadelphia and Paris,

  December 1778-May 1781

  Still in Paris, John Adams read Deane’s broadside and thought that it was “one of the most wicked and abominable productions that ever sprang from a human heart.” Deane had blown the whistle on Congress’s dirty secrets. There was now “no alternative but the ruin of Mr. Deane or the ruin of his country.” Adams wrote that Deane should be “hunted down for the benefit of mankind.” President Laurens accused Deane of insulting the dignity of Congress, and he demanded that Congress appoint a committee to censure him. When Congress hesitated, Laurens resigned as president in an angry huff. The next day the delegates chose New York delegate John Jay, who happened to be a good friend of Deane’s, as the new president.

  Thomas Paine, who was a friend of Richard Henry Lee, retaliated against Deane’s broadside in a series of vicious articles attacking Deane. Paine repeated the charges that Deane was unfit for public service and had confused his personal affairs and official business at the public’s expense. Further, Paine, the fiery author of Common Sense who had helped to mobilize the people for revolution, now accused Deane of disturbing the peace by publishing his views. A diplomat, wrote Paine, “ought to be as silent as the grave.” “[W]ho would trust a person with a secret,” Paine asked, “who shewed such a talent for revealing?”

  Paine accused Deane of amassing a fortune from underhanded deals with Willing, Morris, and Co. Paine’s charges were too much for Robert Morris. He responded that in fact Deane had only three commercial transactions with Morris’s company, and all of these involved the purchase of armaments for the war. Morris attacked Paine, and then Laurens attacked Morris. The insults and counter insults eventually led to a duel between Laurens and another delegate.

  Months of bitter back-and-forth charges between the allies of Deane and Lee fractured any semblance of consensus in Congress over the conduct of diplomacy and exposed the conflict to the public. For the first time, two parties had emerged in Congress with opposing views regarding foreign affairs: the radical Lee-Adams faction favored “militia diplomacy” and keeping a cautious distance from all European powers; the friends of Deane, Morris, and Franklin supported a pragmatic engagement with France and other governments wherever useful.

  There in a nutshell was the real issue: America’s relationship with France. Deane, Franklin, and Morris welcomed the support of the only ally that could check Britain’s military superiority. The Lee-Adams Junto viewed France through the lens of English history as morally tainted. They feared the corrupting influence of the French monarchy, the Catholic Church, and Continental politics. They might reluctantly accept French aid, but they suspected French motives. It was an emotionally uncomfortable situation to be compelled to depend upon a foreign nation you regarded as anathema to English government, culture, and religion. This was especially true for Anglophiles like the Lees. Since Deane and Franklin were primarily responsible for the Franco-American alliance, the bitterness of their attacks on Deane may have been in part a consequence of their displaced anxiety toward France.

  Without a trace of irony the Anglophile Lees and their friends characterized Deane’s supporters—who leaned toward France—as “Tories” while describing themselves as “Whigs.” And they blamed the Tories for polarizing Congress by forming their own political party. Samuel Adams charged that “artful Tories, who would cordially receive such a character [as Deane] into the Bosom of their councils,” were conspiring to undermine independence against the “honest and zealous Whigs.” (Years after the Revolution, some of the members of these factions of Whigs and Tories formed the twin nuclei of the Federalist and Republican parties, respectively, and they remained bitterly divided over the question of Franco-American relations.)

  Deane’s broadside had another more immediate consequence: his complaint that he had been denied the opportunity to defend himself against unsubstantiated charges shamed the delegates into agreeing to hear his side of the story. On Wednesday, December 23, 1778, Deane arrived at Congress at nine in the morning. It must have given him some comfort that the president’s chair was now occupied by Jay. He was also surprised and pleased to see his friend, General Washington, who happened to be visiting. Snow was expected. The weather outside was biting cold, and inside extra logs were tossed on the fireplace.

