by Earl J. Hess
Many men communicated their feelings publicly and in ways that Johnston could not ignore. Brig. Gen. Clement H. Stevens, who commanded a brigade in Hardee’s Corps, wrote a letter to the general deploring his removal as soon as the news was made public. Troops of W. H. T. Walker’s Division and Brig. Gen. Jesse J. Finley’s Florida Brigade cheered and unfurled their flags as they marched past army headquarters on their way to take up sectors of the Peach Tree Creek Line. A regimental band in Finley’s Brigade stopped to serenade Johnston as well. “The men are bitterly opposed to the change,” wrote Hugh Black in Finley’s command, “and Swear that they will not fight under Hood.”33
The gloom of July 18 and 19 was caused by the loss of Johnston; many men in the Army of Tennessee had at that time no dissatisfaction with his replacement. Hood was as yet an untried general as far as most members of the army were concerned, and most of them were willing to give him a chance. Some soldiers recognized that Johnston was hampered by the fact that the Richmond authorities did not trust him, and they assumed Hood had no such problem.34
The new general would have his chance to prove himself, and after the string of big battles to come in late July, judgment on his ability tended to sour. One can read in many letters and diary entries deep disappointment in the outcome of those bloody battles coexisting with some degree of satisfaction that they at least temporarily stopped Sherman’s efforts to cut the army’s lines of communication around the city.35
After the war ended in bitter defeat, Hood’s accession to command emerged in soldier memoirs as a black event that doomed the Army of Tennessee. If one concentrated only on these postwar accounts, the reality of soldier morale on July 18 would be terribly skewed. Even if one concentrated only on accounts produced on July 18 and 19, it is clear that most men in the Army of Tennessee deeply regretted the loss of Johnston and at best were willing to give Hood a try. Some were so bitter that they could not for the time see themselves fighting for Hood.36
The Army of Tennessee was on the verge of a new phase in the Atlanta campaign, bound for offensive action under a general as yet untried and unknown to most of the troops. This was difficult enough, but the army was still mourning the exit of the most beloved commander in its history. From the standpoint of morale, the army was in poor shape with a large enemy force moving quickly within striking distance north of Atlanta. Davis’s action was poorly timed, through no real fault of his; he had hesitated to take this step for quite a long while to be certain it was the right move. Not until Johnston retired across the Chattahoochee did Davis lose “all hope of a battle,” as he told William D. Gale on July 30. Davis also had no idea when Sherman would move across the river.37
As the Confederate army absorbed the unexpected turmoil, the Federals continued their massive sweep toward Atlanta. Sherman instructed Thomas to move to Buck Head and form a line facing south with his entire army. He identified the Old Peach Tree Road as the objective for July 18. This thoroughfare started at Turner’s Ferry about three miles downstream from the Chattahoochee River railroad bridge and ran northeast until crossing Peach Tree Creek near Moore’s Mill, near its junction with Nancy’s Creek. The Old Peach Tree Road then stretched to Buck Head and beyond. Thomas was to advance south of this road so as to make it available as a ready means of communication along his line. The next obstacle south of the Old Peach Tree Road was the valley of Peach Tree Creek. While Thomas maneuvered into position, Schofield and McPherson were to break away from Nancy’s Creek and head for the Georgia Railroad. This meant a march of some eight miles before McPherson reached the track between Decatur and Stone Mountain and Schofield reached Decatur. “I want that railroad as quick as possible,” Sherman wrote.38
Thomas issued clear instructions to his subordinates for the day’s operations. Howard’s Fourth Corps would lead the Army of the Cumberland, seize Buck Head, and then form east of the town and south of Old Peach Tree Road, facing south. Hooker’s Twentieth Corps would follow and form in similar manner west of Buck Head. Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson’s division of Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps had the job of stretching out to maintain contact with Hooker, but Palmer’s other two divisions, led by Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis and Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird, would essentially maintain the positions they had assumed on the evening of July 17, anchoring Thomas’s right flank.39
