The Battle of Ulundi fatally undermined Cetshwayo’s already waning authority and rendered Zululand prostrate before the British. On 6 July, in the letter referred to above, Captain Slade voiced the general opinion of the victors when he wrote, ‘we all felt at last that the power of the Zulus had been destroyed.’ Without doubt it was a sentiment shared by many of the vanquished—an era had passed.
The capture of Cetshwayo
After the battle, the bulk of the victorious force moved to the Mbilane stream where the men rested and had dinner, while their colleagues still scoured the plain, flushing out hiding Zulus and destroying amakhanda. oNdini itself was put to the torch at 11.40am, shortly after the square had set off for the Mbilane. During the course of the afternoon, the British returned to their encampment beside the White Mfolozi.
Cetshwayo, on the other hand, soon received word of his army’s defeat and fled north across the Black Mfolozi to one of Mnyamana’s homesteads in northern Zululand, where he arrived three days after Ulundi. By this date, Chelmsford and his men had returned to the Mthonjaneni Heights where, owing to bad weather, they remained for several days before withdrawing.
While doing so, on 16 July Chelmsford met Wolseley and the First Division roughly midway between Mthonjaneni and the coast. Chelmsford then said farewell to his men, rode on to Durban, and sailed for England.
Wolseley had been advised by Sir Henry Bulwer to do all he could to convince the Zulu nation that ‘we desire nothing from them but a proper security for peace [and] that we do not desire any portion of their territory; that our quarrel was with the King, and not with them.’ The apprehension of Cetshwayo was thus central to Wolseley’s task of bringing about the ‘settlement’ of the Zulu question.
It was not long before Wolseley heard reports that Cetshwayo was gathering armed men in northern Zululand. Consequently, he decided to reoccupy oNdini with units that had belonged to the First Division and direct operations from there. He made oNdini his headquarters on 10 August, by which time many chiefs had submitted, and the hunt for Cetshwayo commenced with patrols being sent north of the Black Mfolozi.
On the 14th, a party of chiefs and izinduna headed by Mnyamana arrived at oNdini, bringing a large number of cattle on the king’s instructions. Their aim?—to intercede on Cetshwayo’s behalf. ‘We had gone,’ recalled Ntshingwayo, ‘simply to ask for his head, that he might live and not perish’, and continue residing in Zululand. Wolseley assured them that Cetshwayo would not be executed—his continued residence in Zululand was another matter.
Wolseley kept Mnyamana and four other senior members of the party at his camp, and continued hunting down Cetshwayo, who moved to more inaccessible terrain and from homestead to homestead to elude patrols, his support increasingly ebbing away.
On 20 August Wolseley gave orders to ‘burn Kraals & carry off cattle where the King is known to be & to be concealed by the inhabitants.’ Furthermore, torture was employed to induce Zulus to betray his whereabouts. For instance, Chief Mbopha kaWolizibi, a royal favourite, was kicked to the ground and burned with firebrands in a futile attempt to extract such information.
Cetshwayo’s freedom ended early on 28 August when he was surrounded in a homestead on the fringe of the Ngome Forest, together with a number of his followers. That night, while being taken to Wolseley’s camp at oNdini, two of the king’s companions were allowed to return home on the grounds that they had not been members of the royal entourage. They took with them secret instructions ordering Mahubulwana kaDumisela of the Qulusi to disband his men, who were still under arms in the northwest where they had clashed with troops charged with pacifying the area.
Surrender of Cetshwayo. ©Philip Haythornthwaite
Cetshwayo arrived by cart at oNdini on the 31st, where he was told that he had been officially deposed as Zulu king for having violated his ‘coronation vows’, and that he was to be sent into exile and his kingdom split into independent chiefdoms. The following day the distraught Cetshwayo was escorted towards Port Durnford (on the coast above the Umlalazi River) and, on 4 September, sailed for Cape Town, where he was to be confined in the castle.
Meanwhile, three days earlier Wolseley had assembled prominent Zulus at oNdini to inform them how Zululand would be governed in the future.
