by Peter Hart
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
What they could see was the Suvla plan falling apart. The three brigades of the 11th Division had been hours behind schedule when, at 04.30, the forward elements of the 10th Division appeared off Suvla Bay. It had been planned that they would land at A Beach following in after 34th Brigade and then reinforce the push along Kiretch Tepe. The shoals seemed to render this impossible so it was decided to land the 31st Brigade and half of 30th Brigade on C Beach round Nibrunesi Point and just north of B Beach, where the 32nd Brigade had landed. Here, under the overall command of Brigadier General William Sitwell of 34th Brigade, they would be temporarily attached to the 11th Division and assist in the capture of Chocolate Hill. This of course weakened the force devoted to the capture of Kiretch Tepe. More disorder followed when the navy discovered a feasible landing place at West Beach on the northern side of Suvla Bay and the other half of 30th Brigade were landed there. As the 10th Division was already lacking the 30th Brigade, which had been detached for deployment with the ANZAC Corps’ left hook, the changes in landing plans left Lieutenant General Sir Bryan Mahon’s forces split into three, with a devastating effect on command and control. The brigade and battalion commanders had no idea what to do. All these changes caused delays. Time was trickling away.
At last Captain Meugens saw the Irish troops of the 6th Munster Fusiliers beginning to land at West Beach.
Captain Oliver and I went over to see them and they turned out to be the Munsters – 10th Division. I asked their CO the time and he said 12.30. He then informed Oliver, as far as I can remember the exact words, that he had no orders what to do except to ‘Get on shore and reinforce the troops at present fighting!’ He asked the direction he should go and whom he was to reinforce. Captain Oliver then begged him to go and help the Manchesters, who were held up alone on the ridge. He agreed to do his best. At this point the sporting pinnace from the Chatham arrived with a Doctor who told us I am glad to say that he was just in time to save Sergeant Hall. The poor fellow was nearly dead through loss of blood.29
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
It would still take several hours before the Irish battalions of the 10th Division could organise themselves to undertake the steep climb to reinforce the Manchesters struggling on Kiretch Tepe.
About 5 p.m. the Munsters reinforced us and went through us to the attack. They lost so heavily however that we were ordered to join them in the firing line. We then advanced as far as the Pimple, part of which we occupied, but were again held up by the Turks who appeared to have been strongly reinforced. At this point about fifty of the Munsters, who seemed to have lost all their officers and most of their NCOs, retreated through us in disorder, but were afterwards sent back again by our officer.30
Captain Edward Hartley, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
In the end the Manchesters and the Munsters charged into the attack together.
We advanced in extended order down the slope on to the enemy position. Major Bates took charge of the combined Battalions, and with a cry of ‘Come on Manchesters, show the Munsters what you are made of!’ we made a charge. Unfortunately he was hit again and was instantly killed.31
Company Quartermaster Sergeant F. L. Eaton, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Major Harry Bates had already been badly wounded, but had been determined to stick it out. His grit was all in vain, for they could get no further and the Pimple remained in Turkish hands. The Manchesters could do no more: they had been fighting hard all day, and they had no water, so thirst had become an overwhelming obsession. They were replaced in the line by the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers. When the roll calls were taken the Manchesters were found to have suffered some 215 casualties.
But what of the rest of the 34th Brigade? The other three battalions found themselves trapped in a situation that they could neither understand nor control. The 9th Lancashire Fusiliers had eventually managed to get ashore, sending out patrols towards the dried up Salt Lake and probing both flanks to try and determine their position. Just after 03.00, as the first rays of dawn filtered above the horizon, the already lightly wounded Colonel Harry Welstead and Major Cyril Ibbetson were brusquely briefed by Major Lionel Ashburner, the senior staff officer of 34th Brigade.
