Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century

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Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century Page 20

by Thomas E. Woods


  I live in a very retired corner of the country, sir, and seldom get the news until it is news no longer, in other places. Hence, at the date of my last letter, I had only heard of the President’s late message to Congress. That most weak and sophistical, yet most dangerous document, was never read by me, until this morning. It has sunk into a still deeper depth of depression, the few lingering hopes which I was permitted to cherish, that the constitution and public liberty, would survive the administration of Andrew Jackson. I shall have something to say to you upon that subject hereafter. I proceed now to redeem my promise, in proving, or at least endeavouring to prove, that the Virginia resolutions of 1798, cannot be carried out in any other manner than by nullification. In doing this, I shall go back no farther than to the resolutions themselves. I shall give to the language employed, no other construction than that which every man of plain common sense will be compelled to give it. This is the only fair course of proceeding, for the resolutions were intended for the great body of the people, and must have been designed to be comprehensible by the meanest capacity. I will not do the Legislature the injustice of supposing, that they intended to wrap up in mystery, which none but the statesman or the man of learning could penetrate, principles which they deemed essential to the preservation of constitutional liberty. So much of those resolutions as relates to the present subject, as in the following words:—

  “That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the Federal Government as resulting from the compact to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.”

  “That the good people of this Commonwealth, having ever felt, and continuing to feel, the most sincere affection for their brethren of the other States; the truest anxiety for establishing and perpetuating the union of all; and the most scrupulous fidelity to that constitution which is the pledge of natural friendship, the instrument of mutual happiness; the General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions in the other States, in confidence that they will concur with this Commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the acts aforesaid, [the alien and sedition laws,] are unconstitutional; and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each, for co-operating with this State, in maintaining unimpaired, the authorities, rights and liberties, reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

  In these resolutions, the following principles are distinctly affirmed:

  That the Constitution of the United States is a Compact between the States, as such.

  That the Government established by that Compact, possesses no power whatever, except what “the plain sense and intention” of that Compact gives to it.

  That every act done by that Government, not plainly within the limits of its powers, is void.

  That each State has a right to say whether an act done by that Government is plainly within the limits of its powers or not.

  That the States are not bound to submit to, but may resist, any act of that Government which it shall so decide to be beyond the limits of its powers.

  All this is plain enough, and is, as I understand, fully admitted by yourself. The only difficulty is, to discover in what mode the Resolutions contemplated that resistance should be applied. On this subject, I have to remark, in limine, that the Resolutions contemplate that “the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each State” for itself. No uniform mode of resisting the encroachments of the Federal Government is pointed out or suggested. Having affirmed the right, each State is left to its own mode of asserting it in practice. Taking the terms of the Resolutions in their utmost latitude, they authorize any means of resistance whatever. Such, however, is clearly not their meaning. A very slight analysis will force upon us the conviction that no mode of resistance is contemplated, except such as will preserve the Union unimpaired, while it will effectually put down the usurped power. This is shown—

  By the profession of “sincere affection” for the people of the other States; of “anxiety for establishing and perpetuating the union of all;” and of “the most scrupulous fidelity to the Constitution.” It is upon the strength of these feelings, and with a view to these objects, that the co-operation of the other States is invited.

  The interposition of the States must be in such mode as to “arrest the progress of the evil.”

  It must at the same time be such as “to maintain within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.”

  It is to be remarked, that we have here a distinct declaration that there is within the Constitution of the United States, some principle, by which the encroachments and usurpations of the Federal Government may be resisted. I say within the Constitution, and not extra-constitutional and revolutionary.

  And now, Sir, will you be good enough to tell me in what manner that principle is to be applied? Permit me to examine all the modes of resistance which occur to my own mind, and to see which of them is within the principles thus asserted.

  Petition, remonstrance, protest.—It cannot, I think, be sincerely asserted, that these are any means of resistance at all. It is such a resistance as your slave may make, when you chastise him for an imputed fault. If all right of farther resistance be disclaimed, this is an implied admission that the party to whom the appeal is addressed, may, if he chooses, persevere in the wrong. In point of fact, however, remonstrance and protest are founded in the idea that there is such right of farther resistance. Petition is a simple appeal for mercy or forbearance; protest and remonstrance, affirm a right, and threaten the enforcement of it. But they do not in themselves enforce it, and therefore are not resistance.

  An appeal to arms.—This is utterly against all notions of constitutional remedy. Our Government is founded in free choice, and is supposed by public opinion alone. A resort to arms, therefore, would at once change the whole genius of the Constitution. A case might certainly arise, in which a State might rightfully resort to arms for the purpose of putting down or resisting the usurpations of the Federal Government. Suppose, for instance, that the President should send a regiment of his standing army, to turn our Legislature out of doors, and pull down the capitol, I presume that Governor Floyd would be clearly right in calling upon the militia to put every soldier of them to the sword, if the civil authority should prove unable to “arrest the progress of the evil.” At all events, the Legislature might authorize him to do so. This, however, is an extreme case, and such as could not have been anticipated; for the Government could not exist a day, with an administration capable of such an outrage. An actual appeal to arms, therefore, is not to be thought of, as among the proposed modes of resistance.

