by Bob Cashner
The truth, no doubt, lies somewhere between the two extremes. Riding in open-topped half-tracks in armoured columns stretching for miles, the tank tracks filling the air with an endless cloud of dust full of fine grit, and leaping from their half-tracks to hit the sand, the Israeli armoured infantry would have found their weapons filthy at the moment of contact. In the lightning-fast mobile combat the Israelis engaged in, soldiers hardly had The FAL in action alongside its
time to eat and went days without sleep; there is not always time for Israeli replacement, the Galil
constant weapons cleaning. As one joker put it, when exposed to enough assault rifle – but a long way
desert dust and sand, any man-made machine short of a claw-hammer will from the Middle East. This photo
stop functioning eventually.
of two Sandinista guerillas
was taken on 6 June 1979 as
The FAL began to be replaced by the Israeli-designed and -manufactured they fought to overthrow the
Galil assault rifle in 1974. Based upon the Kalashnikov rotating-bolt Somoza government. Their rifles
mechanism and the Garand trigger mechanism, the Galil used the Finnish are recently captured from the
M62 assault rifle as a basis for the receiver; this combination offered Nicaraguan National Guard.
(Archives UPI/AFP/Getty Images)
durability and reliability under the roughest of conditions. During both training and war, some Israeli
soldiers had been observed
using the feed lips of rifle
magazines as bottle openers,
itself a habit not conducive
to good weapon functioning.
When Israeli Military
Industries (IMI) introduced
the new Galil rifle, it featured
a bottle opener on the bipod
to prevent this problem, and
that feature seemed to
fascinate the press and the
shooting world.
Whatever the case of the
desert FAL – junk or gem,
misused or incapable – it did
equip the IDF for two
decades and contributed to
Israeli victory in two major
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modern wars.
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THE INDO-PAKISTANI WARS
In the aftermath of World War II, the ‘Big Three’ victors (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom) divided up many smaller countries and territories. In the case of North and South Korea, an arbitrary line was literally scratched across a map. Many of these ill-thought-out and nearly random divisions have been a source of friction ever since.
In 1947, British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan and to date there have been four ‘official’ wars, one undeclared war and endless border skirmishes. The first battles began in 1947 and ended in 1948, and were collectively known either as the First Indo-Pakistani War or the First Kashmir War. The largest of these conflicts were the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971. In October 1962, India also fought a short, vicious and disastrous border conflict with communist China.
As with the Arab–Israeli Wars, massive mobile tank battles and air combat between modern jet aircraft dominated the headlines and garnered the most interest from other military forces. Still it was the infantry, as always, who had to be there to provide boots on the ground to end the conflicts. In 1965 and 1971, the Indian version of the FAL, the Ishapore-made 1A, equipped a great many of India’s troops, although many were still armed with the Indian-built .303in No. 1 Mk III* Lee-Enfield in 1965. The 1A1, offering semi-automatic fire only, also saw service with the 1987 Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka and most recently in the 1999 Kargil War.
The terrain itself in north-west India along the Pakistani border is infantry country, and light infantry country at that. Roads are few, logistics are a nightmare and the steep mountains make armoured or mechanized manoeuvres impossible. In October 1962, open fighting broke out between the People’s Republic of China and India in a month-long war over the tense and disputed border along the Tibetan frontier. The Chinese Army soundly trounced the Indian Army in a series of actions despite some heroic last stands by Indian defenders. The Indian Army had rushed formations directly from low-altitude areas, clad in summer-issue clothing, armed with Lee-Enfields and often limited to the ammunition carried in their pouches, and the men suffered from the environment as much as the Chinese forces.