‘Look, do you see that hill, over there on the left? That is the hill we want – Hill 10. If you can take all the men you have got, and carry that hill between those two trees on the horizon we shall be all right, otherwise we shall probably be driven into the sea!’ We started in three lines in extended order, the men going forward splendidly, led by their Platoon Commanders, in the most superb manner imaginable, with shells and bullets coming thicker and thicker, every man being eager to get to the objective. There was a check just before we got to the foot of the hill. Then in one mad rush we carried the hill at the point of the bayonet. A terrific fire was opened on us from a fieldwork facing us, from some trenches on our right which enfiladed our position and from some guns high up in a valley above us. Realising that we could not hold this position, unless the trenches were cleared of the enemy, I ordered an attack on these trenches. There was much confusion, so I was unable to get orders to the whole of my command, but I got a good lot together and soon we took those trenches, but the casualties were very heavy and I was wounded too. I soon found that the fieldwork, which I had ignored, enfiladed to a nicety these trenches and if anybody moved he was immediately hit. I ordered everybody to make cover for themselves and attend to the wounded. Nobody was allowed to show himself. Suddenly, to our horror, we saw Hill 10 evacuated by the troops which had come up to reinforce us and we watched them retire right back in the direction from whence we had come. We were now isolated. Our casualties increased and we made a desperate fight of it for hours until the West Yorks appeared on Hill 10 again. I shall not forget that trench.32
Major Cyril Ibbetson, 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Worse still this was not Hill 10. The low hill erroneously identified by Major Ashburner was just a large sand dune occupied by a small Turkish detachment. The real Hill 10 was some 400 yards further north. The bulk of the Turkish forces in the sector were still firmly dug in and their positions had not yet been located by the Lancashire Fusiliers.
Behind the first wave of the 34th Brigade troops came the 8th Northumberland Fusiliers and the 5th Dorsets, who had been left aboard the destroyers until the lighters could refloat themselves and then get back to take them ashore. They had to guess what was happening and wait patiently; there was no effective means of communication. When the lighters eventually picked them up they were again caught on the infuriating shoals of Suvla Bay. And despite the efforts of those that had gone before them, snipers were still firing at them from concealed positions. As a result many of the Northumberland Fusiliers and Dorsets had become unnerved by their prolonged exposure to a nasty combination of tedium and danger without the compensating opportunity of returning fire, or indeed of doing anything at all. At least the navy had eventually sent small tows of boats to help land the men from the stricken lighters, but the delays just kept multiplying. When they at last arrived on shore they were met by chaos.
We had only advanced a short distance when we fell into a hopeless confusion, Lancashire Fusiliers, West Yorks and others getting mixed up with us. It was at this point I lost my Company, but pushed straight on until I came to a bog. The men I had with me were inclined to look for a way around it, but shouting, ‘Follow me!’ I waded straight through it and the others followed. It was a good job we did so for we came under cover on a sand hill. I crept up the side and saw some of the enemy trying to take some of the Lancashire Fusiliers prisoners. I called on my men to hurry up into position and open fire, having first shouted to the Lancashires to lie down, which they did. The enemy left a few dead behind them and then retired as fast as possible. We followed them
up and whilst doing so one of my men trod upon a land mine, blowing him up. The force of the explosion lifted me off my feet.33
Corporal Daniel Burns, 8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
By this time the Turkish artillery had begun to fire towards the beach areas. The combination of land mines and shells was intimidating.
We came in contact with some very marshy ground, which was very difficult to pass, and on which several of our men fell wounded or killed. As I got near the edge of the marsh, I heard another explosion in front of me and to the right, which I soon learned was the bursting of a mine. Still we pushed on, and within a very few minutes there was another mine exploded close by my right side. This affected the advance, but through some encouraging remarks made by my Company Commander we kept pushing forward, until we could find cover behind a short hedge. Just then a shell dropped in front of me on the other side of the hedge and I felt something strike my helmet which carried me about 2 yards on my back. However, it was only some of the earth that had been blown up from in front, and, apart from the shock, I was little the worse.34
Sergeant Peter Thompson, 8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Hill 10 was eventually located and captured shortly after 06.00. By this time all semblance of command and control had disappeared. No one had any idea of what was happening, or indeed any apparent grasp of their objectives. Soon the orders and counter-orders began, draining the energy of the men and frustrating their officers.
