Some historians believe that the Matabele were strongly influenced by the Mwari cave-cult, which had a number of shrines in their territory, and that the cult’s officers played a central role in inspiring and coordinating the rebellion of 1896. That members of the cult were involved in the rebellion is evident. Essentially, however, the rising should be viewed as a desire by the Matabele themselves to overthrow white rule and restore the old order, and it was the royal family and aristocracy who provided the main leadership.
On 16 June grim news for the Europeans arrived from the northeast. The supposedly docile and quiescent Shona in Mashonaland had likewise risen in revolt, killing white men, women and children, thus further undermining the Chartered Company’s position.
Carrington responded by sending the Salisbury Column back to Mashonaland, and provided it with the support of other detachments, including the mounted infantry at Cape Town whom he ordered to make their way to Salisbury via Beira, a port in Mozambique. To strengthen his hand in Matabeleland itself, he ordered up the regulars at Mafeking.
Before their arrival, he launched a major assault under Plumer on Intaba Zi Ka Mambo, where Nyamanda (who had been recognised by Umlugulu and other Matabele as their king by this date) and many other members of the royal family were present. Plumer left Bulawayo on 30 June. According to Frank Sykes, the ‘numerical strength of the Column, including natives, Cape Boys (drivers) etc., was about 1,200 and was by far the largest yet concentrated in Rhodesia.’
On 3 July, Plumer arrived at a recently built fort at Inyathi, some twenty miles from the enemy. The next day a Thembu scout called John Grootboom, who spoke English and Sindebele, reported that their presence was known to the rebels. The latter intended sending their cattle and other loot northwards on 5 July, anticipating an assault later that day.
But Plumer made a night march and attacked at dawn. ‘All through the night we rode,’ recalled the journalist De Vere Stent, ‘a stealthy band of khaki grey intruders . . . on towards the mountain looming indistinct before us.’ The column then divided, ‘some to outflank the position, others to move into the heart of the enemy’s fastness’. Battle was then joined against the rebels, who had been weakened by the departure of some of their number as Plumer had drawn near. He describes their position ‘as a confused mass of kopjes with grassy hollows scattered among them; all these kopjes are full of caves and shelters formed among the interstices of the boulders and capable of containing many thousands of people.’
Nonetheless, despite stiff resistance, his force succeeded in storming the position in a series of independent actions lasting from 6am until noon. Most of the defeated warriors then began heading south to join fellow rebels, such as Umlugulu, who had retired into the Matopos following the reverse on 6 June. Plumer says that the number of enemy dead was estimated at about 100. In contrast, eighteen of his men were killed, nine of whom were Europeans, and their deaths deeply affected Rhodes, who had spurred on one of the assaults while himself unarmed.
Fighting in the Matopos
A number of inconclusive engagements ensued with the rebels in the Matopo Hills, terrain described by the historian Oliver Ransford:
It is difficult to imagine worse country to campaign in than the Matopo Hills . . . an entire army could very easily be swallowed up and lost in this fantastically broken mass of hills measuring some thirty miles from west to east, and fifty miles across. Its innumerable kopjies are strewn with gigantic boulders, and riddled with caves, and surrounded by almost impenetrable underbrush.
In July, Plumer moved with the bulk of his command, supported by ancillaries, against Matabele rebels under Babyaan and Dhliso in the centre of the northernmost Matopo Hills. Late on the 19th, he left an encampment at ‘Usher’s No. 1’ (a farm belonging to William Usher) just to the north of the Matopos and did so guided by Baden-Powell, who had undertaken scouting work and thus knew the country. Carrington, though ill, was with the column, as were Lord Grey and Rhodes.
Shortly after midnight the column halted to sleep, but before dawn Plumer was on the move once again, approaching a pass through hills that led to a valley occupied by the rebels. After briefly halting, partly to jettison greatcoats and other impedimenta, the column resumed its march and entered the valley.
