Prisoner of the Vatican

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by David I. Kertzer


  The pope was not convinced. "If the Powers, especially Austria, had first, before entering into such an alliance with Italy, insisted on measures designed to defend the Church's rights and the safety and independence of the Holy See," Leo XIII told him, "it would be another matter! I would have hoped for at least this much from the Powers, even from Bismarck, from whom I had reason to expect much more."

  When Count Kalnoky received his envoy's account, he immediately summoned Galimberti and angrily described what he had learned from Rome. Kalnoky's account of the conversation that followed offers an unusual glimpse into the relationship between Galimberti and the Austrian leadership.

  "Monsignor Galimberti," Kalnoky recalled, "told me, in the greatest confidence, that during the summer the Holy Father had been erroneously led to hold out the hope that Prince Bismarck would energetically raise the Roman question with Italy and find a solution. He had been counting on being able to host crowds of pilgrims, on the occasion of his Jubilee, in the papacy's restored temporal dominion." The news that Crispi had traveled to Germany and was being feted by Bismarck "had produced bitter disillusionment on the part of the pope, who was now venting his spleen against the two central powers."9

  Leo was not the only leader in Rome who was angry at the Austrians. Crispi was upset as well, albeit for the opposite reason. On September 29, three thousand Austrian demonstrators, led by the bishop of Linz, held a rally culminating in a unanimous vote for a resolution calling for the restoration of the Papal States. This was bad enough, but even worse was that three government representatives had taken part in the rally. Crispi directed his ambassador in Vienna to lodge a complaint but received no satisfactory reply. So on November 23 he again wrote to his ambassador.

  "You know as well as I," observed Crispi, "that we could never view the Vatican question, raised anew by Leo XIII's and Rampolla's letters, as an international matter and that Italy would never allow any foreign government to interfere in it. It is an entirely domestic affair." He continued: "The rally at Linz and Kalnoky's silence, together with the Emperor's refusal to return the [Italian king's] visit to Vienna with a visit to Rome, are facts that unfortunately lend themselves to equivocations regarding Austria-Hungary's true sentiments toward us." Given all this, Crispi urged, it was crucial for the Austrian government to take action aimed at "dissipating this ambiguity and demonstrating to Italian public opinion that the Imperial and Royal government does not share our enemies' view on this subject."10

  Behind the Austrians' action—and their inaction—was their fear of the Vatican's support for France. Such open support would be a disaster on many counts, given how many of the Empire's subjects were Catholic not only in the Austrian heartland, with its overwhelmingly Catholic population, but in many of the more restive regions of the empire, such as the portions of Poland ruled by Austria. While valuing their alliance with Italy, the Austrian leaders were not eager to alienate the Vatican.

  This balancing act was on display when Galimberti and Kalnoky met in Vienna on February 16,1888. The Austrian foreign minister began by congratulating him on the large number of pilgrims who had recently gone to the Vatican for the pope's Jubilee. This display, he said, "revealed to the whole world the Vatican's moral superiority over the Quirinal, which was eclipsed by it." Kalnoky went on to reassure Galimberti on another point: the Austrians would never accept the Italian government's position that the pope's status in Rome was simply a domestic, Italian affair. Clearly, it was a matter to be regulated by international agreement.

  The foreign minister then came to the French threat. "The Vatican," Kalnoky said, "is unwise to depend on the support of France, which is opposing Italy only out of bitterness and not out of any devotion to the papal cause." Believing that a war with France was not entirely unlikely, Kalnoky asked Galimberti to caution the pope against supporting a French invasion of Rome. Such an occupation, he warned, "would expose the Holy See to the prospect of a republican form of government, which one day soon might well have a member of the radical party as president."11

  The death of the German emperor, Wilhelm I, on March 9,1888, just short of his ninety-first birthday, offered the pope a new chance to drive a wedge between Germany and Italy. On receiving the news, the pope sent Galimberti to Berlin on a special mission, carrying his condolences to the new emperor, Friedrich III. The symbolism of such a visit, Leo believed, could be powerful. Yet arranging for this audience would not be easy, for Friedrich III was known to be in bad health. Rampolla explained what was at stake in the instructions he relayed to Galimberti: "If the emperor has granted an audience to some of the representatives of the other Courts and denies it to the Representative of the Holy See, such a refusal would be too humiliating. If, on the other hand, having denied an audience to the others, he were to concede it to the pontifical representative, this distinction would certainly be most satisfying."