Apparently we were too much to the right, because we got the order to move about 500 yards north, which we did, and then lay down extended. About an hour later, we got orders to close in to the right. During this closing in, Platoons and Companies became somewhat muddled, as some men made longer rushes than others, making for cover behind the sand dunes as much as possible. The next orders I received were from Colonel C. C. Hannay personally, who told me that we were to advance, changing direction half-right. This would bring us facing south-east towards Chocolate Hill – the original idea. When the sun had about half-risen the advance began and I found that the remainder of the Battalion in sight were swinging half-left, or towards Karakol Dagh, so I came to the conclusion that fresh orders had been issued and not reached me, so I followed suit. A short way further on I came across about 50 men of different companies, taking cover behind a large sand dune, apparently without a leader and uncertain what to do. I took charge of them and told them to wait where they were while I went round the forward side of the sand dune to see exactly what was happening and how I could best get them extended again, preparatory to continuing the advance. I had hardly gone about 5 yards when three shells landed on the forward slope of the sand dune without any appreciable effect; but by the time I went back to fetch the men I found they had scattered, evidently thinking the locality unhealthy. I collected what men I could and with them advanced towards Karakol Dagh.35
Lieutenant Donald Drysdale, 5th Dorsetshire Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
With the sun beating down on them the men became increasingly tired as they sweated uphill and down across the fringes of the Suvla Plain. With the rudimentary communications equipment available in 1915, controlling the men was almost impossible once they were out of earshot. Wireless sets were far too heavy and unwieldy to be portable and it was extremely difficult to run out and maintain telephone lines, even if it was known where they should be laid, while runners were sniped at mercilessly. Yet even allowing for this severe handicap, Brigadier General William Sitwell, now in command of both the 34th Brigade and part of 10th Division, was incompetent – in which he was typical of most of the senior officers and staff officers of the 11th Division. While the Turks undoubtedly provided a more robust defence than had been expected, nevertheless what was needed from Sitwell was a determined resolution to push ahead to the overall objectives. But paralysed by his own fear of failure and unwillingness to take a chance, he did nothing. Attacks were ordered and cancelled; troops were marched backwards and forwards and the strength of their formations was leached away to no constructive end. He was the senior brigadier general, but he constantly sought to defer to higher authority. Worse, the commander of 11th Division, Major General Frederick Hammersley, was already exhausted and unable to cope with the responsibility. He had suffered severe psychiatric problems before the war and lacked the mental resilience to wrest control of the situation in the face of his negative-minded subordinates. He too looked to a higher authority: but Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stopford remained hopelessly out of touch offshore, aboard the headquarters yacht Jonquil. General Sir Ian Hamilton, the ultimate authority, had his eyes fixed on the Anzac breakout and at this stage was paying little attention to Suvla. The end result was a command vacuum.
All that long, boiling afternoon Chocolate Hill, Green Hill and the W Hills remained in Turkish hands. It was not until shortly after 19.00 that elements of the 11th Division joined in the attack launched by the 10th Division. Only then were the twin Chocolate and Green Hills finally captured. As darkness fell units were scattered all over the northern sector of the Suvla Plain and Kiretch Tepe Ridge.
I was separated from the Company and found myself among some of the Lincoln Regiment and, together with stragglers of the Royal Irish, a handful of the Munsters and others of the 10th Division, I took part in a skirmish and an advance against Chocolate Hill. We gained the summit of the hill and took a ring of trenches round the top of it. By this time I was thoroughly tired and slightly nervy as we had very little artillery support – all the work in that direction seemed to be done by the enemy!36
Sergeant Cyril Johnston, 8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Up on Kiretch Tepe, the 5th Inniskillings had overnight relieved the valiant 11th Manchesters.