7. CIVIL WAR AND REBELLION
‘The rule of the House of Chaka is a thing of the past . . . it is like water spilt on the ground.’ Sir Arthur Havelock
On the afternoon of 1 September 1879, some 200 Zulus were assembled at oNdini, and through the services of John Shepstone—who acted as Wolseley’s interpreter—they were told that Cetshwayo had been sent into permanent exile. Furthermore, they heard details of how Zululand was now to be governed, for over the course of the previous weeks Wolseley had devised a settlement scheme after receiving advice from various sources, most notably Sir Theophilus Shepstone and John Dunn. Henceforth Zululand was to be ruled by thirteen independent chiefs appointed by the British. Moreover, a British Resident was to be appointed to serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the British government: he would not involve himself in the internal affairs of the chiefdoms unless the chiefs violated the terms of their appointment.
The chosen chiefs then signed separate treaties, which contained clauses that enjoined them to respect their new boundaries, to abolish the Zulu military system, and not to hinder any of their people from working in neighbouring territories.
On 3 September, Wolseley reported to Hicks Beach:
In the redistribution of territory . . . I have given a place to the representatives [of the clans subjugated by Shaka] who, though to a large extent amalgamated . . . with the Zulus, are I am assured, mindful of their . . . independent origin, and proud of their distinct traditions. Such breaking up of the cohesion of the country will, I firmly believe, preclude for the future all, or almost all, possibility of any reunion of its inhabitants under one rule.
In fact, though, most of the appointees did not reflect the pre-Shakan system. Dunn is the most conspicuous example. He had secured Wolseley’s admiration and was thus granted the largest chieftainship, located between the Mhlatuze and Tugela Rivers and comprising about one-fifth of the former kingdom. Wolseley viewed it as a buffer-zone. Another appointee was likewise an alien. This was Hlubi, a Sotho who had distinguished himself on the British side during the recent war. He was granted a chiefdom along the border in the west, consisting of the area hitherto dominated by Sihayo. Two members of the Zulu royal house, Hamu, the chief of the Ngenetsheni, and Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the chief of the Mandlakazi, also ranked among the appointees. They were granted territory north of the Black Mfolozi. Mnyamana, most of whose adherents had been assigned to Hamu’s territory, was also offered a chiefdom but declined to accept it partly because he did not wish to be split from his people. It was therefore granted to Ntshingwayo.
The boundaries of the chiefdoms, and the borders of Zululand itself, were determined by a boundary commission established by Wolseley. The general had promised the Zulus that they would be left in full possession of their land but this proved not to be the case, for Zululand was reduced in size. For instance, the commission moved the western border with the Transvaal eastward, in contravention of the findings of the 1878 boundary commission, thereby excluding people who had long been viewed as part of the Zulu nation.
Wolseley’s settlement was flawed in other respects. It took little or no account of the existing state of affairs in Zululand. Members of groups with long-standing antipathy to one another, for example, found themselves now combined under the same appointed chief. Wolseley instructed the boundary commission to declare that Zulus owing allegiance to a chief whom they viewed as unacceptable should simply move to that of another they deemed more agreeable. But this was both impractical and insensitive. For one thing, strong emotional and religious links bound Zulus to their ancestral territories, which they were loath to leave. Another problem with the settle
ment was that throughout Zululand there were men of great status and authority who were excluded by it, and whose position and power were now undermined by the appointment of rivals.
It was not just in Zululand that the settlement had critics. Natal’s white community, for example, was far from happy. Its members vociferously maintained that Zululand should have been annexed and opened up to white settlement, or that arrangements should be made to ease the colony’s land shortage by transferring blacks from Natal to Cetshwayo’s former kingdom.
Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had been asked to comment on Wolseley’s settlement plan, and of course likewise favoured annexation, was also condemnatory. On 14 October, he wrote: ‘We cannot rid ourselves of the responsibilities . . . of the war . . . by the simple device of practically leaving [the Zulus] to themselves, after we have taken away their head, and advising them not to hurt each other.’
