by Peter Hart
I was horrified, about an hour later, to receive a message from Bridges asking me to return at once, as the position was now critical. I went ashore again and was met by Bridges and Godley, with several of their senior officers. They told me that their men were so exhausted after all they had gone through, and so unnerved by constant shell fire after their wonderfully gallant work, that they feared a fiasco if a heavy attack should be launched against us next morning. I was told that numbers had already dribbled back through the scrub, and the two Divisional Commanders urged me most strongly to make immediate arrangements for re-embarkation. At first I refused to take any action. I argued that Turkish demoralisation was in all probability considerably greater than ours, and that in any case I would rather die there in the morning than withdraw now.49
Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, Headquarters, ANZAC Corps
Nevertheless Birdwood felt it his duty to send Hamilton a letter informing him of what was going on.
Both my Divisional Generals and Brigadiers have represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralised by shrapnel fire to which they have been subjected all day after exhaustion and gallant work in the morning. Numbers have dribbled back from firing line and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even New Zealand Brigade, which has been only recently engaged, lost heavily and is to some extent demoralised. If troops are subjected to shell fire again tomorrow morning there is likely to be a fiasco as I have no fresh troops with which to replace those in firing line. I know my representation is most serious but if we are to re-embark it must be at once.50
Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, Headquarters, ANZAC Corps
Although intended for Hamilton, through staff incompetence Birdwood’s letter was not addressed to anyone in particular. Hence, in somewhat farcical circumstances, at about 23.00 it was passed to Admiral Sir Cecil Thursby, who thought it was for him.
I was quite taken back, as I had no idea that things were in such a critical state on shore. A moment’s consideration convinced me that to re-embark under the conditions which then prevailed would be disastrous and could not be thought of, especially as I did not know yet what had happened at Helles. The night had turned dark and stormy, our men were tired and disorganised, and the confusion of any attempt to re-embark then would have been indescribable. Our losses would have been appalling. Besides which, I felt confident that when daylight came I could, with the guns of the fleet, hold back the enemy while our men dug themselves in and re-organised, either for a further advance or for an orderly re-embarkation under the guns of the fleet.51
Admiral Sir Cecil Thursby, HMS Queen
Thursby set off for shore to meet Birdwood, but on sighting the Queen Elizabeth he took the letter aboard to consult with Hamilton and de Robeck.
I was dragged out of a dead sleep by Braithwaite who kept shaking me by the shoulder and saying, ‘Sir Ian! Sir Ian!!’ I had been having a good time for an hour far away somewhere, far from bloody turmoil, and before I quite knew where I was, my Chief-of-Staff repeated what he had, I think, said several times already, ‘Sir Ian, you’ve got to come right along – a question of life and death – you must settle it!’ Braithwaite is a cool hand, but his tone made me wide awake in a second.52
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Headquarters, MEF
After consulting with the anxious Thursby, Hamilton took the decision to ‘stick it out’, writing, famously, to Birdwood:
Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out. It would take at least two days to re-embark you as Admiral Thursby will explain to you. Meanwhile, the Australian submarine has got up through the Narrows and has torpedoed a gunboat at Chunuk. Hunter-Weston, despite his heavy losses, will be advancing tomorrow which should divert pressure from you. Make a personal appeal to your men and Godley’s to make a supreme effort to hold their ground. P.S. You have got through the difficult business, now you have only to dig, dig, dig, until you are safe.53
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Headquarters, MEF
Thursby rushed back ashore carrying the letter to Birdwood. From then on there was no doubt: the ANZAC Corps would fight it out where they stood. This was the only possible decision, as any attempted impromptu evacuation would have surely ensured a far worse disaster.
THE TURKS HAD THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. As Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal succinctly put it: ‘I could not get any clear information from anywhere. Owing to the darkness I could not get a picture of the battle situation.’ 54 Their biggest problem lay with the 77th Regiment, which seemed to be disintegrating as it was ordered forward into the line in support of the 27th Regiment. As an Arab unit recruited from outside the Turkish heartlands, its soldiers had much less commitment to the cause than the native Turks. Perhaps as relevantly, they also had much less experience and training. That evening Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Sefik moved forward into Legge Valley to check the situation.
