The Pope and Mussolini

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The Pope and Mussolini Page 53

by David I. Kertzer


  40. DDF, series 2, vol. 1, n. 447, Charles-Roux à Flandin, 17 mars 1936.

  41. Milza 2000, pp. 726–27. The most fascist of Fascists, and scourge of the Vatican, Roberto Farinacci was granted his wish of joining the Italian air forces in Ethiopia. Arriving in February, he did not last long. In April he took a break from bombing defenseless tribesmen and went fishing in a small lake. Lacking fishing gear, he and his comrades decided to use their hand grenades. Perhaps distracted by the banter with his mates, he held on to a grenade too long, and it blew up in his hand. Farinacci returned to Italy some weeks later to a hero’s welcome and got a fitting for his new metal appendage. The government put out the story that the courageous leader had been wounded during a military exercise. Fornari 1971, p. 161; Bottai 2001, p. 102.

  42. Mockler 2003, pp. 133–42.

  43. Later that week Charles-Roux reported that Tacchi Venturi was an “ami personnel,” a personal friend, of the dictator. DDF, series 2, vol. 2, n. 185, Charles-Roux à Flandrin, 8 mai 1936.

  44. ACS, CR, b. 68, Tacchi Venturi a Mussolini, Roma, 6 maggio 1936.

  45. Ojetti 1939, pp. 116–20; Morgan 1941, pp. 188–91.

  46. DDF, series 2, vol. 2, n. 287, Chambrun à Delbos, 10 juin 1936.

  47. “Pope Gives Up All Exercise as 80th Year Approaches,” and “Vatican Easter Quietest in Years,” BG, April 13, 1936, p. 2.

  48. ASMAE, APSS, b. 31, Mussolini a Ambasciata presso la Santa Sede, Roma, telegramma in partenza, 14 maggio 1936.

  49. ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 363, f. 57, “Il Ministro d’Inghilterra,” 15 maggio 1936.

  50. DDI, series 8, vol. 4, n. 78, Pignatti a Mussolini, 19 maggio 1936. Pignatti concludes: “I will also keep an eye on the Holy See’s actions to be able, if need be, to direct them in conformity with the information and instructions of the Royal Minister.” DDF, series 2, vol. 2, n. 287, Chambrun à Delbos, ministre des affaires etrangères, 10 juin 1936.

  51. De Felice 1974, pp. 756–7.

  52. DDI, series 8, vol. 4, n. 40, Pignatti a Mussolini, 14 maggio 1936.

  53. Navarra 2004, p. 86.

  54. Quoted in De Felice 1974, p. 759.

  55. The dictator was also becoming ever more cynical. Anyone or anything that stood in his way had to be overcome. Italians, the Duce told a foreign interviewer in May 1936, needed music and flags to stir them. “The crowd is disorganized and dispersed like a herd of animals, until it is disciplined and guided,” he said, using one of his favorite images. “It does not need to know, it needs faith, for it is faith that moves mountains.… The truth is, the tendency of our modern men to believe is absolutely incredible!” Quoted in De Felice 1974, p. 799.

  56. Galeotti 2000, pp. 29–30.

  CHAPTER 18: DREAMS OF GLORY

  1. Chiron 2006, p. 371.

  2. Quoted by Pacelli in his notebook, ASV, AESS, pos. 430a, fasc. 352, f. 81, 30 dicembre 1935. On the buzzer, see Charles-Roux 1947, p. 13.

  3. DGFP, C 4b, n. 482, Ambassador Bergen to Foreign Minister Neurath, Rome, January 4, 1936. Because Pacelli was eager to avoid angering Hitler, he always dealt solicitously with the German ambassador. But to others, he occasionally let his anger show. In 1936 Anton Mussert, head of the Dutch Nazi party, came to see him and, in an attempt to win his favor, told him that two forces were effectively opposing the advance of Bolshevism in Europe: Mussolini and Hitler. Pacelli tore into him, saying curtly that while he shared his view of Mussolini, he did not share his admiration for Hitler. Later, simply in recounting this conversation, Pacelli became so heated that the veins bulged from his neck. DDI, series 8, vol. 4, n. 316, Pignatti a Ciano, 19 giugno 1936.