This debacle led to India raising its specialized mountain divisions, consisting of acclimatized local soldiers who were then well trained and equipped for combat in the Himalayan mountain ranges that line India’s borders. These mountain divisions were high on the priority list to first receive the new 1A1 when it went into full production in 1963. Operating in rugged terrain with no armour, limited logistics trains and only some 75mm pack howitzers for indirect-fire support, the infantrymen in the mountain-warfare units found that their rifles took on considerably more significance. This fact had been noted in ski and mountain units since World War II: ‘Fire fights of the infantry in snow-covered terrain take on added importance because the terrain can be kept under observation more easily and also because visibility is usually better. In cases where [mountain]
troops have no artillery support, fire fights alone are frequently the only means of securing the success of the engagement’ (MID 1942: 29).
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Today, only India’s Ishapore Arsenal, Brazil’s IMBEL and De Santos Arms (DSA), based in Illinois, have the hardware to continue FAL
production. While replaced in frontline Indian Army service by the 5.56×45mm INSAS assault rifle, some 1A1s still soldier on, in part because the newer INSAS, like the British SA80 and American M16, suffered considerable teething problems when first adopted. Mirroring the re-emergence of the American M14/M21, some scoped versions of the 1A1
are retained in frontline units to serve as DMRs to provide long-range precision firepower at the squad or section level.
The 1A1 rifle still sees use in the hands of some units in the contested high mountain border areas. India and Pakistan have skirmished for years in the mountains along the Line of Control (LOC) border in Kargil, including fighting on Siacham Glacier, the highest battlefield in the world at around 6,000m ( c. 20,000ft) above sea level. Here, combat often comes down to small-unit scraps, squad on squad or even smaller, and the soldier’s rifle remains crucially important.
Private Bill Stallan of 6th
In addition to Indian Army DMR use, reserve and non-military or Battalion, The Royal Australian
semi-military forces have retained the 1A1. Special units such as the Regiment on jungle patrol in
Sashastra Seema Bal (Armed Border Force), a paramilitary force of guards/
Phuoc Tuy, 1971. Although the
Australians’ Lithgow-made L1A1s
trackers who police the remote mountain areas of the India–Nepal border, were supremely reliable and
have kept their 1A1s, the longer range of the weapon and its dependability powerful, soldiers were initially
in cold and snow proving valuable in mountain warfare. Some Indian only issued with five magazines,
police forces also retain 1A1s; quite a few policemen brought their SLRs which they were expected to refill
from bandoliers. (IWM MH 16767)
into play during the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
VIETNAM
Australian and New Zealand units fighting
alongside US, South Vietnamese and other
forces in Vietnam during the 1960s and
1970s were armed with the Lithgow-made
L1A1 semi-automatic SLR; they found it a
reliable weapon for jungle fighting. Despite
very limited manpower and artillery and air
support when compared to their American
by receiving special jungle training derived
from lessons learned in the jungles of
Malaya and Borneo, operated in a manner
which the Viet Cong and NVA came to fear.
Small Australian and New Zealand patrols
moved like ghosts and often proved
superior to the enemy when it came to
stealth and fieldcraft. Despite the
Australians’ general disdain for the ‘body
count’ as a measure of success, the statistics
do provide considerable vindication of the
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unconventional methods they used.
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Some estimates claim that American troops
expended around 200,000 rounds of small-
arms ammunition per enemy casualty; for the
Australians and New Zealanders armed with
the L1A1, 275 rounds were expended per
enemy casualty (Hall & Ross 2009). The
reasons for this were many. First, the Australian
and New Zealand soldiers were trained to a
standard of marksmanship far above and
beyond that of the American infantryman.
Second, many old hands in the 1st Australian
Task Force were Borneo and Malaya veterans,
reinforcing the jungle training Australian and
New Zealand forces received before
deployment to Vietnam. Third, the Australians
and New Zealanders frequently operated in
small, quiet, stealthy patrols rather than in
huge, blundering, easily-avoided battalion-sized (or larger) sweeps.