We went amongst the brushwood – from the right and left we heard a series of separate rifle shots. Without doubt these shots could have endangered our forward troops. Three or four men were talking in Arabic. It seemed that they and all those who had fired the rifle shots were Arabs belonging to the 77th Regiment which had gone forward for battle. They were men who had deserted, hidden among the bushes and fled. They spoke Turkish mixed with Arabic. It was impossible to overpower them because they ran away again in the darkness.55
Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Sefik, Headquarters, 27th Regiment, 9th Division, Fifth Army
Sefik felt that the Arab soldiers were unwilling to fight and that the combination of rough ground, copious undergrowth and the darkness of night made it impossible for their officers to maintain order. When he went forward to join his men on the Lone Pine section of 400 Plateau there was no sign of reinforcement by the 77th Regiment. This left the Turkish line very weak. In fact the ANZAC Corps was also so weak that no night attack from them was ever going to be feasible, but the Turks did not know that and so spent the night in considerable trepidation. Lieutenant Colonel Fahrettin Bey,56 the Chief of Staff of III Corps, recalled their fears and relief as the majority of their men stood firm.
That was our anxiety on the first day. If, God forbid, our soldiers had given way to panic as in the recent Balkan War and had been pushed back, our situation would have been very bad. Thanks to the Almighty, our officers and men rushed forward with self-sacrifice beyond description. Our troops, especially the officers, performed miracles. A wounded private was being carried from the front line to the rear. I walked with him for a little, holding him by the hand. When I uncovered his face and smoothed his bloody cheeks, he sighed, ‘Oh, Sir, I am not grieving over my wounds but because I cannot see those fellows chased into the sea. Perhaps, if I could have stayed a bit longer, I should have seen them!’57
Lieutenant Colonel Fahrettin Bey, Headquarters, III Corps, Fifth Army
But of course the men of the 27th Regiment were totally exhausted. They had been on an exercise all the previous night, then a full day of marching and fighting. The nerve-shredding tension of being a few yards from their enemy and not having the slightest clue as to what they were planning – or doing – meant that few could sleep.
Struggling with exhaustion as best they could, both sides spent the night trying to consolidate their positions wherever they had been washed up by the tides of battle. When the next day finally dawned they could at last see where they were. And of course their enemies could share that view. The Turks had succeeded in smuggling several men through the porous Australian lines to take up concealed positions on Russell’s Top, which was almost vacant of Anzac troops. From here they could shoot straight into the backs of the men in the trenches on Second Ridge and Pope’s Hill.
Dawn showed at last and all had their rifles ready for a shot. Percy Black grabbed his and, sighting carefully, dropped a Turkish sniper, who had been crawling along the side of a cliff about 90 yards away. The poor wretch fell down the steep
side, caught his legs in a low fork and there he hung for days. We all hoped that the shot had killed him and that he did not have to linger in such a position. Our own casualties began to mount up unpleasantly. One by one men hurtled down the steep hill, often shot through the head.58
Private Harry Murray, 16th (Western Australia and South Australia) Battalion, 4th Brigade, NZ&A Division, AIF
The Anzac left flank was seriously exposed, but the 16th Battalion machine guns on Pope’s Hill played a vital part in defending The Nek and the half-open route to Russell’s Top.
