A sniper and spotter of U.S. 1st Marine Division look out for enemy targets in Korea in January 1950. The sniper is armed with an M1 Garand rifle.
A U.S. sniper team undergo training during 1952, wearing somewhat rudimentary helmet camouflage. The sniper is armed with an M1 Garand rifle with an M82 telescopic sight.
Rookie sniper
U.S. Marine Corporal Ernest R. Fish found himself in a similar position to Chet Hamilton. Having achieved high scores at Camp Pendleton, he was dragged out of the frontline and given some rudimentary sniper training with an M1 rifle and a 2x magnification telescopic sight. This was hardly an ideal weapon for the purpose and not comparable to the Springfield rifles and Winchesters made available to the army. However, a well-zeroed rifle in the hands of someone as gifted as Corporal Fish was a dangerous weapon.
Back in the frontlines and with snow camouflage overalls, Fish found himself out on patrol looking for targets. Unfortunately, the North Koreans were as circumspect as their Chinese allies and Fish found himself staring at a lot of snow and a lot of empty trenches. Eventually, a North Korean was unwise enough to stand up in his trench and gaze in Fish’s direction. You do not gaze at snipers.
In Korea, apart from a few honorable exceptions, sniping was a do-it-yourself job in response to an emergency. It was as if sniping were a lost art or that military forces were in denial about its importance, not only as a support in both defense and attack, but as a means of keeping enemy snipers at bay.
The Korean War proved again that sniping was not just some bad dream from World War II but an essential part of infantry tactics, especially in more static tactical situations. Those armies that did not train snipers did so at their peril.
ZHANG TAOFANG (1931–2007)
Zhang Taofang was a Chinese soldier during the Korean War who is credited with seventy-one confirmed kills in thirty-two days without using a magnifying scope.
The Korean War began as an invasion of South Korea by North Korea, leading to intervention by the forces of many nations under the United Nations banner. This in turn resulted in China joining the conflict to prevent the defeat of its neighbor and ally, North Korea. The war gradually settled down into a grim stalemate along the “main line of resistance.” This created ideal conditions for sniping, with both sides occupying static positions.
By January 1953, Zhang Taofang had been in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for under two years. He was assigned to 8th Company, 214th Regiment, XXIV Corps, holding positions on the main line of resistance around Triangle Hill. This position was flanked by high ground, creating ideal sniper positions, and thus inevitably became known as Sniper Ridge. A system of trenches protected these positions, with tunnels constructed through the upper part of the ridge to allow snipers to move into firing positions on the forward slopes and retire in the face of artillery or heavy enemy fire.
These heavily fortified positions had been the scene of bitter fighting the previous year. Indeed, the losses incurred around Triangle Hill were a major factor in the decision by UN commanders not to launch more large-scale attacks against Communist positions. This in turn resulted in a stalemate that lasted until the end of the war.
First contact
Zhang Taofang joined the fighting around Triangle Hill on January 11, 1953. He was assigned to a sniper team and issued an elderly Mosin-Nagant rifle, which had only iron sights (considered accurate at ranges of up to 400 metres [438 yards]) rather than a magnifying telescopic scope. With this distinctly inadequate weapon he joined the snipers harassing UN positions, and waited for a suitable target to present itself.
After eighteen fruitless days of waiting Zhang Taofang got what he wanted, and opened fire on his target. His shooting was poor but persistent, two serious errors for a sniper, since every shot gives the enemy an opportunity to zero his position. After twelve missed shots Zhang Taofang attracted a huge volume of return fire and narrowly escaped being killed.
Realizing that he needed to improve his shooting, Zhang Taofang worked out how to make better use of his basic iron sights, and claimed his first victim the next day. He also developed his sniper craft, no longer brazenly blasting away at the enemy, and rapidly became a deadly effective marksman.
“That’s when my buddy got killed. We were bringing up the rear. There was a road that cut into the mountains. He darted across and hit the ditch. I darted right behind him. A sniper got him. He was lying dead in the ditch. I was left by myself.”
