by Earl J. Hess
The Chattahoochee River was a Rubicon of sorts for the Confederate general as well; when Johnston fell back to the south side, Davis felt he had gone one river too far. The Confederate president sent Bragg, now his military advisor to visit the Army of Tennessee. Bragg had helped to organize that army and had commanded it from the spring of 1862 until the disastrous defeat at Missionary Ridge in late November 1863. Always controversial, Bragg nevertheless possessed talent as an administrator and had become an important part of Davis’s presidential staff. When Bragg reached Atlanta on July 13, he confirmed that all Confederate troops were south of the Chattahoochee, “and indications seem to favor an entire evacuation of this place.”26
When Bragg met with Johnston on July 14, they had a rather strange series of interactions. Davis’s emissary did not disclose the real reason for his visit, preferring to observe Johnston to see if there were any signs of fight in the general. For his part, Johnston also failed to take Bragg into his confidence. They conversed about a wide range of topics without engaging in meaningful discussion about the most important issue of the moment. Bragg also conferred with the two corps leaders in the Army of Tennessee, William J. Hardee and John Bell Hood, on July 14. He spoke as well with Alexander P. Stewart, who had been named as Leonidas Polk’s permanent replacement in charge of the Army of Mississippi after Polk was killed by Union artillery fire at Pine Mountain on June 14. This army, consisting of troops drawn from the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, had been on detached service cooperating with Johnston’s Army of Tennessee since mid-May.27
Bragg’s conference with the corps leaders produced no startling developments except for an interesting letter written by Hood. Apparently spurred on by Bragg’s visit, Hood more openly criticized Johnston’s handling of the campaign than he had previously dared. In a long letter addressed to Bragg and dated July 14, Hood blasted Johnston for failing to take advantage of numerous opportunities to strike Sherman since Dalton. The Army of Tennessee lost 20,000 men in his estimation even though it had not yet fought a general battle with the Yankees. Hood adamantly opposed abandoning Atlanta. “We should attack him, even if we should have to recross the river to do so. I have, general, so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to almost be regarded reckless by the officers high in rank in this army, since their views have been so directly opposite. I regard it as a great misfortune to our country that we failed to give battle to the enemy many miles north of our present position.”28
This letter was the culmination of a sordid series of actions and attitudes that had gripped Hood since the young general had been elevated to command a corps in the Army of Tennessee. A West Point graduate who had racked up a sterling record as a brigade and division commander under Lee in Virginia, Hood suffered debilitating injuries on the battlefield. He lost the use of an arm at Gettysburg and suffered amputation of a leg after Chickamauga. Bragg became enamored of him as a soldier and strongly urged Hood’s appointment to the corps command. Davis needed little urging because he had developed a personal acquaintance with Hood during the winter of 1863–64. Both men seemed to have looked on Hood as a breath of fresh air for an army that had been battered by in-fighting between Bragg and his corps leaders, Hardee and Polk.29
But Hood had not done well as a corps commander. Ironically, he was responsible for some of Johnston’s decisions to retreat rather than fight. Johnston assigned Hood the task of moving forward to strike Sherman on May 19 near Cassville, only to call off the offensive when Hood reported that Union troops unexpectedly appeared near his right flank. Later that evening, Hood and Polk badgered Johnston into giving up a good defensive position on top a high ridge outside Cassville because Federal artillery had gained enfilade fire on their lines. Johnston later regretted caving in to his generals on that occasion. Hood missed another chance to attack along the New Hope Church–Pickett’s Mill–Dallas Line when the Federals moved troops quickly enough to protect their left flank. Moreover, when Hood did launch an attack at Kolb’s Farm on June 22, it was without orders from Johnston and without preparation. The result was a bloody repulse with 1,000 casualties. The only thing Hood gained from it was to block Sherman’s attempt to find and turn the Confederate left flank, something he could have accomplished with a skirmish line and the loss of a few dozen troops.30
Hood’s letter to Bragg of July 14 was duplicitous and irresponsible. Johnston was not as supine as Hood pretended, and Hood was not so vigorous a proponent of the offensive as he professed. Worst of all, Hood appeared to be above his ability as a corps commander both in terms of how he handled the three divisions under his charge and in terms of how he dealt with his colleagues and superior. He got along very well with Polk because both men were intriguers who enjoyed making trouble behind the scenes (Polk had been the chief thorn in Bragg’s side for months). Hood seems to have bought into Polk’s habits and mimicked the bishop general’s penchant for trading on his deep personal friendship with Davis against anyone he did not like.31