Baden-Powell was in command of the advance guard which consisted of Cape Boys, 200 friendly Matabele, twenty mounted white scouts, a Hotchkiss gun and two Maxims. He states that his telescope ‘soon showed that there was a large camp [on the eastern side of the valley] with numerous fires, and crowds of natives moving among them. These presently formed into one dense brown mass, with their assegai blades glinting sharply in the rays of the morning sun.’ The column’s guns were rapidly brought up and opened fire, ‘banging their shells with beautiful accuracy over the startled rebel camp’.
While this was occurring, Baden-Powell made his way into the bottom of the valley and came to a spot where two valleys ran off from the main valley. One was merely a long narrow gorge heading off south, through which ran the Tuli River, while the other did so in an easterly direction, forming a small open plateau surrounded by kopjes. While looking in this direction, Baden-Powell suddenly saw rebel warriors making their way across the valley, falling back from the shellfire and intent on taking up positions among the kopjes. He thus sent back word of their movements before conducting a flank attack at the head of the friendly Matabele against the unsuspecting rebels.
Of the assault he comments: ‘Our friendlies went very gaily at the work at first, with any amount of firing, but very little result.’ A comparable point is made by Frank Sykes, who served in the Medical Corps of the Matabeleland Relief Force. ‘In this engagement the “friendlies” completely lost their heads and fired their rifles off wildly as fast as they could load without any definite object. They were a useless rabble, as well as a considerable source of danger to those near them.’ Hence Baden-Powell called up the Cape Boys, whom, he states, ‘went to work with a will’. Moreover, he also brought up the Hotchkiss and two Maxims, whose fire helped drive the rebels back, as the fighting gradually moved along the eastern valley. Sykes tells us that, with the exception of the scouts, the white members of the column ‘were held in reserve, and were simply spectators of the fight from the surrounding heights’. On the other hand, Baden-Powell relates that Plumer moved up in support and helped to drive off some warriors who had tried to cut him off. What is clear is that Baden-Powell’s men bore the brunt of the day’s fighting against the rebels.
During the afternoon the column returned to camp. Casualties were slight: a white sergeant who had been attached to the scouts and three Cape Boys had been killed, while a number of Cape Boys and ‘friendlies’ had been wounded. And what of rebel losses? Sykes comments: ‘There are very conflicting accounts as to the number of the enemy who were killed . . . . Some exaggerate their loss into hundreds, whilst the rebels themselves give the equally ridiculous return of barely a dozen.’
Given the nature of the terrain, which afforded the Matabele a considerable amount of cover and the opportunity to slip away, it is unlikely that their losses were very high, though they were no doubt more than a mere handful. Baden-Powell, for instance, states that he saw about twenty dead in a particular spot and that the Cape Boys found ‘numerous bodies and blood-trails’ that ‘spoke to the success of the morning’s attack’.
Meanwhile, on the 19th, Major Tyrie Laing had entered the Matopos from the west in command of 170 mounted Europeans, 300 ‘friendlies’ and an armament that included a couple of machine guns (one of which was a Maxim) and a 7-pounder. Laing had been given the task of storming local rebel positions and then moving east to support Plumer. He made his way up a narrow gorge before laagering for the night in more open ground beneath a prominent hill called Inungu.
At dawn on the 20th, Laing was attacked. The brunt of the assault was against the northern side of his position. Sykes states: ‘So fierce and determined
was the onslaught, that several of the foremost [Matabele] actually succeeded in sweeping up to within a pace or two of the rifles.’ But fire from the defenders, including case-shot from the 7-pounder, compelled the Matabele to fall back, where they opened fire from cover. Baden-Powell states that at one place several of the best rebel marksmen were gathered and did ‘great execution’ until the 7-pounder opened up on them. He also relates that four men firing the Maxim were successively shot in turn by the Matabele.
Laing’s force had been badly mauled. Sykes and Baden-Powell both relate that three Europeans were killed. One of them was a picquet who had been chased back to the defences where, upon arrival, he was shot in the head by enemy fire. The ‘friendlies’, who had been encamped a short distance from the white element of Laing’s force, suffered heavier losses. Baden-Powell, for instance, put the figure at 25. He also estimated that nearly 100 of the enemy were slain.