Nevertheless, Hicks Beach proceeded to confirm Wolseley’s settlement, for as Jeff Guy has commented the British government, which was
under attack for reckless expansionism, [did not believe] that direct control over Zululand was in Britain’s interests [now that] the military strength of the Zulu had been terminated, and as long as the Zulu people remained divided and powerless, there was no need for Zululand to be included within the formal boundaries of the Empire; the Zulu served imperial interests sufficiently merely by occupying their territory, thereby blocking Boer expansion to the south-east, and possible foreign occupation of the coast.
However, imperial policy was to change. It would not be long before the Colonial Office would assume a stance more in line with the sentiments expressed by Shepstone and the settlement’s other critics.
In March 1880, Melmoth Osborn, an experienced Natal civil servant and a close friend of Shepstone (whose outlook he shared) became the British Resident in Zululand, a post that had been briefly held by another Natal official. Osborn was to retain the position through the 1880s and was thus to play a central role in the affairs of Zululand. He was initially responsible to the High Commissioner, and later to the Governor of Natal, who was also the Special Commissioner for Zululand; and they in turn were directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. With the exception of Wolseley, who left South Africa in April 1880, the high commissioners and governors depended heavily on Shepstone for advice concerning Zululand. Moreover, until 1884, the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs was Shepstone’s brother, John, who was succeeded by Theophilus’ son, Henrique. They also exerted influence on the Special Commissioner for Zululand, who consequently tended to incline towards the colonial point of view concerning Zulu affairs, an attitude that led to conflict with London.
Meanwhile, during the course of September 1879, Wolseley and the remaining British troops left Zululand. For their part, Hamu, Zibhebhu and Dunn promptly set to work exploiting their new status and augmenting their wealth, for they were avaricious and ambitious men. Hamu’s people, for instance, are said to have looted the property of fellow Zulus whenever they had the opportunity, while one of the steps taken by Dunn was to demand a £25 licence fee from any trader wishing to enter his territory.
Most of the Zulu royal family were living in the region north of the Black Mfolozi granted to Hamu and Zibhebhu by the settlement. As a result of the war and Wolseley’s plan for the future administration of Zululand, they had experienced a serious loss of status; and salt was now rubbed into the wound when the chiefs began rounding up their cattle, seizing other property, and imposing fines on them for not having handed it over voluntarily. The seizure of the royal cattle was in accord with the wishes of Wolseley, who had ordered Osborn to encourage Hamu and Zibhebhu to round up the livestock. But as Shula Marks comments, the policy ‘of confiscating the royal herd was particularly misguided, as most of the cattle in the hands of the uSuthu [supporters of the royal house] was royal cattle that had been “sisa-ed” [lent] to them and from which they drew their sustenance.’
After the Battle of Ulundi, Cetshwayo had placed his heir, Dinuzulu (who had been born in 1868), in the care of Zibhebhu. But the prince rapidly developed a strong aversion to his guardian, who, to use the words of one of James Stuart’s informants, Mpatshana kaSodondo, wished ‘to set himself up as practically king in place of Cetshwayo.’ Hence Dinuzulu managed to escape and came under the protection of one of Cetshwayo’s full-brothers, Ndabuko, a rather morbid but tenacious individual whose homesteads were located in the territory assigned to Zibbebhu by Wolseley’s settlement.
Rising tension
Tension mounted between Zibhebhu and Hamu on the one hand, and Ndabuko and fellow members of the uSuthu faction, as the royalists were known. The former pair, as beneficiaries of Wolseley’s settlement, were confident and assertive, and determined to retain their ascendancy. Ndabuko and his associates were angered by their own loss of status and influence and by the high-handed behaviour of Zibhebhu and Hamu. Therefore they were equally resolute, eager to uphold their own authority and promote their personal interests, as well as those of their exiled king and Dinuzulu.
The uSuthu faction sent two messengers south to the residence of the Bishop of Natal, John Colenso, at Bishopstowe just outside Pietermaritzburg. The bishop was sympathetic to the plight of the Zulu nation, which he believed—and it was an unfashionable belief in white colonial circles—to be the victim of an iniquitous war and an unjust settlement.
