By November, Frere had received the Colonial Secretary’s response to the boundary commission’s report. It was not favourable to his stance: Hicks Beach accepted the report’s findings. Nonetheless, Frere was undaunted. He had begun assembling troops near the Zulu border in anticipation of conflict (Cetshwayo responded by calling up amabutho) and subsequently sent word to the king that the findings of the boundary commission and ‘other communications’ would be delivered on 11 December at the Lower Drift of the Tugela, near where the river met the Indian Ocean. The ‘other communications’ would prove to be an ultimatum.
On the morning of the 11th, fourteen royal izinduna and their attendants were ferried across the drift on flat-bottomed punts to the Natal bank where a party headed by John Shepstone (the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs and brother of Theophilus) was awaiting them. After announcing the findings of the boundary commission, Shepstone presented the British ultimatum to the increasingly incredulous Zulu embassy. Among other things, the perpetrators of the border incidents were to be handed over and Cetshwayo was to pay a fine of 500 cattle for not having already surrendered up Sihayo’s sons.
Much more significant, however, were demands that would render Cetshwayo politically and militarily impotent. The Zulu army was to be permanently disbanded; all Zulus were to be free to marry upon reaching maturity; missionaries were to be allowed to return and operate without hindrance; Cetshwayo was to observe his coronation oaths regarding the shedding of innocent blood; and a British Resident was to be stationed in Zululand to enforce the conditions. The ultimatum was due to expire on 11 January 1879 and, as Stephen Taylor comments: ‘It was called an ultimatum but it was more a declaration of war.’
Frere expected Cetshwayo to resist and was confident that in the event of conflict the Zulu nation would soon be overcome. His confidence was based on the superiority of British military might and the knowledge that cracks existed in the Zulu polity, for certain senior Zulus had built up their own power-bases and were known to be on strained terms with their king. Internal discord and defections were expected. In fact, one of the greatest chiefs in Zululand, Prince Hamu kaNzibe (a half-brother of the king) had already let the British know that in the event of war he was prepared to desert Cetshwayo in return for protection.
Within days, word of what Frere required arrived at oNdini. Cetshwayo responded by stating that he was prepared to pay the fine and hand over Sihayo’s sons, but had to discuss the weightier issues with his councillors. By late December, though, he was unwilling to hand over Sihayo’s sons despite strong pressure from his inner council to do so. But as far as the demand for the dismantling of the Zulu military apparatus was concerned, Cetshwayo and his councillors were in agreement—compliance was out of the question. Hence when Cetshwayo called upon his regiments to assemble on the Mahlabathini plain for the great umKhosi festival (the amabutho had stood down by early December following their previous call-up), he ordered them to bring their arms and ammunition so that they could be ready for immediate active service during the festival, which was due to occur in January.
On 11 January 1879, British forces began to enter Zululand. Their commander was Lieutenant-General Frederick Augustus Thesiger, second Baron Chelmsford, a courteous and essentially decent man with a strong sense of duty. War had commenced.
Chelmsford’s plan of campaign
Instead of concentrating his available manpower, Chelmsford had decided to divide his forces into five columns, three of which would take part in the invasion while the others, he hoped, would protect Natal and the Transvaal from any Zulu counter-thrusts. Moreover, by dividing his invasion force Chelmsford avoided the logistical problems that a single column would have entailed, for the larger the convoy, the slower it moved and the more pressing was the problem of obtaining suitable forage. Also, by dividing his strike force Chelmsford no doubt hoped to induce the Zulus into fighting a pitched battle, for he feared that they might intend waging a protracted guerrilla campaign.