  But Galimberti was given a second assignment, as important as the first. He was to use the occasion of the funeral to meet privately with Bismarck and discuss two topics: the situation of the Catholic Church in Germany and the Roman question. Galimberti was to tell Bismarck that his meeting a few months earlier with Crispi had "produced a very painful impression on the Holy Father, all the more so given how well known in Rome are Crispi's character, his revolutionary and sectarian intentions, his attitude toward the Vatican as a former wild Garibaldian, his intimate ties with the radicals, and the profound hatred of the papacy that often leads him to the most undignified acts of violence."12

  Galimberti arrived in Berlin at midnight on Sunday, March 18, taking up residence at the British Hotel. Two days later, a carriage from the imperial court came to pick him up, carrying him through Berlin's snowy streets—their buildings adorned with black drapes of mourning—to the imperial residence. In the grand room of Charlottenburg Castle, with members of the imperial family in attendance, Galimberti handed the emperor Leo's letter of condolence. The empress, to Galimberti's delight, replied in Italian, asking him to convey their personal thanks to the pope for his kind thoughts. But the papal envoy was shocked to see how ill her husband was. "I fear," Galimberti reported to Rampolla, "that the step from the Charlottenbourg palace to the next Mausoleum will be brief."

  Six days later Bismarck received him. "I found the Prince," Galimberti reported, "very tired and very worried. He told me that recent events had made it hard for him to sleep and that he found himself in the sad situation of acting as a nursemaid for the sick." After discussing the Church's situation in Germany, they turned their attention to the Roman question. Galimberti pleaded, on the pope's behalf, for German support.

  "Yes," Bismarck responded, "you are right, but you must be patient. Giving Rome back to the Holy See at this time would trigger a revolution in Italy. Such a revolution now would bring with it the fall of the dynasty, and the alliance of a Republican Italy with the French. Such an alliance would end up being useful neither for the Holy See nor for the conservation of order and peace in Europe." As for the pope's displeasure over Germany's alliance with Italy, said Bismarck, he should understand that, given the likely prospect of a French-Russian war against Germany, such a defensive alliance was absolutely necessary.

  Should Italy overthrow its monarchy and become a republic, said Bismarck, he would be the first to champion the return of the Papal States, and perhaps too, he added, the restoration of the Kingdom of Naples in the South. But the pope should be patient. "Not only am I not against the temporal dominion of the Holy See," he told Galimberti, "I would not hesitate to take part in its restitution once the victory of conservative forces has assured peace in Europe." And then Bismarck repeated his refrain, "Il faut savoir attendre" —be patient.13

  Patience was certainly needed, since the new German emperor—in agony from the throat cancer that was sapping his life—was in no position to do much of anything, and for another three months Bismarck had to mark time as nursemaid to yet another dying emperor, all the while believing that a new war
with France was becoming increasingly likely. But there is reason to think that Rampolla was not entirely displeased that Galimberti had failed to enlist the Germans' help. Aside from drawing satisfaction from his rival's failure, his own view was that success in restoring the pope to power in Rome depended on weaning the Austrians from the Germans and Italians and creating a strategic realignment of the two Catholic powers—France and Austria—with the Vatican against Italy.14

  On June 19, 1888, just four days after the new German emperor's death and before he could even be buried, Rampolla gave Galimberti new instructions, this time to be carried out in Vienna. The nuncio was to approach the Austrian emperor, as best he could, to ask him to confirm his willingness to provide refuge for the pope. The urgency of the matter, it appears, arose from the dramatic defeat of the Catholic candidates in Rome's municipal elections, which had been held just a few days earlier, and the victory of Crispi's handpicked candidates.