  A repeal of the unconstitutional law by Congress. This, I perceive, is one of the President’s modes, but unfortunately, he is not very apt to discern the principles which his measures involve. This would, indeed, be a complete remedy for the evil, and an ample redress of the wrong.—You know, however, sir, that although you may “call spirits from the vasty deep,” it is not certain that they will “come when you do call them.” It is not likely that the usurper will either acknowledge his usurpation, or lay down his usurped power. You must remember too, that the usurper in the present case, is a majority of the people, usurping upon the rights of the minority, and the history of the tariff laws, ought to convince you how unapt such usurpers are to give way. This remedy, therefore, would be of little value in practice. Besides, it is in principle, a simple appeal to the wrong doer, and is therefore, no more a mode of resistance, than the right of petitio
n. Every thing is left at last, to the will and discretion of the usurping power.

  An amendment of the constitution. I certainly should not have mentioned this as a means of resistance, if it had not been mentioned by the President, as one of the modes in which the aggrieved States or people, might seek redress. No man, but one of his peculiar intellect, would ever think of an amendment of the Constitution, as a means of resisting a breach of that instrument. It is not the object to amend the Constitution, but to preserve it, unimpaired as it is. I hope that the President’s future labors, in the study of the Constitution, may show him this distinction.

  Secession, or a withdrawal from the Union by the aggrieved State. This, sir, is your favourite mode, and as far as I can perceive, your only mode, of resisting the usurpations of the Federal Government. The President, however, in the plentitude of his merciful consideration of State Rights, does not even allow them this humble refuge from oppression.—Let us now see how you will carry out this mode of resistance, consistently with the resolutions of 1798.

  In the first place, a State which withdraws from the Union, breaks the Union. This is true, ex vi termini, and therefore, need not be proved. But I have already shown that the resolutions of 1798, proceed upon the idea, that the Union is to be preserved; and indeed, that is the main object of resistance, as therein contemplated. In this respect, therefore, secession is not a means of resistance within those resolutions.

  In the second place, the resistance therein contemplated, must be such as will “arrest the progress of the evil.” Will you be so obliging as to tell me, sir, how a usurped power can be resisted, by giving way to it. In one way, indeed, the evil may be arrested by secession; the usurped power may be rendered nugatory, by withdrawing from its reach, all the subjects upon which it can exercise itself. I can scarcely imagine, however, that this tame and submissive idea, was entertained by the Statesmen of 1798. It appears to my humble understanding, that secession, so far from being a form of resistance to usurped power, is the precise reverse; it is neither more nor less than a running away from the oppressor. And so far from “arresting the progress of the evil,” it encourages and invites the evil, by removing all restraint from the wrong-doer. In this view, therefore, it is not within the resolutions of 1798.

  In the third place, the interposition of the States, must be such as to “maintain within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties, appertaining to them.” Now what are these “authorities, rights and liberties?” To you, sir, I need not say, that as sovereign and independent States, they are entitled to all the authorities, rights and liberties, which at any time, belonged to them as such, except such part thereof, as they plainly surrendered when they ratified the constitution. These they may, it is true, enjoy in a state of separation. But they are also entitled to all the authorities, rights and liberties, which the other States guarantied to them, by the terms of Union. Among these are to be remembered, their just weight in the measures of the common government; a share in the common property of the whole; protection by the common power; a Republican Government assured by that power, and all and every benefit and advantage which they could enjoy as members of the Union. It was in this character alone, that their cooperation was invoked in the resolution of 1798. And now, sir, be good enough to say how the authorities, rights, and liberties, which belong to the States, as members of the Union, can be “maintained,” by their going out of the Union. If you cannot, you must feel yourself bound, in candor, to admit that in this respect also, secession is not within the resolutions of 1798. I know you will tell me that these resolutions have been much misunderstood. You have already said so, and much subtlety in reasoning, and refinement in language, have been resorted to by your correspondents to prove it. It is for this very reason, that I have taken such parts of the resolution only, as no man can misunderstand, and such as do not admit of but one construction. You may refine until doomsday, and you will not change the plain meaning and object of the plain language employed.

  I have thus examined every mode of “arresting the progress of the evil, and maintaining within the respective limits of the States, the authorities, rights and liberties which appertain to them,” which occur to my mind, except nullification. It appears, I think, clearly enough, that none of these will answer the purpose. If there be any other mode, you will confer a great benefit upon the country, by pointing it out. I promised to prove to you that Nullification is this other mode, but I must make that the business of another letter. I have already occupied quite as much space in the Whig as I am fairly entitled to, and would not willingly trespass too far upon the indulgence of its Editors. Besides, sir, although you may not consider these letters worthy of being answered, I am very desirous that they should be read, and, therefore, I will make them so short as not to deter any one from perusing them, and not to fatigue any one over-much, who shall venture upon that undertaking.

  NO. III.