Howard received these instructions just as his corps started to move out at 4:30 A.M., July 18, with Brig. Gen. John Newton’s Second Division in the lead. Newton met Confederate cavalry skirmishers two miles from camp and pressed them to Nancy’s Creek by 7 A.M. The bridge was partially destroyed and part of Williams’s Confederate cavalry brigade was positioned atop a bluff on the south side with four pieces of artillery behind breastworks. Brig. Gen. Luther P. Bradley, whose command led Newton’s division, brought up his own guns and arranged for a push over the stream with three regiments, the 65th Ohio, 125th Ohio, and 3rd Kentucky. When the infantry set out at 9:40 A.M., it drove the enemy away, but the Federals had to rebuild the bridge by stripping timber from a nearby barn before they moved on at 11 A.M.40
An hour before Newton resumed his advance toward Buck Head, one of Thomas’s staff officers delivered a civilian to Sherman’s headquarters. The man was a spy who had managed to get out of Atlanta and into Union lines with a newspaper dated July 18, announcing that Hood had replaced Johnston. Sherman knew that Hood had been in the same class at West Point as Schofield, so he asked him about the new commander. Sherman “learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant ‘fight.’” Sherman took comfort in noting that Hood graduated forty-fourth in the class of 1853, whereas Schofield had graduated seventh and McPherson first. After the war Sherman could afford to comment that Jefferson Davis had done him a favor by replacing Johnston with Hood, for he was more wary of the former and did not mind meeting the latter in open battle. But it is difficult to tell how much bravado he felt on July 18 while superintending his tricky move toward Atlanta. Col. Andrew J. Mackay, chief quartermaster of the Fourteenth Corps, knew Hood well before the war. “A man who will bet a thousand dollars without having a pair in his hand,” he told Richard W. Johnson, “will fight when he has the troops with which to do it.”41
Sherman received another bit of intelligence on July 18, a document found in a Rebel camp by his advancing troops that indicated the Army of Tennessee had 44,400 men under arms. The estimate undervalued the strength of Hood’s army by 4,000 to 7,000 men. It did not change Sherman’s mode of moving forward; he had to be prepared for anything now that Hood was in charge.42
Newton continued pushing Williams’s cavalry east of Nancy’s Creek until his van, with Howard along, reached Buck Head at 12:30 P.M. The crossroads did not impress any of the Federals, who noticed a tavern, two or three stores, and a handful of houses. Howard established Newton in two lines east of town and advanced them far enough south to embrace the Old Peach Tree Road as ordered. When Stanley’s and Wood’s divisions arrived by midafternoon, they also were placed in line with Stanley holding Howard’s left, Wood occupying his center, and Newton his right. The advance east of Nancy’s Creek had been relatively easy, with only light skirmishing. A Southern newspaper reporter gave Williams far too much credit for hard fighting, claiming the brigade killed and wounded 500 Yankees on July 18; Howard actually suffered only six men wounded that day. John Wesley Marshall of the 97th Ohio in Newton’s division spent more time “picking blackberries” than in worrying about the enemy.43
Hooker’s Twentieth Corps moved out on July 18 with Brig. Gen. William T. Ward’s Third Division crossing Nancy’s Creek late in the morning. The other two divisions, commanded by Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams and Brig. Gen. John W. Geary, crossed during the afternoon. Hooker instructed Ward to send a brigade toward Buck Head but not long after informed Ward that Howard’s Fourth Corps troops had already occupied the town. Ward then moved his division forward and took position to Howard’s right, facing
south and embracing the Old Peach Tree Road, at 5 P.M.44
