The Battle of Peach Tree Creek

by Earl J. Hess

  William T. Sherman, commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, whose calculations did not include having to deal with a Confederate attack at Peach Tree Creek on July 20. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-07315)

  While Sherman retained a healthy respect for Johnston’s skill as an army administrator, he knew that his opponent was not an aggressive tactician.6 As long as he could maintain his tenuous line of communications (a rail line stretching 350 miles to Louisville) and keep his army intact, Sherman could afford to take his time in approaching Atlanta.

  Several rivers not only posed obstacles to Sherman’s advance but marked geographic divisions along his march toward Atlanta. The Oostanaula River, which flowed from northeast toward the southwest near Resaca about twenty miles south of Chattanooga, marked the limit of Appalachian terrain. The area north of this stream consisted of high ridges that dominated the countryside, but Sherman had little difficulty maneuvering through it, using the long ridges to shield his flanking movements around the imposing Confederate positions. The Etowah River, draining toward the west some forty miles south of Chattanooga, marked the limit of a transition zone between Appalachia and the Piedmont. This was an area of more open and fertile country, also posing few difficulties to Sherman’s advance.7

  When the Federals crossed the Etowah River on May 23, temporarily cutting away from the railroad, they entered a Piedmont region of rolling terrain often engulfed with thick pine forests and dotted by isolated villages. This territory slowed Sherman enormously and aided Johnston’s defensive tactics. The Federals often did not discover their enemy until within a few yards of their works, and Sherman’s massive army group found it difficult to maneuver across the narrow, primitive roads. When rains set in, the situation grew worse, and Federal progress slowed to a crawl. Only by working their way in short stages were the Unionists able to regain the railroad by June 7. Then Sherman continued to move in short stages southward until forcing Johnston onto the dominating heights of Kennesaw Mountain. He again experimented by launching a major attack, the largest of the campaign, on June 27. His 15,000 troops hardly dented the Confederates’ well-constructed earthen line, and suffered 3,000 casualties in the attempt. Only when he mounted a major movement away from the railroad to turn Johnston’s left flank did the Confederates give up Kennesaw Mountain and fall back on July 2.8

  Johnston now gave up ground in smaller increments, exhibiting more determination to make his Fabian tactics work by tenaciously holding every possible defensive position. He fell back from the Kennesaw Mountain Line only a short distance to Smyrna Station, giving up that line on July 4 and taking up the Chattahoochee River Line along the north bank of that stream. It took Sherman two months to get this far, ninety miles on a straight line from Chattanooga and only ten miles north of Atlanta. Along the way the Federals lost about 21,000 men, and Johnston suffered about 9,000 casualties, far less than the Union and Confederate losses in Virginia.9

  Chattanooga to Atlanta

  But Sherman’s success thus far should not be underestimated. He had pried enemy forces out of ten fortified positions and was busy devising ways to eject them from the eleventh line. After that, the crossing of the Chattahoochee River itself represented an event of symbolic importance. It was, in a sense, Sherman’s Rubicon. Julius Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon River in 49 BC had been a major event in Roman history; as the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, he was forbidden by law to take his troops across the border of that province and toward Rome or risk being branded an enemy of the state. In crossing the river to seize power, Caesar knew he had to either win or suffer the worst consequences. For Sherman the stakes were not so high, but once south of the Chattahoochee he could not go back across the river except after capturing Atlanta. To be driven back to the north side would be rightfully seen as a major military defeat with potentially dire consequences for the Northern war effort as a whole. Once across, the Federals had to whip Johnston decisively or drive him out of the city by other means to make a success of the Atlanta campaign.