  I am now to prove to you, sir, that Nullification is the only mode in which the usurpations of the Federal Government may be resisted by the States, in accordance with the principles of our resolutions of 1798. Daring as you may consider this enterprise, I do not enter upon it with any fear, although I approach without flourish of trumpets, or any other parade. I am a plain, practical man, and desire to state my opinions in a manner which other plain, practical men will understand. If such men are not the ornaments of the country, they are at least its strength and support, and the very people to whose capacity all reasoning upon political subjects ought to be addressed.

  I beg you to bear in mind the principles which have already been stated as deducible from the resolutions of 1798. Perhaps our best course of proceeding will be to state them in detail, and see whether nullification does or does not conform to every one of them.

  The resolutions assert that there is some mode within the Constitution by which the usurpations of the Federal Government may be resisted by the States. Now, it is true that nullification is denied to be a constitutional remedy; but the nullifiers assert that it is constitutional; and I mention the point only to show that they do not intend to assert any extra-constitutional or revolutionary remedy—and that so far, at least, they are within the resolutions of 1798. Whether their remedy is constitutional or not, supposing the principles of the resolutions to be so, must depend on its conformity with those principles in the subsequent propositions. We remark, therefore, that

  The remedy must be such as to “arrest the progress of the evil.”—Now, be pleased to bear in mind, that nullification does not proceed upon any supposed right of the State to repeal a constitutional law, but upon the right of a State to declare that an unconstitutional law really is so, and to refuse obedience to it for that reason. I beg you to bear this distinction in mind. If nullification proposes any thing more or less than this, I am no nullifier, and do not understand the doctrine. Now, sir, is not this right of a State (to decide on the constitutionality of an act of Congress) distinctly asserted in the resolutions of 1798? Nay, has not Virginia asserted it in practice, both in regard to the Alien and Sedition Laws, and in regard to these very Tariff Laws themselves? We all know that such is the fact. And was not resistance to such unconstitutional laws distinctly contemplated in the resolutions of 1798? I have already shown that it was; and if any farther proof is necessary, it will be found, in all abundance, in the address to the people which accompanied those resolutions. It appears, then, that the principles upon which nullification proceeds, are (in the abstract) in strict conformity with those of the resolutions of 1798. But those principles, it is admitted, must be limited and qualified by the object in view. We are, then, to inquire whether nullification does, or does not, “arrest the progress of the evil.” The evil is the exercise of an usurped power: nullification declares that the usurped power shall no longer be obeyed. Is not this the best of all possible modes, if not the only mode, in which it can be “arrested”? Perhaps it is not too great a refinement to say, that the “arr
est” here contemplated, is of the usurpation only, and not of the usurping power. In other words, it is not designed to put down the Federal Government—nor embarrass nor impede its legitimate operation; but simply to prevent it from exercising a power which does not belong to it. Hence, no resort is contemplated in the resolutions of 1798 to any measures which may submit the existence of that Government to the decision of arms. Its operations within the constitution must all go on as before, whilst its operations beyond the Constitution must be “arrested.” Now, this is precisely and peculiarly the effect of nullification. And, strange to tell, it is on this very ground that you and others have most strongly assailed that doctrine. You all say, that it is absurd to pretend that a State can be in the Union and out of the Union at the same time; and that it is monstrous in a State to contend for all the advantages of the Union, as to certain laws, while she refuses to submit to the burthens imposed by other laws. Nothing in nature can be more perfectly self-evident than all this. It is not surprising that a man of General Jackson’s measure of intellect and information should be deceived by such a superficial view of the subject; but we had a right to expect better things from a veteran in politics, like yourself. Remember, sir, that a law beyond the Constitution is no law at all, and there is no right any where to enforce it. A State which refuses to submit to such a pretended law, is strictly within the Union—because she is in strict obedience to the Constitution; and it is strange to say that she “refuses to submit to the burthens” imposed by any LAW which is NOT LAW AT ALL. There, then, you have a picture of Nullification. It secures to the State the right to remain in the Union, and to enjoy all the advantages which the Constitution and laws can afford—submitting, at the same time, to all which that Constitution and laws rightfully enjoin; while it “arrests the progress” of usurped power, by destroying the obligation of every pretended law which the Constitution does not authorise, and which, therefore, is NOT law. If this is not the meaning of the resolutions of 1798, I have much misunderstood them. It is precisely upon this point that the public mind of Virginia has been most strangely misled by the authority of the President’s name, and the speciousness of your paragraphs. You owe the people a heavy debt of reparation, which I hope you will live to pay. This leads us to the second object of the resolutions of 1798, which is “to maintain within the limits of the respective States, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.” I have already shown, in my second letter, that these authorities, rights, and liberties are not merely those which belong to every sovereign State, and which may be enjoyed as well in a state of separation as in league with others, but also all the authorities, rights, and liberties which the States are entitled to, under the Constitution and as members of the Union. No State, therefore, can possibly effect this object of the resolutions of 1798, by any proceeding which either withdraws her from the Union or weakens her just influence in it.

 

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