Goold-Adams then headed towards Bulawayo, albeit slowly, for Loch had failed to instill in him any sense of urgency. On 6 November, by which time Khama and his warriors had decided to return home, Goold-Adams received word from Jameson that Bulawayo had been taken, that Lobengula was in flight, and that Gampo and his impi had withdrawn towards the Gwai River. The Southern Column belatedly arrived at the former Matabele capital on the 15th (although Goold-Adams had ridden ahead to see Jameson), by which time Loch had heard with dismay that the Chartered Company’s forces had beaten his men to Bulawayo.
The pursuit of Lobengula
The Matabele king was at Shiloh, about 30 miles north of Bulawayo, when he heard of the outcome of the Battle of Bembesi. On 7 November, Jameson sent a letter calling upon him to return, for he would be ‘kindly treated.’ But Lobengula continued moving north, with the aim of crossing the Zambezi. As it was deemed vital to apprehend him, a strong force was despatched on the 14th to do just that. Commanded by Forbes, it comprised 300 Europeans (90 of whom were members of the BBP) and 200 native carriers. The armament included four Maxims and a 7-pounder.
Large Matabele bands were said to be 30-40 miles or so north of Bulawayo, including the vicinity of Shiloh, intent on protecting Lobengula’s flight. Forbes arrived at Shiloh on the 23rd, after advancing by a circuitous route and, instead of encountering Matabele, found men that Jameson had sent to Shiloh with fresh supplies. On the 25th, Forbes resumed his march with a reduced force of almost 300 men, together with four wagons, four Maxims and a Hotchkiss gun, and rations for twelve days. He had orders ‘to push on and do his utmost to capture the King’.
The pursuit proved arduous, for heavy rains hampered progress. In three days they only covered seventeen miles. It was too slow. Hence Forbes ordered 130 of the men to head back with the wagons, and pressed on with the remainder, mostly Chartered Company volunteers, some of whom lacked mounts. He did so with two horse-drawn Maxims: supplies were carried by pack horses.
At about 3pm on the afternoon of 3 December, as the column was nearing the Shangani River, a shot rang out someway off on the left rear flank, but Forbes continued to move forward. Two envoys from Lobengula, after unsuccessfully trying to locate Forbes, had met a couple of stragglers. They were troopers of the BBP, William Daniel and James Wilson—the latter proved to be a deserter from the 11th Hussars under an assumed name. They were handed a bag of gold sovereigns worth about £1,000 and given the following message from the king: ‘Take this and go back. I am beaten.’ But instead of handing the money over to Forbes and delivering the message, the troopers kept the gold for themselves and withheld the message, a deception that led to their being imprisoned after the war when the truth became known.
Late on 3 December, Forbes encamped near the south bank of the Shangani. Shortly before this, at about 5pm, he had sent Major Allan Wilson and a small party consisting of several officers and twelve men on good mounts to reconnoitre across the river and determine the whereabouts of Lobengula, who had been joined during his flight by about 3,000 warriors, some of them survivors of Shangani and Bembesi. Wilson was instructed to be back by 6.30pm, when darkness would fall. That time came and went—there was no sign of him. Hours passed—but still nothing. Finally, at about 9pm, two of Wilson’s party returned, having been sent back because their horses were knocked up. Then, at 11pm, three others arrived. One of them told Forbes that he believed that Wilson wished Forbes to move up to join him during the night so that they could launch an attack on the Matabele at dawn. Instead, Forbes ordered Captain Borrow and twenty men of the Salisbury Column to reinforce Wilson in case he ran into trouble.
Early on the 4th, while Forbes was preparing to move off to locate Wilson with the rest of his command, the sound of gunfire was heard coming from across the river, which had risen significantly during the night and was now in spate. After travelling about half a mile up the Shangani, Forbes himself came under attack from warriors who had crossed the river before its level rose. He managed to repel the enemy— whom he estimated as about 300 strong—at a cost of five men wounded, and sixteen horses and two mules killed.
Forbes notes that during the skirmish he and his men ‘heard a considerable amount of firing where Major Wilson was’. Moreover, shortly thereafter, Forbes was joined by three of Wilson’s men who swam across the flooded river, one of whom told him: ‘I think I may say we are the sole survivors of that party.’