Members of B Company of 2nd
The Australian method paid off in inflicting enemy casualties without Battalion, The Royal Australian the need for dozens of aircraft and thousands of artillery rounds per Regiment move with care after landing by helicopter, July 1967.
engagement. For instance, more than a third of the Australians’ enemy The ANZACs in Vietnam often contacts were ambushes. In 34 per cent of the cases, the Aussies and Kiwis removed the carrying handles of ambushed the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) while in their SLRs to save weight, and only 2 per cent of the contacts did the enemy manage to surprise the the flash hiders to cut length.
(© Bettmann/Corbis)
ANZACs in their own ambushes. One SAS study of Australian actions in Vietnam claimed that, despite the usually quite timely and relatively heavy air strikes and artillery support Western infantry enjoyed in that war, some 70 per cent of enemy casualties were inflicted with infantry small arms.
The ANZACs’ tactical methods also kept the enemy responding to them rather than vice versa, a critical element in counter-insurgency warfare.
Although its 1,143mm (45in) length was hardly ideal in the jungle, the SLR got very high marks for its ruggedness and dependability. The battle of Long Tan in August 1966 occurred in a pounding monsoon downpour and sloppy mud, conditions that caused more than a few problems for the M60 machine guns and their exposed ammunition belts, as well as the handful of the new American Armalite M16 rifles used by the Australians.
The L1A1 weathered the test with flying colours; the official Australian Army after-action report called it ‘the outstanding weapon of the action’.
(Australian Army 1967: 26)
As with the British L1A1, the Australian SLR offered semi-automatic fire only. The conservation of ammunition provided by the semi-automatic made a real difference at Long Tan. Most soldiers were issued with, at best, one loaded magazine in the rifle and four spare magazines in their web gear; a total of 100 rounds or fewer does not last long in a set-piece long-term firefight, even on semi-automatic. Still, in the jungle, it was usually standard operating procedure to ‘dump’ the first magazine as fast as possible to establish fire superiority and then switch to the aimed ‘double-tap’ thereafter.
Even so, one of the biggest lessons of Long Tan was the issue of a great deal more ammunition and magazines to the infantryman. The issue of 53
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only five magazines, which were expected to be reloaded from bandoliers, was obviously insufficient for a soldier engaged in a firefight.
As with fighting men around the globe, the Australians and New Zealanders also quickly made use of the penetrative power of the 7.62×51mm NATO round. More than one enemy soldier hiding behind the trunk of a rubber tree found his cover turned into mere concealment by 7.62×51mm rounds blasting through it.
One semi-official modification of the L1A1 in Vietnam, which began in the Australian SAS, was nicknamed ‘The Beast’, or sometimes ‘The Bitch’. This was an L1A1 converted to full-automatic fire with parts from the L2A1 SAW and the barrel, minus flash suppressor, cut off just beyond the gas-plug assembly. With a 30-round magazine, which it could empty in less than three seconds, it was a fearsome close-range weapon. More than a few soldiers of both sides thought the huge muzzle blast of ‘The Beast’ sounded like a heavy .50-calibre machine gun, providing a powerful psychological effect along with the extra firepower. Australian Recce veteran Peter Haran described his combat-zone modifications to his SLR: In Recce we had a choice of weapon, and I went back to the SLR [from the Armalite], but made a few adjustments. I replaced the safety catch with one from an L2A1 heavy-barrelled SLR and filed down the trigger sear and the pin designed to stop the safety catch from going ‘auto’. With a 30-round instead of a 20-round magazine I now had the weapon I wanted in the bush – a ‘Slaughtermatic’, I called it: in essence a fully automatic 7.62mm machine gun without a belt-feed, a lightweight rifle with maximum punch when on automatic fire. I considered that too many magazines going through without a break were likely to melt the barrel, but if it ever came to that sort of fight I probably wouldn’t be coming home anyway. (Haran & Kearney 2001: 32)
The FAL in Vietnam (opposite)
On 18 August 1966 at Long Tan, South Vietnam, elements of D Company, 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment made contact with what would turn out to be a regiment of Viet Cong supported by at least a battalion of North Vietnamese Army forces. The Australians were soon pinned down in a rubber plantation, just as the monsoon rains began to pour down. Despite the sea of mud and water, the Australians’ L1A1 Self-Loading Rifles gave extremely reliable performance, the official after-action report calling the SLR the
‘outstanding weapon of the action’.