  4. DDF, series 2, vol. 3, n. 114, Charles-Roux à Delbos, ministre des affaires étrangères, 9 août 1936.

  5. By mid-August, in Madrid, those churches that had not been burned down or sacked were being occupied by “red militias.” Canosa 2009, pp. 63–69.

  6. Among other steps, the government introduced new public controls over Church property, evicted the Jesuits from the country, and ended the involvement of the religious orders in public education.

  7. Kent 1981, pp. 140–41. L’Osservatore romano published many articles lamenting the various elements of the anticlerical campaign in Spain.

  8. Acknowledging that “excesses” had occurred, the ambassador argued that in many cases rebel arms were being stored in churches and monasteries, and that the military revolt had left the government no choice but to arm the civilian population to defend itself, creating many of the conditions the cardinal was lamenting. ASV, AESS, pos. 340b, fasc. 363, f. 102, appunti di Pacelli,12 agosto 1936. See also Brendon 2000, pp. 374–75. A few days later Pacelli received a report from the nuncio in Madrid. No church was able to operate, and Republican forces occupied the archbishop’s headquarters, the seminary, and the presses of all the Catholic newspapers. The archbishop had fled to parts unknown, and priests had taken refuge in the homes of friends and relations, moving constantly “to avoid falling into the hands of the reds.” Many priests, deemed enemies of the people, had been brutally killed. Others had been jailed. The famous monument to the Sacred Heart of Jesus had been profaned and then destroyed. Those few private homes where mass was still secretly celebrated did so at great risk. ASV, AESE, pos. 889, fasc. 263, ff. 30r–32r, Silvio Sericano, Madrid, 20 agosto 1936.

  9. ASV, AESE, pos. 889, fasc. 264, ff. 74r–76r, Borgongini a Pacelli, 28 novembre 1936.

  10. De Felice 1981, pp. 358–89.

  11. De Felice 1981, pp. 390–91.

  12. In October the pope, looking tired and beaten down, told Charles-Roux he thought Mussolini was playing with fire in threatening to tie Italy’s fate to Germany’s in his game of brinksmanship with France and Britain. MAESS, 38, 28–34, Charles-Roux à Delbos, ministre des affaires étrangères, 22 octobre 1936.

  13. Micheler 2005, pp. 113–14. An angry Pacelli told the Italian ambassador that if the Jesuits were put on trial, the repercussions would be enormous and “all of Germany would be shaken.” DDI, series 8, vol. 4, n. 613, Pignatti a Ciano, 24 luglio 1936. The pope wanted Mussolini to intercede on behalf of the Jesuits. The day after their meeting Cardinal Pacelli called Pignatti to relay instructions he had just gotten from the pope: Mussolini was not to mention he was acting at the pope’s request. DDI, series 8, vol. 4, n. 636, Pignatti a Ciano, 27 luglio 1936. The next month, when the Italian ambassador in Berlin, on instructions from Rome, pleaded on behalf of both the Austrian nuns and the Jesuits, Pacelli expressed his thanks. DDI, series 8, vol. 5, n. 150, L’Incaricato d’affari presso la Santa Sede, Cassinis, a Ciano, 2 ottobre 1936.

  14. “The Germans,” wrote Grandi (1985, pp. 410–11), made Ciano “their pliable tool.” See Innocenti 1992, pp. 14–16; Moseley 1999, pp. 4–9; Morgan 1941, p. 265; De Felice 1974, p. 804; Brendon 2000, p. 559. Grandi’s comment should be viewed with caution, however, as he saw himself as losing influence with the Duce to Ciano. On this conflict, see also Renzo De Felice’s preface to Ciano’s (2002, p. xiv) diary.