Pvte. Eugene Sutherland, U.S. 7th Infantry Division
His skills improved so quickly that on February 15, 1953 he scored seven confirmed kills with nine shots, still without using a scope. According to Chinese records, he made seventy-one successful kills with two hundred and forty shots during a forty-day period. Other claims put his tally in the hundreds.
There have been suggestions that Zhang Taofang’s record is dubious, given the weapon he was using at the time. His success is possibly attributable to an intimate knowledge of static enemy positions gained from long hours of observation. With enemy targets liable to present themselves in predictable locations, which he might have already fired on, it is not implausible that Zhang Taofang could have learned to gauge distance and bullet drop based on previous shots taken in the same area.
U.S. infantry work their way through hilly territory north of Seoul, winter 1951. Craggy, mountainous terrain made up much of the main line of resistance and was consequently ideal country for snipers, with good viewing points and clear fields of fire.
Corporal Scott C. Anderson, a scout/sniper with the 23rd Marines, 5th Marines Division, takes aim on a training exercise in 1986. He has an M40A1 rifle with a Unertl 10x magnification telescopic sight. Note the comprehensive snow camouflage, including overalls, mittens and rifle camouflage.
COLD WAR CONFLICTS
In Vietnam, as in Korea, the United States found itself embroiled in a conflict where it tried to prevent the democratic south of a nation being overrun by the communist north. To make matters more complicated, communist sympathizers called the Viet Cong also operated in the south. As in Korea, the communists were backed by the Soviet Union and China and the U.S. became evermore deeply committed as it pursued its policy of containment.
A U.S. Marine aims an M40A1 rifle on the Que Son mountains in Vietnam in 1969. The Marine has made little attempt at camouflage, showing bare arms and a spotless rifle.
From 1961, the number of U.S. “advisers” were increased exponentially and by 1965 there were active combat units on the ground. By 1969, these had risen to five hundred thousand men. Not only did American forces have to cope with the complexities of jungle warfare, including extreme heat and difficult terrain, but their enemies also proved to be elusive, capable of sustaining large casualties and of running an open-ended war of attrition.
This was not a force that was prepared to fight decisive pitched battles. Although they might appear to have been defeated in one engagement, they would always reappear for another. The Viet Cong’s People’s Liberation Forces (PLAF) were ordinary villagers who took up arms on a part-time basis before returning to their daily lives. Local organized forces of Viet Cong (VC) remained in hiding in swamps, mountains or other remote areas. These forces were supplied from the north via the Ho Chi Minh Trail or, as an alternative, they either captured U.S. weapons or bought them from corrupt officials.
Attempts to segregate villagers from Viet Cong, in a similar way to which the British had separated Malayan villagers from communist guerrilla infiltration during the Malayan Emergency (1949–60), proved fruitless as the Viet Cong influence was too insidious and the cancer could not be isolated. The North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh issued a statement that summarized effectively the nature of the insurgency. He said that if the Americans “want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years.”
RECONNAISSANCE
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary definition of reconnaissance is “military observation of a region t
o locate an enemy or ascertain strategic features; preliminary surveying or research.”
Reconnaissance can take many forms, depending on the unit that has responsibility for it in any particular armed force, and it may include working out the lie of the land or specifically identifying the type and movements of enemy formations. Reconnaissance is associated with the roles of specialist tasks such as forward observation and target acquisition and also with sniping. The U.S. Marine Corps took the logical step of formalizing this natural association and for this reason their snipers are known as scout/snipers and are trained to fulfill both reconnaissance and sniping duties. This should not be confused, however, with Marine Recon. There are separate Marine reconnaissance battalions that provide a proactive mix of intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and preparatory raiding. Marine Recon have responsibility for deep penetration and reconnaissance patrols and were active in Vietnam. A similar service is provided by the British Army by the Pathfinder Platoon, whose missions may include covert reconnaissance as well as direct action. Typically, the Pathfinders will prepare landing grounds and identify enemy positions ahead of the arrival of the main force. Members of the Brigade Patrol Group of the British Royal Marines also provide intelligence gathering and are trained as snipers. Special forces of many kinds are often involved in reconnaissance work, whether it be the British SAS or the U.S. Delta Force.