The Right Flank Column (No. 1) was commanded by Colonel Charles Pearson, 3rd Buffs, and was to cross into Zululand via the Lower Drift on the Tugela. It numbered some 4,750 officers and men. No. 2 Column, under Colonel Anthony Durnford, RE, was stationed above the Middle Drift, roughly halfway upstream from the Lower Drift and the Tugela’s junction with the Mzinyathi, and had a total strength of 3,871. The Centre Column (No. 3) was commanded by Colonel Richard Glyn, 24th Regiment, although Chelmsford’s decision to accompany it effectively reduced Glyn to being its nominal commander. Its strength was 4,709 officers and men. It was to cross the Mzinyathi into Zululand via Rorke’s Drift about 40 miles northwest of where the Mzinyathi meets the Tugela. The Left Flank Column (No. 4), 2,278 strong, commanded by Colonel Evelyn Wood VC, 90th Light Infantry, would do so from a point known as Bemba’s Kop on the Ncome, while the remaining column, No. 5, under Colonel H. Rowlands VC of the 34th Regiment, comprising 1,565 officers and men, was based further north at Luneburg in the Transvaal, charged with opposing any Zulu incursion and keeping a watchful eye on restive Boers in the Transvaal.
The three invading columns were to march on oNdini. For much of the way they would be so far apart that they would have to act independently. Chelmsford would only be able to exercise command over the whole invasion force as the columns converged on their goal.
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of Chelmsford’s forces, but something needs to be said about their composition and weaponry. He was in overall command of an army of 17,929 men, of whom 5,476 were British regulars, 1,193 irregular colonial horse and 9,350 black levies raised in Natal: the remainder were wagon drivers, etc. To supply his men while on campaign, Chelmsford had assembled 10,023 oxen, 398 mules, 977 wagons and 56 carts, a task that had proved difficult and expensive.
Regular infantry regiments either consisted of a single battalion or contained two battalions. The latter was true, for instance, of the 24th Regiment, which played a prominent part in the Zulu War. The first battalion had been in South Africa since 1875 and had been heavily involved in a recent Frontier War with the Xhosa, while the second battalion had only arrived in 1878 and had been employed in mopping-up operations. The 2/24th mostly comprised younger men than its sister battalion and, as the regimental depot had been established at Brecon in 1873, had a higher proportion of Welsh origin.
Officers of an infantry regiment possessed swords and revolvers, while the rank and file were armed with a Martini-Henry rifle and bayonet. The rifle weighed 9 lbs and was just over 4 feet long. It had been introduced in the early 1870s and was a breech-loading, single-shot weapon that fired a .45 inch calibre lead bullet, of which each man carried 70 rounds. Although sighted up to 1,700 yards, the British Army considered the rifle’s effective battle range as between 300 and 450 yards, though it was nonetheless common for firing to commence at 800 yards. Dirt in the mechanism made the rifle liable to jam, while after ten rounds the barrel became too hot to hold, a defect that had become apparent during the recent Ninth Frontier War. Consequently, soldiers had begun to fit protective bullock-hide covers over the barrel and stock. A battalion’s fire was normally delivered by volley, but independent firing was sometimes allowed. The bayonet was of the socket type and had a 21.5 inch blade, the longest ever employed by British infantry.
Chelmsford had no regular regiments of cavalry at the commencement of the Zulu War (the 1st King’s Dragoon Guards and 17th Lancers participated in its later stages after being sent out from England) but he did nevertheless have mounted soldiers from the outset. These included the 1st and 2nd Squadrons Imperial Mounted Infantry, which had been formed in 1877 and 1878. Each was about 120 strong and was divided into two troops. Officers and men were drawn from various infantry regiments, wore buff cord riding breeches, were armed with Swinburne-Henry carbines and had bandoliers instead of ammunition pouches. In 1875, Chelmsford’s predecessor, Sir Arthur Cunynghame, had declared that ‘experience has always shown me that picked
officers and men from foot regiments can in a very short time be turned into mounted riflemen of the very best description.’
The Imperial Mounted Infantry were supplemented by men from the Natal Volunteer Corps which consisted of various settler units whose weapons and uniforms were provided by the government, although the men provided their own mounts. All were part-time units, with the exception of the 110-strong Natal Mounted Police. Another fine unit was the Frontier Light Horse, commanded by a British officer, Major Redvers Buller of the 60th Rifles, which had just seen service in the Frontier War. The colonial irregulars were armed with a rifle or carbine and had bandoliers.