  15. Rauscher 2004, p. 220.

  16. Later the American reporter Thomas Morgan (1941, p. 265) wrote of Ciano: “When he was getting fat—which was a dangerous omen, for his father and mother were mildly monstrous—he adopted Il Duce’s diet of fruit, fish and fowl.”

  17. Milza 2000, p. 737. But it was hard to take Ciano seriously, observed Phillips (1952, p. 188), because “it was impossible to keep his attention for more than a few minutes”; his eye was constantly on the lookout for attractive women. Elisabetta Cerruti, wife of Italy’s ambassador to Germany, captured him well: “Although he was not attractive, being too fat for his age and somehow unhealthy, he had a certain unrefined handsomeness and thought himself quite irresistible to the ladies.… The prettiest women blatantly pursued him, vying with one another for one of his smiles. It was painful to watch.” Quoted in Moseley 1999, p. 30.

  18. Phillips 1952, pp. 189–91.

  19. Quoted in De Felice 1981, p. 273.

  20. Bottai 2001, pp
. 109–10.

  21. Baratter 2008.

  22. Giuseppe Bastianini’s dramatic description of this rite is quoted in De Felice 1981, p. 283.

  23. Navarra 2004, pp. 64–65, 97.

  24. In Italy, faith in the Duce was rivaling faith in Jesus Christ. The Fascist federation of Ascoli Piceno, for example, in the August 22, 1936, issue of its periodical, Eja, recommended, “Always have faith. The faith that you have given to Mussolini, because it is something sacred.… All that the Duce affirms is true. One does not discuss the Duce’s word.… After reciting the ‘Credo’ in God every morning, recite the ‘Credo’ in Mussolini.” Quoted in Gentile 1993, p. 127.

  25. Bottai 2001, p. 115; De Felice 1981, p. 267.

  26. In 1938 alone she wrote 1,810 pages, scribbled on loose pieces of paper. Her accounts of her phone conversations with Mussolini were so detailed that, when the inspector general of the Italian State Archives later examined them, he suspected she had installed a recording device on her telephone. Petacci 2010, p. 5; Festorazzi 2012, p. 308.

  27. Milza 2000, p. 528; Monelli 1953, pp. 153–56; Petacci 2011, p. 423.

  28. Here I share a number of perspectives first articulated by De Felice (1981, p. 277).

  29. The importance of the American Church was taking some getting used to in Rome, for the Holy See had long regarded the United States as something of a backwater. Only a few decades earlier Vatican relations with the Church in the United States were still being conducted not by the secretary of state office, as for all the European countries, but rather by the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, which dealt with those areas—Asia and Africa mostly—regarded as remote, the home of missions rather than of established churches. But by the 1930s the United States had solidified its place not only as a major, thriving center for Roman Catholics and the Church but as the single largest financial source of support for the Holy See. Pollard 2012.

  30. Arnaldo Cortesi, “Papal Secretary of State Coming Here; Rome Speculates on Subject of Mission,” NYT, October 1, 1936, p. 1; Cortesi, “Pacelli Reported Seeking Aid of U.S. in Anti-Red Drive,” NYT, October 2, 1936, p. 1. The Italian embassy in Washington reported these rumored motives for the trip to Ciano, mentioning that the Vatican’s apostolic delegate was himself surprised, perplexed, and somewhat alarmed by the visit. DDI, series 8, vol. 5, n. 151, L’Incaricato d’affari a Washington, Rossi Longhi, al ministro degli esteri, Ciano, 3 ottobre 1936; and ibid., n. 160, Rossi Longhi a Ciano, 6 ottobre 1936. For Pignatti’s speculation about Pacelli’s papal ambitions, see DDI, series 8, vol. 5, n. 170, Pignatti a Ciano, 7 ottobre 1936. In November 1934 Pacelli had been the pope’s representative to the International Eucharistic Congress in Buenos Aires, where he had drawn large crowds. On the way home, he stopped in Brazil, where he addressed, in Portuguese, the National Assembly and Supreme Court. Blet 1996, p. 202.