On 9 February 1880, the messengers arrived and declared that they had been sent by an impressive array of notables, including Ndabuko, three of his brothers and Mnyamana. Zibhebhu was oppressing the house of Mpande and seemed intent on destroying Cetshwayo’s family. The messengers asked Colenso if he thought it would be possible for them to request that Mpande’s children be freed from such pressure by being allowed to occupy a territory of their own. Colenso suggested that they visit the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, John Shepstone, and sent a letter of introduction to him on their behalf.
The next day the messengers met Shepstone, who declared that the house of Cetshwayo had been destroyed; that it was out of the question that Ndabuko would receive any official recognition, and that any complaints against appointed chiefs should be made to the British Resident in Zululand.
Meanwhile, events far from South Africa were to fill Colenso with optimism that the lot of the Zulu nation could be improved. In April 1880, Disraeli and the Conservatives were ousted from power by Gladstone and the Liberals, partly as a result of a backlash in Britain against the Zulu War. On 24 April, Colenso wrote enthusiastically:
‘Now . . . something will be done, I presume, to rectify the enormous wrongs of the Zulu War & (so-called) Settlement . . . . The heart of England, I trust, is still beating rightly, & will expect that . . . the Liberals . . . shall do what can be done under existing circumstances to rectify the past.’
A week later, Ndabuko appeared before Osborn and requested permission to visit the Governor of Natal to pay his respects. He received authorisation, and with Shingana kaMpande (one of Cetshwayo’s half-brothers and the second most senior figure in the uSuthu party) proceeded to lead over 200 men into Natal, including twenty men of rank, most of whom came from the chiefdoms of Hamu and Zibhebhu.
The arrival in the colony of the deputation under Ndabuko at this juncture may have been entirely coincidental, but it has been plausibly suggested that the uSuthu had received word from Colenso of Gladstone’s victory and that circumstances were thus now more favourable for petitioning Cetshwayo’s return.
In Pietermaritzburg, the Zulus had two frustrating meetings with officialdom. Consequently, on 5 June, having failing to obtain their objectives, they began to traipse home. Nonetheless, their long trek had not been entirely futile. They had gained the firm support of the Colenso family and had learned from them that Britain had not sought war with the Zulus—the conflict had been brought about through the actions of officials in South Africa.
For
their part, Zibhebhu and Hamu, well aware that they enjoyed official sanction, continued their high-handed activities. Indeed, as 1880 progressed they became increasingly aggressive towards the uSuthu in their chiefdoms.
In such circumstances, Ndabuko sent messengers secretly to Colenso. Consequently, on 3 December the bishop (who had just visited Cetshwayo at Cape Town for the first time), wrote to F. W. Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, stating, ‘It is clear that an unpleasant state of things exists in Zululand that some day or other may end in fighting & revolution.’
By late 1880 the situation was such that Osborn felt compelled to intervene after many of Mnyamana’s Buthelezi had been forced to flee their homesteads, following an attack by Hamu. Osborn told Hamu and Mnyamana that he would investigate matters and pass his findings to the High Commissioner for a decision. He also ordered Hamu ‘to stop seizing cattle and property’ while the inquiry was underway. He adopted the same approach with Zibhebhu, who had fined many uSuthu in his district, and with Ndabuko and Ziwedu, a son of Mpande. Osborn had thus raised the hopes of the supporters of the Zulu royal house. Perhaps at last their grievances would be dealt with seriously.
The inquiries appear to have been conducted, respectively, in December 1880 and January 1881. The uSuthu presented their evidence to Osborn with great care. Ndabuko and Ziwedu, for instance, brought 60 witnesses to testify against Zibhebhu, whom they accused, among other things, of seizing 1,140 head of cattle, mostly on the grounds that they were royal livestock. Zibhebhu responded bluntly: ‘I am Chief of my territory and give notice plainly here today, as these people are in arms against me . . . I will drive them out of my territory, I will eat them up.’
The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations Page 17