There was no one in front of us but the enemy of whose whereabouts or number we had no knowledge and we must try to dig in, as the staff were of the opinion that we should be shelled in the morning. That night was one of the most arduous and uncomfortable I have ever spent. The soil was hard and rocky; our only digging implements were entrenching tools. We dug all night and when dawn broke had little to show for our labours. Most of the men had succeeded in digging shallow graves with a parapet of loose earth and flints, but some who had struck rocks had not even that. It was indeed fortunate that we were not shelled in the morning.37
Second Lieutenant Ivone Kirkpatrick, 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 31st Brigade, 10th Division
The Irish troops found it indeed a harsh environment to cope with. The bare rock reflected back the heat of the August sun, baking them alive or dead as they lay in their sangar trenches. When the wind blew from the sea there was some slight relief, but on the landward side of the ridge there was no respite. All around them various insects went about their business oblivious to the war that had come to their world. Lizards scurried and even the occasional snake could be seen basking in the sun. The men, completely exposed to the broiling sun, had to make do with a pint or so of water a day. And even obtaining that was a trial.
I took a party of some thirty men one afternoon to ‘A’ Beach to draw water for the company. It was considered a great treat to be selected for these fatigues since it meant that we could have a hearty whack at the water on the beach. It took us well over an hour to cover the three mile journey. On arrival I paraded the men in front of a large iron tank the shape of a trough into which water had been pumped by a hose from a ship. Each man advanced in turn, filled the water bottles he was carrying, and then put his head into the tank to drink until he could drink no more. Of course the water was quite warm from exposure to the sun and was almost black from the dirt off the unwashed faces and hands of the countless soldiers who had used the tank. Our return to the line took longer even than the outward journey. The men weighed down with the weight of their water bottles could do little more than crawl up the rocky paths and gullies which led back to the Battalion.38
Second L
ieutenant Ivone Kirkpatrick, 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 31st Brigade, 10th Division
Many of the men suffered agonies of thirst, unrelieved by the constant sight of the salty seas from their vantage point on the ridge.
I suffered less than most, for instead of drinking my ration of water I spat it back into a small collapsible tin mug and kept rinsing my mouth at constant intervals, always spitting what remained back into the mug. Even so I must admit that I had a perpetual craving for a drink and envied the people at home who have only to turn on a tap to get as much as they want.39
Second Lieutenant Ivone Kirkpatrick, 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 31st Brigade, 10th Division
Soon, for most of the troops at Suvla, the water shortage began to dominate their waking thoughts. Unlike Kirkpatrick, few had any concept of water discipline, of keeping some water back for possible worse shortages to come.
After turning the enemy off the hill we posted sentries and tried to get what rest we could, but we were continually being fired on and firing back on our part. At this period I parted with my last drop of water to a wounded comrade of the Munster Fusiliers and I’ll never forget how grateful he was for that drop of water – for being young soldiers they had drunk all their water earlier in the day whereas I, benefiting from other campaigns, had nursed my water, therefore not feeling the want as much as they did.40
Corporal Daniel Burns, 8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Under the pressure the arrangements for water supply collapsed completely. Near the beach there was a breakdown in discipline as men fought to get at the water lighters as soon as they pulled into harbour. Nothing could be more counter-productive, but these men were desperate beyond reason.
Some 20 tons of water comes in and the troops, in their frightful anxiety to get at something to drink, slit the pipes conveying the water from the barge to the shore with their jack knives in order to get the first drink. Thus the barge is rendered useless and I am sent down to keep order as well as possible and see what can be done. I arrive to find a perfect Babel of chaos. Two or three engineers on the barge are struggling with the men, the intervening space between the boat and shore is thick with struggling humanity, swimming backwards and forwards and carrying strings of water bottles over their heads.41