There was no organised attack on us for some hours, but rifle fire was increasing in both volume and accuracy. Black never missed a chance with his machine gun and he was a deadly shot. As the day wore on, the Turks tried to cross some open country and Black caught them in enfilade in lines. They simply sank and died. In one case, when overtaken by that death rain, they hunched together for protection and very few escaped. This drew on Black a concentrated ‘hate’ from the Turks. A mountain gun shelled him. He got a shrapnel through the ear and another through his hand, both painful wounds which bled profusely, but still he managed to deliver his lethal spray whenever opportunity offered. His gun casing was now holed with rifle bullets. Suddenly a party of seventy Turks jumped out of a small depression some 80 yards in front. ‘Here they come,’ roared Percy, and a steady stream of fire roared from his gun. The nearest of them got to within 40 yards of us before collapsing. All were exceptionally brave men, who pushed home the attack in the name of Allah, but none were able to get back. A soldier by intuition, Black pointed out the weakness of our open left flank to an officer and offered to take a few men and line listening posts across the valley, but the officer seemed inclined to disregard the suggestion as being unimportant! Some Turkish snipers later got through the unguarded valley, as might have been expected, and that officer was one of their first victims.59
Private Harry Murray, 16th (Western Australia and South Australia) Battalion, 4th Brigade, NZ&A Division, AIF
Many of the Anzacs maintained that the Turks attacked them during the second day, but if that was so the attacks were very localised, for additional Turkish reinforcements did not arrive until the night of 26 April. Only small-scale attacks and counter-attacks were made by both sides.
After a heavy bombardment all the morning, attacks were made in force on our right and left. First the right wing broke and we had the mortification of seeing our boys retire at a double. I ordered my gun to swing round and we checked the pursuit by pouring in a heavy enfilade fire on the pursuing Turks. This broke him up and gave our boys time to collect and take up a fair position which their supports had managed to get ready. Just then we noticed that the new line was in the rear of us, so that our position, which had been isolated all through, was now liable to enfilade on the right. We at once started digging and throwing up a parapet to meet this new danger, when I was thunderstruck to see our left give way and retreat. You can guess our opinion of our chances. There we were, out in front, dug right in, no protection on our right or left and enfilade fire coming on us and our retreating troops. Suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, a 15-inch shell fell fair in among the pursuing enemy; before they could rally another fell, then another, a panic set up and the momentary triumph of John Turco was over.60
Captain Dixon Hearder, 11th (Western Australia) Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
It was at moments like this that the awesome power of the British naval guns was felt. If they could catch the Turks in the open they were deadly.
Turks attacked strongly apparently and attempted a flanking movement on the left flank. Urgent signal from General to shell them which we did – it being visible and not indirect firing: this was about 10 a.m. Nearly all ships fired. We fired rapid 6″ and fore turret and must have flattened out anything living in that square. Signal, ‘Cease Firing!’ followed by a signal expressing the thanks of the Infantry Brigade for the assistance given. I rather think this heavy shelling saved the left flank.61
Lieutenant Chichele Bampton, HMS Prince of Wales
There was no effective method of controlling the naval guns and the complex situation on the ground militated against them opening fire except when the Turks were visible from the sea. The closeness of the fighting in hidden gullies or on the reverse slopes of ridges meant that the navy could rarely get involved without risking hitting their own men.
At a time when every nerve was strained to hold the enemy at bay, one of our warships dropped four great shells into our midst. They buried deep into the earth and blew out tremendous craters, hurling men high into the air, but, fortunately, no one was injured. This made us realise how little damage the spectacular bombardment had wrought among the Turks – howitzers were what was wanted, not naval guns. A distinct note of comedy was supplied by some men as they tried to scramble back to the trench over the loose dirt that was sliding down the steep face of the hill and carrying them like struggling ants with it. Serious as the position was, some of us had to smile. Fortunately, there were no casualties.62
Private Harry Murray, 16th (Western Australia and South Australia) Battalion, 4th Brigade, NZ&A Division, AIF
If the individual soldiers did not know where they were, if the navy was struggling to see what was going on, then it was incumbent on the ANZAC Corps commanders and staff officers to find out where their units were located and where exactly the front line, if it existed, ran around the bridgehead. And where were the Turks? There was no easy way to find out. Two staff officers were despatched from the headquarters of 1st Division to track the exact course of the line. This was a difficult and dangerous task.
