Subsequently, the Zulus launched several more assaults. At one point, warriors reached the trenches along the southern side of the redoubt before being driven off. Then, at about 4.30 p.m., they moved against the north and northeast faces of the British position, supported by the iNgobamakhosi, who moved forward from the rocks where they had been sheltering. Again they were repulsed.
The Zulus’ gallantry impressed their adversaries. For example, Sergeant Edward Jervis of the 90th Light Infantry wrote two days after the battle: ‘I confess that I do not think that a braver lot of men than our enemies in point of disregard for life, and for their bravery under fire, could be found anywhere.’
By 5.30pm, the Zulus were evidently spent and intent on retiring. Wood therefore ordered a company of the 1/13th to clear the cattle laager, where some warriors were still present, and despatched a company of the 90th to the edge of the valley in front of that enclosure. Here, after driving Zulus back with the bayonet, it opened fire on the warriors below as they began falling back eastwards towards Zungwini.
Their orderly withdrawal was turned into a rout when Wood launched his mounted troops against them. The pursuit lasted for over two hours and many of the exhausted Zulus were mercilessly slaughtered. Some simply stood and waited to be shot: others were stabbed with spears that had fallen into British hands. Buller is said to have been ‘like a tiger drunk with blood.’ He was not alone. For instance, Captain Cecil D’Arcy of the Frontier Light Horse exhorted his men: ‘No quarter, boys, and remember yesterday!’, whereupon they butchered ‘the brutes all over the place.’ Likely, they needed little encouragement.
The number of Zulus killed in the battle, or who died during the pursuit or subsequently from their injuries, is unknown: but it was high. During the following two days, 785 Zulu dead were collected from Khambula and its environs; and in a letter to his parents, D’Arcy commented that there were ‘hundreds and hundreds’ of Zulu bodies ‘some miles off, that are being eaten by dogs and vultures’. In short, the official British estimate of Zulu dead as ‘nearly 2,000’ is not likely to have been far wrong. A high percentage of high-ranking men had perished, for as Cetshwayo truly noted, they had ‘exposed themselves a great deal, attempting to lead on their men’. Wood’s casualties, in contrast, were modest. Eighteen British soldiers were killed, and eight officers and fifty-seven men wounded, of whom ten subsequently died.
Khambula is frequently said to have been the decisive battle of the war. This is a fair assessment. Not only did the engagement inflict heavy losses on the Zulus’ crack regiments—causing much lamentation in the Zulu nation— it also rammed home a fundamental point. No matter how bravely Cetshwayo’s warriors pressed home their attacks, their shields and assegais were no match for artillery and firearms employed effectively by British soldiers in compact positions. Cetshwayo was greatly saddened and angered by the battle’s outcome, and understandably so. Barring a miracle, the war was as good as lost.
The Battle of Gingindlovu
As noted, not all of the warriors who had assembled at oNdini by 22 March participated in the Khambula campaign. A significant minority of them were sent southeast to reinforce the warriors in the vicinity of Eshowe, thereby putting further pressure on Pearson’s beleaguered No. 1 Column and threatening any British attempt to march to its relief.
Hence the British garrison at Eshowe witnessed a growing enemy presence in the neighbourhood in the closing week of March, and by the beginning of April there were some 10,000 warriors in south-eastern Zululand. Some of them belonged to coastal elements of regiments such as the iNgobamakhosi, uMcijo and uMbonambi. Indeed, it is likely that almost all amabutho were represented, but many of the warriors were irregulars, including non-Zulu Tsonga from chiefdoms in the vicinity of St Lucia Bay which had strong cultural and tributary links with the Zulu state.
On 28 March, the day before Khambula, Chelmsford began advancing from the Lower Drift of the Tugela to relieve Eshowe. He did so at the head of a force that totalled 3,390 Europeans and 2,280 Africans. Some of its constituent units had recently arrived in South Africa after being sent out by the British government following Isandlwana. The regular element consisted of the 57th and 91st Regiments, six companies of the 3/60th Rifles, five companies of the 99th and two of the Buffs, Mounted Infantry, and a contingent of the Naval Brigade which included two 9-pounder guns, two Gatlings, and two heavy 24-pounder rocket tubes. John Dunn, the ‘White Zulu’, was also present, now well and truly on the British side.