  For three days, as the logs crackled and embers flew, Deane read into the record a narrative of more than 20,000 words that faithfully recorded all of his activities from the time he left Philadelph
ia in 1776 to the present, including detailed descriptions of many of the purchases and shipments he made, at least to the extent he could reconstruct them in the absence of his account books. It was a confident and politic performance in which he was careful to understate his own contributions in deference to Franklin, Beaumarchais, and the French government. He avoided personal attacks against the Lee brothers, and he repeatedly praised Congress. At the conclusion, he answered the charges of public corruption head on:

  The settlement of the public accounts, which I am exceedingly anxious for, will shew, whether, during that time, I have applied one shilling of the public moneys to my own use. It is well known that my private fortune in America, which at the time I left my country was moderate, has not been augmented, but the contrary, by my absence; and I now assure Congress that, except [for] a few pieces of silk sent out to the care of my brother, the effects of which he left with me, and for which, I am accountable, and one hundred guineas or louis d’ors for pocket money, I brought nothing with me from France excepting my clothes.

  If Congress reflected on the opportunities he had for amassing wealth from his position, he argued, it would realize that “I well knew I could have made a fortune equal to my wants or wishes. I never lost a moment on the subject.”

  The moderates in Congress were favorably impressed by Deane’s narrative. This only enraged Lee’s faction. Francis Lightfoot Lee wrote to his brother, Richard Henry, that “[a]lthough Deane had two Colleages, the word We, is never used in his Narrative, I did everything. I procured all the supplies, bro’t about the Alliance, procured D’Estaings fleet, conducted them to America, discover’d the designs of the Enemy & baffled them, in short I have establish’d the Liberty and independance of America.”

  Tom Paine, who did not hesitate to invent facts to win arguments, disputed that Deane had anything to do with the delivery of arms that had proved decisive at Saratoga. In a new series of articles, Paine claimed that the French had promised the arms as a gift before Deane even arrived in France. This, of course, was the same phony story that Arthur Lee had circulated. In fact, Paine, as the secretary to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, had access to correspondence that proved that Lee was lying and that all of the arms and supplies for 30,000 men arrived through the efforts of Deane and Beaumarchais.

  At this point, the French ambassador, Gérard, inserted himself into the controversy in defense of Deane. Gérard told Congress that Paine had contradicted the official account of the government of France: namely, that France had not provided any arms prior to the signing of the treaties. The Deane affair now threatened relations with France and the war with Britain. Rather than issuing a public statement himself, Gérard demanded that Congress clarify the record. Congress feared alienating America’s first ally. Some delegates insisted that Paine must be censured to preserve the Franco-American alliance. Deane’s friend, Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris, denounced Paine as a “meer Adventurer from England without Fortune, without Family or Connections ignorant even of Grammar.”

  On January 12, 1779, Congress unanimously resolved to disavow Paine’s statements, and Paine was removed as secretary to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. More important, Congress unanimously affirmed for the first time that “the supplies shipped in the Amphitrite, Seine, and Mercury were not a present,” and that the French king “did not preface his alliance with any supplies whatever sent to America.” In effect, Congress implied that Deane and Beaumarchais had told the truth and that Arthur Lee had lied about the nature of the arms shipments from France.

  While Deane waited for Congress to clear his name and authorize his return to France, Gérard informed Jay in February that Spain was prepared to enter the war against Britain unless Britain agreed to a settlement mediated by Spain. This was great news, and Gérard wanted Congress to prepare for peace talks by clarifying the terms it would insist on in any peace treaty. For this purpose, a committee was appointed.

  The committee recommended to Congress that at a minimum Britain should be required to recognize the independence of the States, withdraw its troops up to the Canadian border, respect the freedom to trade at New Orleans, and allow Americans to fish off the coast of Newfoundland. Of these terms, the only one that was highly contentious was the insistence on fishing rights. While fishing was a major industry in parts of New England, the mid-Atlantic and southern states had no economic interest in Canadian fisheries. Since Britain’s defeat at Saratoga, the war was focused on the southern states. Why should they bear the burden of continuing the war solely to gain access to fishing rights for New England? Gérard, too, doubted that France and Spain would be willing to prolong the war for the sake of Boston fishermen. In the end, President Jay finessed a compromise: Congress would not insist on fishing rights, but it would affirm that in the event that the British prevented fishing off the coast of Newfoundland, the States were prepared to oppose Britain by force. At the end of February, Congress communicated its peace terms to Spain.