  Sherman dealt with the Chattahoochee River Line the same way he had dealt with the other ten Confederate positions—by threatening the flanks. He crossed a small force to the south side of the river at Isham’s Ford, upstream from both the railroad bridge and Johnston’s right flank, on July 8. This was enough for Johnston to order his army to evacuate the line on the night of July 9. Like most of the previous evacuations, it was conducted relatively smoothly and without interference from the enemy who did not know it had taken place until the early morning hours.10

  But Johnston failed to tenaciously block the many crossing points of the river; instead, he pulled his troops close to Atlanta for rest and to watch enemy developments. This gave ample room for Sherman to create bridgeheads on the south side of the Chattahoochee at several locations with virtually no interference. Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard’s cavalry division crossed at Roswell about twelve miles upstream from the railroad bridge on July 9. By the next day, Schofield’s Twenty-Third Corps crossed at the mouth of Soap Creek, using Isham’s Ford to get across the stream. On July 12, Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley’s Fourth Corps division, Army of the Cumberland, crossed at Isham’s Ford and moved more than three miles south to secure the bluffs on the east side of the Chattahoochee River opposite Power’s Ferry, making that crossing available to Sherman as well. After the 58th Indiana laid a pontoon bridge at Power’s Ferry, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood’s Fourth Corps division crossed it to join Stanley on the south side. Brig. Gen. John Newton’s division of the Fourth Corps crossed the river at Roswell on July 13 and moved down to join Stanley and Wood.11

  Chattahoochee River Area

  Within four days of Johnston’s drawback to the south side of the Chattahoochee, Sherman had all of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard’s Fourth Corps, the entire Army of the Ohio, and Garrard’s cavalry division on the Confederate side of the river. The Federals possessed a connected bridgehead from Isham’s Ford to Power’s Ferry that was more than three miles wide, plus an isolated bridgehead at Roswell six miles farther upstream. Howard and Schofield had access to a road network that reached from the river out toward road junctions at Cross Keys and Buck Head due north of Atlanta. Those junctions gave access to roads running in nearly any direction. Increasing his presence on the south side, Sherman moved Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge’s Left Wing, Sixteenth Corps over the river at Roswell by July 14 to enlarge that bridgehead. He also extended cavalry troops south of the railroad bridge as far as Baker’s Ferry some seven miles downstream. The Federal army group stretched for some twenty miles along the north side of the Chattahoochee River with two important bridgeheads on the south side.12

  As historian Thomas L. Connelly has rightly pointed out, Johnston did nothing to stop Sherman from gaining control of useful crossings of the Chattahoochee River. Judging by his performance, the Confederate commander intended to continue his passive resistance to Sherman’s advance, await developments, and fight from behind chosen positions. Johnston posted his cavalry to watch the Federals north of Atlanta, given that the bridgeheads held by Howard, Schofield, Dodge, and Garrard portended a major move north of the railroad bridge. Brig. Gen. John H. Kelly, commander of a cavalry division, took Col. George G. Dibrell’s brigade to Cross Keys by July 10. To Dibrell’s left, Kelly positioned Brig. Gen. John S. Williams’s cavalry brigade some distance north of Buck Head and straddling the road between that place and Roswell. Still farther to Williams’s left, Kelly positioned Col. Robert H. Anderson’s cavalry brigade so that Anderson’s left flank touched the Chattahoochee near the mouth of Long Island Creek.13

  Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, who commanded the Cavalry Corps, Army of Tennessee, was responsible for the overall positioning of these mounted units under Johnston’s general direction. They were posted to guard against a major Union move south from Roswell but were in position so as to quickly confront any Federal move out of the Isham’s Ford–Power’s Ferry bridgehead as well. Johnston’s directions to Wheeler were
simple: “Please watch the force you mention as on this side of the river, and whenever it moves forward impede its march as much as you can, destroying bridges after you. Give notice of all the roads by which they march, also.”14

  Despite the missed opportunity inherent in failing to block these crossing points of the river with large infantry forces, Johnston displayed an air of calm routine in posting his cavalry and issuing orders. But his withdrawal across the Chattahoochee caused anything but calm among the residents of Atlanta. “Our presence on the south side of the Chatahoochee [sic] created considerable alarm,” wrote Irenus Watson Landingham, a member of Lieut. Gen. John Bell Hood’s corps staff, “and the good people of that city have been getting to the rear in a hurry.” As soon as he settled the Army of Tennessee south of the river and just a short distance north of the city, Johnston ordered surplus government stores removed from Atlanta to safer locations south. This logical step simply increased the sense of panic among the citizens. News of the shifting of stores also penetrated the rank and file and led many soldiers to wonder if Johnston had any intention of fighting for possession of the city. J. Walker Coleman of the 1st Tennessee was not surprised to learn that the residents despaired of their safety and were trying to leave Atlanta. Many officers shared Coleman’s view. Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker, who commanded a division in Lieut. Gen. William J. Hardee’s Corps, was convinced that the civilians had become disheartened by Johnston’s fall back from Dalton to the gates of Atlanta, but he assured his daughter that most of his men were still in good heart and willing to fight.15