Undaunted, Laing pressed on northeast later that morning to support Plumer and dispersed another body of warriors, leaving him free to continue across what he aptly describes as ‘most difficult and dangerous country’. But during the course of the afternoon he changed direction, after beginning to suspect his guides of treachery, and headed for Carrington’s camp at Usher’s No. 1. Late on the 21st, he was joined by a 100-strong search party under Baden-Powell which had been sent to find him, and immediately proceeded to Carrington’s camp, arriving at about 3am on the 22nd.
Morale among Carrington and his staff was dented by recent developments, and was not improved when a strong force failed in an attempt to storm Inungu on the 25th. Bringing the rebels in the Matopos to heel was proving no easy task. This was demonstrated once again when Plumer conducted an assault on rebel positions in the eastern Matopos.
On 31 July the camp at Usher’s No. 1 was broken up, and Plumer encamped at Sugar Bush (later called Fort Umlugulu) near the north bank of the Nsezi River and on the north-eastern periphery of the Matopos. Across the Nsezi, in hills overlooking the encampment, were some 4,000 Matabele rebels under Umlugulu and two other izinduna, Sikombo and Nyanda, with the majority centred on a commanding feature named Tshingengoma.
Early on 5 August, Plumer advanced from Sugar Bush with 700 men, crossed the Nsezi and moved into the hills, guided once again by Baden-Powell. At dawn Plumer halted below one of the hills located at the entrance to a pass leading to a valley. Baden-Powell describes the valley as being semicircular, with its back ‘formed by a single high ridge of smooth granite’ (Tshingengoma) from which ‘five offshoots ran down into the valley like fingers from the ridge of knuckles’ and at the tip of which were rocky peaks or kopjes.
At 7.30am Captain Beresford, 7th Hussars, was sent with 130 dismounted men and artillery to occupy a kopje at the far end of the valley and to cover the advance of the rest of the force. Initially Beresford headed south, but soon swung to the right, thereby disappearing from view, and proceeded to ascend the kopje. Upon reaching a small shoulder halfway up the hill, nearly an hour after setting off, he came under attack from a large number of Matabele who closed in from three sides. He rapidly formed his command into a square and a sharp fight ensued, lasting for over an hour. According to Baden-Powell, the Matabele attacked ‘in great numbers’, apparently confident of victory, only to be repeatedly checked by the steady destructive fire of their opponents (including Maxim fire) in what was ‘a stiff and plucky fight on both sides’. Sykes comments that the Matabele ‘made a desperate rush from the surrounding rocks’, only to be halted by case-shot fired at point-blank range when they were within a few paces of the guns.
Realising the gravity of the situation, Plumer began advancing to Beresford’s assistance, and upon swinging to the right saw the position occupied by the beleaguered officer and his men, whereupon the Matabele began falling back, making their way to take up positions on the next of the spurs or ‘fingers’ mentioned by Baden-Powell, who continues:
This ridge we at once attacked, and we were at the foot of the ridge almost as soon as the enemy were on the upper part of it . . . . Dismounting and leaving our horses under cover of the rocks, we commenced to clamber up the hill, firing whenever we got a chance.
Matabele return fire was generally too high and passed well overhead. The majority of the warriors, here, thus began making for the next spur, but some who had occupied the kopje at its base stood their ground and fired in a more telling manner than had their colleagues. The task of dislodging them was given to a squadron of MRF under Major Kershaw, a popular officer noted for his gallantry: Baden-Powell, on the other hand, was ordered to lead a unit, Coope’s Scouts, past Beresford’s position and if possible make his way around the flank and rear of the enemy.
While he rode off, Kershaw and his men set to work, and according to Sykes they were assisted by another squadron under Captain Drury. Kershaw was well to the fore of his men when his progress abruptly halted near the summit for he was hit by enemy fire. He fell mortally wounded, as did a nearby NCO, struck almost simultaneously.
Baden-Powell, in due course, arrived on top of Tshingengoma, where he skirmished with a few rebels and saw others falling back across the ridge some way off. From the summit he had a ‘splendid bird’s eye view of the whole battlefield’ and witnessed the final stages of the fighting below.