Chelmsford did not advance towards Eshowe along the route taken by Pearson, for the nature of the terrain was close and presented the Zulus with the opportunity of setting an ambush. At Dunn’s suggestion, he thus moved up a track along the coast before heading inland. Progress was slow, partly because Chelmsford ensured that the camp was entrenched and laagered after each day’s march.
By the evening of 1 April, Pearson’s observers at Eshowe could see the approaching column as it moved into laager on the south side of the Nyezane near burnt-out Gingindlovu. Chelmsford encamped on the summit of a slight knoll over a mile from the river.
The laager was 128 yards square, thereby providing sufficient room for the column’s 2,000 oxen, 300 horses and the black levies. Some 15 yards in front of the wagons was a trench 157 yards square, and the excavated earth was used to build a waist-high wall on the inner side of the ditch. In the event of combat, it would be manned by many of Chelmsford’s white troops, who bivouacked between the wall and the wagons so that battle stations could be rapidly manned: and some of the infantry were to be positioned on top of the wagons, thereby confronting the Zulus with a double tier of fire. The northwest face was nearest to the river, and had a Gatling in each corner, while the rear face had the two 9-pounders in one corner and the rockets in the other.
The British spent an uncomfortable night, anticipating an attack. In addition, rain fell steadily. At midnight Chelmsford gave orders for the strengthening of the defences. Then, at 4am, as dawn approached, the soldiers stood to arms.
By this time the Zulu forces in the region had concentrated and were closing in. They were commanded by Somopho kaZikhale, the senior induna of the emaNgweni ikhanda and a close friend of Cetshwayo, who had instructed him to minimise Zulu losses as far as possible. Somopho had intended to ambush Chelmsford as the British commander headed towards Eshowe along the inner track. The general’s decision to march through the more open terrain of the coastal route had thwarted him. Now, with Chelmsford only a day’s march from Eshowe, Somopho had to strike, for delaying an attack until Chelmsford was closer to Eshowe ran the risk of being taken in the rear by Pearson.
At 5.45am, with the ground enveloped in thick mist, reports from mounted scouts and picquets reached Chelmsford, warning of the Zulus’ advance. The mist soon lifted and warriors were sighted north of the Nyezane, and on Misi Hill to the west of the laager, on the south side of the river. The Zulu concentration to the north divided and proceeded to cross the Nyezane, though reserves stayed on the hills to the north of the river. The left division, or left horn, then headed towards the northeast corner of the British position while the other division, the chest, moved against the northern face of the square. In the meantime, the Zulus on Misi Hill deployed in bush north of the hill, threatening both the western and southern faces of the laager. Hence within ten minutes of coming into view, the Zulus were formed into the famed crescent formation and advancing against three sides of Chelmsford’s position.
They did so in three relatively distinct lines of knots and groups of men, and when some 1,000 yards from the laager, came under concerted fire from the Gatlings, the artillery and the rockets. In turn, when about 800 yards from the British position, the Zulus also opened fire. As Captain Edward Hutton of the 3/60th Regiment recalled:
In spite of the excitement of the moment, we could not but admire the perfect manner in which these Zulus skirmished. A small knot of five or six would rise and dart
through the long grass, dodging from side to side with heads down, rifles and shields kept low and out of sight. They would then suddenly sink into the long grass, and nothing but puffs of curling smoke would show their whereabouts. Then they advanced again, and their bullets soon began to whistle merrily over our heads or strike the little parapet in front.
In response, when the Zulus were about 400 yards off, the British infantry began firing volleys. The left horn and chest enjoyed cover afforded by the long grass, bush and ant-hills—in places the grass and bush came to within 100 yards of the British—but the right horn was more exposed.
It was the warriors of the left horn and chest who first pressed home an attack, charging the northern and north-eastern perimeters of the laager. As they converged on the British, they were cut down in large numbers by the withering fire. Several desperate attempts to close by warriors ‘brave to madness’ failed (none of the charges came to within 20 yards or so of the north-east corner of the laager) and soon heaps of dead and dying Zulus littered the ground.