  Johnston paid no attention to public opinion as he calmly prepared for the future. After crossing the Chattahoochee, he concentrated on improving the City Line that encircled Atlanta. Started the previous summer of 1863, and laid out and supervised by engineer Capt. Lemuel P. Grant, only the basic trench line studded with many forts on high ground existed when the Army of Tennessee crossed the river. Johnston told his chief engineer to assist Grant in the improvements, including cutting embrasures so the artillery could be protected from enemy sharpshooters. He also asked for the shipment of several heavy guns from Mobile and selected an outer line north of the City Line to oppose the Federals when they moved down from Roswell and Power’s Ferry. Johnston gave indication that he intended to hold the city as long as possible and that the City Line could be made a formidable position barring Sherman’s entry into Atlanta.16

  But the city’s supply lines were vulnerable. Johnston had been unable to prevent Sherman from outflanking him thus far in the campaign, and there was every reason to believe the Federal commander would continue using maneuver and flanking rather than frontal attacks as his modus operandi once he moved south of the Chattahoochee. In fact, Sherman had no intention of battering his army group against Grant’s line of fortifications. As early as June 30 he had informed his wife that he would operate against the city’s lines of communication instead of against its earthworks. Sherman expressed it well to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, chief of staff of the United States Army, when he wrote on July 6 that, “instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its railroads. This is a delicate movement and must be done with caution.”17

  The presence of three corps and one cavalry division at Roswell and Power’s Ferry telegraphed to the enemy that Sherman intended to move on the city from the north. Was there an alternative? Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, who commanded a division in Schofield’s Twenty-Third Corps, carefully examined that question after the war. Cox noted that two railroads entered Atlanta from the south. The Atlanta and West Point Railroad came from Montgomery, Alabama, and joined the Macon and Western Railroad at East Point six miles south of the city. From there traffic on both roads used the track of the Macon and Western Railroad into Atlanta. The Georgia Railroad entered Atlanta from the east, coming from Augusta, Georgia, while the Western and Atlantic Railroad, already in Federal hands, came from Chattanooga, northwest of Atlanta.18

  Cox envisioned the possibility of Sherman crossing the Chattahoochee River downstream from the railroad bridge. Such a crossing would have given him a relatively short march to reach the railroad south of Atlanta. But Cox foresaw that then Johnston could have relied on the Georgia Railroad and his connection with Augusta. The Confederate commander could also have given up Atlanta and defended every town on the Georgia Railroad as he retired toward Augusta. Missing from Cox’s analysis, however, was the knowledge that Johnston had positioned two of his corps (Hardee’s and Hood’s) to the northwest of Atlanta. They could have quickly confronted any Union move toward the railroad south of the city.19

  Moreover, Sherman feared that a major crossing downstream from the railroad bridge would expose his own line of communications to a Confederate cavalry force that crossed the Chattahoochee north of the bridge. Moreover, he always had to keep in mind a significant threat: Robert E. Lee might be able to detach troops from the Army of Northern Virginia and use the Confederate rail network to shift reinforcements to Johnston. If so, those troops would likely arrive by way of the Georgia Railroad rather than by the southern route to Atlanta. The strategic situation as well as the tactical environment therefore seemed to dictate a move upstream of the railroad bridge, an approach from the north, and an attempt to cut the Georgia Railroad before hitting the other lines.20