  31. Among the honorary degrees were those at Georgetown (“Pacelli Urges World Peace, Blesses Many,” WP, October 23, 1936, p. 1), Fordham College, and Notre Dame (“Papal Aide Gets Notre Dame Honor,” NYT, October 26, 1936, p. 18).

  32. Coughlin’s political party, the National Union of Social Justice, was running a candidate against Roosevelt—or “Franklin Double-Crossing Roosevelt,” as the priest called him. Fogarty 2012, p. 110.

  33. In September Coughlin called for “bullets” to be used against the president—for which he later, under pressure, apologized—and added that Roosevelt was a pro-Communist “dictator.” D’Alessio (2012, pp. 133–34) quotes from two of Cicognani’s letters to Pacelli, written on October 9 and 10.

  34. Joseph Kennedy—a Catholic business magnate and father of a future president—helped arrange the meeting and took part in it. Pacelli’s preoccupation with the Communist threat was likely heightened by his focus on the Spanish civil war. Roosevelt’s account, to Florence Kerr at a dinner in Hyde Park in 1943, is quoted in Gallagher 2008, pp. 87–88.

  35. Examinations of the Pacelli trip to the United States are offered by Gannon 1962, pp. 106–16; Fogarty 2012, p. 115; and D’Alessio 2012, pp. 131–35. Sister Pascalina accompanied Pacelli to the United States, as she had two years earlier to Buenos Aires. However, for propriety’s sake she traveled on a different ship and kept in the background. Schad 2008, pp. 81–87.

  36. ASMAE, APSS, b. 36, Ciano al ministero dell’interno, telespresso n. 691938, 7 dicembre 1936; Falconi 1967, p. 226; Confalonieri 1957, pp. 334–38.

  37. Baudrillart 1996, p. 364 (6 décembre 1936). The pope’s old friend Agostino Gemelli made frequent visits, once personally administering an electrocardiogram. Venini 2004, p. 201. According to Lazzarini (1937, pp. 142–43), on one visit Father Gemelli heard the pope complain about the food. The “magnificent terror,” as Gemelli was known, asked, in his Milanese dialect, if he could prepare him a meal. The pope’s eyes lit up. Gemelli, said to be an excellent cook as well as a physician, found a kitchen nearby and soon reappeared with a plate of risotto à la Milanese, made with saffon and cooked al dente. “The best,” said the pope, as he happily devoured the risotto, “is still that which comes from home.”

  38. Tardini’s marginal note on Pacelli’s notes of his meeting with the pope tells of these sickbed visits. ASV, AESS, b. 560, fasc. 592, f. 16r, 9 dicembre 1937.

  39. Both Venini (2004, pp. 182–87) and Baudrillart (1996, pp. 364, 371, 378–79) discuss these events in their diaries.

  40. CC 1937 I, pp. 182–83; OR, 4–5 gennaio 1937. The British envoy chronicled all the earlier health reports being put out by the Vatican: D. G. Osborne, Annual Report 1936, January 1, 1937, R 57/57/22, in Hachey 1972, p. 365, section 101.

  41. Confalonieri 1957, pp. 349–50.

  CHAPTER 19: ATTACKING HITLER

  1. ACS, MCPG, b. 172, ff. 57–59, 28 gennaio 1937.

  2. In Pignatti’s words, “the German cardinals, a good part of the North American and English cardinals, and virtually all of the French cardinals will not vote for a cardinal who has shown sympathy for the fascist regimes.” DDI, series 8, vol. 6, n. 456. Reporting to Paris in mid-March, Charles-Roux, the French ambassador, recalled that ever since the “brief but violent” conflict over Catholic Action in 1931, relations between the Holy See and the Fascist state had been smooth, because Vatican officials were “with very rare exceptions, entirely Italian,” and the Italian clergy were virtually unanimous in their enthusiasm for Mussolini. MAEI, vol. 267, 78–79, Charles-Roux à Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 19 mars 1937. Charles-Roux devoted the bulk of his lengthy report to urging that both the Sacred College of Cardinals and the main administrative and diplomatic staff of the Holy See be internationalized and that the Vatican move away from the Italians’ overwhelming domination. On the Catholic press in Germany, see Conway 1968, p. 171.