At 6.40am, the chest began falling back into the long grass, whereupon Chelmsford sent Barrow and 120 Mounted Infantry and Natal Volunteers, out against them. However, Barrow and his men soon received a nasty shock. The Zulus regained their fighting spirit and began closing round, intent on cutting off their pursuers. Barrow was forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal to the sanctuary of the laager. The chest then veered to the right and joined in the assault of part of the right horn against the west front of the British position. Here, too, the Zulus failed to make headway—their ranks were decimated by the impenetrable enemy fire.
At about the same time as the chest joined in the assault on the western front of the laager, around 7am, the other division of the right horn began attacking the southern face of the British position. This sector witnessed the most determined assault. On horseback, Dabulamanzi, Cetshwayo’s brother, urged on the warriors and sustained a flesh wound above the knee in the process. The ferocity of the attack was at least partly due to the presence of the NNC in the rear of the laager, which led the Zulus to mistakenly conclude that Chelmsford lacked enough British troops to man his entire position. But once again, the Zulus were cut down relentlessly and, demoralised, they began falling back to low ground to the south.
Seeing this, Chelmsford ordered Barrow to lead all the mounted troops out of the unengaged east face of the square, partly with the aim of attacking the east flank of the right horn. This sortie proved the final straw for the Zulus in general and they began to retire. The withdrawal soon degenerated into a rout when troopers charged home with swords drawn. Some warriors were pursued as they headed west towards Misi Hill or southward (their pursuers included members of the NNC who vacated the laager at 7.15am), while part of Barrow’s force wheeled north against the Zulus falling back towards the Nyezane and drove them through the river.
British casualties in the battle were slight—two officers and eleven men killed, four officers and forty-four men wounded. In contrast, Lord Chelmsford reported that 471 enemy dead were found within 984 yards of the laager and that another 200 had been discovered in the vicinity. Other bodies were found at a distance of up to approximately five miles. Hence Chelmsford estimated the total number of enemy dead as 1,000, but the War Office was to put the figure at ‘nearly 1200’ after accepting slightly higher estimates of other officers.
The following day Chelmsford advanced to Eshowe, headed by the 91st Highlanders with pipes playing and colours flying. Two days later, the Relief Column and Eshowe’s former garrison began returning to Natal. Chelmsford headed back by the coastal route and arrived in Natal on the 7th where he was to prepare for renewed hostilities, well satisfied with recent developments.
Cetshwayo felt differently. Gingindlovu, coming close on the heels of Khambula, had again depressed his spirits and further undermined national morale.
Prelude to Ulundi
During Lord Chelmsford’s absence, the bulk of the reinforcements sent from Britain had arrived at Durban and were becoming acclimatised. Among them were three infantry battalions, the 2/21st Royal Scots Fusiliers, the 58th and 94th. Moreover, the 1/24th had been reconstituted with a draft of 600 men. Additional gun batteries had also arrived, while new colonial mounted units, such as the Natal Light Horse, had been formed. Furthermore, along with the reinforcements had come four major-generals.
Chelmsford now prepared for what he hoped would prove the knockout blow, using two invading columns. One, the First Division, some 7,500 men strong, would advance up the coast from Fort Pearson at the Lower Drift of the Tugela under the command of the newly arrived Major-General H. H. Crealock, destroy important amakhanda, and hopefully ease the pressure on the other British forces by compelling Cetshwayo to send part of his army against it. On the other hand, the Second Division, approximately 5,000 strong, under Major-General E. Newdigate, would march by way of Landman’s Drift on the Mzinyathi, a crossing upstream from Rorke’s Drift. The latter was rejected as a point of entry, partly because Chelmsford did not wish his men to pass Isandlwana where the decaying bodies of the soldiers killed on 22 January still lay. After advancing from Landman’s Drift, the division would cross the Ncome and swing south towards Babanango, beyond Isandlwana, before heading towards oNdini along the route the Centre Column would have taken had it not been overwhelmed by disaster. The division was to link up with Wood’s command of 3,200 men, henceforth to be known as the Flying Column, currently still at Khambula.