After being reinforced by Borrow, Wilson had ridden off at daylight on the 4th to capture Lobengula, having been told by a native that only a few men were with the king. After about six miles, he had come across Lobengula’s wagons, but not the monarch, who had apparently abandoned them the previous afternoon and had continued his flight on horseback. Here Wilson came under fire from both front and flanks, and thus answered in kind. Seeing that the enemy were attempting to encircle him, he galloped back approximately 650 yards to a large ant-heap, dismounted his men, and fired at the oncoming warriors, before again withdrawing.
Wilson’s party included two American scouts and he now ordered them and a trooper to ride post-haste to bring up Forbes, whom, as noted above, they located after swimming the Shangani. As the men rode off under attack by Matabele, Wilson’s position became critical, for the enemy, including members of Imbizo and Ingubo, were encircling him and he was soon cut off. In a desperate final stand, Wilson and his 33 men fought to the last in a manner that won the general admiration of their numerous assailants, who undoubtedly suffered heavier losses.
Wilson and his colleagues were soon lionised by the white community. Of them H. Rider Haggard wrote: ‘The fame of this death has spread far and wide . . . their story is immortal and will be told hundreds of years hence . . . . Surely, it is no small thing to have gained such a death.’
The morning after the destruction of Wilson and his men, Forbes began withdrawing up the Shangani River from a laager he had hastily prepared the previous day. The retreat proved a nightmare due to rain, lack of food, enemy harassment and the frequently difficult nature of the terrain. On the 8th, Matabele briefly attacked and although they failed to injure any of their opponents, succeeded in driving off the sole remaining pack-ox and cattle that Forbes’ men had rounded up that morning. On the 10th, Matabele struck again twice, killing a member of the BBP and eight horses. After the second attack, the gun carriages were abandoned and the Maxims were carried on in blankets when the retreat resumed at 10pm with a night march. On the 12th, a further clash occurred. The Matabele concentrated their fire on the Maxims, and two of Forbes’ men were wounded.
The spirits of the retreating men soared on the evening of the 14th when they arrived at the camp of a well-supplied relief column that had come up from Bulawayo to meet them. Willoughby was one of those who welcomed Forbes and his men:
The whole party, including the few wounded, five in number, had had a very severe time of it; the men had undergone considerable hardships from their clothes and boots being worn out with the rough wear, and from want of food, the last few days, having had to eat some of their horses.
Finally, on 18 December, they reached Bulawayo.
Meanwhile, in November, Goold-Adams had sent out patrols to the south and southwest of Bulawayo to induce Matabele forces there to capitulate and thus follow the example of some of their colleagues who had already done so. Major S.D. Browne of the BBP led one patrol, consisting of 65 mounted members of the BBP and 30 dismounted members of the Chartered Company’s forces. He moved south into the Matopos and conducted forays there until Christmas, meeting little resistance, burning homesteads, and receiving the surrender of some of the warriors in the area—men who had formerly belonged to the impi under Gampo. Gampo himself, with the remainder of his men, was encamped to the west on the Gwai River at this date and was only to ‘come in’ at the end of March the following year.
In February 1894, James Dawson, who enjoyed Lobengula’s affection, set off from Bulaway
o with a couple of companions to contact him. He took with him a letter in Loch’s name promising Lobengula that he would be treated in an honourable manner. On 1 March, Dawson reported that they had come across the remains of Wilson and his men and had buried them. He also confirmed reports (which had come in during the course of February) that Lobengula was dead. According to Dawson, Lobengula had contracted smallpox and died of fever on 22 or 23 January when some 30-40 miles south of the Zambezi. Subsequently, however, some sources maintained that Lobengula had committed suicide by drinking poison, a view confirmed in 1943 by several leading Matabele.
In the meantime, the imperial forces in Matabeleland had begun to withdraw, and this process was completed in the weeks that followed the news of Lobengula’s death.