Hood was far less adept at playing this game than Polk, and he overstretched himself in the July 14 letter to Bragg. It is quite possible that, on the basis of this letter, Bragg decided Johnston had to go and Hood had to replace him. Hood’s motives in this have been a bone of contention among historians ever since. Many have assumed Hood connived for the command of the army all along. Hood biographer Richard McMurry goes so far as to say that he deliberately lied in the letter and wonders if Bragg was his accomplice or his dupe. There is another line of interpretation—that Hood really was not angling for the command. He had given no indication in any way that he wanted to lead the Army of Tennessee, but he certainly did not like Johnston or the way the campaign had evolved thus far. Hood simply went too far in his letter concerning the game he had learned to play from Polk—influencing great events through personal influence with decision makers. Polk had been quite careful in what he put down on paper, but Hood had no discretion in this matter. Bragg and Davis had largely come to the decision to drop Johnston in any case, but Hood’s letter may have led them to conclude that Hood was the best replacement for him. If so, it most likely was not part of a plan on Hood’s part for, as we shall see in the next chapter, Hood was genuinely surprised at the appointment and tried to persuade Davis to change his mind about elevating him to army command before he only reluctantly accepted the appointment.32
Bragg wrote a long letter to Davis on July 15 before he left Atlanta. In it he spelled out Johnston’s failures, noting that he had two conferences with the general. “He has not sought my advice, and it was not volunteered. I cannot learn that he has any more plan for the future than he has had in the past. It is expected that he will await the enemy on a line some three miles from here, and the impression prevails that he is now more inclined to fight.” For his part, Johnston later recalled his visits with Bragg in the same way. Indeed, Bragg had been quite cagey with Johnston about the true nature of his visit to Atlanta, and that created a good deal of surprise and resentment on Johnston’s part when later he realized what was happening. Bragg advised Davis to appoint Hood to the command. His recommendation of Hood was less enthusiastic than his recommendation had been for Hood’s corps command, but he thought the young man had the right spirit for the job.33
Ironically, Bragg’s July 15 letter did not play a direct role in Davis’s decision because Bragg sent it by a courier who did not reach Richmond before the Confederate president decided to relieve Johnston. But Bragg’s recommendations were fully in line with Davis’s views and could only have added strength to his conviction. Davis made up his own mind as the result of a garbled report that the Federals were building a fortified line south of the Chattahoochee River toward the Georgia Railroad. This report arrived in Richmond on July 16, before the Yankees had crossed the river in force. Yet it prompted Davis to urgently telegraph Johnston. “I wish to hear from you as to present situation, and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me to anticipate e
vents.” Unlike Lee, Johnston had never informed Davis of his tactical or strategic plans for dealing with the enemy, and the Confederate president was understandably worried.34
“As the enemy has double our number,” Johnston telegraphed on July 16, “we must be on the defensive. My plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy. It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider.” Johnston further explained the reality behind the report that set Davis a flutter: Wheeler reported that some troops from Schofield’s Twenty-Third Corps had moved about three miles east of Isham’s Ford and made some breastworks.35
Johnston’s telegram was honest and frank, and it demonstrated why he had not communicated his plans before July 16. The truth was Johnston had no real plan to deal with Sherman other than to wait and see what would develop and fall back whenever there was a threat to his position. His few and furtive efforts to take the tactical offensive often were spoiled by Hood, and Johnston did not seem to care a great deal about them. His Fabian strategy had prolonged the campaign and kept the Army of Tennessee intact, but it had destroyed whatever political capital he held with the Richmond authorities. Because Bragg had not been frank with him, Johnston also was blissfully unaware that his career as commander of the main Confederate army in the West was about to end.
Davis waited another day to ponder the momentous decision he was about to make, but in the end he could see no other way than to change commanders. It was a desperate move on the eve of Sherman’s massive sweep south of the Chattahoochee River, and the fate of Atlanta and perhaps of the Western Confederacy lay in the balance.
2: Across the Chattahoochee, July 17–18
I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me.—John B. Hood
The men are bitterly opposed to the change and Swear that they will not fight under Hood.—Hugh Black
To-morrow I want a bold push for Atlanta.—William T. Sherman
Sherman set July 17, a clear and hot day, as the beginning of the last phase of his drive toward Atlanta. Three corps of his army group prepared to move across the Chattahoochee River that day. Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s Twentieth Corps, both of Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, planned to cross within the Isham’s Ford–Power’s Ferry bridgehead, while Maj. Gen. John A. Logan’s Fifteenth Corps and Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair’s Seventeenth Corps of McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee planned to cross at Roswell. As soon as the entire army group was on the south side, it was to move forward along well-planned routes to cover the northern and eastern approaches to Atlanta. McPherson and Garrard would march about sixteen miles until reaching Decatur and the Georgia Railroad east of the city. Thomas’s large army had anywhere from one to ten miles to move until covering nearly the entire front north of Atlanta, while Schofield would try to fill in the gap between the two larger armies. There was a screen of Confederate cavalry in the way, and Federal officers would have difficulty finding roads that allowed all units to move forward without exposing dangerous gaps in the approach, but the Federals had conducted similarly dangerous moves before in the campaign.1