  Galimberti was told to inform Franz Josef "that the pope is, more or less directly, being forced by the Italian government and by the radical elements behind it to temporarily leave Rome. Should this happen, it is important to know in advance if the Holy Father can rely on Austrian hospitality and also if he can count on the assistance and cooperation of His Majesty's representative to allow him to leave Italy's borders freely." The pope had an additional request as well. Even if he remained for the time being in Rome, he needed to plan for the eventuality of his own death, for he was an old man. Should "the Sacred College of Cardinals deem it necessary to celebrate the Conclave outside Italy to permit the free and tranquil election of the Holy Pontiff, could this," Galimberti was to ask, "take place in His Majesty's dominions?" 15

  Galimberti succeeded in speaking with Count Kalnoky on July 4. As he had no doubt suspected, the Austrian was not sympathetic. "Count Kalnoky was quite surprised about the matter," Galimberti reported, "and then expressed the opinion that neither he nor the wider diplomatic community gave any credence to the notion that Crispi wants to force the Holy Father to leave Rome." Crispi may have said some radical things when he was a young parliamentary deputy, Kalnoky added, but as prime minister he would act very differently. In any case, said the Austrian leader, Crispi was constrained by the Italian monarchy, by European diplomacy, and by the moderate liberal element in Italy, all of whom opposed the pope's departure from Rome.

  Galimberti tried a different tack. We are only talking hypothetically here, he said. Let's not, for the moment, enter into the question of whether the pope will judge it necessary to leave. The question is whether Austria would be willing to take him in if he did.

  "Well," asked Kalnoky, "in which of Austria's lands might His Holiness take up residence?"

  "Perhaps the city of Trent," Galimberti replied.

  "Do you not know, Monsignor, that Trent is a city in which a liberal Italian spirit predominates? The pope would most certainly be uncomfortable there, amid hostile demonstrations, and the incitements coming from the nearby Italian border would certainly not be conducive to his dignity."

  The alternative of Salzburg was then raised but dismissed on the grounds that its winters were too cold.

  It makes no sense to discuss such details at this point, interjected Kalnoky, since it would be difficult for Austria to consider taking in the pope given current circumstances in Europe. "If it were up to me, or to the Emperor, we wouldn't have to spend a moment to think about it. The Holy Father would always be welcome, and we would be proud to host him and leave it up to him to choose the place where he would most like to live. But," he pointed out, "the Emperor is a constitutional sovereign. I have to answer to the Houses, both of which have to consider both public opinion and the press, which is in the hands of the Jews and those favorable to the Masons." Yet, despite all these problems, Kalnóky said he would take the question up with the emperor at the first opportunity and get back to him. 16

  True to his word, the Austrian foreign minister met with Franz Josef at the imperial summer residence and on his return to Vienna on Thursday, July 21, summoned the papal nuncio. Galimberti, to his surprise, was told that the emperor had agreed to invite the pope to take up residence anywhere in the Austrian empire that he chose. "The emperor," said Kalnóky, "has asked me to give the Holy Father the most formal assurances on this point." The emperor also promised to allow the Sacred College to hold its next conclave in Austria should it desire.

  Although the emperor left the decision to the pope, he was clearly not eager for Leo to take him up on his offer, and Austria's ambassador to Italy was instructed to speak with Crispi. Not surprisingly, Crispi blamed the Vatican for provoking the latest crisis. If the pope would simply stop trying to undermine the Italian state, Crispi said, he would find that he had greater freedom in Italy than anywhere else in the world. Crispi added that he had no intention of forcing the pope to leave Rome; he was all too aware of the difficulties that such a departure would create for his government.17

  While Leo was putting all the pressure he could on the Austrians, he continued to look with special favor on Europe's other major Catholic power, France, which had the virtue of distrusting the Italian government as much as he did and shared his interest in weakening it.

  In mid-July, with the pages of Europe's newspapers filled with threats of the pope's departure from Rome, the papal nuncio to France, Monsignor Luigi Roteili, met in Paris with René Goblet, the French foreign minister.

  Roteili regaled Goblet with the Vatican's latest litany of woes, listing all of the measures that Crispi's government had recently taken against the Church.