11. ‘THE MATABELE ARE COMING!’ — THE MATABELE REBELLION
‘This region of turbulent savages, this last stronghold of South African barbarism has been completely pacified.’ E. F. Knight
Knight wrote the above in his book, Rhodesia of Today, published in 1895, the year in which the Chartered Company adopted the name Rhodesia for the combined territories that included Mashonaland and Matabeleland. He continued:
very great credit indeed is due to the Administrator and other officers of the Chartered Company who have with such admirable tact, discretion and decision brought about this end . . . . The natives appeared to be unaffectedly pleased to see the white man in their country and there is no doubt that our invasion and occupation have been welcomed by the vast majority of the Matabele nation . . . no conquered people were ever treated with more consideration.
In reality, this was a very complacent view, indeed a very inaccurate one, and a belief soon to be shattered. Substantial numbers of Matabele were about to rise in revolt.
Various factors contributed to the rising, and actions of the victors of the Matabele War of 1893, such as Cecil Rhodes, played a decisive role in shaping the course of events. As Robert Blake has commented, as far as Rhodes was concerned, ‘the important task after the war was to keep the settlers sweet and carry out his promises to the Victoria volunteers’. Moreover, Rhodes was preoccupied by other matters—the seizure of Matabeleland was, after all, only a means to an end. This, combined with his mistaken belief that the Matabele were generally pleased to be free of Lobengula’s yoke, meant that he paid less attention than was required to ensuring that the administration of the newly won territory was sound and that the Matabele were treated with circumspection. Terence Ranger has aptly commented:
The most important thing about Rhodes’s views and aims was that he did not really pay much regard to Africans at all . . . .After 1893, for instance, it did not occur to Rhodes that the Ndebele were any longer a factor that had to be taken into account in adumbrating his plans for the north.
The months that followed Lobengula’s downfall witnessed the large-scale granting of Matabele grazing and agricultural land by the British South Africa Company to Europeans, not only to men who had participated in the conquest of Lobengula’s domain but to other individuals as well, such as members of the British aristocracy. Well-nigh all the core territory of Lobengula’s former kingdom was granted away. A Land Commission established in the latter half of 1894 (and upon which the British government was represented) reported in October that the amount of unallotted land remaining was insufficient to support the Matabele and that they should thus be relocated to proposed reserves to the north and northeast.
However, the reserves were unsuited to settlement—for one thing, they were badly watered, ‘cemeteries not homes’. Thus most, if not all, of the Matabele stayed where they were, thereby squatting on land that was now, of course, the property of white individuals or syndicates, though in most cases the farms had no European presence at this date.
The new administration dealt in a similarly sweeping way with Matabele cattle, seizing not only livestock that had belonged to Lobengula but also animals owned by his former subjects. For its part, the British government was anxious that the Matabele would be allowed to retain enough beasts for their needs. As Ripon told Loch on 13 December 1893: ‘Her Majesty’s government attach importance to securing to Matabele ample cattle for their requirements.’ But reality fell short of this ideal. Much livestock was seized as loot in late 1893, and patrols charged with securing further cattle were frequently sent out the following year and indeed in 1895. Additionally, some whites simply helped themselves to livestock or bought it from Matabele at ridiculously low prices.
In October 1894, the Land Commission recommended that the company should immediately ‘appoint officials entrusted with the duty of exercising supervision over the natives’ and ‘ascertaining the number of natives and cattle on the Reserves’. Consequently, the Native Department in Matabeleland was established. Initially it was essentially involved in collecting cattle, and a number of the commissioners were to prove overbearing and at times brutal.
In June 1895 all Matabele cattle and their offspring were officially declared to belong to the company. Then, in November, the Land Commission’s chairman, Judge Joseph Vintcent, declared that according to the Native Department, the number of cattle in Matabeleland still in African possession was 74,500—this was far short of the number estimated as belonging to the Matabele prior to the war (according to one reckoning, as many as 280,000). Of the remaining cattle, 40,930 were to be allotted to the Matabele: the remainder were to be sold off by the company to ‘bona fide farmers’, or would serve as police rations, or would be given to influential supporters such as Willoughby.