The soldier shown here changing magazines could not have done so often; the official basic load at the time was one 20-round magazine in the weapon and four spares, for a total of 100
rounds of ammunition. Empty magazines were supposed to be reloaded from bandoliers.
This system, of course, proved inadequate for combat. Only a daring low-level resupply drop from a helicopter kept D Company from running out of ammunition entirely during the engagement.
The company commander recommended eight magazines per man after this battle.
Although the Australian Army had adopted the heavy-barrelled L2A2 SAW version of the FAL and had begun to make very promising improvements to the weapon, the adoption of the belt-fed American M60 7.62mm NATO machine gun, seen here, led to the L2A2’s demise.
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The rifles that fought the
THE FALKLANDS WAR
Falklands War. Above is the
In the Falklands War of 1982 between Argentina and Britain, the terrain British L1A1 SLR and below is an
was such that long-range heavy-calibre infantry weapons came into their Argentine folding-stock ‘Para’ FN
own. Barren and nearly devoid of vegetation, the islands were usually FAL. (Neil Grant)
windswept and the open,
featureless terrain (weather permitting) offered unlimited visibility but made range estimation difficult.
The Falklands War was odd in that both sides’ infantry were equipped with the FAL. The Argentine model was a Metric-pattern FAL, licence-manufactured locally, with full-automatic capability. Some Army troops received folding-stock ‘Para’ models, but it was the Argentine Naval Marines, operating from armoured amphibious tracked vehicles, who had significant numbers of the ‘Para’ version. Heavy-barrelled FAP SAWs were also in widespread use by the Argentine infantry. The British forces had their L1A1 SLRs, offering semi-automatic fire only, and had long preferred the L4 Bren to the heavy-barrelled FAL. Both sides, however, used the same GPMG, the FN MAG.
While a general misperception has grown over the years that the Falklands War was a cakewalk for the British, the late Major-General Sir Jeremy Moore, the commander of the British land forces during the conflict, called it, ‘a damn close run thing.’ Being volunteers and belonging to more elite light-infantry units such as the Royal Marines, Paras and Gurkhas, the British forces were better trained, with long traditions and a strong esprit de corps, which made them generally more aggressive than their opponents. In contrast, the Argentine forces consisted for the most part of conscripts with only a year or so of military service; some reinforcements rushed in had completed only 45 days of training. When well trained and led, however, the Argentine soldier was as good a combatant as could be found anywhere. After the Battle of Two Sisters on 11/12 June 1982, a senior British NCO said, ‘They were good steadfast troops. I rate them.’ High praise indeed coming from a sergeant-major in 56
the Royal Marines.
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With some notable exceptions, much of the Argentine officer corps proved to be unprofessional, self-serving and sometimes even abusive towards their men. Proving the old adage that there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers, Argentine units under good leadership gave the British unexpectedly stubborn opposition, however.
While the British also used the single-shot throw-away 66mm Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) rocket, in Argentine accounts of the 1982 conflict the use of the Energa rifle-launched grenade is mentioned on numerous occasions; the Energa’s use was frequent if not always effective. An Argentine officer, 2nd Lieutenant La Madrid, recalled his use of one during the confused night fighting on Mount Tumbledown (13/14 June 1982): I went through another gap in the rocks and was surprised by three men speaking in English behind and above me and firing over the top of me. I could see them with my night binoculars; there were about twelve of them in all. I was anxious to get back to my platoon. I took a rifle grenade and fired at where I had seen the first three men. I heard it explode and some shouts and cries of pain, and the sound of someone falling down the rocks. (Quoted in Middlebrook 1990: 265)