As Williams and Geary closed up to extend the line Ward began, the men of the Twentieth Corps remarked on the rough nature of the terrain, covered as it often was by thick underbrush. As they approached the Old Peach Tree Road, however, they were struck by the nature of the roadbed, wide and firmly trod, one of the best thoroughfares they had seen in Georgia. The landscape south of the road also had more clearings and substantial houses, an intermediate zone between the wilderness to the north and the thriving city of Atlanta to the south. William Clark McLean noticed a small field with corn already twelve feet tall. “I never saw such corn,” he remarked in his diary. More than one Twentieth Corps man picked as many blackberries as he could that day; “the boys have quite a feast,” Albert M. Cook of the 123rd New York reported.45
When Hooker’s men took position just south of Old Peach Tree Road that evening, they constructed breastworks to secure their line. Ward held the left, Geary the center and Williams the right. Some units worked well into the night until the men felt their barricades were high enough to protect them.46
Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps largely maintained its position while shifting only one division to maintain contact with Hooker’s men. Col. Anson G. McCook’s brigade led Johnson’s division forward, crossing Nancy’s Creek and pushing back Confederate cavalry skirmishers, until it reached the Old Peach Tree Road at 2 P.M. At this point McCook was very near Peach Tree Creek, so he moved south along Howell’s Mill Road and drove the enemy across that stream. The Confederates burned the bridge at Howell’s Mill, about two miles up from the mouth of the creek, preventing McCook from pushing farther south. McCook took position on the high ground north of Peach Tree Creek and constructed breastworks. The other brigades of Johnson’s division came forward to extend the line west.47
Johnson filed a report with Palmer about the day’s accomplishment, noting that Peach Tree Creek appeared to be deep and had very steep banks, rendering it unwise to cross without a bridge. He knew the Confederates were on the south side but had no information as to their strength. The miller at Howell’s Mill told the Federals the Rebels were on the high bluff behind tree cover; McCook’s skirmishers could catch only a few glimpses of them. Johnson reported a small gap in Thomas’s line between McCook’s brigade and Williams’s division of the Twentieth Corps.48
The rest of Palmer’s command moved up behind and to the right of Johnson. Baird’s division took position as a reserve near Howell’s Mill. Davis wheeled his division across Nancy’s Creek and moved a short distance toward the north side of Peach Tree Creek. He was responsible for the stretch of ground from Johnson’s right flank, below Howell’s Mill and down to the mouth of Peach Tree Creek. Confederate skirmishers kept up a lively fight with Davis in the area of Moore’s Mill, half a mile upstream from the mouth of the creek, but the Federals pushed them across the watercourse and dug in on the north side. Only on Davis’s far right, where the Confederates had no skirmishers near the south bank of Peach Tree Creek, did the Federals cross the stream. Col. John G. Mitchell sent two companies of the 121st Ohio from his brigade to construct works on the south side of the creek on the night of July 18. Thomas could report that his army accomplished Sherman’s objectives for the day.49
As Thomas moved in easy stages toward the Old Peach Tree Road, Schofield moved south of Nancy’s Creek until stopping along the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek three miles away. Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascall’s division took position at Johnson’s Mill, four miles short of Decatur. He sent a brigade to reconnoiter down the road linking the mill with Atlanta to see what lay ahead. On the evening of July 17 a gap had existed between Schofield’s left and McPherson’s right; now a gap of one mile developed between Schofield’s right and Howard’s left. The Army of the Ohio clearly was not large enough to maintain contact to right and left. The Fourth Corps sent out patrols to cover one of those gaps and give the alert in case the enemy discovered and tried to exploit it.50
Despite all Sherman’s efforts, his troops were unable to advance toward Atlanta in a continuous line. This was not surprising considering the difficulties of maneuvering tens of thousands of men over this large area. The units had to march along roads and hope to wind up at the end of the day in lines that were at least close to being connected. Ironically, Thomas had the luxury of keeping Baird’s division in reserve on his right wing. If Baird had extended the line, the one-mile gap between Howard and Schofield would have nearly closed.
McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee moved out from Nancy’s Creek on the morning of July 18, detached from Schofield, and moved southeast toward the railroad between Decatur and Stone Mountain. Garrard’s cavalry division led the way, followed by Logan’s Fifteenth Corps. By late afternoon Logan was near the railroad and, at McPherson’s direction, sent a detachment to tear up a short stretch of the track. These Federals were the first to lay hands on the Georgia Railroad. Meanwhile, Dodge’s Left Wing, Sixteenth Corps pushed Confederate cavalry skirmishers away as he advanced from Nancy’s Creek and drove the enemy across the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek. Dodge then bivouacked for the night on the north bank with Schofield to his right across the mile-long gap and Blair’s Seventeenth Corps to his left.51
While Sherman’s troops were fulfilling their objectives for the advance on July 18, the Army of Tennessee also was on the move. Johnston had set it in motion before giving up command to Hood so that the Peach Tree Creek Line could become a reality. For Stewart’s Army of Mississippi, there was relatively little motion because it already was essentially occupying the ground allotted to its troops in that line. Stewart had rested most of his command between the railroad and the Pace’s Ferry Road to the east ever since the army crossed the Chattahoochee River. Each division was to place two brigades on line with one brigade held as a reserve. For the time being, Stewart told his subordinates only to take up the position, not to fortify it, clearly signaling his expectation that an attack would soon be ordered.52
Evening, July 18
Samuel G. French’s Division anchored Stewart’s and the army’s left flank. As of July 18, French had one brigade on picket along the south bank of the river from the railroad bridge up to Peach Tree Creek, and then along its south bank some distance east. Another brigade had already formed a main line from the railroad east, and his third brigade acted as a reserve.53
Hardee’s Corps was resting northwest of Atlanta when Johnston’s order to take up the Peach Tree Creek Line arrived on July 18. The men had to move several miles to take post to Stewart’s right, but Hardee instructed the troops to wait until the next day to construct fortifications along the new line. Hood’s Corps also had to move from bivouac areas northwest of Atlanta to extend the developing Confederate position. Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson took command of the corps when Hood assumed charge of the army on the afternoon of July 18. Stevenson marched the troops several miles to take post to the right of Hardee’s Corps. It was during all this marching about that several brigades happened to pass Johnston’s headquarters on the Marietta Road and cheered him a fond goodbye.54
The developing Peach Tree Creek Line faced entirely north because neither Johnston nor Hood had yet become aware of McPherson’s long march to the Decatur–Stone Mountain area. As far as they were concerned, Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland posed the most immediate threat to Atlanta. The entire Army of Tennessee was arrayed to face Thomas by the evening of July 18. The line crossed several major roads approaching the city as well as several significant streams. Starting near the railroad, it traversed the Howell’s Mill Road and Shoal Creek (or Tanyard Branch), before crossing the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. The line also crossed Clear Creek and ended at Pea Vine Creek. Jacob Cox thought the “ground was well chosen.” Hood tried to take full credit for the Peach Tree Creek Line in his report, arguing that the Army of Tennessee had been lying around scattered camps when he assumed command with hardly a thought that they would soon be called on to do battle after a long ser
ies of retreats and missed opportunities for fighting.55
Later, with the benefit of hindsight, Hood also tried to argue that the creation of the Peach Tree Creek Line compelled Sherman to extend his army group so as to get around its right flank and approach Atlanta from the east. The truth was quite different. Sherman’s plan to hit the Georgia Railroad already had borne fruit by the evening of July 18, and he had always intended to approach the city from the east as well as from the north.56
Wheeler directed the cavalry that opposed Thomas, Schofield, and at least Dodge on July 18. He fell back before the Federals, burning bridges wherever possible. By the evening of July 18, the Army of Tennessee occupied the Peach Tree Creek Line and took over picketing and skirmishing duties from the cavalry. At that point, Wheeler shifted Armstrong, Williams, Ferguson, and any other mounted units he had north of the city to the east side of Atlanta. Kelly’s Division, already there to guard the Georgia Railroad, was positioned too close to the city to interfere with Logan. As a result, the Federals were able to tear up some track east of Decatur without opposition. It is quite possible that Wheeler did not know Logan had touched the Georgia Railroad that afternoon. If Wheeler did not know, Johnston would not have known either, and Hood unfairly blamed his former commander for not telling him that important fact.57
As far as Hood understood the situation on the evening of July 18, Thomas was the real threat. He informed Seddon that the lines were well drawn between the enemy and his new command, “the creek intervening between the armies.” Confederate corps commanders arranged for skirmish lines to be sent to the valley of Peach Tree Creek opposite their units.58
Although the Army of Tennessee was still reeling from the news that its beloved leader was gone, it became obvious to most members that a change in policy would occur. “A fight now is obliged to come off,” W. H. T. Walker told his wife. Walker had a long and friendly relationship with Johnston and “dislike exceedingly to see him leave us.” But he accepted the decision from Richmond and marveled that “Hood has ‘gone up like a rocket.’ It is to be hoped . . . that ‘he will not come down like the stick.’ He is brave, wither he has the capacity to command armies (for it required a high order of talent) time will develop.” Walker knew full well that Hardee, his corps commander, was mortified by Hood’s promotion. Hardee’s “star has always been in the ascendant and he always the most dashing light around the throne. I wonder how he likes to have it obscured & suffer an eclipse by the passing of this new planet between him and the sun.”59