Soldiers of the U.S. 9th Division pause on patrol after a sniper bullet is fired. The Viet Cong and North Vietanmese PLA were fully aware of the value of snipers.
NORTH VIETNAMESE SNIPERS
Not only did the North Vietnamese send arms and other supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, they also sent snipers. They were armed with the Mosin-Nagant Model 1891/30 rifle with telescopic sights and, like the Japanese in the jungles of the Pacific, they were capable of holding down units for hours as they lay concealed in thick jungle foliage. Such was the effect of the sniper that aerial assets could be called in and thousands of pounds of ordnance expended, sometimes to no avail.
The sniper therefore was a true emblem of the war of attrition that was taking place and he was also emblematic of how a vastly more powerful force, namely that of the United States, could be held at bay by vastly inferior but well-placed units. In one incident, a single North Vietnamese Army (NVA) sniper held down two Marine companies and required the involvement of six fighter-bombers. If this was what was needed to deal with one sniper, what would be required to deal with thousands?
A U.S. Marine sniper aims through an embrasure constructed from concrete blocks. He is using an M40A1 rifle with a Redfield telescopic sight and wears a body armor vest.
U.S. Marines undergo sniper training among rice paddy fields in Vietnam. The helmet is used as a support for the M40A1 sniper rifle and the spotter has also dispensed with head protection.
The U.S. military relied heavily on helicopters to move its troops around and to insert them for offensive missions. North Vietnamese snipers targeted helicopters and also selected targets once the troops were on the ground. They created maximum disruption by shooting key personnel such as officers, NCOs, radio operators and those carrying or operating vital equipment and weaponry.
The Battle of Ia Drang
In the fight at Ia Drang in October 1965, Captain Bennett, Commander of Company A, 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry, was killed by a sniper and sniper activity proved to be an enduring feature of the battle. The official history of the battle records:
Still concerned with possible enemy intentions and capabilities and no doubt wary because of what had happened to Company C on the previous morning’s sweep, Colonel Moore directed all companies to spray the trees, anthills, and bushes in front of their positions to kill any snipers or other infiltrators–a practice that the men called a “mad minute.”
Seconds after the firing began, an enemy platoon-size force came into view 150 meters [164 yards] in front of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and opened fire at the perimeter. An ideal artillery target, the attacking force was beaten off in twenty minutes by a heavy dose of high-explosive variable time fuse. The “mad minute” effort proved fruitful in other respects. During the firing one North Vietnamese soldier dropped from a tree, dead, immediately in front of Captain Herren’s command post. The riddled body of another fell and hung upside down, swinging from the branch from which the man had tied himself in front of Diduryk’s leftmost platoon. An hour later somebody picked off an enemy soldier as he attempted to climb down a tree and escape. [Seven Firefights in Vietnam, John A. Cash, John Albright and Allan W. Sandstrum]
U.S. MARINES SNIPER SCHOOL
The current U.S. Marine Corps sniper course is called the Scout/Sniper School. In Vietnam, Captain Robert E. Russell was given the task of establishing a sniper school in Phu Bai in 1965.
Russell was in the Marines 3rd Division and Captain Jim Land of 1st Marines Division was also enrolled in the task of gathering a team of expert marksmen to train snipers. As candidates came forward to the schools, they were assessed for a range of skills and about 25 percent were returned to their units as unsuitable.