A good deal of confusion existed as to the position of the front line. General Bridges, therefore, sent Major Duncan Glasfurd to the left flank and myself to the right. We were to work towards the centre and compile, in the shortest possible time, a joint sketch of the line of the most forward positions held by ‘our’ side. The ‘line’ at that time was, of course, very far from being a continuous one – it consisted of holes in the ground of every shape and size, sometimes roughly joined up, but frequently a cricket pitch or more apart. I aimed at making a ‘pace and compass traverse’ but the pacing consisted of my bolting as hard as I could lick between posts. As far as possible, I signalled ahead that I was coming, but in many instances I had to guess where the next post was and frequently fell into it – to the great discomfiture and alarm of the occupant. The survey was indeed a rough one, but it provided a rough and ready solution of the mystery as to the position of the forward troops – and the reason for the confusion. It turned out that the line did not meet in the middle, but overlapped with obviously disconcerting result.63
Major Richard Casey, Headquarters, 1st Division, AIF
Once it was known exactly where the front line was the Anzacs could rationalise the scattered outposts and over the next twenty-four hours the Corps managed to establish a continuous line. But it was a dangerous operation. Deadly shots could come from almost anywhere. Straight from the front or from the wide open flanks, and even on 27 April there were still Turkish snipers concealed in the scrub behind them on Russell’s Top and in the upper reaches of Monash Valley.
During the afternoon Colonel MacLaurin and Major Irvine started out to go along the line towards the left. Irvine, who could not be persuaded to get under cover, got on to the top of the parapet and proceeded to take stock of the situation, while the Brigadier kept behind the line. After going a short distance Irvine was shot by an enemy rifleman and died shortly afterwards. Almost at the same moment the Brigadier was shot by a sniper concealed in the undergrowth behind our lines and lived but a very short time. At this moment Lieut. E. G. Hamilton, our signal officer, was the only officer at Brigade Headquarters and was therefore temporarily in command of the 1st Brigade.64
Corporal Frederick James, Signal Company, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
Two more senior officers had thrown their lives away; officers who
had been trained to carry out the military duties befitting their rank, rather than engaging in dangerous heroics to no good purpose. War was more serious than this. Sharper minds were appalled at the waste and tried to inculcate sensible precaution.
Such unnecessary exposure not only does no possible good but seriously impairs morale. While it is true that, like everybody else, I have had many narrow escapes, such as, for example, passing a spot where a few minutes after a shrapnel burst, yet I have always insisted on all my people exercising reasonable caution in not remaining stationary in spots which are obviously dangerous, and in doing their observations and reconnaissances from covered places.65
Colonel John Monash, Headquarters, 4th Australian Brigade, NZ&A Division, AIF
Sniping was not the only problem. As each hour passed the Turkish artillery was becoming increasingly effective as its gunners worked out where the Anzac lines were located. The batteries situated at Scrubby Knoll on Third Ridge and near Gaba Tepe had excellent fields of fire across the ANZAC Corps’ positions. A close escape from a bursting shell could leave its mark on a hitherto exemplary soldier – as Corporal Will Weaver was to discover.
I saw one shell scatter a bunch of our men. Another, and still another came at brief intervals. More men went up. Then a fourth. I was standing back carrying out some observations. With a scream and a screech it passed by my right side. Some yards further on the great mass rushed in to the earth. I can see the base of the shell now. One great ring and the two big dots in the centre. It only occupied a fraction of a second – the scream, the gouging of the earth and then – all was blank. Later in the day I found myself in Shrapnel Gully, dazed – a silly sort of feeling all over me. Other men were lying about, some wounded, some dead. I suppose the explosion lifted me there. I didn’t hear any explosion, though. I believe some of the medical corps found me and took me to the hospital. A week later I came to my senses in a well-made trench while drinking a cup of coffee. They say I must have left the hospital almost as soon as I was admitted, for I had been in the trench a week, during which time I went about my work in a strangely preoccupied way, but sensibly enough. I remember nothing of the happenings of that week. Gradually I was able to piece things together, bit by bit. I became aware that there was something wrong with me physically. My arms and legs had lost concerted action – when I used my arms my legs refused to do duty, and vice versa. I stayed in the trench for a few days. I wasn’t the only madman in that trench. They were scattered here and there in it. One chap was as mad as a March hare. When a shell fell anywhere near him he raced for his life up the trench. If one fell near him there he dashed back again. Quite mad – thought every shell was meant for him.66