At the beginning of the Zulu War, Chelmsford’s artillery arm consisted of N Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, and 11th Battery, 7th Brigade, Royal Garrison Artillery. Moreover, a number of guns were provided for land operations by the Royal Navy. The batteries’ guns were 7-pounders which had a maximum range of 3,100 yards and were capable of firing shrapnel, common shell, double shell or case-shot. One of the batteries that arrived during the course of the war, and also a detachment from the navy, used 9-pounders, capable of projecting a shell up to 3,500 yards.
The Gatling gun was also employed during the war. It was mounted on a carriage (like the field guns) and consisted of ten rifled barrels revolving around a central shaft which were fed from a cylindrical magazine. It was fired by rotating a crank handle. The gun propelled a .45 inch calibre round up to an effective range of 1,200 yards and was capable of firing about 300 rounds a minute. It was prone, however, to jamming.
Hale’s rockets, invented by William Hale in the 1860s, were also used, with 9-pounders and 24-pounders respectively being employed by the Royal Artillery batteries and the Naval Brigade. The rockets possessed either an explosive or an incendiary warhead and had an effective range of approximately 1,300 yards. Accuracy was not one of their strengths, but they could nonetheless be effective against a massed target and their high-pitched shrieking sound in flight would presumably disconcert the Zulus, who were unfamiliar with such a weapon.
Chelmsford could also use the services of two field companies of Royal Engineers. One of these companies, and the advance party of the other, were present at the outset: the rest of the second company was making its way up from Durban. If occasion demanded, sappers acted as infantry if they could be spared from their normal duties.
The Royal Navy’s contribution to the forces at Chelmsford’s disposal consisted of detachments of officers and seamen, Royal Marine Artillery and Royal Marine Light Infantry. The Naval Brigade’s initial strength was a mere 230 men, but this was to rise to just over 800.
Of the black troops, 7,630 belonged to the Natal Native Contingent which was divided into three regiments, one with three battalions and the others with two. Each battalion comprised ten companies with nine white officers and NCOs, and 100 natives, and three companies of the 1st Battalion 3rd NNC consisted of dissident Zulus resident in Natal who had opposed Cetshwayo’s succession. No uniforms were issued to members of the NNC. Their only means of identification was a red rag tied around the head. In addition, some wore the occasional item of European clothing. Firearms were noticeably absent. Only one man in ten possessed a gun, many of which were old-fashioned, and consequently the bulk of the NNC were armed with spears and shields. The quality of the officers and NCOs was not high. Many were unsavoury characters for the majority of the best colonials were serving in the irregular mounted units. The 1st regiment of the NNC had the best officers and NCOs, thanks to its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford of the Royal Engineers, who had been stationed in Natal for several years and had lost the use of an arm through an injury sustained in combat. Durnford admired and respected blacks and managed to obtain white subordinates of a better calibre than the majority of those in the other regiments of the NNC, and he enjoyed the esteem of his men.
The NNC formed the bulk of the native levies who were to participate in the war. Others belonged to the Natal Native Horse (which contained five troops of men who were well mounted and armed with carbines), and two companies of Natal Native Pioneers, equipped with picks and shovels, who were intended to supplement Chelmsford’s limited number of sappers.
Cetshwayo’s Army
It was Cetshwayo’s aim to fight a defensive war, for he hoped that a purely defensive strategy would reap political dividends. He knew, for example, from white advisers such as Dunn that Britain’s resources were far greater than his own and that a violation of British territory would no doubt provoke a response of such magnitude that victory for the Zulus would become unattainable.
The king’s spies informed him that the Centre Column was the strongest of the invading forces, and so he decided to send the bulk of his army against it. The warriors were told to conserve their energy by advancing slowly, and were to refrain from attacking entrenched positions. Furthermore they were to avoid night attacks and, after driving back the enemy, were forbidden to follow them across the border.
The exact number of warriors Cetshwayo had at his disposal is unknown. The army’s nominal strength was probably about 40,000, but some of the regiments consisted of men who were very advanced in years and thus of little worth. The number of effective warriors available was about 29,000.
As in the past, the majority of regiments consisted of individuals of the same age drawn from different parts of Zululand. However, in the north-west the Qulusi, who enjoyed a close relationship with the Zulu royal house, formed their own regiment drawn from their specific locality centred on an ikhanda founded by Shaka.