  The difficulties of this approach were apparent to Sherman, and Cox explained them well in his postwar history of the campaign. Atlanta lay on high ground that constituted the watershed of terrain draining north toward the Chattahoochee River and south toward the Ocmulgee River. But the ground north of Atlanta did not drain directly into the river; it mostly drained into Peach Tree Creek, which ran generally east to west about four miles north of Atlanta. The creek dominated the area and represented a good defensive position for the Confederates. It emptied into the Chattahoochee River just upstream from the railroad bridge where its mouth was, in Cox’s words, “a wide and muddy bed.”21

  Not only did the creek pose a serious obstacle to the Federal advance, in terms of both the depth of its valley and the possibility of Confederate resistance, but a northern approach would have to come out of the two bridgeheads already established south of the Chattahoochee. Cox noted that any Union force moving from Roswell would have to march three to four times more miles to reach the Georgia Railroad than would troops marching from the Isham’s Ford–Power’s Ferry bridgehead to Peach Tree Creek. Sherman faced the problem of coordinating the movement of his army group over a wide area within reach of the enemy so as not to open a dangerous hole in his line of approach that could be exploited by the Confederates. His left would have to move a long distance from Roswell toward Decatur, while his right would have to move a very short distance to the mouth of Peachtree Creek. With inadequate information about the road system, this would be a difficult task.22

  Before tackling this problem, Sherman offered his troops much needed time for rest. They had been marching, digging, and fighting for more than two months. “Seventy odd days is a long time in such a life as we are leading, with just enough of rest and comfort to keep us from breaking down altogether,” complained Luther P. Bradley, a brigade commander in Newton’s division. While quartermasters and commissaries stockpiled supplies at forward depots located in newly occupied places such as Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining’s Station, the rank and file took it easy for a few days. Scurvy became apparent in some units due to the lack of fresh vegetables, and clothing was universally ragged and worn out. Officers dealt with these problems as best they could in the short time available before the campaign moved into its next phase south of the Chattahoochee River. Morale was high in Sherman’s ranks; the course of the campaign thus far had inspired most Federals to assume they would be successful in capturing the city, and they expected the place to fall soon after they crossed the river.23

  Most Confederates also expected something important to happen soon after their enemy crossed the Chattahoochee. Ellison Capers, c
ommander of the 24th South Carolina, thought Johnston would hit the Federal flank as his enemy maneuvered north of Atlanta while closing in on the city. Capers feared that if Johnston did not take the tactical offensive, he might evacuate Atlanta and retire east. W. H. T. Walker more than conjectured about Johnston’s intentions; he was deeply worried that his commander would not fight. “I am getting very wearied of this eternal retiring,” he told his wife on July 12, “Where it is to stop I don’t know.” Walker was certain the men remained in good spirits and were eager to fight. A company commander in the 28th Mississippi Cavalry named Sidney S. Champion also thought the rank and file was solidly in favor of a major battle, and he was certain a “great stand up fight will be made” on the south side of the Chattahoochee.24

  While many Confederates worried about Johnston’s long retreat from Dalton, most of them retained faith in his leadership and hoped that, with the army’s back to Atlanta, there would be no more retreats. But that sense of cautious optimism was not shared by Confederate authorities in Richmond. In fact, Johnston’s long withdrawal from Dalton had created an atmosphere of crisis in the Confederate capital. President Jefferson Davis had a deep history of frustration and conflict with Johnston stemming from the period following the Confederate victory at First Manassas. Johnston had disappointed everyone in Richmond when he failed to relieve the siege of Vicksburg the previous summer. Davis had consented to Johnston’s replacement of Gen. Braxton Bragg to command the Army of Tennessee because he felt there was no better alternative, but his fears grew with each retrograde movement south from Dalton. Johnston made the situation worse by failing to mollify Richmond and harping on the need for sending Confederate cavalry from Mississippi to cut Sherman’s line of communications in Tennessee. That cavalry had its hands full dealing with several Union expeditions penetrating the state from Memphis. Davis in turn urged Johnston to use his own cavalry command to strike at Sherman’s line of communications, but the general felt he needed the horsemen to extend and protect his flanks in the face of Sherman’s more numerous army group. What little communication was exchanged between the general and the president tended to have a testy, worried tone on the part of Davis and an air of frustrating calm on the part of Johnston.25