After all the fits and starts in the previous three wars–World War I, World War II and the Korean War–it had now become clear to the authorities that sniping could no longer be treated like an optional extra, with marksmen being asked to perform on a freelance basis when occasion demanded. Snipers on both sides had proved that sniping was a skill that had an influence on the battlefield way out of proportion to the numbers involved. If you wanted to influence the battle, you required trained and organized snipers.
As time went on, the U.S. Marine Corps started to develop a course that set it apart from sniper training in the U.S. Army as well as the training in other countries. The U.S. Marine sniper would also be a scout, providing essential reconnaissance information for the infantry battalion in which they served. The scout/snipers would be attached to the team of specialists who also dealt with target acquisition and surveillance. They were, in short, an elite and they had to pass through a searchingly rigorous assessment and training course in order to achieve that elite status. A potential scout/sniper in the Marines volunteers from the ranks and is normally given an assessment that may include rigorous fitness tests and interviews. If successful, the Marine would be passed on to the Scout/Sniper Basic Course (SSBC), which could take place at a number of different U.S. Marines bases, including Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, Quantico or Hawaii. This comprises an eight-week course, the rigour of which can be measured by its failure rate of 60 percent. Once the course is under way, students are taught basic marksmanship, which includes precision shooting under pressure at a variety of different ranges. The students work in a team–one firing while another spots and then they change over. To make it more difficult, the tests are conducted in the form of a race, which has all sorts of implications for fitness and the ability to be steady for the next shot. The score has to be at least twenty-eight out of thirty-five rounds on the black part of the target.
A U.S. Marine instructor guides a student sniper using a Remington Model 700 rifle from which the U.S. Marines M40A1 sniper rifle was developed.
Apart from marksmanship, students are also taught stalking, which means approaching an observation post (OP) undetected. The aim is for the student to get themselves into a good shooting position at the OP without being observed and to have their rifle adjusted for the shot. Other parts of the course cover camouflage and concealment, movement, observation and field sketches and weapons. Successful students can elect to specialize in other areas, such as urban sniping, mountain sniping and team leading or to carry on with a course at a foreign sniper school, such as the British Royal Marines sniping school or the Israeli Foreign Forces Snipers School.
The role of the trained scout/sniper is to provide accurate fire in support of combat operations; to establish hides from which to operate as a sniper and an observer; and to be able to use all necessary tools, whether weapons, navigational equipment or radios, in
pursuit of these tasks.
In this battle, therefore, the VC/NVA snipers did not have everything their own way.
In October 1967, 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry were sent out to monitor possible enemy insurgents near Dak To in Kontum Province. In a firefight on a hill, they discovered NVA snipers once again in trees. Like the Japanese, the NVA lashed themselves into the trees from which they swayed grotesquely when shot.
The Tet Offensive
During the Tet Offensive, the U.S. 3rd Marine Division heading towards Hue in trucks discovered that NVA snipers were just as adept at hiding in buildings. As the task force closed in on the city, communist snipers opened fire on the Marines from dilapidated buildings and thatched huts that lined either side of the highway. The column drove on, spraying each suspected sniper position with a hail of bullets as it passed. For 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, enemy snipers would also prove to be a significant obstacle. Moving south of Hue, they came to a small hamlet called Thon Que Chu, whereupon the inhabitants evaporated.
As the battalion reached the hamlet, snipers began firing at the Americans from the woods to the south where the villagers had fled. … The colonel called for an artillery strike from two South Vietnamese 105-mm [4.1in] howitzers at Pk-17. Without interpreters on hand to adjust the fire, however, the shelling proved to be ineffectual. Although the low cloud ceiling ruled out any close air support missions from the U.S. Air Force, brigade headquarters sent gunship and aerial rocket artillery helicopters to soften up the enemy position. … The preparatory bombardment had done little harm to the enemy, but General Tolson demanded that Sweet take Thon Que Chu without further delay. Colonel Sweet strongly recommended waiting until the artillery battery attached to his battalion became operational at Pk-17, but Tolson overruled him. Out of options, the colonel decided to take Thon Que Chu with a frontal assault.
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