The units that comprised the Second Division, which Chelmsford intended to accompany, began to concentrate at Landman’s Drift in early May. Moreover, on 5 May, Wood left Khambula with the aim of ultimately joining the Second Division.
During the course of the month, Chelmsford sent out a number of patrols and raiding parties from Landman’s Drift to reconnoitre and reduce the Zulus’ capacity to offer resistance in the areas through which he would march by seizing cattle and destroying homesteads and crops. Little opposition was encountered; much of the countryside had been abandoned. Cross-border raids were also conducted on Chelmsford’s orders by forces to the east, who crossed the Tugela.
On 18 May, a patrol of the 17th Lancers reported that they had located a drift across the Ncome at Koppie Alleen, less than ten miles northeast of Landman’s Drift. Beyond it, a track usable by wagons headed east before turning south towards Babanango. Chelmsford had intended crossing the Ncome further upstream, about twenty miles north of Landman’s Drift, and had had supplies transported to the point; but as a shorter route to oNdini was now possible the supplies were transferred to Koppie Alleen instead.
While this was underway, Chelmsford turned his attention to burying the soldiers who had fallen at Isandlwana. Thus, on 21 May, Major-General F. Marshall, who commanded the Cavalry Brigade attached to the Second Division, arrived at the battlesite with a force largely consisting of the 17th Lancers, and having put to the torch surviving Zulu homesteads on the way, commenced burying the British dead. He then returned to Landman’s Drift, leaving the task to be completed later.
By the end of May, the Second Division had advanced to Koppie Alleen. Hence, on the 31st, its leading brigade crossed the Ncome into Zululand where it encamped on the far bank, and was followed the next day by the division’s second brigade. It was intended to link up with Wood’s Flying Column on 2 June in a valley between the Tshotshosi and Tombokola Rivers.
In contrast, Crealock’s division was still not ready to advance from Fort Chelmsford, recently established beside the Nyezane, and to which the foremost units had advanced from the Lower Drift. In the event, it would be 19 June before his whole force was assembled beside the Nyezane.
Chelmsford was in sanguine mood, but soon received shattering news. On Sunday, 1 June, an observer on his staff was killed in ignominious circumstances while out reconnoitring, for he was abandoned by his colleagues following a surprise Zulu attack in the Tshotshosi Valley. The observer was no
ordinary mortal. He was none other than young Louis Bonaparte, the Prince Imperial of France, the only son of the late Napoleon III, and had been living in exile in Britain since being forced to flee France during the Franco-Prussian War.
The prince’s death was a devastating blow which put Chelmsford under even greater pressure to crush the Zulus, for the news of Louis’ death was met with horror and incredulity in Britain and France. Indeed, it caused a wave of Anglophobia in the latter country, even among Republicans who had derided the prince’s claim to the vacant French throne.
On 3 June, Newdigate’s Second Division pressed on. It crossed the Tshotshosi River the following day and encamped on ground just vacated by Wood, whose Flying Column had already just crossed the river and now advanced to a new encampment on the far side of another river, the Nondweni.
Early on the 5th, Marshall and the Cavalry Brigade rode east to reconnoitre after hearing that a small Zulu force lay to their front, and in so doing met up with Buller and irregular horse from the Flying Column. A skirmish ensued in the valley of the Ntinini (Phoko) River in which the Zulus forced their opponents to withdraw.
On the same day, Chelmsford, who had advanced to the Nondweni, interviewed three envoys from Cetshwayo, who earnestly desired to bring an end to hostilities, a desire shared by the principal men of his kingdom. Chelmsford, however, felt otherwise and was determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. Hence the diplomatic overture proved futile, as did others launched by Cetshwayo during this period.
Chelmsford established an intermediate depot called Fort Newdigate beside the Nondweni. Then, on the 7th, he moved forward to the Ntinini, where he halted for over a week. He did so to await the arrival of fresh supplies that were brought up, escorted by the Flying Column and half the regular cavalry of the Second Division, which had been charged with the task.
The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations Page 15