Skombo’s stronghold: the cross near the summit of the kopje indicates the spot where Major Kershaw was killed on 5 August 1896. ©National Archives of Zimbabwe
Following the clash in which Kershaw died, bloodshed had occurred further up the valley, away from Beresford’s position. Rebels occupied at least two of the other spurs and their associated kopjes. They were compelled to withdraw after being attacked and by 3pm the day’s fighting was over. After reassembling his men, Plumer began returning to Sugar Bush and as the column was leaving the hills it was jeered by Matabele warriors (part of Umlugulu’s impi) who had arrived on the scene too late to take part in the action.
Five of Plumer’s men had been killed and fifteen were wounded, two of whose injuries proved mortal: the fatalities were all white. According to Baden-Powell, it was estimated that 200-300 rebels had died. Even so, morale was at a low ebb. Sykes comments: ‘A perceptible gloom was cast over the whole Force by the untimely deaths of these brave comrades in arms.’
Shortly before midnight on 8 August, the column set off from Sugar Bush again, hoping to surprise the Matabele in the vicinity of Tshingengoma at first light. Most of the men marched on foot, and after six arduous hours in which Baden-Powell once again guided the column, the foremost units arrived at the foot of Tshingengoma an hour before dawn and rested for a while, awaiting the arrival of the rest of the column, some of whose members had got lost en route. Throughout the 9th, intermittent skirmishing occurred with rebels in the neighbourhood, but on the 10th the column withdrew.
On 27 August, Lady Grey wrote to her children and expressed a widely held sentiment:
The Matopos . . . extend a very long distance and fighting in them is practically throwing away valuable lives for no adequate gain. The men are simply shot at from behind rocks without ever really a chance of an open fight and if they do drive the enemy back a kopjie or two and kill a certain number of them very little is gained for they simply retire on other kopjies and after a time come back and re-occupy the old positions when the white force has moved somewhere else.
By this date, however, Rhodes wished to negotiate and had indeed opened up contact with rebel leaders in the Matopos. De Vere Stent relates that the deaths of the Europeans at Intaba Zi Ka Mambo had affected Rhodes deeply and had turned his mind towards the idea of a compromise peace. But other considerations were also at work. Rhodes was eager to have the war concluded speedily, thereby limiting the cost of operations to his company and removing the need for imperial forces to be in Rhodesia ‘before their presence’, comments Ranger, ‘turned gradually but inevitably into imperial control of the administration’.
Some of the Matabele leaders likewise were eager for peace and had quarrelled with others who felt differently. Their supplies of ammunition and food were running low, while for some months enemy patrols had been systematically burning homesteads and destroying crops in the open country. If the struggle continued, the Matabele would face starvation.
The Indabas
On 14 August, after hearing that some of the Matabele commanders wished to talk, Rhodes and a few companions boldly met several of them in the Matopos. Further contact followed and led to an indaba (meeting) at an appointed rendezvous on 21 August. Rhodes was accompanied by Johan Colenbrander, who was to act as interpreter, Hans Sauer and De Vere Stent. They had revolvers but no guards. Rhodes’ party arrived first. A group of senior izinduna approached with a white flag, watched by thousands of warriors on overlooking hills.
According to Stent, their spokesman, Somabulana, related the story of their wanderings since the days of Mzilikazi and then declared:
The Maholi and the Mashona . . . what are they? Dogs! Sneaking cattle thieves! Slaves! But we the Amandabili, the sons of Khumalo, the Izulu, Children of the Stars; we are no dogs! You came, you conquered. The strongest takes the land. We accepted your rule. We lived under you. But not as dogs! If we are to be dogs it is better to be dead. You can never make the Amandabele dogs. You may wipe them out . . . but the Children of the Stars can never be dogs.
Somabulana and other leading Matabele complained bitterly about how their people had been treated by the company’s administration, and Rhodes was profoundly affected by what he heard. The indaba ended at nightfall, after Rhodes had promised to disband the black police and clearly implied that he would reform the administration, put an end to the collection of cattle, and guarantee the lives of the senior izinduna.
The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations Page 31