  "Yes," Goblet observed, "Monsieur Crispi is extraordinarily fearless. He charges ahead without being afraid of anyone."

  "But the European powers should not let themselves be intimidated, much less get bamboozled by the Italian prime minister," objected the nuncio.

  "The European powers!" Goblet scoffed. "They're too busy forming an alliance against France to do anything else."

  "And all of them," replied Rotelli, "are abandoning the pope. Yet it is in this very isolation of both France and the papacy that we once more see their parallel historical destinies. Doesn't this seem an opportune time, Signor Minister, for the two isolated forces to join together against their common enemies for the well-being of both?"

  "But how could republican France do so," asked Goblet, "if Austria itself, an empire that is both Catholic and a monarchy, is allied with Crispi to the detriment of both us and the pope? We French can do no more right now than exercise the greatest caution and reserve to avoid being attacked."

  Yes, Rotelli admitted, France was certainly in a difficult situation, but "papal Rome will never give up its historical hopes in its first-born child."

  Goblet expressed his pleasure at hearing France's privileged position acknowledged in this way, but he hastened to add that his government could do nothing. He then tried to put the nuncio on the spot.

  "The pope's position is very serious, it's true, but who knows whether there isn't some exaggeration in what is being said in the newspapers. Do you really think that the question of the pope's departure from Rome is now being seriously discussed in the Vatican, as the papers say?"

  "I know nothing of it," replied the nuncio. "But I think that the latest decision [by the Italian government], saying that the Vatican is on Italian territory, may have revived Pius IX's old project of leaving Rome."

  "And where would you think Pope Leo would be able to go? Is it true that he would head for Malta?"

  It was the opening that Rotelli was waiting for: "I repeat, I know nothing. But I recall having read in a history of Pius IX that, after 1870, he asked Signor Thiers if he would be able to find exile in France, and that Signor Thiers replied through his ambassador with these precise words: 'Regardless of how disastrous a situation we find ourselves in because of the war and the revolution, we are not yet in such poor shape as to be unable to give refuge to the Pope.'" The nuncio then asked: "If, hypothetically, the Holy Father
were to pose the same question today to the French government, could he count on getting the same reply?"

  "As this possibility has never been discussed in the cabinet," said Goblet, "I do not believe I am authorized to respond in any way." Instead, he asked a question of his own: "What effect would the Pope's departure produce in Italy?"

  "It would be viewed by all Italians—aside from the atheist sectarians and the anarchists—as a true religious and national disaster."

  "Well then, why don't the Italians themselves act to ward off such a serious danger?"

  "The great majority of Italians," Rotelli replied, "have always done everything that they could to support the Holy See's rights ... But the Pope's current situation cannot be improved without the joint action of both Catholic and non-Catholic governments."

  The papal nuncio concluded by trying a different tack, appealing to France's colonial ambitions.

  "One way or another, sooner or later," he told Goblet, "the Holy See will prevail. But what about France?...Be warned, two races—the Germans and the Slavs—are now planning how to decide the question of the Orient without France, indeed against France, which is to say without and against the Catholic element, in order to divide European supremacy between themselves. We are always there [in the Orient], France's interests tied always to those of the Church."18

  Meanwhile, trainloads of pilgrims from across Europe were pouring into Rome to pay homage to the pope and to show their support for his claim to be the one true, divinely appointed ruler of the Holy City. Typical was a gathering of over four thousand northern Italian priests, presided over by the archbishop of Turin, received by Leo on September 27. "None of you, most beloved children," the pope told them, "are unaware of how cunning they are in trying to fool the Italian people regarding the current conditions of the pontificate as they continue to tell the people that the Pontiff has broad and full freedom in Rome and that his authority and his person are respected. But the whole world knows and sees the shameful and intolerable condition to which it has been reduced, at the mercy of the power of others." He went on: "You tirelessly keep repeating that the supreme authority vested in the Pontiff cannot, by its very nature, be subject to any earthly power, and that to be truly free and independent, at least in the current order of Providence, the Pontiff must have real Sovereignty."19

 

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