The seizure of the balance thus began in December and continued into early 1896. Adding to the resentment felt by the Matabele over the massive loss of livestock was the manner in which the 40,930 beasts allowed to remain in their hands were distributed, for Vintcent subsequently noted that the company gave cattle to ‘the more deserving indunas and headmen’. Hence as Ranger aptly comments: ‘It looks very much as if the share-out was used to reward “loyalty” rather than to meet the needs of the Ndebele in general.’
The Matabeleland Native Police, who numbered about 300 men by the beginning of 1896 (the force was raised in 1895 and manned by Matabele) were involved in the seizure of cattle. They also played a major role in procuring forced labour, especially for the mining industry, and by late 1895 the force’s commander, H.J. Taylor, declared that 9,000 Matabele had been compulsorily recruited. Such tasks were hardly likely to make the police popular, but the harsh way in which some of them engaged in their work (reportedly, a number of women were raped as policemen to all intents and purposes marauded around the countryside) heightened feelings even further. In short, they were widely loathed by many of their own people.
To make things worse, in late February 1896 rinderpest struck and began decimating many of the remaining cattle. To prevent the disease spreading, thousands of healthy beasts were shot by the Native Commissioners—a move viewed by many natives as an act of sheer malevolence. A series of disastrous droughts and incessant plagues of locusts since Lobengula’s downfall added to Matabele woes.
Nevertheless, Selous, speaking from first-hand experience, tells us that in the areas such as Filabusi where the first Matabele rose in revolt, rinderpest had not yet struck and locusts had done little damage to crops which, because of sufficient rain, ‘were exceptionally good’. It would thus be a mistake to conclude that the Matabele rebellion was primarily due to hardship wrought by nature. Essentially, it was a revolt against the Chartered Company’s harsh rule.
Before the uprising commenced, the strength of Matabele dissatisfaction was not grasped by the administration. So much so, that on 29 December 1895, at Rhodes’ behest, Jameson led the bulk of Rhodesia’s white police (including the majority of those in Matabeleland) south in an attempt to overthrow the government in the Boer republic of the Transvaal. It was hoped that the invasion would receive support from non-Afrikaner whites in the republic, but matters did not go accord
ing to plan and, on 2 January 1896, Jameson was forced to surrender.
The Matabele Rebellion
News of Jameson’s defeat rapidly spread through Matabeleland, where preparations for revolt, which included the storage of grain in underground granaries to sustain a campaign, had already been underway for several months. The time to strike had come. Meetings were thus held by chiefs to make plans, though the rising was never to be directed by a single dominant military authority. Nevertheless, the Matabele were soon to prove themselves potent adversaries. Weapons were still widely held, for measures undertaken to disarm the fighting men following the war of 1893 had been half-hearted and the regimental system had not been truly dismantled. Moreover, additional firearms had been surreptitiously procured or were used by members of the Matabeleland Native Police, many of whom, trained as proficient marksmen, threw in their lot with the rebels at the outset. Furthermore, while the experiences of the Matabele War had no doubt dampened the martial enthusiasm of some warriors, this was by no means universally the case, for many regiments had either not been committed in 1893 or had not sustained significant casualties.
On 20 March, a detachment of African police was attacked at Godhlwayo and two ‘boys’ were killed. Three days later, the murder of isolated whites began. The first Europeans to die were probably those killed by the Godhlwayo rebels at neighbouring Filabusi, a farming and mining community about 65 miles southeast of Bulawayo, and among the murderers were former native police.
Killings soon occurred elsewhere in Matabeleland and in the main former tributary areas, and many whites fled to the sanctuary of centres such as Bulawayo, a town that had come into existence near Lobengula’s former capital. Selous, for instance, who had been managing a farm on behalf of the Chartered Company at Essexvale about 25 miles to the southeast, rode to Bulawayo with his wife. Having ensured her safety, he then set off with one of a number of patrols intent on quelling the revolt and rescuing fellow whites. In his book, Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia, Selous comments that there was reason to believe that by the evening of 30 March ‘not a white man was left alive in the outlying districts of Matabeleland’, for while some had been saved by relief parties, many had been ‘cruelly and treacherously murdered’. According to the early Rhodesian historian, Marshall Hole, 122 men, five women and three children were killed in March, and further murders were to follow, though on a reduced scale.
The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations Page 29