During Mpande’s reign it had become common for warriors to marry earlier than formerly, and white shields, which had distinguished senior unmarried amabutho, now denoted married men. The latter generally lived in their own homesteads and only mustered for exceptional occasions, but some of these regiments continued to serve in the amakhanda, although the men were often accompanied by their wives and were free to come and go as they pleased. In Cetshwayo’s reign, one such ‘white assembly’ was the uThulwana regiment, together with other married regiments that had been incorporated with it to keep it up to strength, all of which were based at oNdini.
The average strength of regiments in the late 1870s was around 1,500 men, but some of the younger amabutho were much stronger. For instance, Cetshwayo’s favourite regiment, the iNgobamakhosi, numbered perhaps 6,000 warriors. Moreover, although it was the norm for newly established regiments to found their own barracks at a specified location, occasionally a new regiment was incorporated into an older one or was assigned to an existing barracks. The uVe, for example, formed shortly before the Zulu War, was a 4,000-strong ibutho which was incorporated into the iNgobamakhosi.
Lavish uniforms were still worn for ceremonial occasions but it was no longer customary to wear full dress into battle (if indeed it had ever been the practice); though adornment such as stuffed headbands of animal skin or the bushy parts of cows’ tails around the arm and leg was frequently worn. Men of rank and members of older regiments generally bore the most elaborate regalia into battle.
Warriors’ traditional arms consisted of spears, knobkerries and shields. Men of status sometimes carried battleaxes, although these appear to have been used principally on ceremonial occasions rather than as weapons of war.
The standard spear was still the stabbing spear, but by 1879 types with shorter and narrower blades (approximately 12 inches long by 1 and a quarter inches wide) had come into vogue at the expense of the larger weapon employed in earlier days, although the latter was nonetheless still used by some. As noted in a previous chapter, throwing spears had been reintroduced by Dingane. The most popular type had a blade about 7 inches long, attached by a shank to a shaft of up to 3 feet in length, and could be thrown with some degree of accuracy up to about 50 yards, and many of the warriors in 1879 would have possessed one or two of these spears.
By this date, of course, firearms suppleme
nted traditional weapons. Indeed, as has been mentioned, they had been acquired in substantial numbers, so much so that the majority of warriors had access to guns. Most were old-fashioned weapons such as Brown Bess muskets. This fact, combined with a lack of training, dearth of spare parts, and irregular supplies of ammunition, rendered the guns less deadly than would otherwise have been the case. Zulu fire was notable for its volume and inaccuracy.
In the mid-1850s Cetshwayo had introduced a new type of war-shield among his followers. It was about 3 and a half feet long and less than 2 feet wide, and thus smaller than the traditional version, making it lighter and easier to wield. Both types were carried during the Zulu War, often by warriors within the same regiment, though the smaller shield was evidently the more popular. Furthermore, the colour-coding of shields was no longer as precise as it had once been and there was less variety: grey and dun colours seem to have passed out of use. On the other hand, black was still viewed as a sign of youth and white as one of experience. Additionally, in at least some regiments—the iNgobamakhosi for one—warriors had shields that differed in colour from those of fellow members of the same regiment. At the beginning of Cetshwayo’s reign, Zululand’s cattle had been decimated by an epidemic of bovine pleuro-pneumonia and this perhaps made it impossible to maintain the colour-matching system of previous years.
Tactically, the Zulu army still employed the ‘beast horns’ manoeuvre, hoping to overcome the enemy by speed, ferocity and numbers. Warriors moved towards the enemy in open order, skilfully exploiting any cover, then fired a volley and closed up to charge at speed. When about 30 yards off, they hurled throwing spears if they had them, before pressing home to engage in hand-to-hand combat. Despite a number of obvious limitations, the army was a highly mobile force, in marked contrast to that of Chelmsford, and enjoyed a high degree of morale and strong motivation. Many of the young warriors, in particular, were itching for a fight. It was a potent force operating on familiar terrain, and one that enjoyed significant numerical superiority.
The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations Page 10