  The Committee on Peace Terms then recommended to Congress that the commissioners Franklin, Arthur Lee, William Lee, and Ralph Izard all be recalled from Europe and a new minister plenipotentiary be appointed to negotiate peace with Britain. Congress heatedly debated these recalls for five weeks, and ultimately agreed to recall William Lee and Ralph Izard. Only eight delegates voted to recall Franklin. Throughout the spring the recall of Arthur Lee became the most contentious issue. Although twenty-two delegates voted to recall him, and only fourteen delegates voted to retain him, the States were evenly divided so that Lee was spared a recall by a single vote.

  This signaled that at least a majority of delegates in Congress no longer supported the Lee-Adams Junto. Deane’s friends and those who favored a closer alliance with France were gaining strength. Partly, delegates were embarrassed by the public revelations that attended the skirmish between Deane, Paine, and Morris, and partly, delegates recognized that the French alliance was too important to the war effort. Arthur Lee was not a popular figure around whom to garner support. Even members of the junto privately voiced doubts about Lee’s character. John Adams wrote to Massachusetts delegate James Lovell that Lee’s “Countenance is disgusting, his Air is not pleasing, his Manners are not engaging, his Temper is harsh, sour and fierce, and his Judgment of Men and Things is often wrong.” The junto was losing delegates, and some of the key leaders of the junto, including Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee, left Congress before the end of 1779. At the same time, moderates, like Jay, were in the ascendancy.

  Yet the Deane affair remained impossible to resolve: the radicals were too weak to punish Deane, while the moderates were not yet strong enough to absolve him. For eight months after Deane had appeared in Congress and Congress had unanimously repudiated his chief accuser, he remained in limbo. Deane repeatedly asked permission to return to France, but to no avail. Although he was no longer a public servant, Congress refused to allow him to leave. Yet there was no reason for Deane to remain in Philadelphia except to give his enemies the pleasure of tormenting him further.

  In June 1779, Spain joined the alliance against Britain. America’s destiny would be determined by political events on the Continent, and the delegates supporting the Franco-American alliance gained strength from Spain’s entry. It was hoped that Spain’s declaration of war would push Britain to make peace. Now there was greater urgency to appoint a peace commissioner.

  Gérard and Deane’s friends favored appointing as the peace commissioner the popular new president, John Jay, who was considered pro-French and sympathetic to Deane. The Lee-Adams Junto supported John Adams as peace commissioner and wanted Arthur Lee appointed as a new minister plenipotentiary to Spain. This selection threatened once again to polarize Congress between the Lee-Adams Junto and the Deane-Franklin-Jay forces. In August, however, the delegates reached a compromise: Jay’s friends agreed to appoint Adams as peace commissioner, and the junto agreed to abandon Lee and support Jay as minister to Spain. With that, Arthur Lee’s tumul
tuous diplomatic career was ended. Lee received notice of his recall at Christmas, and by January 1780, he was on his way back to Philadelphia, seething with renewed rage toward Deane and Franklin.

  With the removal of Lee and the appointment of a peace commission, Congress also finally agreed to give Deane leave to return to France. Deane requested that Congress appoint someone to conduct an audit of his accounts and reimburse him for the amount of his expenses over the last three years. The treasurer of the Congress sent him a draft in the amount of $10,500 for his time and expenses in Philadelphia over the last year. Given the rapid depreciation of the Continental currency, this amount was an insult, and Deane refused it.

  IT WAS DEANE’S fourth sea voyage, and the dull routine of six weeks at sea was broken by the dramatic capture of two British vessels. One of the British ships fired at Deane’s ship for more than an hour with its eighteen guns, but it caused no serious damage. Deane arrived safely at Rochefort in late July and reached Valentinois in early August of 1780. Franklin, who seemed younger, and even lighthearted, now that Lee was gone, welcomed Deane warmly and invited him to resume living at Valentinois. Chaumont and Beaumarchais were also glad to see Deane back from his trial by fire. It was surely an emotional reunion for Deane and his son Jesse, now fifteen, who was living with Franklin. Deane had not seen his only child in more than four years.

 

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