  3. As usual for the Easter mass in St. Peter’s, the Vatican diplomatic corps were all there, with the notable exception of the German ambassador to the Holy See, who boycotted the ceremony. Baudrillart 1996, pp. 456, 464–65 (22 mars 1937; 28 mars 1937); “Pope in Tears at St. Peter’s,” BG, March 29, 1937, p. 1.

  4. Confalonieri 1957, pp. 367–68; Venini 2004, pp. 203, 208–9; Chiron 2006, p. 414.

  5. From Asvero Gravelli, quoted in Bosworth 2002, p. 339.

  6. MAEI, vol. 70, 64–70, Charles-Roux à Delbos, ministre des affaires étrangères, 17 mars 1937.

  7. In America, he wrote, “there is a diffuse strong antipathy for the Nazi regime, which the Jews—who have important positions in the press, in politics, in finance—are naturally taking advantage of.” DDI, series 8, vol. 6, n. 126, Suvich a Ciano, 4 febbraio 1937.

  8. Luconi 2004, p. 159. The case of Cardinal Schuster, head of Italy’s most important archdiocese, Milan, was emblematic of the strong and high-level backing that the Church provided to the Fascist regime. Having done all he could to whip up support for the Ethiopian war, Schuster continued over the following year to cultivate close relations with the Milanese Fascist Party. In January 1937 Milan’s PNF head awarded him a medal in the nam
e of Milanese Fascism, and many locals thought the city’s Fascist leader consulted with the cardinal before he made any important decision. ACS, MI, FP “Schuster,” Milano 7 gennaio 1937. In February, at a lecture attended by Milan’s top Fascist and military leaders, Schuster praised Mussolini again as the man sent by God, comparing him to Constantine, the first Roman emperor to embrace Christianity. ACS, MI, FP “Schuster,” Milano, 27 febbraio 1937.

  9. The interview with Mussolini appeared on the front page of Völkischer Beobachter, January 17, 1937. William Dodd, U.S. ambasssador to Germany, sent an English translation of excerpts to the secretary of state, NARA, LM192, reel 6, January 23, 1937, no. 3265.

  10. ASV, AESI, pos. 855, fasc. 551, ff. 38r–39v, Tacchi Venturi a Pio XI, 2 marzo 1937.

  11. Godman 2004, pp. 133–54. Mit brennender Sorge was preceded, a week earlier, by an encyclical that denounced Communism, Divini redemptoris.

  12. In the interest of trying to keep the peace with Hitler, writes historian Peter Godman, “the Pope decided against speaking out on racism, human rights, and allied issues in the direct and detailed form prepared by the Supreme Tribunal [of the Inquisition]. Emphasizing his desire to ‘re-establish true peace in Germany,’ Pius XI sacrificed on the altar of the Concordat the outright attack on the Nazis that, in 1937, Rome might have launched.” Godman 2004, pp. 146–47. The official English and German translations of the encyclical are available at www.​vatican.​va. The Italian version is found in CC 1937 II, pp. 216–30.

  13. Godman 2004, p. 149; Fattorini 2007, p. 132.

  14. In his letter to Pacelli reporting the decision of the bishops of Berlin and Breslau to burn the documents, Orsenigo wrote that when other bishops asked him if they should do likewise, he replied that they should use their own judgment. In the margin of Orsenigo’s letter, Pacelli scribbled a note: “The Holy Father judges this a weak response.… He instructs that you respond instead that they burn without question all that which might cause problems.” Quoted in Fattorini 2011, pp. 123, 236n; emphasis by Pacelli in original.

 

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