Sherman wanted Thomas to get at least as far as Nancy’s Creek by dark of July 17. That stream flowed southwest and entered Peach Tree Creek about a half mile from the Chattahoochee. Thomas’s men would have to march from one to four miles to reach Nancy’s Creek. Continuing beyond the stream on July 18, Thomas would find Buck Head four miles farther east. As soon as he reached this important crossroads, Sherman wanted him to redirect his columns southward and explore the area along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road to “see what is there. A vigorous demonstration should be made” to distract the enemy from McPherson’s long march.2
The single pontoon bridge at Power’s Ferry proved inadequate for the crossing of two corps in one day. Engineers laid two more pontoon bridges at Pace’s Ferry, two miles north of the railroad bridge and about four miles south of Power’s Ferry, on July 17. Howard sent Thomas J. Wood’s division of the Fourth Corps to cover the laying of these bridges early that morning. Wood pushed away Confederate pickets and formed a line straddling the road leading east from Pace’s Ferry as the 58th Indiana constructed them. Both structures were in place by early afternoon, and then Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps crossed one and Hooker’s Twentieth Corps used the other. When Maj. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’s division of Palmer’s command relieved Wood at 4 P.M., the latter returned to Howard. Davis then skirmished forward along the Pace’s Ferry Road until dusk, driving Confederate cavalry skirmishers until he rested about one mile from the Chattahoochee River.3
As the Federals moved across the stream, these temporary bridges swayed with the movement. The banks on both sides rose from six to fifteen feet above the level of the swift current. The chaplain of the 58th Indiana recalled that the sand along the banks gave the water a distinct yellow color. He also noted that sharp rocks on the river bottom sometimes tore the canvas covering of the pontoon boats when the Indiana troops were careless in maneuvering them into place.4
Davis took position about a mile from the crossing and near Kyle’s Bridge over Nancy’s Creek. Supporting divisions soon trudged up to form a line, Palmer posting his men on the right. Palmer also sent skirmishers down as far as the junction of Nancy’s Creek and Peach Tree Creek. This point would serve as the pivot upon which Thomas had to move his army the next day. The ground was cut up with ravines and heavily covered by forest. Morale was high among Thomas’s men. There was a “general impression . . . that we should be in Atlanta by the 20th, and with almost no fighting,” recalled James A. Connolly, a division level staff officer in the Fourteenth Corps.5
Hooker’s Twentieth Corps troops crossed the river a bit later than Palmer’s men and set out toward Nancy’s Creek. Although some units marched across the pontoons as late at 9 P.M., many Twentieth Corps men found the Chattahoochee River “a beautiful stream, swift and banks very steep.” The two bridges served Sherman’s purpose well; consisting of seventeen pontoon boats each, they provided swift passage over the last river before reaching Atlanta. Once on line to the left of Palmer’s corps, Hooker’s troops found the landscape choked with trees and so irregular in outlay that they crowded together on the high ground to form a feasible defensive position for the night.6
Howard already had his Fourth Corps south of the Chattahoochee River and moved it out of the Isham’s Ford–Power’s Ferry bridgehead on July 17. By evening his troops took position to the left of Hooker’s command fronting Nancy’s Creek. Schofield’s Twenty-Third Corps also already lay south of the river; moving out of the same bridgehead, it kept pace with Howard and took position to the left of the Fourth Corps. Confederate cavalry skirmishers annoyed both corps as they maneuvered into position along the Nancy’s Creek line.7
McPherson set out from the Roswell bridgehead early on July 17. Pushing back Confederate skirmishers, he made good progress until reaching the vicinity of Nancy’s Creek. Dodge’s Left Wing, Sixteenth Corps, positioned on McPherson’s right, now found resistance so heavy that its advance stalled at the creek. Dodge reinforced his skirmish line and managed to push across the stream by 6 P.M., establishing a bridgehead on the Confederate side. He was then about a mile away from Schofield’s left flank, but Cox sent out skirmishers to make contact with Dodge’s troops and cover the gap between Sherman’s wings.8
During the few days before Sherman’s final crossing of the Chattahoochee, Johnston had rearranged his cavalry screen north of Atlanta. Kelly’s Division moved to the east side of the city to guard the Georgia Railroad. It is unclear exactly which cavalry units tried to screen Sherman’s approach north of Atlanta, but at least three brigades were available. Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong’s Brigade of Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson’s Cavalry Division opposed McPherson, while Brig. Gen. John S. Williams’s Brigade of Kelly�
��s Division stood before Thomas. Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Ferguson’s Brigade of Jackson’s Division occupied a spot between Armstrong and Williams with “a wide interval” between his command and Williams’s. It is possible that Wheeler also used elements of Maj. Gen. William T. Martin’s Division on July 17. Even so, it is clear that Johnston devoted few troops to screening and delaying the Union approach. W. C. Dodson, who wrote a eulogizing book about Wheeler in 1899, related a wild story about his hero attacking through the ranks of Federal infantrymen and driving back “an entire division” on July 17, giving up only three miles of territory to the overwhelming foe. It was nothing but fantasy; the Federals had little difficulty pushing the cavalry screen back at will. Even Dodge, who encountered more resistance, managed to advance beyond Nancy’s Creek. Wheeler more accurately reported that his men fought from behind “successive lines of breast-works” against heavy odds and, at best, temporarily repulsed Federal skirmish lines now and then.9